diff options
author | Patrick Griffis <pgriffis@igalia.com> | 2021-04-27 13:29:19 -0500 |
---|---|---|
committer | Carlos Garcia Campos <carlosgc@gnome.org> | 2021-06-02 07:22:46 +0000 |
commit | c775f93c923c615a50987d8eebd0dc325b57c1e4 (patch) | |
tree | 1da8cd1114c6e85e9135692c96da647a61ea3305 /tests | |
parent | dac4665a0c3858dbde3f59c8ca27007b87b8231f (diff) | |
download | libsoup-c775f93c923c615a50987d8eebd0dc325b57c1e4.tar.gz |
ssl-test: Add tests for PKCS#11 pin protected cert
Diffstat (limited to 'tests')
-rw-r--r-- | tests/meson.build | 118 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tests/mock-pkcs11.c | 2866 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tests/pkcs11/pkcs11.h | 252 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tests/pkcs11/pkcs11f.h | 812 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tests/pkcs11/pkcs11p.h | 24 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tests/pkcs11/pkcs11t.h | 1799 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tests/pkcs11/pkcs11u.h | 22 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tests/ssl-test.c | 82 |
8 files changed, 5924 insertions, 51 deletions
diff --git a/tests/meson.build b/tests/meson.build index cb056a30..fc1cb3f7 100644 --- a/tests/meson.build +++ b/tests/meson.build @@ -23,6 +23,23 @@ test_resources = gnome.compile_resources('soup-tests', install_dir : installed_tests_execdir, ) +if gnutls_dep.found() + mock_pkcs11_module = shared_module('mock-pkcs11', + sources: 'mock-pkcs11.c', + name_prefix: '', + gnu_symbol_visibility: 'hidden', + include_directories: include_directories('pkcs11'), + dependencies: [ + gio_dep, + gnutls_dep, + ], + install: installed_tests_enabled, + install_dir: installed_tests_execdir + ) +else + mock_pkcs11_module = [] +endif + configure_file(input : 'index.txt', output : 'index.txt', copy : true) @@ -50,37 +67,42 @@ endif # ['name', is_parallel, extra_deps] tests = [ - ['cache', true, []], - ['chunk-io', true, []], - ['coding', true, []], - ['context', true, []], - ['continue', true, []], - ['cookies', true, []], - ['date', true, []], - ['forms', true, []], - ['header-parsing', true, []], - ['http2-body-stream', true, []], - ['hsts', true, []], - ['hsts-db', true, []], - ['logger', true, []], - ['misc', true, []], - ['multipart', true, []], - ['no-ssl', true, []], - ['ntlm', true, []], - ['redirect', true, []], - ['request-body', true, []], - ['samesite', true, []], - ['session', true, []], - ['server-auth', true, []], - ['server', true, []], - ['sniffing', true, []], - ['socket', true, []], - ['ssl', true, []], - ['streaming', true, []], - ['timeout', true, []], - ['tld', true, []], - ['uri-parsing', true, []], - ['websocket', true, [libz_dep]] + {'name': 'cache'}, + {'name': 'chunk-io'}, + {'name': 'coding'}, + {'name': 'context'}, + {'name': 'continue'}, + {'name': 'cookies'}, + {'name': 'date'}, + {'name': 'forms'}, + {'name': 'header-parsing'}, + {'name': 'http2-body-stream'}, + {'name': 'hsts'}, + {'name': 'hsts-db'}, + {'name': 'logger'}, + {'name': 'misc'}, + {'name': 'multipart'}, + {'name': 'no-ssl'}, + {'name': 'ntlm'}, + {'name': 'redirect'}, + {'name': 'request-body'}, + {'name': 'samesite'}, + {'name': 'session'}, + {'name': 'server-auth'}, + {'name': 'server'}, + {'name': 'sniffing'}, + {'name': 'socket'}, + {'name': 'ssl', + 'dependencies': [gnutls_dep], + 'depends': mock_pkcs11_module, + 'c_args': '-DHAVE_GNUTLS=@0@'.format(gnutls_dep.found() ? 1 : 0), + }, + {'name': 'streaming'}, + {'name': 'timeout'}, + {'name': 'tld'}, + {'name': 'uri-parsing'}, + {'name': 'websocket', + 'dependencies': [libz_dep]}, ] if quart_found @@ -88,15 +110,11 @@ if quart_found output : 'http2-server.py', copy : true) - tests += [ - ['http2', true, []], - ] + tests += [{'name': 'http2'}] endif if brotlidec_dep.found() - tests += [ - ['brotli-decompressor', true, []], - ] + tests += [{'name': 'brotli-decompressor'}] if installed_tests_enabled install_data( @@ -109,17 +127,18 @@ if brotlidec_dep.found() endif if unix_socket_dep.found() - tests += [ - ['unix-socket', true, [ unix_socket_dep ]], - ] + tests += [{ + 'name': 'unix-socket', + 'dependencies': [unix_socket_dep], + }] endif if have_apache tests += [ - ['auth', false, []], - ['connection', false, []], - ['range', false, []], - ['proxy', false, []], + {'name': 'auth', 'parallel': false}, + {'name': 'connection', 'parallel': false}, + {'name': 'range', 'parallel': false}, + {'name': 'proxy', 'parallel': false}, ] configure_file(output : 'httpd.conf', @@ -164,14 +183,14 @@ if have_autobahn endif foreach test: tests - test_name = '@0@-test'.format(test[0]) + test_name = '@0@-test'.format(test['name']) if installed_tests_enabled test_conf = configuration_data() test_conf.set('installed_tests_dir', abs_installed_tests_execdir) test_conf.set('program', test_name) test_conf.set('env', '') - test_conf.set('type', test[1] ? 'session' : 'session-exclusive') + test_conf.set('type', test.get('parallel', true) ? 'session' : 'session-exclusive') configure_file( input : installed_tests_template_tap, output : test_name + '.test', @@ -180,9 +199,11 @@ foreach test: tests ) endif - test_deps = [ libsoup_static_dep ] + test[2] + test_deps = [ libsoup_static_dep ] + test.get('dependencies', []) test_target = executable(test_name, sources : [ test_name + '.c', test_resources ], + c_args : test.get('c_args', []), + include_directories : test.get('includes', []), link_with : test_utils, dependencies : test_deps, install : installed_tests_enabled, @@ -194,7 +215,8 @@ foreach test: tests test(test_name, test_target, args : ['--debug'], env : env, - is_parallel : test[1], + is_parallel : test.get('parallel', true), + depends : test.get('depends', []), timeout : 60, protocol : 'tap', ) diff --git a/tests/mock-pkcs11.c b/tests/mock-pkcs11.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fc549d94 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/mock-pkcs11.c @@ -0,0 +1,2866 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2011-2016 The Pkcs11Interop Project + * Copyright 2019 Igalia S.L. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); + * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * Originally written for the Pkcs11Interop project by: Jaroslav IMRICH <jimrich@jimrich.sk> + */ + +/* + * This file implements a PKCS #11 module to be loaded that returns a mock slot and objects. + * + * It is based on this project originally: https://github.com/Pkcs11Interop/pkcs11-mock + * + * Quite a few things have been changed since then though: + * - The CK defines just below use glib macros just out of convenience. + * - Logging was added just for ease of debugging. + * - Instead of hardcoded defines for objects this now has an array + * of mock_objects that is easier to read and extend. The search behavior + * of C_FindObjects was also updated to actually search through this. + * - The certificates/keys are real certificates/keys backed by gnutls + * loading them in C_Initialize from glib-networkings normal test data. + * This changes the behavior of many functions most notably including C_GetAttributeValue + * and C_Sign to use them. Any function not used in a TLS handshake was largely + * ignored and won't work. + */ + +#undef G_LOG_DOMAIN +#define G_LOG_DOMAIN "MockPKCS11" + +#include <gio/gio.h> +#include <gnutls/gnutls.h> +#include <gnutls/x509.h> +#include <gnutls/abstract.h> + +/* See http://docs.oasis-open.org/pkcs11/pkcs11-base/v2.40/os/pkcs11-base-v2.40-os.html */ +#define CK_PTR * +#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType G_MODULE_EXPORT name +#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType G_MODULE_EXPORT name +#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) returnType (* name) +#define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType (* name) +#define NULL_PTR NULL + +#include "pkcs11/pkcs11.h" + + +#define IGNORE(P) (void)(P) + +#define MOCK_MANUFACTURER_ID "GLib-Networking" +#define MOCK_MODEL "mock" +#define PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MAX_PIN_LEN 256 +#define PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MIN_PIN_LEN 4 + +static CK_INFO mock_info = { + .cryptokiVersion = { 2, 40 }, + .manufacturerID = MOCK_MANUFACTURER_ID, + .libraryDescription = "Mock Module", +}; + +typedef struct { + CK_OBJECT_CLASS object_class; + CK_TOKEN_INFO info; + union { + gnutls_x509_crt_t cert; + gnutls_privkey_t key; + }; +} MockObject; + +static MockObject mock_objects[] = { + { + .object_class = CKO_CERTIFICATE, + .info = { + .model = MOCK_MODEL, + .label = "Mock Certificate", + .serialNumber = "1", + .manufacturerID = MOCK_MANUFACTURER_ID, + .flags = CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED | CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED | CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED | CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED, + .ulMaxSessionCount = 1, + }, + }, + { + .object_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, + .info = { + .model = MOCK_MODEL, + .label = "Mock Private Key", + .serialNumber = "2", + .manufacturerID = MOCK_MANUFACTURER_ID, + .flags = CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED | CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED | CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED | CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED, + .ulMaxSessionCount = 1, + .ulMaxPinLen = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MAX_PIN_LEN, + .ulMinPinLen = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MIN_PIN_LEN, + }, + } +}; + +typedef struct { + CK_SLOT_INFO info; + //CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR tokens[2]; +} MockSlot; + +static const MockSlot mock_slots[] = { + { + .info = { + .slotDescription = "Mock Slot", + .manufacturerID = MOCK_MANUFACTURER_ID, + .flags = CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT, + }, + } +}; + + +// FIXME: These are left overs that are unused +#define PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_DATA 1 +#define PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY 2 +#define PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PUBLIC_KEY 3 +#define PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PRIVATE_KEY 4 +#define PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SLOT_ID 0 + +#define PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID 1 + +typedef enum +{ + PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE, + PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_FIND, + PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_ENCRYPT, + PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT, + PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST, + PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN, + PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN_RECOVER, + PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY, + PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY_RECOVER, + PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST_ENCRYPT, + PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_DIGEST, + PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN_ENCRYPT, + PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_VERIFY +} PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION; + +#define PKCS11_MOCK_CKO_ANYTHING -1 // We'll use -1 as a magic match all + +static CK_BBOOL pkcs11_mock_initialized = CK_FALSE; +static CK_BBOOL pkcs11_mock_session_opened = CK_FALSE; +static CK_ULONG pkcs11_mock_session_state = CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION; +static PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE; +static CK_ULONG pkcs11_mock_sign_key = 0; +static CK_LONG mock_search_template_class = PKCS11_MOCK_CKO_ANYTHING; +static char *mock_search_template_label; +static CK_ULONG mock_search_iterator = 0; +static gboolean mock_logged_in_state = FALSE; +static size_t mock_login_attempts = 0; +static CK_ULONG mock_sign_algo = 0; + +static CK_FUNCTION_LIST pkcs11_mock_functions = +{ + {2, 20}, + &C_Initialize, + &C_Finalize, + &C_GetInfo, + &C_GetFunctionList, + &C_GetSlotList, + &C_GetSlotInfo, + &C_GetTokenInfo, + &C_GetMechanismList, + &C_GetMechanismInfo, + &C_InitToken, + &C_InitPIN, + &C_SetPIN, + &C_OpenSession, + &C_CloseSession, + &C_CloseAllSessions, + &C_GetSessionInfo, + &C_GetOperationState, + &C_SetOperationState, + &C_Login, + &C_Logout, + &C_CreateObject, + &C_CopyObject, + &C_DestroyObject, + &C_GetObjectSize, + &C_GetAttributeValue, + &C_SetAttributeValue, + &C_FindObjectsInit, + &C_FindObjects, + &C_FindObjectsFinal, + &C_EncryptInit, + &C_Encrypt, + &C_EncryptUpdate, + &C_EncryptFinal, + &C_DecryptInit, + &C_Decrypt, + &C_DecryptUpdate, + &C_DecryptFinal, + &C_DigestInit, + &C_Digest, + &C_DigestUpdate, + &C_DigestKey, + &C_DigestFinal, + &C_SignInit, + &C_Sign, + &C_SignUpdate, + &C_SignFinal, + &C_SignRecoverInit, + &C_SignRecover, + &C_VerifyInit, + &C_Verify, + &C_VerifyUpdate, + &C_VerifyFinal, + &C_VerifyRecoverInit, + &C_VerifyRecover, + &C_DigestEncryptUpdate, + &C_DecryptDigestUpdate, + &C_SignEncryptUpdate, + &C_DecryptVerifyUpdate, + &C_GenerateKey, + &C_GenerateKeyPair, + &C_WrapKey, + &C_UnwrapKey, + &C_DeriveKey, + &C_SeedRandom, + &C_GenerateRandom, + &C_GetFunctionStatus, + &C_CancelFunction, + &C_WaitForSlotEvent +}; + + +/* Copy a string into a buffer without NUL termination and padded with ' ' */ +static void +copy_padded_string(CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR dest, const CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR src, size_t dest_size) +{ + const size_t len = strlen((char*)src); + + g_assert (len < dest_size); + + memset(dest, ' ', dest_size); + memcpy(dest, src, len); +} + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)(CK_VOID_PTR pInitArgs) +{ + int status; + gnutls_datum_t data; + char *path; + + if (CK_TRUE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED; + + IGNORE(pInitArgs); + + path = g_test_build_filename(G_TEST_DIST, "test-cert.pem", NULL); + status = gnutls_load_file(path, &data); + g_debug("Loading %s - %s", path, gnutls_strerror(status)); + g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS); + + status = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&mock_objects[0].cert); + g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS); + + status = gnutls_x509_crt_import(mock_objects[0].cert, &data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM); + g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS); + + gnutls_free(data.data); + g_free(path); + + path = g_test_build_filename(G_TEST_DIST, "test-key.pem", NULL); + status = gnutls_load_file(path, &data); + g_debug("Loading %s - %s", path, gnutls_strerror(status)); + g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS); + + status = gnutls_privkey_init(&mock_objects[1].key); + g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS); + + status = gnutls_privkey_import_x509_raw(mock_objects[1].key, &data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM, NULL, 0); + g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS); + + gnutls_free(data.data); + g_free(path); + + pkcs11_mock_initialized = CK_TRUE; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Finalize)(CK_VOID_PTR pReserved) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + IGNORE(pReserved); + + gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(mock_objects[0].cert); + gnutls_privkey_deinit(mock_objects[1].key); + + pkcs11_mock_initialized = CK_FALSE; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetInfo)(CK_INFO_PTR pInfo) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (NULL == pInfo) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + pInfo->cryptokiVersion = mock_info.cryptokiVersion; + copy_padded_string(pInfo->manufacturerID, mock_info.manufacturerID, sizeof(pInfo->manufacturerID)); + pInfo->flags = 0; + copy_padded_string(pInfo->libraryDescription, mock_info.libraryDescription, sizeof(pInfo->libraryDescription)); + pInfo->libraryVersion = mock_info.libraryVersion; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetFunctionList)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR ppFunctionList) +{ + if (NULL == ppFunctionList) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + *ppFunctionList = &pkcs11_mock_functions; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetSlotList)(CK_BBOOL tokenPresent, CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList, CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + IGNORE(tokenPresent); + + if (NULL == pulCount) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == pSlotList) + { + *pulCount = 1; + } + else + { + if (0 == *pulCount) + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + + pSlotList[0] = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SLOT_ID; + *pulCount = 1; + } + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetSlotInfo)(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR pInfo) +{ + MockSlot mock_slot; + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (slotID > G_N_ELEMENTS (mock_slots)) + return CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pInfo) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + mock_slot = mock_slots[slotID]; + + copy_padded_string(pInfo->slotDescription, mock_slot.info.slotDescription, sizeof(pInfo->slotDescription)); + copy_padded_string(pInfo->manufacturerID, mock_slot.info.manufacturerID, sizeof(pInfo->manufacturerID)); + pInfo->flags = mock_slot.info.flags; + pInfo->hardwareVersion = mock_slot.info.hardwareVersion; + pInfo->firmwareVersion = mock_slot.info.firmwareVersion; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetTokenInfo)(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR pInfo) +{ + CK_TOKEN_INFO token; + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (slotID > G_N_ELEMENTS (mock_slots)) + return CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pInfo) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + token = mock_objects[slotID].info; + + copy_padded_string(pInfo->label, token.label, sizeof(pInfo->label)); + copy_padded_string(pInfo->manufacturerID, token.manufacturerID, sizeof(pInfo->manufacturerID)); + copy_padded_string(pInfo->serialNumber, token.serialNumber, sizeof(pInfo->serialNumber)); + copy_padded_string(pInfo->model, token.model, sizeof(pInfo->model)); + pInfo->flags = token.flags; + pInfo->ulMaxSessionCount = token.ulMaxSessionCount; + pInfo->ulSessionCount = (CK_TRUE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) ? 1 : 0; + pInfo->ulMaxRwSessionCount = token.ulMaxRwSessionCount; + pInfo->ulRwSessionCount = ((CK_TRUE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) && ((CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION != pkcs11_mock_session_state) || (CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS != pkcs11_mock_session_state))) ? 1 : 0; + pInfo->ulMaxPinLen = token.ulMaxPinLen; + pInfo->ulMinPinLen = token.ulMinPinLen; + pInfo->ulTotalPublicMemory = token.ulTotalPublicMemory; + pInfo->ulFreePublicMemory = token.ulFreePublicMemory; + pInfo->ulTotalPrivateMemory = token.ulTotalPrivateMemory; + pInfo->ulFreePrivateMemory = token.ulFreePrivateMemory; + pInfo->hardwareVersion = token.hardwareVersion; + pInfo->firmwareVersion = token.firmwareVersion; + memset(pInfo->utcTime, ' ', sizeof(pInfo->utcTime)); + + // FIXME: Not picked up by gnutls + if (mock_login_attempts > 2) + { + pInfo->flags |= CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW; + } + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetMechanismList)(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList, CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (slotID > G_N_ELEMENTS(mock_slots)) + return CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pulCount) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == pMechanismList) + { + *pulCount = 9; + } + else + { + if (9 > *pulCount) + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + + pMechanismList[0] = CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN; + pMechanismList[1] = CKM_RSA_PKCS; + pMechanismList[2] = CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS; + pMechanismList[3] = CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP; + pMechanismList[4] = CKM_DES3_CBC; + pMechanismList[5] = CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN; + pMechanismList[6] = CKM_SHA_1; + pMechanismList[7] = CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA; + pMechanismList[8] = CKM_AES_CBC; + + *pulCount = 9; + } + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetMechanismInfo)(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR pInfo) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SLOT_ID != slotID) + return CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pInfo) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + switch (type) + { + case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN: + pInfo->ulMinKeySize = 1024; + pInfo->ulMaxKeySize = 1024; + pInfo->flags = CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR; + break; + + case CKM_RSA_PKCS: + pInfo->ulMinKeySize = 1024; + pInfo->ulMaxKeySize = 1024; + pInfo->flags = CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_DECRYPT | CKF_SIGN | CKF_SIGN_RECOVER | CKF_VERIFY | CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER | CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP; + break; + + case CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS: + pInfo->ulMinKeySize = 1024; + pInfo->ulMaxKeySize = 1024; + pInfo->flags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; + break; + + case CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP: + pInfo->ulMinKeySize = 1024; + pInfo->ulMaxKeySize = 1024; + pInfo->flags = CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_DECRYPT; + break; + + case CKM_DES3_CBC: + pInfo->ulMinKeySize = 192; + pInfo->ulMaxKeySize = 192; + pInfo->flags = CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_DECRYPT; + break; + + case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN: + pInfo->ulMinKeySize = 192; + pInfo->ulMaxKeySize = 192; + pInfo->flags = CKF_GENERATE; + break; + + case CKM_SHA_1: + pInfo->ulMinKeySize = 0; + pInfo->ulMaxKeySize = 0; + pInfo->flags = CKF_DIGEST; + break; + + case CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: + pInfo->ulMinKeySize = 128; + pInfo->ulMaxKeySize = 256; + pInfo->flags = CKF_DERIVE; + break; + + case CKM_AES_CBC: + pInfo->ulMinKeySize = 128; + pInfo->ulMaxKeySize = 256; + pInfo->flags = CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_DECRYPT; + break; + + case CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS: + // FIXME: Made up key sizes + pInfo->ulMinKeySize = 256; + pInfo->ulMaxKeySize = 256; + // Flags based on table here: http://docs.oasis-open.org/pkcs11/pkcs11-curr/v2.40/csd01/pkcs11-curr-v2.40-csd01.html + pInfo->flags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; + break; + + default: + return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + } + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_InitToken)(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, CK_ULONG ulPinLen, CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pLabel) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SLOT_ID != slotID) + return CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pPin) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if ((ulPinLen < PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MIN_PIN_LEN) || (ulPinLen > PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MAX_PIN_LEN)) + return CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE; + + if (NULL == pLabel) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (CK_TRUE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) + return CKR_SESSION_EXISTS; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_InitPIN)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, CK_ULONG ulPinLen) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS != pkcs11_mock_session_state) + return CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN; + + if (NULL == pPin) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if ((ulPinLen < PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MIN_PIN_LEN) || (ulPinLen > PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MAX_PIN_LEN)) + return CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SetPIN)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pOldPin, CK_ULONG ulOldLen, CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pNewPin, CK_ULONG ulNewLen) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if ((CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION == pkcs11_mock_session_state) || (CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS == pkcs11_mock_session_state)) + return CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY; + + if (NULL == pOldPin) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if ((ulOldLen < PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MIN_PIN_LEN) || (ulOldLen > PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MAX_PIN_LEN)) + return CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE; + + if (NULL == pNewPin) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if ((ulNewLen < PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MIN_PIN_LEN) || (ulNewLen > PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MAX_PIN_LEN)) + return CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_OpenSession)(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_FLAGS flags, CK_VOID_PTR pApplication, CK_NOTIFY Notify, CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (CK_TRUE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) + return CKR_SESSION_COUNT; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SLOT_ID != slotID) + return CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID; + + if (!(flags & CKF_SERIAL_SESSION)) + return CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED; + + IGNORE(pApplication); + + IGNORE(Notify); + + if (NULL == phSession) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + pkcs11_mock_session_opened = CK_TRUE; + pkcs11_mock_session_state = (flags & CKF_RW_SESSION) ? CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION : CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION; + *phSession = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_CloseSession)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + pkcs11_mock_session_opened = CK_FALSE; + pkcs11_mock_session_state = CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION; + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_CloseAllSessions)(CK_SLOT_ID slotID) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SLOT_ID != slotID) + return CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID; + + pkcs11_mock_session_opened = CK_FALSE; + pkcs11_mock_session_state = CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION; + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetSessionInfo)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR pInfo) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pInfo) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + pInfo->slotID = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SLOT_ID; + pInfo->state = pkcs11_mock_session_state; + pInfo->flags = CKF_SERIAL_SESSION; + if ((pkcs11_mock_session_state != CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION) && (pkcs11_mock_session_state != CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS)) + pInfo->flags = pInfo->flags | CKF_RW_SESSION; + pInfo->ulDeviceError = 0; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetOperationState)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pulOperationStateLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == pOperationState) + { + *pulOperationStateLen = 256; + } + else + { + if (256 > *pulOperationStateLen) + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + + memset(pOperationState, 1, 256); + *pulOperationStateLen = 256; + } + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SetOperationState)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pOperationState) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (256 != ulOperationStateLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + IGNORE(hEncryptionKey); + + IGNORE(hAuthenticationKey); + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Login)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_USER_TYPE userType, CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, CK_ULONG ulPinLen) +{ + // More hardcoding + const char *password = "ABC123"; + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if ((CKU_SO != userType) && (CKU_USER != userType) && (CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC != userType)) + return CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pPin) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if ((ulPinLen < PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MIN_PIN_LEN) || (ulPinLen > PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MAX_PIN_LEN)) + return CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE; + + // FIXME: gnutls bug? It calls this before an operation + // if (pkcs11_mock_active_operation == PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE && CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC != userType) + // return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (mock_logged_in_state == TRUE) + return CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN; + + if (ulPinLen == strlen (password) && strncmp ((char*)pPin, password, ulPinLen) == 0) + { + mock_logged_in_state = TRUE; + mock_login_attempts = 0; + return CKR_OK; + } + else + { + mock_login_attempts += 1; + return CKR_PIN_INCORRECT; + } + + // TODO: We don't test any of these states atm + // switch (pkcs11_mock_session_state) + // { + // case CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION: + + // if (CKU_SO == userType) + // rv = CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS; + // else + // pkcs11_mock_session_state = CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS; + + // break; + + // case CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS: + // case CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS: + + // rv = (CKU_SO == userType) ? CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN : CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN; + + // break; + + // case CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION: + + // pkcs11_mock_session_state = (CKU_SO == userType) ? CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS : CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS; + + // break; + + // case CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS: + + // rv = (CKU_SO == userType) ? CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN : CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN; + + // break; + // } + + // return rv; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Logout)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession) +{ + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (mock_logged_in_state == FALSE) + return CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN; + + // if ((pkcs11_mock_session_state == CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION) || (pkcs11_mock_session_state == CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION)) + // return CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN; + + mock_logged_in_state = FALSE; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_CreateObject)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject) +{ + CK_ULONG i = 0; + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pTemplate) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulCount) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == phObject) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + for (i = 0; i < ulCount; i++) + { + if (NULL == pTemplate[i].pValue) + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + + if (0 >= pTemplate[i].ulValueLen) + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + } + + *phObject = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_DATA; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_CopyObject)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phNewObject) +{ + CK_ULONG i = 0; + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_DATA != hObject) + return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == phNewObject) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if ((NULL != pTemplate) && (0 >= ulCount)) + { + for (i = 0; i < ulCount; i++) + { + if (NULL == pTemplate[i].pValue) + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + + if (0 >= pTemplate[i].ulValueLen) + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + } + } + + *phNewObject = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_DATA; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DestroyObject)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_DATA != hObject) && + (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY != hObject) && + (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PUBLIC_KEY != hObject) && + (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PRIVATE_KEY != hObject)) + return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetObjectSize)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, CK_ULONG_PTR pulSize) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (hObject > G_N_ELEMENTS (mock_objects)) + return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pulSize) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + *pulSize = 0; // FIXME: mock_objects[hObject].size; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetAttributeValue)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulCount) +{ + CK_ULONG i = 0; + MockObject obj; + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (hObject > G_N_ELEMENTS (mock_objects)) + return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pTemplate) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulCount) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + obj = mock_objects[hObject]; + + for (i = 0; i < ulCount; i++) + { + if (CKA_LABEL == pTemplate[i].type || CKA_ID == pTemplate[i].type) + { + if (NULL != pTemplate[i].pValue) + { + if (pTemplate[i].ulValueLen < strlen((char*)obj.info.label)) + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + else + memcpy(pTemplate[i].pValue, obj.info.label, strlen((char*)obj.info.label)); + } + + pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = strlen((char*)obj.info.label); + } + else if (CKA_EXTRACTABLE == pTemplate[i].type) + { + *((CK_BBOOL *) pTemplate[i].pValue) = obj.object_class == CKO_CERTIFICATE ? CK_TRUE : CK_FALSE; + pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = sizeof(CK_BBOOL); + } + else if (CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE == pTemplate[i].type || CKA_SENSITIVE == pTemplate[i].type) + { + *((CK_BBOOL *) pTemplate[i].pValue) = obj.object_class == CKO_PRIVATE_KEY ? CK_TRUE : CK_FALSE; + pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = sizeof(CK_BBOOL); + } + else if (CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY == pTemplate[i].type) + { + CK_ULONG t; + if (pTemplate[i].ulValueLen < sizeof(CK_ULONG)) + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + + if (obj.object_class == CKO_CERTIFICATE) + t = CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY_AUTHORITY; + else + t = CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY_UNSPECIFIED; + + memcpy(pTemplate[i].pValue, &t, sizeof(CK_ULONG)); + } + else if (CKA_SUBJECT == pTemplate[i].type) + { + int status; + gnutls_datum_t data; + gnutls_x509_dn_t dn; /* Owned by cert */ + + g_assert (obj.object_class == CKO_CERTIFICATE); + + status = gnutls_x509_crt_get_subject(obj.cert, &dn); + g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS); + status = gnutls_x509_dn_get_str(dn, &data); + g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS); + + if (data.size > pTemplate[i].ulValueLen) + { + gnutls_free(data.data); + pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = data.size; + if (pTemplate[i].pValue != NULL) /* If NULL return OK */ + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + else + { + memcpy(pTemplate[i].pValue, data.data, data.size); + pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = data.size; + gnutls_free(data.data); + } + } + else if (CKA_VALUE == pTemplate[i].type) + { + if (obj.object_class == CKO_CERTIFICATE) + { + int status; + gnutls_datum_t data; + + status = gnutls_x509_crt_export2(obj.cert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER, &data); + g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS); + + if (data.size > pTemplate[i].ulValueLen) + { + gnutls_free(data.data); + pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = data.size; + if (pTemplate[i].pValue != NULL) /* If NULL return OK */ + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + else + { + memcpy(pTemplate[i].pValue, data.data, data.size); + gnutls_free(data.data); + pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = data.size; + } + } + else + { + pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION; + } + } + else if (CKA_CLASS == pTemplate[i].type) + { + if (NULL != pTemplate[i].pValue) + *((CK_ULONG *) pTemplate[i].pValue) = obj.object_class; + pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = sizeof (obj.object_class); + } + else if (CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE == pTemplate[i].type) + { + CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE ret = CKC_X_509; + + if (pTemplate[i].ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE)) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + /* TODO: Test both TRUE and FALSE */ + memcpy(pTemplate[i].pValue, &ret, sizeof(CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE)); + } + else if (CKA_KEY_TYPE == pTemplate[i].type) + { + CK_KEY_TYPE t; + if (pTemplate[i].ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (obj.object_class != CKO_PRIVATE_KEY) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + switch (gnutls_privkey_get_pk_algorithm (obj.key, NULL)) + { + case GNUTLS_PK_RSA: + t = CKK_RSA; + break; + case GNUTLS_PK_DSA: + t = CKK_DSA; + break; + case GNUTLS_PK_DH: + t = CKK_DH; + break; + case GNUTLS_PK_EC: + t = CKK_EC; + break; + default: + pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION; + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID; + } + + memcpy(pTemplate[i].pValue, &t, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)); + } + else if (CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE == pTemplate[i].type) + { + CK_BBOOL ret = CK_TRUE; + + if (pTemplate[i].ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_BBOOL)) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + /* TODO: Test both TRUE and FALSE */ + memcpy(pTemplate[i].pValue, &ret, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + } + else if (CKA_MODULUS == pTemplate[i].type && obj.object_class == CKO_PRIVATE_KEY) + { + /* Hardcode RSA for now */ + gnutls_datum_t modulus; + int status = gnutls_privkey_export_rsa_raw (obj.key, &modulus, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + g_assert (status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS); + + if (modulus.size > pTemplate[i].ulValueLen) + { + gnutls_free(modulus.data); + pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = modulus.size; + if (pTemplate[i].pValue != NULL) /* If NULL return OK */ + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + else + { + memcpy(pTemplate[i].pValue, modulus.data, modulus.size); + gnutls_free(modulus.data); + pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = modulus.size; + } + } + else if (CKA_SIGN == pTemplate[i].type && obj.object_class == CKO_PRIVATE_KEY) /* Any key type in future */ + { + CK_BBOOL ret = CK_TRUE; + + if (pTemplate[i].ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_BBOOL)) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + memcpy(pTemplate[i].pValue, &ret, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + } + else + { + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID; + } + } + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SetAttributeValue)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulCount) +{ + CK_ULONG i = 0; + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (hObject > G_N_ELEMENTS (mock_objects)) + if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_DATA != hObject) && + (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY != hObject) && + (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PUBLIC_KEY != hObject) && + (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PRIVATE_KEY != hObject)) + return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pTemplate) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulCount) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + for (i = 0; i < ulCount; i++) + { + if ((CKA_LABEL == pTemplate[i].type) || (CKA_VALUE == pTemplate[i].type)) + { + if (NULL == pTemplate[i].pValue) + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + + if (0 >= pTemplate[i].ulValueLen) + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + } + else + { + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID; + } + } + + return CKR_OK; +} + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_FindObjectsInit)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulCount) +{ + CK_ULONG i = 0; + CK_ULONG_PTR cka_class_value = NULL; + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pTemplate && ulCount != 0) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + mock_search_template_class = PKCS11_MOCK_CKO_ANYTHING; + g_clear_pointer (&mock_search_template_label, g_free); + + for (i = 0; i < ulCount; i++) + { + if (NULL == pTemplate[i].pValue) + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + + if (0 >= pTemplate[i].ulValueLen) + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + + if (CKA_CLASS == pTemplate[i].type) + { + if (sizeof(CK_ULONG) != pTemplate[i].ulValueLen) + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + + cka_class_value = (CK_ULONG_PTR) pTemplate[i].pValue; + mock_search_template_class = *cka_class_value; + } + else if (CKA_LABEL == pTemplate[i].type) + { + const char *cka_label_value = (char*)pTemplate[i].pValue; + mock_search_template_label = g_strndup (cka_label_value, pTemplate[i].ulValueLen); + } + else + { + g_info ("Ignoring search template for %lu", pTemplate[i].type); + } + } + + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_FIND; + mock_search_iterator = 0; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_FindObjects)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject, CK_ULONG ulMaxObjectCount, CK_ULONG_PTR pulObjectCount) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_FIND != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if ((NULL == phObject) && (0 < ulMaxObjectCount)) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == pulObjectCount) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + *pulObjectCount = 0; + for (; mock_search_iterator < G_N_ELEMENTS (mock_objects) && *pulObjectCount < ulMaxObjectCount; mock_search_iterator++) + { + if ((mock_search_template_class == PKCS11_MOCK_CKO_ANYTHING || mock_objects[mock_search_iterator].object_class == mock_search_template_class) && + (mock_search_template_label == NULL || g_strcmp0 ((char*)mock_objects[mock_search_iterator].info.label, mock_search_template_label) == 0)) + { + phObject[*pulObjectCount] = mock_search_iterator; + *pulObjectCount = *pulObjectCount + 1; + } + } + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_FindObjectsFinal)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_FIND != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_EncryptInit)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) +{ + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) && + (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) && + (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)) + return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pMechanism) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + switch (pMechanism->mechanism) + { + case CKM_RSA_PKCS: + + if ((NULL != pMechanism->pParameter) || (0 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen)) + return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PUBLIC_KEY != hKey) + return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + + break; + + case CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP: + + if ((NULL == pMechanism->pParameter) || (sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS) != pMechanism->ulParameterLen)) + return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PUBLIC_KEY != hKey) + return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + + break; + + case CKM_DES3_CBC: + + if ((NULL == pMechanism->pParameter) || (8 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen)) + return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY != hKey) + return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + + break; + + case CKM_AES_CBC: + + if ((NULL == pMechanism->pParameter) || (16 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen)) + return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY != hKey) + return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + + break; + + default: + + return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + } + + switch (pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + { + case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE: + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_ENCRYPT; + break; + case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST: + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST_ENCRYPT; + break; + case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN: + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN_ENCRYPT; + break; + default: + return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; + } + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Encrypt)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen) +{ + CK_ULONG i = 0; + + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_ENCRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pData) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulDataLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == pulEncryptedDataLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL != pEncryptedData) + { + if (ulDataLen > *pulEncryptedDataLen) + { + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + else + { + for (i = 0; i < ulDataLen; i++) + pEncryptedData[i] = pData[i] ^ 0xAB; + + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE; + } + } + + *pulEncryptedDataLen = ulDataLen; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_EncryptUpdate)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen) +{ + CK_ULONG i = 0; + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_ENCRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pPart) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulPartLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == pulEncryptedPartLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL != pEncryptedPart) + { + if (ulPartLen > *pulEncryptedPartLen) + { + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + else + { + for (i = 0; i < ulPartLen; i++) + pEncryptedPart[i] = pPart[i] ^ 0xAB; + } + } + + *pulEncryptedPartLen = ulPartLen; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_EncryptFinal)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_ENCRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) && + (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST_ENCRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) && + (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN_ENCRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pulLastEncryptedPartLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL != pLastEncryptedPart) + { + switch (pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + { + case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_ENCRYPT: + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE; + break; + case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST_ENCRYPT: + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST; + break; + case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN_ENCRYPT: + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN; + break; + default: + return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; + } + } + + *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = 0; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DecryptInit)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) && + (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) && + (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)) + return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pMechanism) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + switch (pMechanism->mechanism) + { + case CKM_RSA_PKCS: + + if ((NULL != pMechanism->pParameter) || (0 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen)) + return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PRIVATE_KEY != hKey) + return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + + break; + + case CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP: + + if ((NULL == pMechanism->pParameter) || (sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS) != pMechanism->ulParameterLen)) + return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PRIVATE_KEY != hKey) + return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + + break; + + case CKM_DES3_CBC: + + if ((NULL == pMechanism->pParameter) || (8 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen)) + return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY != hKey) + return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + + break; + + case CKM_AES_CBC: + + if ((NULL == pMechanism->pParameter) || (16 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen)) + return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY != hKey) + return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + + break; + + default: + + return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + } + + switch (pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + { + case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE: + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT; + break; + case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST: + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_DIGEST; + break; + case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY: + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_VERIFY; + break; + default: + return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; + } + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Decrypt)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen) +{ + CK_ULONG i = 0; + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pEncryptedData) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulEncryptedDataLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == pulDataLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL != pData) + { + if (ulEncryptedDataLen > *pulDataLen) + { + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + else + { + for (i = 0; i < ulEncryptedDataLen; i++) + pData[i] = pEncryptedData[i] ^ 0xAB; + + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE; + } + } + + *pulDataLen = ulEncryptedDataLen; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DecryptUpdate)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen) +{ + CK_ULONG i = 0; + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pEncryptedPart) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulEncryptedPartLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == pulPartLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL != pPart) + { + if (ulEncryptedPartLen > *pulPartLen) + { + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + else + { + for (i = 0; i < ulEncryptedPartLen; i++) + pPart[i] = pEncryptedPart[i] ^ 0xAB; + } + } + + *pulPartLen = ulEncryptedPartLen; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DecryptFinal)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) && + (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_DIGEST != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) && + (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_VERIFY != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pulLastPartLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL != pLastPart) + { + switch (pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + { + case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT: + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE; + break; + case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_DIGEST: + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST; + break; + case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_VERIFY: + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY; + break; + default: + return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; + } + } + + *pulLastPartLen = 0; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DigestInit)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism) +{ + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) && + (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_ENCRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) && + (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)) + return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pMechanism) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (CKM_SHA_1 != pMechanism->mechanism) + return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + + if ((NULL != pMechanism->pParameter) || (0 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen)) + return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + + switch (pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + { + case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE: + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST; + break; + case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_ENCRYPT: + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST_ENCRYPT; + break; + case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT: + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_DIGEST; + break; + default: + return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; + } + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Digest)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen) +{ + CK_BYTE hash[20] = { 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2C, 0x3A, 0x1F, 0x48, 0xC8, 0x60, 0x9A, 0xE2, 0x12, 0xCD, 0xFB, 0x63, 0x9D, 0xEE, 0x39, 0x67, 0x3F, 0x5E }; + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pData) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulDataLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == pulDigestLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL != pDigest) + { + if (sizeof(hash) > *pulDigestLen) + { + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + else + { + memcpy(pDigest, hash, sizeof(hash)); + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE; + } + } + + *pulDigestLen = sizeof(hash); + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DigestUpdate)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pPart) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulPartLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DigestKey)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY != hKey) + return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DigestFinal)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen) +{ + CK_BYTE hash[20] = { 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2C, 0x3A, 0x1F, 0x48, 0xC8, 0x60, 0x9A, 0xE2, 0x12, 0xCD, 0xFB, 0x63, 0x9D, 0xEE, 0x39, 0x67, 0x3F, 0x5E }; + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) && + (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST_ENCRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) && + (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_DIGEST != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pulDigestLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL != pDigest) + { + if (sizeof(hash) > *pulDigestLen) + { + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + else + { + memcpy(pDigest, hash, sizeof(hash)); + + switch (pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + { + case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST: + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE; + break; + case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST_ENCRYPT: + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_ENCRYPT; + break; + case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_DIGEST: + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT; + break; + default: + return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; + } + } + } + + *pulDigestLen = sizeof(hash); + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignInit)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) && + (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_ENCRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)) + return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (hKey > G_N_ELEMENTS(mock_objects) || mock_objects[hKey].object_class != CKO_PRIVATE_KEY) + return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pMechanism) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + mock_sign_algo = pMechanism->mechanism; + + // TODO: Hardcoded list + if (CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS == pMechanism->mechanism) + { + CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params; + + if ((NULL == pMechanism->pParameter) || (0 == pMechanism->ulParameterLen)) + return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + + params = pMechanism->pParameter; + + g_assert (params->hashAlg == CKM_SHA256); + g_assert (params->mgf == CKG_MGF1_SHA256); + // if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PRIVATE_KEY != hKey) + // return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + } + else if (CKM_RSA_PKCS == pMechanism->mechanism) + { + // FIXME: Also assert SHA256? + } + else + { + g_assert_not_reached (); + return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + } + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE == pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN; + else + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN_ENCRYPT; + + pkcs11_mock_sign_key = hKey; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Sign)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen) +{ + const gnutls_datum_t data = { + .data = pData, + .size = ulDataLen, + }; + gnutls_datum_t signature; + int status; + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pData) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulDataLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == pulSignatureLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + // TODO: Handle user not logged in + + // TODO: Hardcoded algo list + if (mock_sign_algo == CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS) + status = gnutls_privkey_sign_hash2 (mock_objects[pkcs11_mock_sign_key].key, GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA256, + GNUTLS_PRIVKEY_SIGN_FLAG_RSA_PSS, &data, &signature); + else if (mock_sign_algo == CKM_RSA_PKCS) + status = gnutls_privkey_sign_hash2 (mock_objects[pkcs11_mock_sign_key].key, GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_SHA256, + GNUTLS_PRIVKEY_SIGN_FLAG_TLS1_RSA, &data, &signature); + else + g_assert_not_reached (); + + // g_assert (status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS); + if (status != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) + return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; // TODO: Best return code? + + if (signature.size > *pulSignatureLen) + { + gnutls_free (signature.data); + *pulSignatureLen = signature.size; + if (pSignature != NULL) + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + else + { + // This is called twice, once with NULL to just query size + if (pSignature != NULL) + { + memcpy (pSignature, signature.data, signature.size); + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE; + } + *pulSignatureLen = signature.size; + gnutls_free (signature.data); + } + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignUpdate)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen) +{ + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pPart) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulPartLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignFinal)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen) +{ + CK_BYTE signature[10] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09 }; + + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) && + (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN_ENCRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pulSignatureLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL != pSignature) + { + if (sizeof(signature) > *pulSignatureLen) + { + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + else + { + memcpy(pSignature, signature, sizeof(signature)); + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN == pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE; + else + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_ENCRYPT; + } + } + + *pulSignatureLen = sizeof(signature); + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignRecoverInit)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) +{ + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pMechanism) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (CKM_RSA_PKCS == pMechanism->mechanism) + { + if ((NULL != pMechanism->pParameter) || (0 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen)) + return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PRIVATE_KEY != hKey) + return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + } + else + { + return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + } + + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN_RECOVER; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignRecover)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen) +{ + CK_ULONG i = 0; + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN_RECOVER != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pData) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulDataLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == pulSignatureLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL != pSignature) + { + if (ulDataLen > *pulSignatureLen) + { + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + else + { + for (i = 0; i < ulDataLen; i++) + pSignature[i] = pData[i] ^ 0xAB; + + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE; + } + } + + *pulSignatureLen = ulDataLen; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_VerifyInit)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) +{ + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) && + (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)) + return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pMechanism) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if ((CKM_RSA_PKCS == pMechanism->mechanism) || (CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS == pMechanism->mechanism)) + { + if ((NULL != pMechanism->pParameter) || (0 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen)) + return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PUBLIC_KEY != hKey) + return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + } + else + { + return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + } + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE == pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY; + else + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_VERIFY; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Verify)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen) +{ + CK_BYTE signature[10] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09 }; + + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pData) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulDataLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == pSignature) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulSignatureLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (sizeof(signature) != ulSignatureLen) + return CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE; + + if (0 != memcmp(pSignature, signature, sizeof(signature))) + return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_VerifyUpdate)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pPart) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulPartLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_VerifyFinal)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen) +{ + CK_BYTE signature[10] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09 }; + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) && + (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_VERIFY != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pSignature) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulSignatureLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (sizeof(signature) != ulSignatureLen) + return CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE; + + if (0 != memcmp(pSignature, signature, sizeof(signature))) + return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY == pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE; + else + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_VerifyRecoverInit)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) +{ + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pMechanism) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (CKM_RSA_PKCS == pMechanism->mechanism) + { + if ((NULL != pMechanism->pParameter) || (0 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen)) + return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PUBLIC_KEY != hKey) + return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + } + else + { + return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + } + + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY_RECOVER; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_VerifyRecover)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen) +{ + CK_ULONG i = 0; + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY_RECOVER != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pSignature) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulSignatureLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == pulDataLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL != pData) + { + if (ulSignatureLen > *pulDataLen) + { + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + else + { + for (i = 0; i < ulSignatureLen; i++) + pData[i] = pSignature[i] ^ 0xAB; + + pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE; + } + } + + *pulDataLen = ulSignatureLen; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DigestEncryptUpdate)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen) +{ + CK_ULONG i = 0; + + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST_ENCRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pPart) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulPartLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == pulEncryptedPartLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL != pEncryptedPart) + { + if (ulPartLen > *pulEncryptedPartLen) + { + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + else + { + for (i = 0; i < ulPartLen; i++) + pEncryptedPart[i] = pPart[i] ^ 0xAB; + } + } + + *pulEncryptedPartLen = ulPartLen; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DecryptDigestUpdate)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen) +{ + CK_ULONG i = 0; + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_DIGEST != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pEncryptedPart) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulEncryptedPartLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == pulPartLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL != pPart) + { + if (ulEncryptedPartLen > *pulPartLen) + { + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + else + { + for (i = 0; i < ulEncryptedPartLen; i++) + pPart[i] = pEncryptedPart[i] ^ 0xAB; + } + } + + *pulPartLen = ulEncryptedPartLen; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignEncryptUpdate)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen) +{ + CK_ULONG i = 0; + + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN_ENCRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pPart) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulPartLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == pulEncryptedPartLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL != pEncryptedPart) + { + if (ulPartLen > *pulEncryptedPartLen) + { + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + else + { + for (i = 0; i < ulPartLen; i++) + pEncryptedPart[i] = pPart[i] ^ 0xAB; + } + } + + *pulEncryptedPartLen = ulPartLen; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DecryptVerifyUpdate)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen) +{ + CK_ULONG i = 0; + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_VERIFY != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pEncryptedPart) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulEncryptedPartLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == pulPartLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL != pPart) + { + if (ulEncryptedPartLen > *pulPartLen) + { + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + else + { + for (i = 0; i < ulEncryptedPartLen; i++) + pPart[i] = pEncryptedPart[i] ^ 0xAB; + } + } + + *pulPartLen = ulEncryptedPartLen; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GenerateKey)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey) +{ + CK_ULONG i = 0; + + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pMechanism) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN != pMechanism->mechanism) + return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + + if ((NULL != pMechanism->pParameter) || (0 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen)) + return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pTemplate) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulCount) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == phKey) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + for (i = 0; i < ulCount; i++) + { + if (NULL == pTemplate[i].pValue) + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + + if (0 >= pTemplate[i].ulValueLen) + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + } + + *phKey = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GenerateKeyPair)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate, CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate, CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey) +{ + CK_ULONG i = 0; + + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pMechanism) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN != pMechanism->mechanism) + return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + + if ((NULL != pMechanism->pParameter) || (0 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen)) + return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pPublicKeyTemplate) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulPublicKeyAttributeCount) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == pPrivateKeyTemplate) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == phPublicKey) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == phPrivateKey) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + for (i = 0; i < ulPublicKeyAttributeCount; i++) + { + if (NULL == pPublicKeyTemplate[i].pValue) + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + + if (0 >= pPublicKeyTemplate[i].ulValueLen) + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + } + + for (i = 0; i < ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount; i++) + { + if (NULL == pPrivateKeyTemplate[i].pValue) + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + + if (0 >= pPrivateKeyTemplate[i].ulValueLen) + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + } + + *phPublicKey = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PUBLIC_KEY; + *phPrivateKey = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PRIVATE_KEY; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_WrapKey)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen) +{ + CK_BYTE wrappedKey[10] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09 }; + + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pMechanism) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (CKM_RSA_PKCS != pMechanism->mechanism) + return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + + if ((NULL != pMechanism->pParameter) || (0 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen)) + return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PUBLIC_KEY != hWrappingKey) + return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY != hKey) + return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL != pWrappedKey) + { + if (sizeof(wrappedKey) > *pulWrappedKeyLen) + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + else + memcpy(pWrappedKey, wrappedKey, sizeof(wrappedKey)); + } + + *pulWrappedKeyLen = sizeof(wrappedKey); + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_UnwrapKey)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey) +{ + CK_ULONG i = 0; + + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pMechanism) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (CKM_RSA_PKCS != pMechanism->mechanism) + return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + + if ((NULL != pMechanism->pParameter) || (0 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen)) + return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PRIVATE_KEY != hUnwrappingKey) + return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pWrappedKey) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulWrappedKeyLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == pTemplate) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulAttributeCount) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == phKey) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + for (i = 0; i < ulAttributeCount; i++) + { + if (NULL == pTemplate[i].pValue) + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + + if (0 >= pTemplate[i].ulValueLen) + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + } + + *phKey = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DeriveKey)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey) +{ + CK_ULONG i = 0; + + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pMechanism) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA != pMechanism->mechanism) + return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + + if ((NULL == pMechanism->pParameter) || (sizeof(CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA) != pMechanism->ulParameterLen)) + return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + + if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY != hBaseKey) + return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == phKey) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if ((NULL != pTemplate) && (0 >= ulAttributeCount)) + { + for (i = 0; i < ulAttributeCount; i++) + { + if (NULL == pTemplate[i].pValue) + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + + if (0 >= pTemplate[i].ulValueLen) + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + } + } + + *phKey = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SeedRandom)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed, CK_ULONG ulSeedLen) +{ + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == pSeed) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulSeedLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GenerateRandom)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR RandomData, CK_ULONG ulRandomLen) +{ + + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + if (NULL == RandomData) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (0 >= ulRandomLen) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + memset(RandomData, 1, ulRandomLen); + + return CKR_OK; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetFunctionStatus)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_CancelFunction)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession)) + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + + return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL; +} + + +CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_WaitForSlotEvent)(CK_FLAGS flags, CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlot, CK_VOID_PTR pReserved) +{ + if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized) + return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if ((0 != flags) && (CKF_DONT_BLOCK != flags)) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL == pSlot) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + if (NULL != pReserved) + return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + + return CKR_NO_EVENT; +} diff --git a/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11.h b/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f796560b --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11.h @@ -0,0 +1,252 @@ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 1994-1999 RSA Security Inc. Licence to copy this document + * is granted provided that it is identified as "RSA Security In.c Public-Key + * Cryptography Standards (PKCS)" in all material mentioning or referencing + * this document. + * + * The latest version of this header can be found at: + * http://www.rsalabs.com/pkcs/pkcs-11/index.html + */ +#ifndef _PKCS11_H_ +#define _PKCS11_H_ 1 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* Before including this file (pkcs11.h) (or pkcs11t.h by + * itself), 6 platform-specific macros must be defined. These + * macros are described below, and typical definitions for them + * are also given. Be advised that these definitions can depend + * on both the platform and the compiler used (and possibly also + * on whether a PKCS #11 library is linked statically or + * dynamically). + * + * In addition to defining these 6 macros, the packing convention + * for PKCS #11 structures should be set. The PKCS #11 + * convention on packing is that structures should be 1-byte + * aligned. + * + * In a Win32 environment, this might be done by using the + * following preprocessor directive before including pkcs11.h + * or pkcs11t.h: + * + * #pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) + * + * and using the following preprocessor directive after including + * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: + * + * #pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) + * + * In a UNIX environment, you're on your own here. You might + * not need to do anything. + * + * + * Now for the macros: + * + * + * 1. CK_PTR: The indirection string for making a pointer to an + * object. It can be used like this: + * + * typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR; + * + * In a Win32 environment, it might be defined by + * + * #define CK_PTR * + * + * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by + * + * #define CK_PTR * + * + * + * 2. CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes + * an exportable PKCS #11 library function definition out of a + * return type and a function name. It should be used in the + * following fashion to define the exposed PKCS #11 functions in + * a PKCS #11 library: + * + * CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)( + * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved + * ) + * { + * ... + * } + * + * For defining a function in a Win32 PKCS #11 .dll, it might be + * defined by + * + * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ + * returnType __declspec(dllexport) name + * + * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by + * + * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ + * returnType name + * + * + * 3. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes + * an importable PKCS #11 library function declaration out of a + * return type and a function name. It should be used in the + * following fashion: + * + * extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)( + * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved + * ); + * + * For declaring a function in a Win32 PKCS #11 .dll, it might + * be defined by + * + * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ + * returnType __declspec(dllimport) name + * + * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by + * + * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ + * returnType name + * + * + * 4. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name): A macro + * which makes a PKCS #11 API function pointer declaration or + * function pointer type declaration out of a return type and a + * function name. It should be used in the following fashion: + * + * // Define funcPtr to be a pointer to a PKCS #11 API function + * // taking arguments args and returning CK_RV. + * CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtr)(args); + * + * or + * + * // Define funcPtrType to be the type of a pointer to a + * // PKCS #11 API function taking arguments args and returning + * // CK_RV, and then define funcPtr to be a variable of type + * // funcPtrType. + * typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtrType)(args); + * funcPtrType funcPtr; + * + * For accessing functions in a Win32 PKCS #11 .dll, in might be + * defined by + * + * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ + * returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) + * + * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by + * + * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ + * returnType (* name) + * + * + * 5. CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes + * a function pointer type for an application callback out of + * a return type for the callback and a name for the callback. + * It should be used in the following fashion: + * + * CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallback)(args); + * + * to declare a function pointer, myCallback, to a callback + * which takes arguments args and returns a CK_RV. It can also + * be used like this: + * + * typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallbackType)(args); + * myCallbackType myCallback; + * + * In a Win32 environment, it might be defined by + * + * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ + * returnType (* name) + * + * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by + * + * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ + * returnType (* name) + * + * + * 6. NULL_PTR: This macro is the value of a NULL pointer. + * + * In any ANSI/ISO C environment (and in many others as well), + * this should be defined by + * + * #ifndef NULL_PTR + * #define NULL_PTR 0 + * #endif + */ + +/* All the various PKCS #11 types and #define'd values are in the + * file pkcs11t.h. */ +#include "pkcs11t.h" + +#define __PASTE(x, y) x##y + +/* packing defines */ +#include "pkcs11p.h" +/* ============================================================== + * Define the "extern" form of all the entry points. + * ============================================================== + */ + +#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1 +#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ + CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, name) + +/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the PKCS #11 + * function prototypes. */ +#include "pkcs11f.h" + +#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO + +/* ============================================================== + * Define the typedef form of all the entry points. That is, for + * each PKCS #11 function C_XXX, define a type CK_C_XXX which is + * a pointer to that kind of function. + * ============================================================== + */ + +#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1 +#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ + typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, __PASTE(CK_, name)) + +/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the PKCS #11 + * function prototypes. */ +#include "pkcs11f.h" + +#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO + +/* ============================================================== + * Define structed vector of entry points. A CK_FUNCTION_LIST + * contains a CK_VERSION indicating a library's PKCS #11 version + * and then a whole slew of function pointers to the routines in + * the library. This type was declared, but not defined, in + * pkcs11t.h. + * ============================================================== + */ + +#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ + __PASTE(CK_, name) \ + name; + +struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST { + + CK_VERSION version; /* PKCS #11 version */ + +/* Pile all the function pointers into the CK_FUNCTION_LIST. */ +/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the PKCS #11 + * function prototypes. */ +#include "pkcs11f.h" +}; + +#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO + +#undef __PASTE + +/* unpack */ +#include "pkcs11u.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11f.h b/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11f.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..eb742302 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11f.h @@ -0,0 +1,812 @@ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 1994-1999 RSA Security Inc. Licence to copy this document + * is granted provided that it is identified as "RSA Security In.c Public-Key + * Cryptography Standards (PKCS)" in all material mentioning or referencing + * this document. + */ +/* This function contains pretty much everything about all the */ +/* PKCS #11 function prototypes. Because this information is */ +/* used for more than just declaring function prototypes, the */ +/* order of the functions appearing herein is important, and */ +/* should not be altered. */ + +/* General-purpose */ + +/* C_Initialize initializes the PKCS #11 library. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Initialize) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_VOID_PTR pInitArgs /* if this is not NULL_PTR, it gets + * cast to CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR + * and dereferenced */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_Finalize indicates that an application is done with the + * PKCS #11 library. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Finalize) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_VOID_PTR pReserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_GetInfo returns general information about PKCS #11. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetInfo) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_INFO_PTR pInfo /* location that receives information */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_GetFunctionList returns the function list. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionList) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR ppFunctionList /* receives pointer to + * function list */ + ); +#endif + +/* Slot and token management */ + +/* C_GetSlotList obtains a list of slots in the system. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotList) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_BBOOL tokenPresent, /* only slots with tokens? */ + CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList, /* receives array of slot IDs */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* receives number of slots */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_GetSlotInfo obtains information about a particular slot in + * the system. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotInfo) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the ID of the slot */ + CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the slot information */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_GetTokenInfo obtains information about a particular token + * in the system. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetTokenInfo) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ + CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the token information */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_GetMechanismList obtains a list of mechanism types + * supported by a token. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismList) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of token's slot */ + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList, /* gets mech. array */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* gets # of mechs. */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_GetMechanismInfo obtains information about a particular + * mechanism possibly supported by a token. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismInfo) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, /* type of mechanism */ + CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives mechanism info */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_InitToken initializes a token. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitToken) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +/* pLabel changed from CK_CHAR_PTR to CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR for v2.10 */ +( + CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ + CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the SO's initial PIN */ + CK_ULONG ulPinLen, /* length in bytes of the PIN */ + CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pLabel /* 32-byte token label (blank padded) */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_InitPIN initializes the normal user's PIN. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitPIN) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the normal user's PIN */ + CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* length in bytes of the PIN */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_SetPIN modifies the PIN of the user who is logged in. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetPIN) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pOldPin, /* the old PIN */ + CK_ULONG ulOldLen, /* length of the old PIN */ + CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pNewPin, /* the new PIN */ + CK_ULONG ulNewLen /* length of the new PIN */ + ); +#endif + +/* Session management */ + +/* C_OpenSession opens a session between an application and a + * token. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_OpenSession) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the slot's ID */ + CK_FLAGS flags, /* from CK_SESSION_INFO */ + CK_VOID_PTR pApplication, /* passed to callback */ + CK_NOTIFY Notify, /* callback function */ + CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession /* gets session handle */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_CloseSession closes a session between an application and a + * token. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseSession) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_CloseAllSessions closes all sessions with a token. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseAllSessions) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SLOT_ID slotID /* the token's slot */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_GetSessionInfo obtains information about the session. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSessionInfo) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives session info */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_GetOperationState obtains the state of the cryptographic operation + * in a session. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetOperationState) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* gets state */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen /* gets state length */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic + * operation in a session. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetOperationState) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* holds state */ + CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen, /* holds state length */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, /* en/decryption key */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey /* sign/verify key */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_Login logs a user into a token. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Login) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_USER_TYPE userType, /* the user type */ + CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the user's PIN */ + CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* the length of the PIN */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_Logout logs a user out from a token. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Logout) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ + ); +#endif + +/* Object management */ + +/* C_CreateObject creates a new object. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CreateObject) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* the object's template */ + CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject /* gets new object's handle. */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_CopyObject copies an object, creating a new object for the + * copy. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CopyObject) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new object */ + CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phNewObject /* receives handle of copy */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_DestroyObject destroys an object. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DestroyObject) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject /* the object's handle */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_GetObjectSize gets the size of an object in bytes. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetObjectSize) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulSize /* receives size of object */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_GetAttributeValue obtains the value of one or more object + * attributes. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetAttributeValue) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs; gets vals */ + CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_SetAttributeValue modifies the value of one or more object + * attributes */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetAttributeValue) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs and values */ + CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_FindObjectsInit initializes a search for token and session + * objects that match a template. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsInit) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* attribute values to match */ + CK_ULONG ulCount /* attrs in search template */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_FindObjects continues a search for token and session + * objects that match a template, obtaining additional object + * handles. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjects) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject, /* gets obj. handles */ + CK_ULONG ulMaxObjectCount, /* max handles to get */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulObjectCount /* actual # returned */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_FindObjectsFinal finishes a search for token and session + * objects. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsFinal) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ + ); +#endif + +/* Encryption and decryption */ + +/* C_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptInit) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the encryption mechanism */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of encryption key */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Encrypt) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the plaintext data */ + CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of plaintext */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* gets ciphertext */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen /* gets c-text size */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption + * operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptUpdate) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ + CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext data len */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text size */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption + * operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptFinal) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, /* last c-text */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen /* gets last size */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptInit) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the decryption mechanism */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of decryption key */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Decrypt) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* ciphertext */ + CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, /* ciphertext length */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets plaintext */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets p-text size */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption + * operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptUpdate) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* encrypted data */ + CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* input length */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* p-text size */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption + * operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptFinal) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, /* gets plaintext */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen /* p-text size */ + ); +#endif + +/* Message digesting */ + +/* C_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestInit) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism /* the digesting mechanism */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_Digest digests data in a single part. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Digest) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* data to be digested */ + CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of data to digest */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets digest length */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting + * operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestUpdate) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* data to be digested */ + CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* bytes of data to be digested */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting + * operation, by digesting the value of a secret key as part of + * the data already digested. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestKey) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* secret key to digest */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting + * operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestFinal) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets byte count of digest */ + ); +#endif + +/* Signing and MACing */ + +/* C_SignInit initializes a signature (private key encryption) + * operation, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to + * the data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the + *signature. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignInit) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of signature key */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single + * part, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the + * data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Sign) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */ + CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation, + * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data, + * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignUpdate) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the data to sign */ + CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* count of bytes to sign */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation, + * returning the signature. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignFinal) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation, where + * the data can be recovered from the signature. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecoverInit) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of the signature key */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_SignRecover signs data in a single operation, where the + * data can be recovered from the signature. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecover) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */ + CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ + ); +#endif + +/* Verifying signatures and MACs */ + +/* C_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation, where the + * signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext cannot + * cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA). */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyInit) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation, + * where the signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext + * cannot be recovered from the signature. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Verify) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* signed data */ + CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* length of signed data */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature */ + CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length*/ + ); +#endif + +/* C_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification + * operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data, + * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyUpdate) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* signed data */ + CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* length of signed data */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification + * operation, checking the signature. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyFinal) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */ + CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification + * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecoverInit) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part + * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecover) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */ + CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen, /* signature length */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets signed data */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets signed data len */ + ); +#endif + +/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */ + +/* C_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting + * and encryption operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestEncryptUpdate) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ + CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and + * digesting operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptDigestUpdate) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */ + CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets plaintext len */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and + * encryption operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignEncryptUpdate) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ + CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and + * verify operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptVerifyUpdate) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */ + CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets p-text length */ + ); +#endif + +/* Key management */ + +/* C_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key + * object. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKey) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key generation mech. */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new key */ + CK_ULONG ulCount, /* # of attrs in template */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets handle of new key */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair, + * creating new key objects. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKeyPair) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key-gen mech. */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate, /* template for pub. key */ + CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, /* # pub. attrs. */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate, /* template for priv. key */ + CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, /* # priv. attrs. */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey, /* gets pub. key handle */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey /* gets priv. key handle */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WrapKey) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the wrapping mechanism */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, /* wrapping key */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, /* key to be wrapped */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* gets wrapped key */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen /* gets wrapped key size */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new + * key object. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_UnwrapKey) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* unwrapping mech. */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, /* unwrapping key */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* the wrapped key */ + CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen, /* wrapped key len */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */ + CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key + * object. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DeriveKey) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key deriv. mech. */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey, /* base key */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */ + CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */ + ); +#endif + +/* Random number generation */ + +/* C_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's + * random number generator. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SeedRandom) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed, /* the seed material */ + CK_ULONG ulSeedLen /* length of seed material */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_GenerateRandom generates random data. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateRandom) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR RandomData, /* receives the random data */ + CK_ULONG ulRandomLen /* # of bytes to generate */ + ); +#endif + +/* Parallel function management */ + +/* C_GetFunctionStatus is a legacy function; it obtains an + * updated status of a function running in parallel with an + * application. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionStatus) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ + ); +#endif + +/* C_CancelFunction is a legacy function; it cancels a function + * running in parallel. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CancelFunction) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ + ); +#endif + +/* Functions added in for PKCS #11 Version 2.01 or later */ + +/* C_WaitForSlotEvent waits for a slot event (token insertion, + * removal, etc.) to occur. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WaitForSlotEvent) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_FLAGS flags, /* blocking/nonblocking flag */ + CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlot, /* location that receives the slot ID */ + CK_VOID_PTR pRserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */ + ); +#endif
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11p.h b/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11p.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1c920135 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11p.h @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 1994-1999 RSA Security Inc. Licence to copy this document + * is granted provided that it is identified as "RSA Security Inc. Public-Key + * Cryptography Standards (PKCS)" in all material mentioning or referencing + * this document. + */ +/* these data types are platform/implementation dependent. */ +/* + * Packing was removed from the shipped RSA header files, even + * though it's still needed. put in a central file to help merging.. + */ + +#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WINDOWS) +#ifdef __clang__ +#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wpragma-pack" +#endif +#ifdef _MSC_VER +#pragma warning(disable : 4103) +#endif +#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) +#endif diff --git a/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11t.h b/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11t.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3d17fa7f --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11t.h @@ -0,0 +1,1799 @@ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ +/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is + * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface + * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. + + * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that + * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 + * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or + * referencing the derived work. + + * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the + * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for + * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied + * warranty of any kind. + */ + +#ifndef _PKCS11T_H_ +#define _PKCS11T_H_ 1 + +#define CK_TRUE 1 +#define CK_FALSE 0 + +#define CK_INVALID_SESSION 0 + +/* an unsigned 8-bit value */ +typedef unsigned char CK_BYTE; + +/* an unsigned 8-bit character */ +typedef CK_BYTE CK_CHAR; + +/* an 8-bit UTF-8 character */ +typedef CK_BYTE CK_UTF8CHAR; + +/* a BYTE-sized Boolean flag */ +typedef CK_BYTE CK_BBOOL; + +/* an unsigned value, at least 32 bits long */ +typedef unsigned long int CK_ULONG; + +/* a signed value, the same size as a CK_ULONG */ +/* CK_LONG is new for v2.0 */ +typedef long int CK_LONG; + +/* at least 32 bits; each bit is a Boolean flag */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_FLAGS; + +/* some special values for certain CK_ULONG variables */ +#define CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION (~0UL) +#define CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE 0 + +typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR; +typedef CK_CHAR CK_PTR CK_CHAR_PTR; +typedef CK_UTF8CHAR CK_PTR CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR; +typedef CK_ULONG CK_PTR CK_ULONG_PTR; +typedef void CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR; + +/* Pointer to a CK_VOID_PTR-- i.e., pointer to pointer to void */ +typedef CK_VOID_PTR CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR_PTR; + +/* The following value is always invalid if used as a session */ +/* handle or object handle */ +#define CK_INVALID_HANDLE 0 + +/* pack */ +#include "pkcs11p.h" + +typedef struct CK_VERSION { + CK_BYTE major; /* integer portion of version number */ + CK_BYTE minor; /* 1/100ths portion of version number */ +} CK_VERSION; + +typedef CK_VERSION CK_PTR CK_VERSION_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_INFO { + /* manufacturerID and libraryDecription have been changed from + * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ + CK_VERSION cryptokiVersion; /* PKCS #11 interface ver */ + CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ + CK_FLAGS flags; /* must be zero */ + + /* libraryDescription and libraryVersion are new for v2.0 */ + CK_UTF8CHAR libraryDescription[32]; /* blank padded */ + CK_VERSION libraryVersion; /* version of library */ +} CK_INFO; + +typedef CK_INFO CK_PTR CK_INFO_PTR; + +/* CK_NOTIFICATION enumerates the types of notifications that + * PKCS #11 provides to an application */ +/* CK_NOTIFICATION has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG + * for v2.0 */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_NOTIFICATION; +#define CKN_SURRENDER 0 + +typedef CK_ULONG CK_SLOT_ID; + +typedef CK_SLOT_ID CK_PTR CK_SLOT_ID_PTR; + +/* CK_SLOT_INFO provides information about a slot */ +typedef struct CK_SLOT_INFO { + /* slotDescription and manufacturerID have been changed from + * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ + CK_UTF8CHAR slotDescription[64]; /* blank padded */ + CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ + CK_FLAGS flags; + + /* hardwareVersion and firmwareVersion are new for v2.0 */ + CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */ + CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */ +} CK_SLOT_INFO; + +/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot + * Bit Flag Mask Meaning + */ +#define CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT 0x00000001 /* a token is there */ +#define CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE 0x00000002 /* removable devices*/ +#define CKF_HW_SLOT 0x00000004 /* hardware slot */ + +typedef CK_SLOT_INFO CK_PTR CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR; + +/* CK_TOKEN_INFO provides information about a token */ +typedef struct CK_TOKEN_INFO { + /* label, manufacturerID, and model have been changed from + * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ + CK_UTF8CHAR label[32]; /* blank padded */ + CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ + CK_UTF8CHAR model[16]; /* blank padded */ + CK_CHAR serialNumber[16]; /* blank padded */ + CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */ + + /* ulMaxSessionCount, ulSessionCount, ulMaxRwSessionCount, + * ulRwSessionCount, ulMaxPinLen, and ulMinPinLen have all been + * changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ + CK_ULONG ulMaxSessionCount; /* max open sessions */ + CK_ULONG ulSessionCount; /* sess. now open */ + CK_ULONG ulMaxRwSessionCount; /* max R/W sessions */ + CK_ULONG ulRwSessionCount; /* R/W sess. now open */ + CK_ULONG ulMaxPinLen; /* in bytes */ + CK_ULONG ulMinPinLen; /* in bytes */ + CK_ULONG ulTotalPublicMemory; /* in bytes */ + CK_ULONG ulFreePublicMemory; /* in bytes */ + CK_ULONG ulTotalPrivateMemory; /* in bytes */ + CK_ULONG ulFreePrivateMemory; /* in bytes */ + + /* hardwareVersion, firmwareVersion, and time are new for + * v2.0 */ + CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */ + CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */ + CK_CHAR utcTime[16]; /* time */ +} CK_TOKEN_INFO; + +/* The flags parameter is defined as follows: + * Bit Flag Mask Meaning + */ +#define CKF_RNG 0x00000001 /* has random # \ + * generator */ +#define CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x00000002 /* token is \ + * write- \ + * protected */ +#define CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED 0x00000004 /* user must \ + * login */ +#define CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED 0x00000008 /* normal user's \ + * PIN is set */ + +/* CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED is new for v2.0. If it is set, + * that means that *every* time the state of cryptographic + * operations of a session is successfully saved, all keys + * needed to continue those operations are stored in the state */ +#define CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000020 + +/* CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN is new for v2.0. If it is set, that means + * that the token has some sort of clock. The time on that + * clock is returned in the token info structure */ +#define CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN 0x00000040 + +/* CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH is new for v2.0. If it is + * set, that means that there is some way for the user to login + * without sending a PIN through the PKCS #11 library itself */ +#define CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH 0x00000100 + +/* CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS is new for v2.0. If it is true, + * that means that a single session with the token can perform + * dual simultaneous cryptographic operations (digest and + * encrypt; decrypt and digest; sign and encrypt; and decrypt + * and sign) */ +#define CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS 0x00000200 + +/* CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the + * token has been initialized using C_InitializeToken or an + * equivalent mechanism outside the scope of PKCS #11. + * Calling C_InitializeToken when this flag is set will cause + * the token to be reinitialized. */ +#define CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED 0x00000400 + +/* CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION if new for v2.10. If it is + * true, the token supports secondary authentication for + * private key objects. This flag is deprecated in v2.11 and + onwards. */ +#define CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION 0x00000800 + +/* CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an + * incorrect user login PIN has been entered at least once + * since the last successful authentication. */ +#define CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00010000 + +/* CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true, + * supplying an incorrect user PIN will it to become locked. */ +#define CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00020000 + +/* CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the + * user PIN has been locked. User login to the token is not + * possible. */ +#define CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED 0x00040000 + +/* CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true, + * the user PIN value is the default value set by token + * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been + * expired by the card. */ +#define CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00080000 + +/* CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an + * incorrect SO login PIN has been entered at least once since + * the last successful authentication. */ +#define CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00100000 + +/* CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true, + * supplying an incorrect SO PIN will it to become locked. */ +#define CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00200000 + +/* CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the SO + * PIN has been locked. SO login to the token is not possible. + */ +#define CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED 0x00400000 + +/* CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true, + * the SO PIN value is the default value set by token + * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been + * expired by the card. */ +#define CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00800000 + +typedef CK_TOKEN_INFO CK_PTR CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR; + +/* CK_SESSION_HANDLE is a PKCS #11-assigned value that + * identifies a session */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_SESSION_HANDLE; + +typedef CK_SESSION_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR; + +/* CK_USER_TYPE enumerates the types of PKCS #11 users */ +/* CK_USER_TYPE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for + * v2.0 */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_USER_TYPE; +/* Security Officer */ +#define CKU_SO 0 +/* Normal user */ +#define CKU_USER 1 +/* Context specific (added in v2.20) */ +#define CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC 2 + +/* CK_STATE enumerates the session states */ +/* CK_STATE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for + * v2.0 */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_STATE; +#define CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION 0 +#define CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS 1 +#define CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION 2 +#define CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS 3 +#define CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS 4 + +/* CK_SESSION_INFO provides information about a session */ +typedef struct CK_SESSION_INFO { + CK_SLOT_ID slotID; + CK_STATE state; + CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */ + + /* ulDeviceError was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for + * v2.0 */ + CK_ULONG ulDeviceError; /* device-dependent error code */ +} CK_SESSION_INFO; + +/* The flags are defined in the following table: + * Bit Flag Mask Meaning + */ +#define CKF_RW_SESSION 0x00000002 /* session is r/w */ +#define CKF_SERIAL_SESSION 0x00000004 /* no parallel */ + +typedef CK_SESSION_INFO CK_PTR CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR; + +/* CK_OBJECT_HANDLE is a token-specific identifier for an + * object */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_HANDLE; + +typedef CK_OBJECT_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR; + +/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS is a value that identifies the classes (or + * types) of objects that PKCS #11 recognizes. It is defined + * as follows: */ +/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for + * v2.0 */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_CLASS; + +/* The following classes of objects are defined: */ +/* CKO_HW_FEATURE is new for v2.10 */ +/* CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS is new for v2.11 */ +/* CKO_MECHANISM is new for v2.20 */ +#define CKO_DATA 0x00000000 +#define CKO_CERTIFICATE 0x00000001 +#define CKO_PUBLIC_KEY 0x00000002 +#define CKO_PRIVATE_KEY 0x00000003 +#define CKO_SECRET_KEY 0x00000004 +#define CKO_HW_FEATURE 0x00000005 +#define CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS 0x00000006 +#define CKO_MECHANISM 0x00000007 +#define CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 + +typedef CK_OBJECT_CLASS CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR; + +/* CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is new for v2.10. CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is a + * value that identifies the hardware feature type of an object + * with CK_OBJECT_CLASS equal to CKO_HW_FEATURE. */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE; + +/* The following hardware feature types are defined */ +/* CKH_USER_INTERFACE is new for v2.20 */ +#define CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER 0x00000001 +#define CKH_CLOCK 0x00000002 +#define CKH_USER_INTERFACE 0x00000003 +#define CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 + +/* CK_KEY_TYPE is a value that identifies a key type */ +/* CK_KEY_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_KEY_TYPE; + +/* the following key types are defined: */ +#define CKK_RSA 0x00000000 +#define CKK_DSA 0x00000001 +#define CKK_DH 0x00000002 + +/* CKK_ECDSA and CKK_KEA are new for v2.0 */ +/* CKK_ECDSA is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_EC is preferred. */ +#define CKK_ECDSA 0x00000003 +#define CKK_EC 0x00000003 +#define CKK_X9_42_DH 0x00000004 +#define CKK_KEA 0x00000005 + +#define CKK_GENERIC_SECRET 0x00000010 +#define CKK_RC2 0x00000011 +#define CKK_RC4 0x00000012 +#define CKK_DES 0x00000013 +#define CKK_DES2 0x00000014 +#define CKK_DES3 0x00000015 + +/* all these key types are new for v2.0 */ +#define CKK_CAST 0x00000016 +#define CKK_CAST3 0x00000017 +/* CKK_CAST5 is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_CAST128 is preferred. */ +#define CKK_CAST5 0x00000018 +#define CKK_CAST128 0x00000018 +#define CKK_RC5 0x00000019 +#define CKK_IDEA 0x0000001A +#define CKK_SKIPJACK 0x0000001B +#define CKK_BATON 0x0000001C +#define CKK_JUNIPER 0x0000001D +#define CKK_CDMF 0x0000001E +#define CKK_AES 0x0000001F + +/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKK_BLOWFISH 0x00000020 +#define CKK_TWOFISH 0x00000021 + +/* Camellia is proposed for v2.20 Amendment 3 */ +#define CKK_CAMELLIA 0x00000025 + +#define CKK_SEED 0x00000026 + +#define CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 + +/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE is a value that identifies a certificate + * type */ +/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG + * for v2.0 */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE; + +#define CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY_UNSPECIFIED 0UL +#define CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY_TOKEN_USER 1UL +#define CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY_AUTHORITY 2UL +#define CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY_OTHER_ENTITY 3UL + +/* The following certificate types are defined: */ +/* CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT is new for v2.10 */ +/* CKC_WTLS is new for v2.20 */ +#define CKC_X_509 0x00000000 +#define CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT 0x00000001 +#define CKC_WTLS 0x00000002 +#define CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 + +/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE is a value that identifies an attribute + * type */ +/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for + * v2.0 */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE; + +/* The CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE flag identifies an attribute which + consists of an array of values. */ +#define CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE 0x40000000 + +/* The following attribute types are defined: */ +#define CKA_CLASS 0x00000000 +#define CKA_TOKEN 0x00000001 +#define CKA_PRIVATE 0x00000002 +#define CKA_LABEL 0x00000003 +#define CKA_APPLICATION 0x00000010 +#define CKA_VALUE 0x00000011 + +/* CKA_OBJECT_ID is new for v2.10 */ +#define CKA_OBJECT_ID 0x00000012 + +#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 0x00000080 +#define CKA_ISSUER 0x00000081 +#define CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER 0x00000082 + +/* CKA_AC_ISSUER, CKA_OWNER, and CKA_ATTR_TYPES are new + * for v2.10 */ +#define CKA_AC_ISSUER 0x00000083 +#define CKA_OWNER 0x00000084 +#define CKA_ATTR_TYPES 0x00000085 + +/* CKA_TRUSTED is new for v2.11 */ +#define CKA_TRUSTED 0x00000086 + +/* CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY ... + * CKA_CHECK_VALUE are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY 0x00000087 +#define CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN 0x00000088 +#define CKA_URL 0x00000089 +#define CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008A +#define CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008B +#define CKA_CHECK_VALUE 0x00000090 + +#define CKA_KEY_TYPE 0x00000100 +#define CKA_SUBJECT 0x00000101 +#define CKA_ID 0x00000102 +#define CKA_SENSITIVE 0x00000103 +#define CKA_ENCRYPT 0x00000104 +#define CKA_DECRYPT 0x00000105 +#define CKA_WRAP 0x00000106 +#define CKA_UNWRAP 0x00000107 +#define CKA_SIGN 0x00000108 +#define CKA_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00000109 +#define CKA_VERIFY 0x0000010A +#define CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x0000010B +#define CKA_DERIVE 0x0000010C +#define CKA_START_DATE 0x00000110 +#define CKA_END_DATE 0x00000111 +#define CKA_MODULUS 0x00000120 +#define CKA_MODULUS_BITS 0x00000121 +#define CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT 0x00000122 +#define CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT 0x00000123 +#define CKA_PRIME_1 0x00000124 +#define CKA_PRIME_2 0x00000125 +#define CKA_EXPONENT_1 0x00000126 +#define CKA_EXPONENT_2 0x00000127 +#define CKA_COEFFICIENT 0x00000128 +/* CKA_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO is new for v2.40 */ +#define CKA_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO 0x00000129 +#define CKA_PRIME 0x00000130 +#define CKA_SUBPRIME 0x00000131 +#define CKA_BASE 0x00000132 + +/* CKA_PRIME_BITS and CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS are new for v2.11 */ +#define CKA_PRIME_BITS 0x00000133 +#define CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS 0x00000134 +#define CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS +/* (To retain backwards-compatibility) */ + +#define CKA_VALUE_BITS 0x00000160 +#define CKA_VALUE_LEN 0x00000161 + +/* CKA_EXTRACTABLE, CKA_LOCAL, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, + * CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, CKA_MODIFIABLE, CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS, + * and CKA_EC_POINT are new for v2.0 */ +#define CKA_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000162 +#define CKA_LOCAL 0x00000163 +#define CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000164 +#define CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE 0x00000165 + +/* CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM is new for v2.11 */ +#define CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM 0x00000166 + +#define CKA_MODIFIABLE 0x00000170 + +/* CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS is deprecated in v2.11, + * CKA_EC_PARAMS is preferred. */ +#define CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS 0x00000180 +#define CKA_EC_PARAMS 0x00000180 + +#define CKA_EC_POINT 0x00000181 + +/* CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH, CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS, + * are new for v2.10. Deprecated in v2.11 and onwards. */ +#define CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH 0x00000200 +#define CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS 0x00000201 + +/* CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE ... + * CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE 0x00000202 + +#define CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED 0x00000210 +#define CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE | 0x00000211) +#define CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE | 0x00000212) + +/* CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE, CKA_RESET_ON_INIT, and CKA_HAS_RESET + * are new for v2.10 */ +#define CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE 0x00000300 +#define CKA_RESET_ON_INIT 0x00000301 +#define CKA_HAS_RESET 0x00000302 + +/* The following attributes are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKA_PIXEL_X 0x00000400 +#define CKA_PIXEL_Y 0x00000401 +#define CKA_RESOLUTION 0x00000402 +#define CKA_CHAR_ROWS 0x00000403 +#define CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS 0x00000404 +#define CKA_COLOR 0x00000405 +#define CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL 0x00000406 +#define CKA_CHAR_SETS 0x00000480 +#define CKA_ENCODING_METHODS 0x00000481 +#define CKA_MIME_TYPES 0x00000482 +#define CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE 0x00000500 +#define CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000501 +#define CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000502 +#define CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000503 +#define CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE | 0x00000600) + +#define CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 + +/* CK_ATTRIBUTE is a structure that includes the type, length + * and value of an attribute */ +typedef struct CK_ATTRIBUTE { + CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type; + CK_VOID_PTR pValue; + + /* ulValueLen went from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ + CK_ULONG ulValueLen; /* in bytes */ +} CK_ATTRIBUTE; + +typedef CK_ATTRIBUTE CK_PTR CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR; + +/* CK_DATE is a structure that defines a date */ +typedef struct CK_DATE { + CK_CHAR year[4]; /* the year ("1900" - "9999") */ + CK_CHAR month[2]; /* the month ("01" - "12") */ + CK_CHAR day[2]; /* the day ("01" - "31") */ +} CK_DATE; + +/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE is a value that identifies a mechanism + * type */ +/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for + * v2.0 */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_MECHANISM_TYPE; + +/* the following mechanism types are defined: */ +#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000000 +#define CKM_RSA_PKCS 0x00000001 +#define CKM_RSA_9796 0x00000002 +#define CKM_RSA_X_509 0x00000003 + +/* CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS, CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS + * are new for v2.0. They are mechanisms which hash and sign */ +#define CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS 0x00000004 +#define CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS 0x00000005 +#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS 0x00000006 + +/* CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS, CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS, and + * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP are new for v2.10 */ +#define CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS 0x00000007 +#define CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS 0x00000008 +#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP 0x00000009 + +/* CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_RSA_X9_31, CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31, + * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS are new for v2.11 */ +#define CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x0000000A +#define CKM_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000B +#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000C +#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000D +#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000E + +#define CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000010 +#define CKM_DSA 0x00000011 +#define CKM_DSA_SHA1 0x00000012 +#define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000020 +#define CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE 0x00000021 + +/* CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE, + * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE, and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE are new for + * v2.11 */ +#define CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000030 +#define CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE 0x00000031 +#define CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE 0x00000032 +#define CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE 0x00000033 + +/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS 0x00000040 +#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS 0x00000041 +#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS 0x00000042 +#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000043 +#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000044 +#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000045 + +/* CKM_SHA224 new for v2.20 amendment 3 */ +#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS 0x00000046 +#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000047 + +#define CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN 0x00000100 +#define CKM_RC2_ECB 0x00000101 +#define CKM_RC2_CBC 0x00000102 +#define CKM_RC2_MAC 0x00000103 + +/* CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ +#define CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000104 +#define CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD 0x00000105 + +#define CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN 0x00000110 +#define CKM_RC4 0x00000111 +#define CKM_DES_KEY_GEN 0x00000120 +#define CKM_DES_ECB 0x00000121 +#define CKM_DES_CBC 0x00000122 +#define CKM_DES_MAC 0x00000123 + +/* CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_DES_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ +#define CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000124 +#define CKM_DES_CBC_PAD 0x00000125 + +#define CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN 0x00000130 +#define CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN 0x00000131 +#define CKM_DES3_ECB 0x00000132 +#define CKM_DES3_CBC 0x00000133 +#define CKM_DES3_MAC 0x00000134 + +/* CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD, CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN, + * CKM_CDMF_ECB, CKM_CDMF_CBC, CKM_CDMF_MAC, + * CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL, and CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ +#define CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000135 +#define CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD 0x00000136 +#define CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN 0x00000140 +#define CKM_CDMF_ECB 0x00000141 +#define CKM_CDMF_CBC 0x00000142 +#define CKM_CDMF_MAC 0x00000143 +#define CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000144 +#define CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD 0x00000145 + +/* the following four DES mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKM_DES_OFB64 0x00000150 +#define CKM_DES_OFB8 0x00000151 +#define CKM_DES_CFB64 0x00000152 +#define CKM_DES_CFB8 0x00000153 + +#define CKM_MD2 0x00000200 + +/* CKM_MD2_HMAC and CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ +#define CKM_MD2_HMAC 0x00000201 +#define CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000202 + +#define CKM_MD5 0x00000210 + +/* CKM_MD5_HMAC and CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ +#define CKM_MD5_HMAC 0x00000211 +#define CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000212 + +#define CKM_SHA_1 0x00000220 + +/* CKM_SHA_1_HMAC and CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ +#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC 0x00000221 +#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000222 + +/* CKM_RIPEMD128, CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC, + * CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL, CKM_RIPEMD160, CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC, + * and CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.10 */ +#define CKM_RIPEMD128 0x00000230 +#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC 0x00000231 +#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000232 +#define CKM_RIPEMD160 0x00000240 +#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC 0x00000241 +#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000242 + +/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKM_SHA256 0x00000250 +#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC 0x00000251 +#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000252 +#define CKM_SHA384 0x00000260 +#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC 0x00000261 +#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000262 +#define CKM_SHA512 0x00000270 +#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC 0x00000271 +#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000272 + +/* CKM_SHA224 new for v2.20 amendment 3 */ +#define CKM_SHA224 0x00000255 +#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC 0x00000256 +#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000257 + +/* All of the following mechanisms are new for v2.0 */ +/* Note that CAST128 and CAST5 are the same algorithm */ +#define CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN 0x00000300 +#define CKM_CAST_ECB 0x00000301 +#define CKM_CAST_CBC 0x00000302 +#define CKM_CAST_MAC 0x00000303 +#define CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000304 +#define CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD 0x00000305 +#define CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN 0x00000310 +#define CKM_CAST3_ECB 0x00000311 +#define CKM_CAST3_CBC 0x00000312 +#define CKM_CAST3_MAC 0x00000313 +#define CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000314 +#define CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD 0x00000315 +#define CKM_CAST5_KEY_GEN 0x00000320 +#define CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN 0x00000320 +#define CKM_CAST5_ECB 0x00000321 +#define CKM_CAST128_ECB 0x00000321 +#define CKM_CAST5_CBC 0x00000322 +#define CKM_CAST128_CBC 0x00000322 +#define CKM_CAST5_MAC 0x00000323 +#define CKM_CAST128_MAC 0x00000323 +#define CKM_CAST5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324 +#define CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324 +#define CKM_CAST5_CBC_PAD 0x00000325 +#define CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD 0x00000325 +#define CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN 0x00000330 +#define CKM_RC5_ECB 0x00000331 +#define CKM_RC5_CBC 0x00000332 +#define CKM_RC5_MAC 0x00000333 +#define CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000334 +#define CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD 0x00000335 +#define CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN 0x00000340 +#define CKM_IDEA_ECB 0x00000341 +#define CKM_IDEA_CBC 0x00000342 +#define CKM_IDEA_MAC 0x00000343 +#define CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000344 +#define CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD 0x00000345 +#define CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN 0x00000350 +#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY 0x00000360 +#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000362 +#define CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE 0x00000363 +#define CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000364 +#define CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY 0x00000365 +#define CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000370 +#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000371 +#define CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000372 + +/* CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, + * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, and + * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH are new for v2.11 */ +#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000373 +#define CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000374 +#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000375 +#define CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000376 +#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000377 + +/* CKM_TLS_PRF is new for v2.20 */ +#define CKM_TLS_PRF 0x00000378 + +#define CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC 0x00000380 +#define CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC 0x00000381 +#define CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000390 +#define CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000391 +#define CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000392 + +/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000393 +#define CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000394 +#define CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000395 + +/* CKM_SHA224 new for v2.20 amendment 3 */ +#define CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000396 + +#define CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC 0x000003A0 +#define CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC 0x000003A1 +#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC 0x000003A2 +#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC 0x000003A3 +#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A4 +#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A4 +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A5 +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A5 +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 0x000003A6 +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 0x000003A7 +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC 0x000003A8 +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC 0x000003A9 +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC 0x000003AA +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC 0x000003AB + +/* CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 is new for v2.10 */ +#define CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 0x000003B0 + +#define CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC 0x000003C0 + +/* WTLS mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x000003D0 +#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x000003D1 +#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC 0x000003D2 +#define CKM_WTLS_PRF 0x000003D3 +#define CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D4 +#define CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D5 + +/* TLS 1.2 mechanisms are new for v2.40 */ +#define CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x000003E0 +#define CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003E1 +#define CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x000003E2 +#define CKM_TLS12_KEY_SAFE_DERIVE 0x000003E3 +#define CKM_TLS12_MAC 0x000003E4 +#define CKM_TLS_MAC 0x000003E4 +#define CKM_TLS_KDF 0x000003E5 + +#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS 0x00000400 +#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP 0x00000401 + +/* CKM_CMS_SIG is new for v2.20 */ +#define CKM_CMS_SIG 0x00000500 + +/* Fortezza mechanisms */ +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN 0x00001000 +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64 0x00001001 +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 0x00001002 +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64 0x00001003 +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64 0x00001004 +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32 0x00001005 +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16 0x00001006 +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8 0x00001007 +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP 0x00001008 +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP 0x00001009 +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX 0x0000100a +#define CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001010 +#define CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE 0x00001011 +#define CKM_FORTEZZA_TIMESTAMP 0x00001020 +#define CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN 0x00001030 +#define CKM_BATON_ECB128 0x00001031 +#define CKM_BATON_ECB96 0x00001032 +#define CKM_BATON_CBC128 0x00001033 +#define CKM_BATON_COUNTER 0x00001034 +#define CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE 0x00001035 +#define CKM_BATON_WRAP 0x00001036 + +/* CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN is deprecated in v2.11, + * CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN is preferred */ +#define CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040 +#define CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040 + +#define CKM_ECDSA 0x00001041 +#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA1 0x00001042 + +/* CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, and CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE + * are new for v2.11 */ +#define CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE 0x00001050 +#define CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE 0x00001051 +#define CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE 0x00001052 + +#define CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN 0x00001060 +#define CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128 0x00001061 +#define CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128 0x00001062 +#define CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER 0x00001063 +#define CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE 0x00001064 +#define CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP 0x00001065 +#define CKM_FASTHASH 0x00001070 + +/* CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, CKM_AES_ECB, CKM_AES_CBC, CKM_AES_MAC, + * CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN, + * CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN, and CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN are + * new for v2.11 */ +#define CKM_AES_KEY_GEN 0x00001080 +#define CKM_AES_ECB 0x00001081 +#define CKM_AES_CBC 0x00001082 +#define CKM_AES_MAC 0x00001083 +#define CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00001084 +#define CKM_AES_CBC_PAD 0x00001085 +/* new for v2.20 amendment 3 */ +#define CKM_AES_CTR 0x00001086 +/* new for v2.30 */ +#define CKM_AES_GCM 0x00001087 +#define CKM_AES_CCM 0x00001088 +#define CKM_AES_CTS 0x00001089 +#define CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC 0x0000108C +#define CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC_96 0x0000108D + +/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001090 +#define CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC 0x00001091 +#define CKM_TWOFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001092 +#define CKM_TWOFISH_CBC 0x00001093 + +/* Camellia is proposed for v2.20 Amendment 3 */ +#define CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000550 +#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB 0x00000551 +#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC 0x00000552 +#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC 0x00000553 +#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000554 +#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000555 +#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000556 +#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000557 + +#define CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN 0x00000650 +#define CKM_SEED_ECB 0x00000651 +#define CKM_SEED_CBC 0x00000652 +#define CKM_SEED_MAC 0x00000653 +#define CKM_SEED_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000654 +#define CKM_SEED_CBC_PAD 0x00000655 +#define CKM_SEED_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000656 +#define CKM_SEED_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000657 + +/* CKM_xxx_ENCRYPT_DATA mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001100 +#define CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001101 +#define CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001102 +#define CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001103 +#define CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001104 +#define CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001105 + +#define CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002000 +#define CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002001 +#define CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002002 + +#define CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 + +typedef CK_MECHANISM_TYPE CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR; + +/* CK_MECHANISM is a structure that specifies a particular + * mechanism */ +typedef struct CK_MECHANISM { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism; + CK_VOID_PTR pParameter; + + /* ulParameterLen was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for + * v2.0 */ + CK_ULONG ulParameterLen; /* in bytes */ +} CK_MECHANISM; + +typedef CK_MECHANISM CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_PTR; + +/* CK_MECHANISM_INFO provides information about a particular + * mechanism */ +typedef struct CK_MECHANISM_INFO { + CK_ULONG ulMinKeySize; + CK_ULONG ulMaxKeySize; + CK_FLAGS flags; +} CK_MECHANISM_INFO; + +/* The flags are defined as follows: + * Bit Flag Mask Meaning */ +#define CKF_HW 0x00000001 /* performed by HW */ + +/* The flags CKF_ENCRYPT, CKF_DECRYPT, CKF_DIGEST, CKF_SIGN, + * CKG_SIGN_RECOVER, CKF_VERIFY, CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER, + * CKF_GENERATE, CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, CKF_WRAP, CKF_UNWRAP, + * and CKF_DERIVE are new for v2.0. They specify whether or not + * a mechanism can be used for a particular task */ +#define CKF_ENCRYPT 0x00000100 +#define CKF_DECRYPT 0x00000200 +#define CKF_DIGEST 0x00000400 +#define CKF_SIGN 0x00000800 +#define CKF_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00001000 +#define CKF_VERIFY 0x00002000 +#define CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x00004000 +#define CKF_GENERATE 0x00008000 +#define CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR 0x00010000 +#define CKF_WRAP 0x00020000 +#define CKF_UNWRAP 0x00040000 +#define CKF_DERIVE 0x00080000 + +/* CKF_EC_F_P, CKF_EC_F_2M, CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS, CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE, + * CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS, and CKF_EC_COMPRESS are new for v2.11. They + * describe a token's EC capabilities not available in mechanism + * information. */ +#define CKF_EC_F_P 0x00100000 +#define CKF_EC_F_2M 0x00200000 +#define CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS 0x00400000 +#define CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE 0x00800000 +#define CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS 0x01000000 +#define CKF_EC_COMPRESS 0x02000000 + +#define CKF_EXTENSION 0x80000000 /* FALSE for this version */ + +typedef CK_MECHANISM_INFO CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR; + +/* CK_RV is a value that identifies the return value of a + * PKCS #11 function */ +/* CK_RV was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_RV; + +#define CKR_OK 0x00000000 +#define CKR_CANCEL 0x00000001 +#define CKR_HOST_MEMORY 0x00000002 +#define CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID 0x00000003 + +/* CKR_FLAGS_INVALID was removed for v2.0 */ + +/* CKR_GENERAL_ERROR and CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED are new for v2.0 */ +#define CKR_GENERAL_ERROR 0x00000005 +#define CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED 0x00000006 + +/* CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_NO_EVENT, CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS, + * and CKR_CANT_LOCK are new for v2.01 */ +#define CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD 0x00000007 +#define CKR_NO_EVENT 0x00000008 +#define CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS 0x00000009 +#define CKR_CANT_LOCK 0x0000000A + +#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY 0x00000010 +#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE 0x00000011 +#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000012 +#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID 0x00000013 +#define CKR_DATA_INVALID 0x00000020 +#define CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000021 +#define CKR_DEVICE_ERROR 0x00000030 +#define CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY 0x00000031 +#define CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED 0x00000032 +#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID 0x00000040 +#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000041 +#define CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED 0x00000050 +#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL 0x00000051 + +/* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED is new for v2.0 */ +#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000054 + +#define CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000060 + +/* CKR_KEY_SENSITIVE was removed for v2.0 */ + +#define CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000062 +#define CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000063 + +/* CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED, CKR_KEY_CHANGED, CKR_KEY_NEEDED, + * CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, + * CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE, and CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE are new for + * v2.0 */ +#define CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000064 +#define CKR_KEY_CHANGED 0x00000065 +#define CKR_KEY_NEEDED 0x00000066 +#define CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE 0x00000067 +#define CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED 0x00000068 +#define CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE 0x00000069 +#define CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE 0x0000006A + +#define CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID 0x00000070 +#define CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID 0x00000071 + +/* CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INCONSISTENT and CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INVALID + * were removed for v2.0 */ +#define CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000082 +#define CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE 0x00000090 +#define CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000091 +#define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT 0x000000A0 +#define CKR_PIN_INVALID 0x000000A1 +#define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE 0x000000A2 + +/* CKR_PIN_EXPIRED and CKR_PIN_LOCKED are new for v2.0 */ +#define CKR_PIN_EXPIRED 0x000000A3 +#define CKR_PIN_LOCKED 0x000000A4 + +#define CKR_SESSION_CLOSED 0x000000B0 +#define CKR_SESSION_COUNT 0x000000B1 +#define CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000B3 +#define CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x000000B4 +#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY 0x000000B5 +#define CKR_SESSION_EXISTS 0x000000B6 + +/* CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS and + * CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS are new for v2.0 */ +#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS 0x000000B7 +#define CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS 0x000000B8 + +#define CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID 0x000000C0 +#define CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE 0x000000C1 +#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE 0x000000D0 +#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000D1 +#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT 0x000000E0 +#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED 0x000000E1 +#define CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x000000E2 +#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000F0 +#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x000000F1 +#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000F2 +#define CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000100 +#define CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN 0x00000101 +#define CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000102 +#define CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000103 + +/* CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN and CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES + * are new to v2.01 */ +#define CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000104 +#define CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES 0x00000105 + +#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID 0x00000110 +#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE 0x00000112 +#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000113 +#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000114 +#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000115 +#define CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000120 + +/* These are new to v2.0 */ +#define CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG 0x00000121 + +/* These are new to v2.11 */ +#define CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID 0x00000130 + +/* These are new to v2.0 */ +#define CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 0x00000150 +#define CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID 0x00000160 +#define CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE 0x00000170 +#define CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE 0x00000180 + +/* These are new to v2.01 */ +#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000190 +#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED 0x00000191 +#define CKR_MUTEX_BAD 0x000001A0 +#define CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED 0x000001A1 + +/* This is new to v2.20 */ +#define CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED 0x00000200 + +#define CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 + +/* CK_NOTIFY is an application callback that processes events */ +typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_NOTIFY)( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_NOTIFICATION event, + CK_VOID_PTR pApplication /* passed to C_OpenSession */ + ); + +/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is a structure holding a PKCS #11 spec + * version and pointers of appropriate types to all the + * PKCS #11 functions */ +/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is new for v2.0 */ +typedef struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_FUNCTION_LIST; + +typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR; + +typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR; + +/* CK_CREATEMUTEX is an application callback for creating a + * mutex object */ +typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_CREATEMUTEX)( + CK_VOID_PTR_PTR ppMutex /* location to receive ptr to mutex */ + ); + +/* CK_DESTROYMUTEX is an application callback for destroying a + * mutex object */ +typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_DESTROYMUTEX)( + CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ + ); + +/* CK_LOCKMUTEX is an application callback for locking a mutex */ +typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_LOCKMUTEX)( + CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ + ); + +/* CK_UNLOCKMUTEX is an application callback for unlocking a + * mutex */ +typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_UNLOCKMUTEX)( + CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ + ); + +/* CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS provides the optional arguments to + * C_Initialize */ +typedef struct CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS { + CK_CREATEMUTEX CreateMutex; + CK_DESTROYMUTEX DestroyMutex; + CK_LOCKMUTEX LockMutex; + CK_UNLOCKMUTEX UnlockMutex; + CK_FLAGS flags; + /* The official PKCS #11 spec does not have a 'LibraryParameters' field, but + * a reserved field. NSS needs a way to pass instance-specific information + * to the library (like where to find its config files, etc). This + * information is usually provided by the installer and passed uninterpreted + * by NSS to the library, though NSS does know the specifics of the softoken + * version of this parameter. Most compliant PKCS#11 modules expect this + * parameter to be NULL, and will return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD from + * C_Initialize if Library parameters is supplied. */ + CK_CHAR_PTR *LibraryParameters; + /* This field is only present if the LibraryParameters is not NULL. It must + * be NULL in all cases */ + CK_VOID_PTR pReserved; +} CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS; + +/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot + * Bit Flag Mask Meaning + */ +#define CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS 0x00000001 +#define CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK 0x00000002 + +typedef CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS CK_PTR CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR; + +/* additional flags for parameters to functions */ + +/* CKF_DONT_BLOCK is for the function C_WaitForSlotEvent */ +#define CKF_DONT_BLOCK 1 + +/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is new for v2.10. + * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is used to indicate the Message + * Generation Function (MGF) applied to a message block when + * formatting a message block for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption + * scheme. */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE; + +typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE_PTR; + +/* The following MGFs are defined */ +/* CKG_MGF1_SHA256, CKG_MGF1_SHA384, and CKG_MGF1_SHA512 + * are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKG_MGF1_SHA1 0x00000001 +#define CKG_MGF1_SHA256 0x00000002 +#define CKG_MGF1_SHA384 0x00000003 +#define CKG_MGF1_SHA512 0x00000004 + +/* v2.20 amendment 3 */ +#define CKG_MGF1_SHA224 0x00000005 + +/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10. + * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the source + * of the encoding parameter when formatting a message block + * for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption scheme. */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE; + +typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR; + +/* The following encoding parameter sources are defined */ +#define CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED 0x00000001 + +/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.10. + * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the + * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP mechanism. */ +typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg; + CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf; + CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE source; + CK_VOID_PTR pSourceData; + CK_ULONG ulSourceDataLen; +} CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS is new for v2.11. + * CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS provides the parameters to the + * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS mechanism(s). */ +typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg; + CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf; + CK_ULONG sLen; +} CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_EC_KDF_TYPE is new for v2.11. */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_EC_KDF_TYPE; + +/* The following EC Key Derivation Functions are defined */ +#define CKD_NULL 0x00000001 +#define CKD_SHA1_KDF 0x00000002 +#define CKD_SHA224_KDF 0x00000005 +#define CKD_SHA256_KDF 0x00000006 +#define CKD_SHA384_KDF 0x00000007 +#define CKD_SHA512_KDF 0x00000008 + +/* CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. + * CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the + * CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE and CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE mechanisms, + * where each party contributes one key pair. + */ +typedef struct CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS { + CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; + CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; +} CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. + * CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the + * CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE mechanism, where each party contributes two key pairs. */ +typedef struct CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS { + CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; + CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; + CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; +} CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS { + CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; + CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; + CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey; +} CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* Typedefs and defines for the CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN and the + * CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN mechanisms (new for PKCS #11 v2.11) */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE; +typedef CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE_PTR; + +/* The following X9.42 DH key derivation functions are defined + (besides CKD_NULL already defined : */ +#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1 0x00000003 +#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE 0x00000004 + +/* CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. + * CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the + * CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE key derivation mechanism, where each party + * contributes one key pair */ +typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS { + CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; + CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; +} CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS; + +typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. + * CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the + * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE key derivation + * mechanisms, where each party contributes two key pairs */ +typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS { + CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; + CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; + CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; +} CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS { + CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; + CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; + CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey; +} CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the + * CKM_KEA_DERIVE mechanism */ +/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ +typedef struct CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS { + CK_BBOOL isSender; + CK_ULONG ulRandomLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA; + CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomB; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; +} CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_RC2_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_ECB and + * CKM_RC2_MAC mechanisms. An instance of CK_RC2_PARAMS just + * holds the effective keysize */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_RC2_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_RC2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_CBC + * mechanism */ +typedef struct CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS { + /* ulEffectiveBits was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for + * v2.0 */ + CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */ + + CK_BYTE iv[8]; /* IV for CBC mode */ +} CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the + * CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */ +/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ +typedef struct CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS { + CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */ + CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */ +} CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR + CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_RC5_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_ECB and + * CKM_RC5_MAC mechanisms */ +/* CK_RC5_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ +typedef struct CK_RC5_PARAMS { + CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ + CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ +} CK_RC5_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_RC5_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_CBC + * mechanism */ +/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ +typedef struct CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS { + CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ + CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pIv; /* pointer to IV */ + CK_ULONG ulIvLen; /* length of IV in bytes */ +} CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the + * CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */ +/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ +typedef struct CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS { + CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ + CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ + CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */ +} CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR + CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters to most block + * ciphers' MAC_GENERAL mechanisms. Its value is the length of + * the MAC */ +/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_DES/AES_ECB/CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS are new for v2.20 */ +typedef struct CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { + CK_BYTE iv[8]; + CK_BYTE_PTR pData; + CK_ULONG length; +} CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { + CK_BYTE iv[16]; + CK_BYTE_PTR pData; + CK_ULONG length; +} CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ +typedef struct CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS { + CK_ULONG ulCounterBits; + CK_BYTE cb[16]; +} CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_GCM_PARAMS is new for version 2.30 */ +typedef struct CK_GCM_PARAMS { + CK_BYTE_PTR pIv; + CK_ULONG ulIvLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pAAD; + CK_ULONG ulAADLen; + CK_ULONG ulTagBits; +} CK_GCM_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_GCM_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_GCM_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_CCM_PARAMS is new for version 2.30 */ +typedef struct CK_CCM_PARAMS { + CK_ULONG ulDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pNonce; + CK_ULONG ulNonceLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pAAD; + CK_ULONG ulAADLen; + CK_ULONG ulMACLen; +} CK_CCM_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_CCM_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CCM_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the + * CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP mechanism */ +/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ +typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS { + CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPassword; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; + CK_ULONG ulPAndGLen; + CK_ULONG ulQLen; + CK_ULONG ulRandomLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPrimeP; + CK_BYTE_PTR pBaseG; + CK_BYTE_PTR pSubprimeQ; +} CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS CK_PTR + CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PTR; + +/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS provides the parameters to the + * CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX mechanism */ +/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ +typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS { + CK_ULONG ulOldWrappedXLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pOldWrappedX; + CK_ULONG ulOldPasswordLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPassword; + CK_ULONG ulOldPublicDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPublicData; + CK_ULONG ulOldRandomLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pOldRandomA; + CK_ULONG ulNewPasswordLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPassword; + CK_ULONG ulNewPublicDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPublicData; + CK_ULONG ulNewRandomLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pNewRandomA; +} CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS CK_PTR + CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_PBE_PARAMS { + CK_BYTE_PTR pInitVector; + CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword; + CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pSalt; + CK_ULONG ulSaltLen; + CK_ULONG ulIteration; +} CK_PBE_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_PBE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the + * CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP mechanism */ +/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ +typedef struct CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS { + CK_BYTE bBC; /* block contents byte */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pX; /* extra data */ + CK_ULONG ulXLen; /* length of extra data in bytes */ +} CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR + CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA { + CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom; + CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom; + CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen; +} CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA; + +typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS { + CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; + CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion; +} CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; + +typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR + CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT { + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientMacSecret; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerMacSecret; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientKey; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerKey; + CK_BYTE_PTR pIVClient; + CK_BYTE_PTR pIVServer; +} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT; + +typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS { + CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits; + CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits; + CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits; + CK_BBOOL bIsExport; /* Unused. Must be set to CK_FALSE. */ + CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; + CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial; +} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS is new for version 2.20 */ +typedef struct CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS { + CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; + CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel; + CK_ULONG ulLabelLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput; + CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen; +} CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* TLS 1.2 is new for version 2.40 */ +typedef struct CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS { + CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; + CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prfHashMechanism; +} CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR + CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS { + CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits; + CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits; + CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits; + CK_BBOOL bIsExport; /* Unused. Must be set to CK_FALSE. */ + CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; + CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prfHashMechanism; +} CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_TLS_KDF_PARAMS { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prfMechanism; + CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel; + CK_ULONG ulLabelLength; + CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; + CK_BYTE_PTR pContextData; + CK_ULONG ulContextDataLength; +} CK_TLS_KDF_PARAMS; + +typedef struct CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prfMechanism; + CK_ULONG ulMacLength; + CK_ULONG ulServerOrClient; +} CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* WTLS is new for version 2.20 */ +typedef struct CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA { + CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom; + CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom; + CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen; +} CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA; + +typedef CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA CK_PTR CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; + CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; + CK_BYTE_PTR pVersion; +} CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR + CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; + CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; + CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel; + CK_ULONG ulLabelLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput; + CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen; +} CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT { + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hMacSecret; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey; + CK_BYTE_PTR pIV; +} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT; + +typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; + CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits; + CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits; + CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits; + CK_ULONG ulSequenceNumber; + CK_BBOOL bIsExport; /* Unused. Must be set to CK_FALSE. */ + CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; + CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial; +} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CMS is new for version 2.20 */ +typedef struct CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS { + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE certificateHandle; + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pSigningMechanism; + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pDigestMechanism; + CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pContentType; + CK_BYTE_PTR pRequestedAttributes; + CK_ULONG ulRequestedAttributesLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pRequiredAttributes; + CK_ULONG ulRequiredAttributesLen; +} CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA { + CK_BYTE_PTR pData; + CK_ULONG ulLen; +} CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA; + +typedef CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA CK_PTR + CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA_PTR; + +/* The CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is used for the + * CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY mechanism. It specifies which bit + * of the base key should be used as the first bit of the + * derived key */ +/* CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is new for v2.10. + * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is used to + * indicate the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) used to generate + * key bits using PKCS #5 PBKDF2. */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE; + +typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE_PTR; + +/* The following PRFs are defined in PKCS #5 v2.1. */ +#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1 0x00000001 +#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_GOSTR3411 0x00000002 +#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA224 0x00000003 +#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA256 0x00000004 +#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA384 0x00000005 +#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA512 0x00000006 +#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA512_224 0x00000007 +#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA512_256 0x00000008 + +/* CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10. + * CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the + * source of the salt value when deriving a key using PKCS #5 + * PBKDF2. */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE; + +typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR; + +/* The following salt value sources are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */ +#define CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED 0x00000001 + +/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is new for v2.10. + * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is a structure that provides the + * parameters to the CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 mechanism. */ +typedef struct CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS { + CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE saltSource; + CK_VOID_PTR pSaltSourceData; + CK_ULONG ulSaltSourceDataLen; + CK_ULONG iterations; + CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE prf; + CK_VOID_PTR pPrfData; + CK_ULONG ulPrfDataLen; + CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword; + CK_ULONG_PTR ulPasswordLen; +} CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* NSS Specific defines */ + +/* defines that have been deprecated in 2.20, but maintained in our + * header file for backward compatibility */ +#define CKO_KG_PARAMETERS CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS +#define CKF_EC_FP CKF_EC_F_P +/* new in v2.11 deprecated by 2.20 */ +#define CKR_KEY_PARAMS_INVALID 0x0000006B + +/* stuff that for historic reasons is in this header file but should have + * been in pkcs11n.h */ +#define CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE 0xffffffff + +/* undo packing */ +#include "pkcs11u.h" + +#endif
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11u.h b/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11u.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a2ffb2cb --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11u.h @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 1994-1999 RSA Security Inc. Licence to copy this document + * is granted provided that it is identified as "RSA Security Inc. Public-Key + * Cryptography Standards (PKCS)" in all material mentioning or referencing + * this document. + */ +/* + * reset any packing set by pkcs11p.h + */ + +#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WINDOWS) +#ifdef __clang__ +#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wpragma-pack" +#endif +#ifdef _MSC_VER +#pragma warning(disable : 4103) +#endif +#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) +#endif
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/ssl-test.c b/tests/ssl-test.c index 909b3a20..1a209892 100644 --- a/tests/ssl-test.c +++ b/tests/ssl-test.c @@ -3,6 +3,11 @@ #include "test-utils.h" #include "soup-server-message-private.h" +#if HAVE_GNUTLS +#include <gnutls/gnutls.h> +#include <gnutls/pkcs11.h> +#endif + GUri *uri; typedef struct { @@ -217,8 +222,17 @@ request_certificate_cb (SoupMessage *msg, typedef struct { SoupMessage *msg; GTlsCertificate *certificate; + GTlsPassword *tls_password; + const guchar *password; } SetCertificateAsyncData; +static void +set_certificate_async_data_free (SetCertificateAsyncData *data) +{ + g_clear_object (&data->tls_password); + g_free (data); +} + static gboolean set_certificate_idle_cb (SetCertificateAsyncData *data) { @@ -234,12 +248,41 @@ request_certificate_async_cb (SoupMessage *msg, { SetCertificateAsyncData *data; - data = g_new (SetCertificateAsyncData, 1); + data = g_new0 (SetCertificateAsyncData, 1); data->msg = msg; data->certificate = certificate; g_idle_add_full (G_PRIORITY_DEFAULT_IDLE, (GSourceFunc)set_certificate_idle_cb, - data, g_free); + data, + (GDestroyNotify)set_certificate_async_data_free); + + return TRUE; +} + +static gboolean +set_certificate_password_idle_cb (SetCertificateAsyncData *data) +{ + g_tls_password_set_value (data->tls_password, data->password, -1); + soup_message_tls_client_certificate_password_request_complete (data->msg); + + return FALSE; +} + +static gboolean +request_certificate_password_async_cb (SoupMessage *msg, + GTlsPassword *password, + const guchar *pin) +{ + SetCertificateAsyncData *data; + + data = g_new (SetCertificateAsyncData, 1); + data->msg = msg; + data->tls_password = g_object_ref (password); + data->password = pin; + g_idle_add_full (G_PRIORITY_DEFAULT_IDLE, + (GSourceFunc)set_certificate_password_idle_cb, + data, + (GDestroyNotify)set_certificate_async_data_free); return TRUE; } @@ -252,7 +295,7 @@ do_tls_interaction_msg_test (gconstpointer data) SoupMessage *msg; GBytes *body; GTlsDatabase *tls_db; - GTlsCertificate *certificate, *wrong_certificate; + GTlsCertificate *certificate, *wrong_certificate, *pkcs11_certificate; GError *error = NULL; SOUP_TEST_SKIP_IF_NO_TLS; @@ -348,11 +391,35 @@ do_tls_interaction_msg_test (gconstpointer data) g_clear_error (&error); g_object_unref (msg); + /* Using PKCS#11 works, and asks for a PIN */ + pkcs11_certificate = g_tls_certificate_new_from_pkcs11_uris ( + "pkcs11:model=mock;serial=1;token=Mock%20Certificate;id=%4D%6F%63%6B%20%43%65%72%74%69%66%69%63%61%74%65;object=Mock%20Certificate;type=cert", + "pkcs11:model=mock;serial=1;token=Mock%20Certificate;id=%4D%6F%63%6B%20%50%72%69%76%61%74%65%20%4B%65%79;object=Mock%20Private%20Key;type=private", + &error + ); + g_assert_no_error (error); + g_assert_nonnull (pkcs11_certificate); + g_assert_true (G_IS_TLS_CERTIFICATE (pkcs11_certificate)); + msg = soup_message_new_from_uri ("GET", uri); + soup_message_add_flags (msg, SOUP_MESSAGE_NEW_CONNECTION); + g_signal_connect (msg, "request-certificate", + G_CALLBACK (request_certificate_async_cb), + pkcs11_certificate); + g_signal_connect (msg, "request-certificate-password", + G_CALLBACK (request_certificate_password_async_cb), + "ABC123"); + body = soup_test_session_async_send (session, msg, NULL, &error); + g_assert_no_error (error); + g_clear_error (&error); + g_bytes_unref (body); + g_object_unref (msg); + g_signal_handlers_disconnect_by_data (server, tls_db); soup_test_session_abort_unref (session); g_object_unref (certificate); g_object_unref (wrong_certificate); + g_object_unref (pkcs11_certificate); } static void @@ -376,6 +443,15 @@ main (int argc, char **argv) test_init (argc, argv, NULL); +#if HAVE_GNUTLS + char *module_path = soup_test_build_filename_abs (G_TEST_BUILT, "mock-pkcs11.so", NULL); + g_assert_true (g_file_test (module_path, G_FILE_TEST_EXISTS)); + + g_assert (gnutls_pkcs11_init (GNUTLS_PKCS11_FLAG_MANUAL, NULL) == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS); + g_assert (gnutls_pkcs11_add_provider (module_path, NULL) == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS); + g_free (module_path); +#endif + if (tls_available) { server = soup_test_server_new (SOUP_TEST_SERVER_IN_THREAD); soup_server_add_handler (server, NULL, server_handler, NULL, NULL); |