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/*
* Copyright (C) 2000-2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* Author: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
*
* This file is part of GnuTLS.
*
* The GnuTLS is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of
* the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>
*
*/
/* This file contains the RSA key exchange part of the certificate
* authentication.
*/
#include "gnutls_int.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "errors.h"
#include "dh.h"
#include "num.h"
#include "datum.h"
#include <auth/cert.h>
#include <pk.h>
#include <algorithms.h>
#include <global.h>
#include "debug.h"
#include <tls-sig.h>
#include <x509.h>
#include <random.h>
#include <mpi.h>
#include <abstract_int.h>
#include <auth/rsa_common.h>
int _gnutls_gen_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t, gnutls_buffer_st *);
static int proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t, uint8_t *, size_t);
const mod_auth_st rsa_auth_struct = {
"RSA",
_gnutls_gen_cert_server_crt,
_gnutls_gen_cert_client_crt,
NULL, /* gen server kx */
_gnutls_gen_rsa_client_kx,
_gnutls_gen_cert_client_crt_vrfy, /* gen client cert vrfy */
_gnutls_gen_cert_server_cert_req, /* server cert request */
_gnutls_proc_crt,
_gnutls_proc_crt,
NULL, /* proc server kx */
proc_rsa_client_kx, /* proc client kx */
_gnutls_proc_cert_client_crt_vrfy, /* proc client cert vrfy */
_gnutls_proc_cert_cert_req /* proc server cert request */
};
static
int check_key_usage_for_enc(gnutls_session_t session, unsigned key_usage)
{
if (key_usage != 0) {
if (!(key_usage & GNUTLS_KEY_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT) && !(key_usage & GNUTLS_KEY_KEY_AGREEMENT)) {
gnutls_assert();
if (session->internals.allow_key_usage_violation == 0) {
_gnutls_audit_log(session,
"Peer's certificate does not allow encryption. Key usage violation detected.\n");
return GNUTLS_E_KEY_USAGE_VIOLATION;
} else {
_gnutls_audit_log(session,
"Peer's certificate does not allow encryption. Key usage violation detected (ignored).\n");
}
}
}
return 0;
}
/* This function reads the RSA parameters from peer's certificate;
*
* IMPORTANT:
* Currently this function gets only called on the client side
* during generation of the client kx msg. This function
* retrieves the RSA params from the peer's certificate. That is in
* this case the server's certificate. As of GNUTLS version 3.6.4 it is
* possible to negotiate different certificate types for client and
* server. Therefore the correct cert type needs to be retrieved to be
* used for the _gnutls_get_auth_info_pcert call. If this
* function is to be called on the server side in the future, extra
* checks need to be build in order to retrieve te correct
* certificate type.
*/
int
_gnutls_get_public_rsa_params(gnutls_session_t session,
gnutls_pk_params_st * params)
{
int ret;
cert_auth_info_t info;
unsigned key_usage;
gnutls_pcert_st peer_cert;
gnutls_certificate_type_t cert_type;
assert(!IS_SERVER(session));
/* normal non export case */
info = _gnutls_get_auth_info(session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE);
if (info == NULL || info->ncerts == 0) {
gnutls_assert();
return GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
// Get the negotiated server certificate type
cert_type = gnutls_certificate_type_get2(session, GNUTLS_CTYPE_SERVER);
ret = _gnutls_get_auth_info_pcert(&peer_cert, cert_type, info);
if (ret < 0) {
gnutls_assert();
return ret;
}
gnutls_pubkey_get_key_usage(peer_cert.pubkey, &key_usage);
ret = check_key_usage_for_enc(session, key_usage);
if (ret < 0) {
gnutls_assert();
goto cleanup2;
}
gnutls_pk_params_init(params);
ret = _gnutls_pubkey_get_mpis(peer_cert.pubkey, params);
if (ret < 0) {
ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto cleanup2;
}
gnutls_pcert_deinit(&peer_cert);
return 0;
cleanup2:
gnutls_pcert_deinit(&peer_cert);
return ret;
}
static int
proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
size_t _data_size)
{
const char attack_error[] = "auth_rsa: Possible PKCS #1 attack\n";
gnutls_datum_t ciphertext;
int ret, dsize;
ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
volatile uint8_t check_ver_min;
volatile uint32_t ok;
#ifdef ENABLE_SSL3
if (get_num_version(session) == GNUTLS_SSL3) {
/* SSL 3.0
*/
ciphertext.data = data;
ciphertext.size = data_size;
} else
#endif
{
/* TLS 1.0+
*/
DECR_LEN(data_size, 2);
ciphertext.data = &data[2];
dsize = _gnutls_read_uint16(data);
if (dsize != data_size) {
gnutls_assert();
return GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET_LENGTH;
}
ciphertext.size = dsize;
}
ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
check_ver_min = (session->internals.allow_wrong_pms == 0);
session->key.key.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
if (session->key.key.data == NULL) {
gnutls_assert();
return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
}
session->key.key.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
/* Fallback value when decryption fails. Needs to be unpredictable. */
ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, session->key.key.data,
GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
if (ret < 0) {
gnutls_free(session->key.key.data);
session->key.key.data = NULL;
session->key.key.size = 0;
gnutls_assert();
return ret;
}
ret =
gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key,
0, &ciphertext, session->key.key.data,
session->key.key.size);
/* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
* in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
* channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread very carefully */
/* Error handling logic:
* In case decryption fails then don't inform the peer. Just use the
* random key previously generated. (in order to avoid attack against
* pkcs-1 formating).
*
* If we get version mismatches no error is returned either. We
* proceed normally. This is to defend against the attack described
* in the paper "Attacking RSA-based sessions in SSL/TLS" by
* Vlastimil Klima, Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
*/
/* ok is 0 in case of error and 1 in case of success. */
/* if ret < 0 */
ok = CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(ret, 0);
/* session->key.key.data[0] must equal ver_maj */
ok &= CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[0], ver_maj);
/* if check_ver_min then session->key.key.data[1] must equal ver_min */
ok &= CONSTCHECK_NOT_EQUAL(check_ver_min, 0) &
CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[1], ver_min);
if (ok) {
/* call logging function unconditionally so all branches are
* indistinguishable for timing and cache access when debug
* logging is disabled */
_gnutls_no_log("%s", attack_error);
} else {
_gnutls_debug_log("%s", attack_error);
}
/* This is here to avoid the version check attack
* discussed above.
*/
session->key.key.data[0] = ver_maj;
session->key.key.data[1] = ver_min;
return 0;
}
/* return RSA(random) using the peers public key
*/
int
_gnutls_gen_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session,
gnutls_buffer_st * data)
{
cert_auth_info_t auth = session->key.auth_info;
gnutls_datum_t sdata; /* data to send */
gnutls_pk_params_st params;
int ret;
if (auth == NULL) {
/* this shouldn't have happened. The proc_certificate
* function should have detected that.
*/
gnutls_assert();
return GNUTLS_E_INSUFFICIENT_CREDENTIALS;
}
session->key.key.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
session->key.key.data = gnutls_malloc(session->key.key.size);
if (session->key.key.data == NULL) {
gnutls_assert();
return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
}
ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_RANDOM, session->key.key.data,
session->key.key.size);
if (ret < 0) {
gnutls_assert();
return ret;
}
if (session->internals.rsa_pms_version[0] == 0) {
session->key.key.data[0] =
_gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
session->key.key.data[1] =
_gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
} else { /* use the version provided */
session->key.key.data[0] =
session->internals.rsa_pms_version[0];
session->key.key.data[1] =
session->internals.rsa_pms_version[1];
}
/* move RSA parameters to key (session).
*/
if ((ret = _gnutls_get_public_rsa_params(session, ¶ms)) < 0) {
gnutls_assert();
return ret;
}
ret =
_gnutls_pk_encrypt(GNUTLS_PK_RSA, &sdata, &session->key.key,
¶ms);
gnutls_pk_params_release(¶ms);
if (ret < 0)
return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
#ifdef ENABLE_SSL3
if (get_num_version(session) == GNUTLS_SSL3) {
/* SSL 3.0 */
ret =
_gnutls_buffer_append_data(data, sdata.data,
sdata.size);
_gnutls_free_datum(&sdata);
return ret;
} else
#endif
{ /* TLS 1.x */
ret =
_gnutls_buffer_append_data_prefix(data, 16, sdata.data,
sdata.size);
_gnutls_free_datum(&sdata);
return ret;
}
}
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