Enhanced rsa_pkcs1_sign_tr() to protect against HW/software errors

That verifies the output of the timing-resistant version of the
signing function, to make it also fault-resistant.

1 files changed, 40 insertions, 9 deletions

diff --git a/rsa-pkcs1-sign-tr.c b/rsa-pkcs1-sign-tr.c
index 0f3a5a25..f2b3e45d 100644
--- a/rsa-pkcs1-sign-tr.c
+++ b/rsa-pkcs1-sign-tr.c
@@ -34,11 +34,31 @@
 #if HAVE_CONFIG_H
 # include "config.h"
 #endif
-
 #include "rsa.h"
 
 #include "pkcs1.h"
 
+/* Checks for any errors done in the RSA computation. That avoids
+ * attacks which rely on faults on hardware, or even software MPI
+ * implementation. */
+static int
+rsa_verify_res(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+	       mpz_t s, mpz_t m)
+{
+  mpz_t t;
+  int res;
+
+  mpz_init(t);
+
+  mpz_powm(t, s, pub->e, pub->n);
+
+  res = !mpz_cmp(m, t);
+
+  mpz_clear(t);
+  return res;
+}
+
+/* Side-channel resistant version of rsa_pkcs1_sign() */
 int
 rsa_pkcs1_sign_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
   	          const struct rsa_private_key *key,
@@ -46,23 +66,34 @@ rsa_pkcs1_sign_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
 	          size_t length, const uint8_t *digest_info,
    	          mpz_t s)
 {
-  mpz_t ri;
+  mpz_t ri, m;
+  int ret;
+
+  mpz_init(m);
 
-  if (pkcs1_rsa_digest_encode (s, key->size, length, digest_info))
+  if (pkcs1_rsa_digest_encode (m, key->size, length, digest_info))
     {
       mpz_init (ri);
 
-      _rsa_blind (pub, random_ctx, random, s, ri);
-      rsa_compute_root(key, s, s);
-      _rsa_unblind (pub, s, ri);
+      _rsa_blind (pub, random_ctx, random, m, ri);
+      rsa_compute_root(key, s, m);
 
-      mpz_clear (ri);
+      if (rsa_verify_res(pub, s, m) == 0)
+        {
+          mpz_set_ui(s, 0);
+          ret = 0;
+        }
+      else
+        ret = 1;
 
-      return 1;
+      _rsa_unblind (pub, s, ri);
+      mpz_clear (ri);
     }
   else
     {
       mpz_set_ui(s, 0);
-      return 0;
+      ret = 0;
     }    
+  mpz_clear(m);
+  return ret;
 }