| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Attempt to obtain a Kerberos ticket from LIBGIT2.ORG and then clone the
Negotiate-protected site at test.libgit2.org with that ticket.
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libgit2 does not use `type_t` suffixes as it's redundant; thus, rename
`git_merge_diff_type_t` to `git_merge_diff_t` for consistency.
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Do not return free'd git_repository object on error
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Regression introduced in commit dde6d9c706bf1ecab545da55ab874a016587af1f.
This issue causes lots of crashes in TortoiseGit.
Signed-off-by: Sven Strickroth <email@cs-ware.de>
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This requires adding a new symbolic ref to the testrepo fixture.
Some of the existing tests attempt to delete HEAD, expecting a different failure. Introduce and use a non-HEAD symbolic ref instead.
Adjust a few other tests as needed.
Fixes #5357
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On Windows platforms, we need some logic to emulate symlink(3P) defined
by POSIX. As unprivileged symlinks on Windows are a rather new feature,
our current implementation is comparatively new and still has some
rough edges in special cases.
One such case is relative symlinks. While relative symlinks to files in
the same directory work as expected, libgit2 currently fails to create
reltaive symlinks pointing into other directories. This is due to the
fact that we forgot to translate the Unix-style target path to
Windows-style. Most importantly, we are currently not converting
directory separators from "/" to "\".
Fix the issue by calling `git_win32_path_canonicalize` on the target.
Add a test that verifies our ability to create such relative links
across directories.
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Some servers leave the query parameters intact in the
Location header when responding with a redirect.
The service_suffix removal check as written assumed
that the server removed them.
Handle both cases.
Along with PR #5325, this fixes #5321.
There are two new tests. The first already passed;
the second previously failed.
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When setting up relative URLs for a submodule, then we resolve it to
the actual location and write that into ".git/config" instead of
writing the relative value. We do not yet have a test to nail down this
behaviour, which is now being added by this commit.
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branch: clarify documentation around branches
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As git_reference__name will reallocate storage to account for longer
names (it's actually allocator-dependent), it will cause all existing
pointers to the old object to become dangling, as they now point to
freed memory.
Fix the issue by renaming to a more descriptive name, and pass a pointer
to the actual reference that can safely be invalidated if the realloc
succeeds.
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attr: Update definition of binary macro
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Windows/DOS only supports drive letters that are alpha characters A-Z.
However, you can `subst` any one-character as a drive letter, including
numbers or even emoji. Test that we can identify emoji as drive
letters.
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Users may want to turn off core.protectNTFS, perhaps to import (and then
repair) a broken tree. Ensure that core.protectNTFS=false is honored.
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Enable core.protectNTFS by default everywhere and in every codepath, not
just on checkout.
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Test that when we enable core.protectNTFS that we cannot add
platform-specific invalid paths to the index.
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The name of the `add_invalid_filename` function suggests that we
_want_ to add an invalid filename. Rename the function to show that
we expect to _fail_ to add the invalid filename.
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Ensure that the new protection around .git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION rules are
enabled for using the treebuilder when core.protectNTFS is set.
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Ensure that the new protection around .git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION rules are
enabled for adding to the index when core.protectNTFS is set.
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The name of the `write_invalid_filename` function suggests that we
_want_ to write an invalid filename. Rename the function to show that
we expect to _fail_ to write the invalid filename.
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We just safe-guarded `.git` against NTFS Alternate Data Stream-related
attack vectors, and now it is time to do the same for `.gitmodules`.
Note: In the added regression test, we refrain from verifying all kinds
of variations between short names and NTFS Alternate Data Streams: as
the new code disallows _all_ Alternate Data Streams of `.gitmodules`, it
is enough to test one in order to know that all of them are guarded
against.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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A little-known feature of NTFS is that it offers to store metadata in
so-called "Alternate Data Streams" (inspired by Apple's "resource
forks") that are copied together with the file they are associated with.
These Alternate Data Streams can be accessed via `<file name>:<stream
name>:<stream type>`.
Directories, too, have Alternate Data Streams, and they even have a
default stream type `$INDEX_ALLOCATION`. Which means that `abc/` and
`abc::$INDEX_ALLOCATION/` are actually equivalent.
This is of course another attack vector on the Git directory that we
definitely want to prevent.
On Windows, we already do this incidentally, by disallowing colons in
file/directory names.
While it looks as if files'/directories' Alternate Data Streams are not
accessible in the Windows Subsystem for Linux, and neither via
CIFS/SMB-mounted network shares in Linux, it _is_ possible to access
them on SMB-mounted network shares on macOS.
Therefore, let's go the extra mile and prevent this particular attack
_everywhere_. To keep things simple, let's just disallow *any* Alternate
Data Stream of `.git`.
This is libgit2's variant of CVE-2019-1352.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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The Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) is getting increasingly popular,
in particular because it makes it _so_ easy to run Linux software on
Windows' files, via the auto-mounted Windows drives (`C:\` is mapped to
`/mnt/c/`, no need to set that up manually).
Unfortunately, files/directories on the Windows drives can be accessed
via their _short names_, if that feature is enabled (which it is on the
`C:` drive by default).
Which means that we have to safeguard even our Linux users against the
short name attacks.
Further, while the default options of CIFS/SMB-mounts seem to disallow
accessing files on network shares via their short names on Linux/macOS,
it _is_ possible to do so with the right options.
So let's just safe-guard against short name attacks _everywhere_.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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When we expect a checkout operation to fail, but it succeeds, we
actually do not want to see the error messages that were generated in
the meantime for errors that were handled gracefully by the code (e.g.
when an object could not be found in a pack: in this case, the next
backend would have been given a chance to look up the object, and
probably would have found it because the checkout succeeded, after all).
Which means that in the specific case of `cl_git_fail()`, we actually
want to clear the global error state _after_ evaluating the command: we
know that any still-available error would be bogus, seeing as the
command succeeded (unexpectedly).
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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patch_parse: fix out-of-bounds reads caused by integer underflow
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The patch format for binary files is a simple Base85 encoding with a
length byte as prefix that encodes the current line's length. For each
line, we thus check whether the line's actual length matches its
expected length in order to not faultily apply a truncated patch. This
also acts as a check to verify that we're not reading outside of the
line's string:
if (encoded_len > ctx->parse_ctx.line_len - 1) {
error = git_parse_err(...);
goto done;
}
There is the possibility for an integer underflow, though. Given a line
with a single prefix byte, only, `line_len` will be zero when reaching
this check. As a result, subtracting one from that will result in an
integer underflow, causing us to assume that there's a wealth of bytes
available later on. Naturally, this may result in an out-of-bounds read.
Fix the issue by checking both `encoded_len` and `line_len` for a
non-zero value. The binary format doesn't make use of zero-length lines
anyway, so we need to know that there are both encoded bytes and
remaining characters available at all.
This patch also adds a test that works based on the last error message.
Checking error messages is usually too tightly coupled, but in fact
parsing the patch failed even before the change. Thus the only
possibility is to use e.g. Valgrind, but that'd result in us not
catching issues when run without Valgrind. As a result, using the error
message is considered a viable tradeoff as we know that we didn't start
decoding Base85 in the first place.
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tests: fix compiler warning if tracing is disabled
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If building libgit2's test suite with tracing disabled, then the
compiler will emit a warning due to the unused `message_prefix`
function. Fix the issue by wrapping the whole file into ifdef's for
`GIT_TRACE` and providing separate empty function implementations for
both `cl_global_trace_register` and `cl_global_trace_disable`.
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The test in config::stress::huge_section_with_many_values takes quite a
long time to execute. Hide it behind the GITTEST_INVASIVE_SPEED
environment varibale to not needlessly blow up execution time of tests.
As this environment variable is being set by the continuous integration,
we will execute it regularly anyway.
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diff: complete support for git patchid
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Current implementation of patchid is not computing a correct patchid
when given a patch where, for example, a new file is added or removed.
Some more corner cases need to be handled to have same behavior as git
patch-id command.
Add some more tests to cover those corner cases.
Signed-off-by: Gregory Herrero <gregory.herrero@oracle.com>
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When not shown binary data is added or removed in a patch, patch parser
is currently returning 'error -1 - corrupt git binary header at line 4'.
Fix it by correctly handling case where binary data is added/removed.
Signed-off-by: Gregory Herrero <gregory.herrero@oracle.com>
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Memory optimizations for config entries
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Multivars are configuration entries that have many values for the same
name; we can thus micro-optimize this case by just retaining the name of
the first configuration entry and freeing all the others, letting them
point to the string of the first entry.
The attached test case is an extreme example that demonstrates this. It
contains a section name that is approximately 500kB in size with 20.000
entries "a=b". Without the optimization, this would require at least
20000*500kB bytes, which is around 10GB. With this patch, it only
requires 500kB+20000*1B=20500kB.
The obvious culprit here is the section header, which we repeatedly
include in each of the configuration entry's names. This makes it very
easier for an adversary to provide a small configuration file that
disproportionally blows up in memory during processing and is thus a
feasible way for a denial-of-service attack. Unfortunately, we cannot
fix the root cause by e.g. having a separate "section" field that may
easily be deduplicated due to the `git_config_entry` structure being
part of our public API. So this micro-optimization is the best we can do
for now.
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Improve trace support in tests
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Only show test trace execution when the CLAR_TRACE_TESTS environment
variable is set. This reduces the noise during tracing.
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Move `git_off_t` to `git_object_size_t`
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Prefer `off64_t` internally.
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We currently talk to Azure Repos for executing an online test
(online::clone::path_whitespace). Add a simpler test to talk to Azure
Repos to make it obvious that strange test failures are not likely the
whitespace in the path, but actually a function of talking to Azure
Repos itself.
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For some patches, it is not possible to derive the old and new file
paths from the patch header's first line, most importantly when they
contain spaces. In such a case, we derive both paths from the "---" and
"+++" lines, which allow for non-ambiguous parsing. We fail to use these
paths when parsing binary patches without data, though, as we always
expect the header paths to be filled in.
Fix this by using the "---"/"+++" paths by default and only fall back to
header paths if they aren't set. If neither of those paths are set, we
just return an error. Add two tests to verify this behaviour, one of
which would have previously caused a segfault.
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config_mem: implement support for snapshots
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Similar as in commit dadbb33b6 (Fix crash if snapshotting a
config_snapshot, 2019-11-01), let's implement snapshots for in-memory
configuration entries. As this deletes more code than it adds, it
doesn't make any sense to not allow for this and allows users to treat
config backends mostly the same.
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When parsing header paths from a patch, we reject any patches with empty
paths as malformed patches. We perform the check whether a path is empty
before sanitizing it, though, which may lead to a path becoming empty
after the check, e.g. if we have trimmed whitespace. This may lead to a
segfault later when any part of our patching logic actually references
such a path, which may then be a `NULL` pointer.
Fix the issue by performing the check after sanitizing. Add tests to
catch the issue as they would have produced a segfault previosuly.
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Fix crash if snapshotting a config_snapshot
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Signed-off-by: Sven Strickroth <email@cs-ware.de>
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reflogs: fix behaviour around reflogs with newlines
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In previous versions, libgit2 could be coerced into writing reflog
messages with embedded newlines into the reflog by using
`git_stash_save` with a message containing newlines. While the root
cause is fixed now, it was noticed that upstream git is in fact able to
read such corrupted reflog messages just fine.
Make the reflog parser more lenient in order to just skip over
malformatted reflog lines to bring us in line with git. This requires us
to change an existing test that verified that we do indeed _fail_ to
parse such logs.
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