path: root/doc/protocol/draft-ietf-tls-psk-09.txt

TLS Working Group                                         P. Eronen, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                     Nokia
Expires: December 20, 2005                            H. Tschofenig, Ed.
                                                                 Siemens
                                                           June 21, 2005


     Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
                       draft-ietf-tls-psk-09.txt

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).

Abstract

   This document specifies three sets of new ciphersuites for the
   Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to support authentication
   based on pre-shared keys.  These pre-shared keys are symmetric keys,
   shared in advance among the communicating parties.  The first set of
   ciphersuites uses only symmetric key operations for authentication.
   The second set uses a Diffie-Hellman exchange authenticated with a
   pre-shared key; and the third set combines public key authentication
   of the server with pre-shared key authentication of the client.






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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
       1.1  Applicability statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       1.2  Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  PSK key exchange algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  DHE_PSK key exchange algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   4.  RSA_PSK key exchange algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   5.  Conformance requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       5.1  PSK identity encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       5.2  Identity hint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       5.3  Requirements for TLS implementations  . . . . . . . . . . 10
       5.4  Requirements for management interfaces  . . . . . . . . . 10
   6.  IANA considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       7.1  Perfect forward secrecy (PFS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       7.2  Brute-force and dictionary attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       7.3  Identity privacy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       7.4  Implementation notes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   8.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       9.1  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       9.2  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Authors' and Contributors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   Appendix A.  Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16


























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1.  Introduction

   Usually TLS uses public key certificates [TLS] or Kerberos [KERB] for
   authentication.  This document describes how to use symmetric keys
   (later called pre-shared keys or PSKs), shared in advance among the
   communicating parties, to establish a TLS connection.

   There are basically two reasons why one might want to do this:

   o  First, using pre-shared keys can, depending on the ciphersuite,
      avoid the need for public key operations.  This is useful if TLS
      is used in performance-constrained environments with limited CPU
      power.

   o  Second, pre-shared keys may be more convenient from a key
      management point of view.  For instance, in closed environments
      where the connections are mostly configured manually in advance,
      it may be easier to configure a PSK than to use certificates.
      Another case is when the parties already have a mechanism for
      setting up a shared secret key, and that mechanism could be used
      to "bootstrap" a key for authenticating a TLS connection.

   This document specifies three sets of new ciphersuites for TLS.
   These ciphersuites use new key exchange algorithms, and re-use
   existing cipher and MAC algorithms from [TLS] and [AES].  A summary
   of these ciphersuites is shown below.

      CipherSuite                        Key Exchange  Cipher       Hash

      TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA           PSK           RC4_128       SHA
      TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA      PSK           3DES_EDE_CBC  SHA
      TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA       PSK           AES_128_CBC   SHA
      TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA       PSK           AES_256_CBC   SHA
      TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA       DHE_PSK       RC4_128       SHA
      TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA  DHE_PSK       3DES_EDE_CBC  SHA
      TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA   DHE_PSK       AES_128_CBC   SHA
      TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA   DHE_PSK       AES_256_CBC   SHA
      TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA       RSA_PSK       RC4_128       SHA
      TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA  RSA_PSK       3DES_EDE_CBC  SHA
      TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA   RSA_PSK       AES_128_CBC   SHA
      TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA   RSA_PSK       AES_256_CBC   SHA

   The first set of ciphersuites (with PSK key exchange algorithm),
   defined in Section 2 use only symmetric key algorithms, and are thus
   especially suitable for performance-constrained environments.

   The ciphersuites in Section 3 (with DHE_PSK key exchange algorithm)
   use a PSK to authenticate a Diffie-Hellman exchange.  These



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   ciphersuites protect against dictionary attacks by passive
   eavesdroppers (but not active attackers), and also provide Perfect
   Forward Secrecy (PFS).

   The third set of ciphersuites (with RSA_PSK key exchange algorithm),
   defined in Section 4, combine public key based authentication of the
   server (using RSA and certificates) with mutual authentication using
   a PSK.

1.1  Applicability statement

   The ciphersuites defined in this document are intended for a rather
   limited set of applications, usually involving only a very small
   number of clients and servers.  Even in such environments, other
   alternatives may be more appropriate.

   If the main goal is to avoid PKIs, another possibility worth
   considering is to use self-signed certificates with public key
   fingerprints.  Instead of manually configuring a shared secret in,
   for instance, some configuration file, a fingerprint (hash) of the
   other party's public key (or certificate) could be placed there
   instead.

   It is also possible to use the SRP (Secure Remote Password)
   ciphersuites for shared secret authentication [SRP].  SRP was
   designed to be used with passwords, and incorporates protection
   against dictionary attacks.  However, it is computationally more
   expensive than the PSK ciphersuites in Section 2.

1.2  Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [KEYWORDS].

















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2.  PSK key exchange algorithm

   This section defines the PSK key exchange algorithm and associated
   ciphersuites.  These ciphersuites use only symmetric key algorithms.

   It is assumed that the reader is familiar with ordinary TLS
   handshake, shown below.  The elements in parenthesis are not included
   when PSK key exchange algorithm is used, and "*" indicates a
   situation-dependent message that is not always sent.

      Client                                               Server
      ------                                               ------

      ClientHello                  -------->
                                                      ServerHello
                                                    (Certificate)
                                               ServerKeyExchange*
                                             (CertificateRequest)
                                   <--------      ServerHelloDone
      (Certificate)
      ClientKeyExchange
      (CertificateVerify)
      ChangeCipherSpec
      Finished                     -------->
                                                 ChangeCipherSpec
                                   <--------             Finished
      Application Data             <------->     Application Data

   The client indicates its willingness to use pre-shared key
   authentication by including one or more PSK ciphersuites in the
   ClientHello message.  If the TLS server also wants to use pre-shared
   keys, it selects one of the PSK ciphersuites, places the selected
   ciphersuite in the ServerHello message, and includes an appropriate
   ServerKeyExchange message (see below).  The Certificate and
   CertificateRequest payloads are omitted from the response.

   Both clients and servers may have pre-shared keys with several
   different parties.  The client indicates which key to use by
   including a "PSK identity" in the ClientKeyExchange message (note
   that unlike in [SHAREDKEYS], the session_id field in ClientHello
   message keeps its usual meaning).  To help the client in selecting
   which identity to use, the server can provide a "PSK identity hint"
   in the ServerKeyExchange message.  If no hint is provided, the
   ServerKeyExchange message is omitted.  See Section 5 for more
   detailed description of these fields.

   The format of the ServerKeyExchange and ClientKeyExchange messages is
   shown below.



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      struct {
          select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
              /* other cases for rsa, diffie_hellman, etc. */
              case psk:  /* NEW */
                  opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>;
          };
      } ServerKeyExchange;

      struct {
          select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
              /* other cases for rsa, diffie_hellman, etc. */
              case psk:   /* NEW */
                  opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>;
          } exchange_keys;
      } ClientKeyExchange;

   The premaster secret is formed as follows: if the PSK is N octets
   long, concatenate a uint16 with the value N, N zero octets, a second
   uint16 with the value N, and the PSK itself.

      Note 1: All the ciphersuites in this document share the same
      general structure for the premaster secret, namely

         struct {
             opaque other_secret<0..2^16-1>;
             opaque psk<0..2^16-1>;
         };

      Here "other_secret" is either zeroes (plain PSK case), or comes
      from the Diffie-Hellman or RSA exchange (DHE_PSK and RSA_PSK,
      respectively).  See Sections 3 and 4 for a more detailed
      description.

      Note 2: Using zeroes for "other_secret" effectively means that
      only the HMAC-SHA1 part (but not the HMAC-MD5 part) of the TLS PRF
      is used when constructing the master secret.  This was considered
      more elegant from an analytical viewpoint than, for instance,
      using the same key for both the HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA1 parts.  See
      [KRAWCZYK] for a more detailed rationale.

   The TLS handshake is authenticated using the Finished messages as
   usual.

   If the server does not recognize the PSK identity, it MAY respond
   with an "unknown_psk_identity" alert message.  Alternatively, if the
   server wishes to hide the fact that the PSK identity was not known,
   it MAY continue the protocol as if the PSK identity existed but the
   key was incorrect: that is, respond with a "decrypt_error" alert.



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3.  DHE_PSK key exchange algorithm

   This section defines additional ciphersuites that use a PSK to
   authenticate a Diffie-Hellman exchange.  These ciphersuites give some
   additional protection against dictionary attacks, and also provide
   Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).  See Section 7 for discussion of
   related security considerations.

   When these ciphersuites are used, the ServerKeyExchange and
   ClientKeyExchange messages also include the Diffie-Hellman
   parameters.  The PSK identity and identity hint fields have the same
   meaning as in the previous section (note that the ServerKeyExchange
   message is always sent even if no PSK identity hint is provided).

   The format of the ServerKeyExchange and ClientKeyExchange messages is
   shown below.

      struct {
          select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
              /* other cases for rsa, diffie_hellman, etc. */
              case diffie_hellman_psk:  /* NEW */
                  opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>;
                  ServerDHParams params;
          };
      } ServerKeyExchange;

      struct {
          select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
              /* other cases for rsa, diffie_hellman, etc. */
              case diffie_hellman_psk:   /* NEW */
                  opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>;
                  ClientDiffieHellmanPublic public;
          } exchange_keys;
      } ClientKeyExchange;

   The premaster secret is formed as follows.  First, perform the
   Diffie-Hellman computation in the same way as for other
   Diffie-Hellman based ciphersuites in [TLS].  Let Z be the value
   produced by this computation (with leading zero bytes stripped as in
   other Diffie-Hellman based ciphersuites).  Concatenate a uint16
   containing the length of Z (in octets), Z itself, a uint16 containing
   the length of the PSK (in octets), and the PSK itself.

   This corresponds to the general structure for the premaster secrets
   (see Note 1 in Section 2) in this document, with "other_secret"
   containing Z.





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4.  RSA_PSK key exchange algorithm

   The ciphersuites in this section use RSA and certificates to
   authenticate the server, in addition to using a PSK.

   As in normal RSA ciphersuites, the server must send a Certificate
   message.  The format of the ServerKeyExchange and ClientKeyExchange
   messages is shown below.  If no PSK identity hint is provided, the
   ServerKeyExchange message is omitted.

      struct {
          select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
              /* other cases for rsa, diffie_hellman, etc. */
              case rsa_psk:  /* NEW */
                  opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>;
          };
      } ServerKeyExchange;

      struct {
          select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
              /* other cases for rsa, diffie_hellman, etc. */
              case rsa_psk:   /* NEW */
                  opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>;
                  EncryptedPreMasterSecret;
          } exchange_keys;
      } ClientKeyExchange;

   The EncryptedPreMasterSecret field sent from the client to the server
   contains a 2-byte version number and a 46-byte random value,
   encrypted using the server's RSA public key as described in Section
   7.4.7.1 of [TLS].  The actual premaster secret is formed by both
   parties as follows: concatenate a uint16 with the value 48, the
   2-byte version number and the 46-byte random value, a uint16
   containing the length of the PSK (in octets), and the PSK itself.
   (The premaster secret is thus 52 octets longer than the PSK.)

   This corresponds to the general structure for the premaster secrets
   (see Note 1 in Section 2) in this document, with "other_secret"
   containing both the 2-byte version number and the 46-byte random
   value.

   Neither the normal RSA ciphersuites nor these RSA_PSK ciphersuites
   themselves specify what the certificates contain (in addition to the
   RSA public key), or how the certificates are to be validated.  In
   particular, it is possible to use the RSA_PSK ciphersuites with
   unvalidated self-signed certificates to provide somewhat similar
   protection against dictionary attacks as the DHE_PSK ciphersuites
   defined in Section 3.



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5.  Conformance requirements

   It is expected that different types of identities are useful for
   different applications running over TLS.  This document does not
   therefore mandate the use of any particular type of identity (such as
   IPv4 address or FQDN).

   However, the TLS client and server clearly have to agree on the
   identities and keys to be used.  To improve interoperability, this
   document places requirements on how the identity is encoded in the
   protocol, and what kinds of identities and keys implementations have
   to support.

   The requirements for implementations are divided to two categories,
   requirements for TLS implementations and management interfaces.  In
   this context, "TLS implementation" refers to a TLS library or module
   that is intended to be used for several different purposes, while
   "management interface" would typically be implemented by a particular
   application that uses TLS.

   This document does not specify how the server stores the keys and
   identities, or how exactly it finds the key corresponding to the
   identity it receives.  For instance, if the identity is a domain
   name, it might be appropriate to do a case-insensitive lookup.  It is
   RECOMMENDED that before looking up the key, the server processes the
   PSK identity with a stringprep profile [STRINGPREP] appropriate for
   the identity in question (such as Nameprep [NAMEPREP] for components
   of domain names or SASLprep for usernames [SASLPREP]).

5.1  PSK identity encoding

   The PSK identity MUST be first converted to a character string, and
   then encoded to octets using UTF-8 [UTF8].  For instance,

   o  IPv4 addresses are sent as dotted-decimal strings (e.g.,
      "192.0.2.1"), not as 32-bit integers in network byte order.

   o  Domain names are sent in their usual text form (e.g.,
      "www.example.com" or "embedded.dot.example.net"), not in DNS
      protocol format.

   o  X.500 Distinguished Names are sent in their string representation
      [LDAPDN], not as BER-encoded ASN.1.

   This encoding is clearly not optimal for many types of identities.
   It was chosen to avoid identity type specific parsing and encoding
   code in implementations where the identity is configured by a person
   using some kind of management interface.  Requiring such identity



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   type specific code would also increase the chances for
   interoperability problems resulting from different implementations
   supporting different identity types.

5.2  Identity hint

   In the absence of an application profile specification specifying
   otherwise, servers SHOULD NOT provide an identity hint and clients
   MUST ignore the identity hint field.  Applications that do use this
   field MUST specify its contents, how the value is chosen by the TLS
   server, and what the TLS client is expected to do with the value.

5.3  Requirements for TLS implementations

   TLS implementations supporting these ciphersuites MUST support
   arbitrary PSK identities up to 128 octets in length, and arbitrary
   PSKs up to 64 octets in length.  Supporting longer identities and
   keys is RECOMMENDED.

5.4  Requirements for management interfaces

   In the absence of an application profile specification specifying
   otherwise, a management interface for entering the PSK and/or PSK
   identity MUST support the following:

   o  Entering PSK identities consisting of up to 128 printable Unicode
      characters.  Supporting as wide character repertoire and as long
      identities as feasible is RECOMMENDED.

   o  Entering PSKs up to 64 octets in length as ASCII strings and in
      hexadecimal encoding.




















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6.  IANA considerations

   IANA does not currently have a registry for TLS ciphersuite or alert
   numbers, so there are no IANA actions associated with this document.

   For easier reference in the future, the ciphersuite numbers defined
   in this document are summarized below.

      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA          = { 0x00, 0x8A };
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA     = { 0x00, 0x8B };
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA      = { 0x00, 0x8C };
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA      = { 0x00, 0x8D };
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA      = { 0x00, 0x8E };
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0x00, 0x8F };
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA  = { 0x00, 0x90 };
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA  = { 0x00, 0x91 };
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA      = { 0x00, 0x92 };
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0x00, 0x93 };
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA  = { 0x00, 0x94 };
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA  = { 0x00, 0x95 };

   This document also defines a new TLS alert message,
   unknown_psk_identity(115).

7.  Security Considerations

   As with all schemes involving shared keys, special care should be
   taken to protect the shared values and to limit their exposure over
   time.

7.1  Perfect forward secrecy (PFS)

   The PSK and RSA_PSK ciphersuites defined in this document do not
   provide Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).  That is, if the shared secret
   key (in PSK ciphersuites), or both the shared secret key and the RSA
   private key (in RSA_PSK ciphersuites), is somehow compromised, an
   attacker can decrypt old conversations.

   The DHE_PSK ciphersuites provide Perfect Forward Secrecy if a fresh
   DH private key is generated for each handshake.

7.2  Brute-force and dictionary attacks

   Use of a fixed shared secret of limited entropy (for example, a PSK
   that is relatively short, or was chosen by a human and thus may
   contain less entropy than its length would imply) may allow an
   attacker to perform a brute-force or dictionary attack to recover the
   secret.  This may be either an off-line attack (against a captured



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   TLS handshake messages), or an on-line attack where the attacker
   attempts to connect to the server and tries different keys.

   For the PSK ciphersuites, an attacker can get the information
   required for an off-line attack by eavesdropping a TLS handshake, or
   by getting a valid client to attempt connection with the attacker (by
   tricking the client to connect to wrong address, or intercepting a
   connection attempt to the correct address, for instance).

   For the DHE_PSK ciphersuites, an attacker can obtain the information
   by getting a valid client to attempt connection with the attacker.
   Passive eavesdropping alone is not sufficient.

   For the RSA_PSK ciphersuites, only the server (authenticated using
   RSA and certificates) can obtain sufficient information for an
   off-line attack.

   It is RECOMMENDED that implementations that allow the administrator
   to manually configure the PSK also provide a functionality for
   generating a new random PSK, taking [RANDOMNESS] into account.

7.3  Identity privacy

   The PSK identity is sent in cleartext.  While using a user name or
   other similar string as the PSK identity is the most straightforward
   option, it may lead to problems in some environments since an
   eavesdropper is able to identify the communicating parties.  Even
   when the identity does not reveal any information itself, reusing the
   same identity over time may eventually allow an attacker to perform
   traffic analysis to identify the parties.  It should be noted that
   this is no worse than client certificates, since they are also sent
   in cleartext.

7.4  Implementation notes

   The implementation notes in [TLS11] about correct implementation and
   use of RSA (including Section 7.4.7.1) and Diffie-Hellman (including
   Appendix F.1.1.3) apply to the DHE_PSK and RSA_PSK ciphersuites as
   well.

8.  Acknowledgments

   The protocol defined in this document is heavily based on work by Tim
   Dierks and Peter Gutmann, and borrows some text from [SHAREDKEYS] and
   [AES].  The DHE_PSK and RSA_PSK ciphersuites are based on earlier
   work in [KEYEX].

   Valuable feedback was also provided by Bernard Aboba, Lakshminath



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   Dondeti, Philip Ginzboorg, Peter Gutmann, Sam Hartman, Russ Housley,
   David Jablon, Nikos Mavroyanopoulos, Bodo Moeller, Eric Rescorla, and
   Mika Tervonen.

   When the first version of this draft was almost ready, the authors
   learned that something similar had been proposed already in 1996
   [PASSAUTH].  However, this draft is not intended for web password
   authentication, but rather for other uses of TLS.

9.  References

9.1  Normative References

   [AES]      Chown, P., "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
              Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC
              3268, June 2002.

   [KEYWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RANDOMNESS]
              Eastlake, D., 3rd, Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
              "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
              June 2005.

   [TLS]      Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
              RFC 2246, January 1999.

   [UTF8]     Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
              10646", RFC 3629, November 2003.

9.2  Informative References

   [KERB]     Medvinsky, A. and M. Hur, "Addition of Kerberos Cipher
              Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 2712,
              October 1999.

   [KEYEX]    Badra, M., Cherkaoui, O., Hajjeh, I. and A. Serhrouchni,
              "Pre-Shared-Key key Exchange methods for TLS",
              draft-badra-tls-key-exchange-00 (expired), August 2004.

   [KRAWCZYK] Krawczyk, H., "Re: TLS shared keys PRF",  message on
              ietf-tls@lists.certicom.com mailing list 2004-01-13,
              http://www.imc.org/ietf-tls/mail-archive/msg04098.html.

   [LDAPDN]   Zeilenga, K., "LDAP: String Representation of
              Distinguished Names", draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16 (work in
              progress), February 2005.



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   [NAMEPREP] Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Nameprep: A Stringprep
              Profile for Internationalized Domain Names (IDN)", RFC
              3491, March 2003.

   [PASSAUTH] Simon, D., "Addition of Shared Key Authentication to
              Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
              draft-ietf-tls-passauth-00 (expired), November 1996.

   [SASLPREP] Zeilenga, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep Profile for User Names
              and Passwords", RFC 4013, February 2005.

   [SHAREDKEYS]
              Gutmann, P., "Use of Shared Keys in the TLS Protocol",
              draft-ietf-tls-sharedkeys-02 (expired), October 2003.

   [SRP]      Taylor, D., Wu, T., Mavroyanopoulos, N. and T. Perrin,
              "Using SRP for TLS Authentication", draft-ietf-tls-srp-09
              (work in progress), March 2005.

   [STRINGPREP]
              Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of
              Internationalized Strings ("stringprep")", RFC 3454,
              December 2002.

   [TLS11]    Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The TLS Protocol Version
              1.1", draft-ietf-tls-rfc2246-bis-12 (work in progress),
              June 2005.
























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Authors' and Contributors' Addresses

   Pasi Eronen
   Nokia Research Center
   P.O. Box 407
   FIN-00045 Nokia Group
   Finland
   Email: pasi.eronen@nokia.com


   Hannes Tschofenig
   Siemens
   Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
   Munich, Bayern  81739
   Germany
   Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com


   Mohamad Badra
   ENST Telecom
   46 rue Barrault
   75634 Paris
   France
   Email: Mohamad.Badra@enst.fr


   Omar Cherkaoui
   UQAM University
   Montreal (Quebec)
   Canada
   Email: cherkaoui.omar@uqam.ca


   Ibrahim Hajjeh
   ENST Telecom
   46 rue Barrault
   75634 Paris
   France
   Email: Ibrahim.Hajjeh@enst.fr


   Ahmed Serhrouchni
   ENST Telecom
   46 rue Barrault
   75634 Paris
   France
   Email: Ahmed.Serhrouchni@enst.fr




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Appendix A.  Changelog

   (This section should be removed by the RFC Editor before
   publication.)

   Changes from -08 to -09:

   o  Clarified internationalization of PSK identities in Section 5.

   o  Corrected the example IP address in Section 5.1.

   o  Small clarification to IANA considerations on Section 6.

   o  Editorial: changed numeric references to symbolic ones, updated
      references to latest versions.

   Changes from -07 to -08:

   o  Added table of contents and updated I-D boilerplate.

   o  Small clarification to motivation in Section 1.

   o  Small clarification to note 2 in Section 2.

   o  Corrected all instances of "an uint16" to "a uint16".

   o  Updated references to latest versions.

   Changes from -06 to -07:

   o  Small clarifications to management interface requirements.

   Changes from -05 to -06:

   o  Small clarifications to how the premaster secret is formed.

   o  Added a section about conformance requirements, and moved existing
      text about identity formats there.

   Changes from -04 to -05:

   o  Omit ServerKeyExchange message (in PSK/RSA_PSK versions) if no
      identity hint is provided.

   Changes from -03 to -04:

   o  Added a note about premaster secret "general structure" in
      Sections 3 and 4.



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   o  Something in the I-D submission procedure had removed all
      circumflexes from -03 version, turning e.g. "2^16" (two-to- the
      sixteenth power) to "216" (two hundred and sixteen).  Let's try
      again.

   Changes from -02 to -03:

   o  Aligned the way the premaster secret is derived.

   o  Specified that identities must be sent as human-readable UTF-8
      strings, not in binary formats.  Changed reference to RFC 3629
      from informative to normative.

   o  Selected ciphersuite and alert numbers, and updated IANA
      considerations section to match this.

   o  Reworded some text about dictionary attacks in Section 6.2.

   Changes from -01 to -02:

   o  Clarified text about DHE_PSK ciphersuites in Section 1.

   o  Clarified explanation of HMAC-SHA1/MD5 use of PRF in Section 2.

   o  Added note about certificate validation and self-signed
      certificates in Section 4.

   o  Added Mohamad Badra et al. as contributors.

   Changes from draft-ietf-tls-psk-00 to -01:

   o  Added DHE_PSK and RSA_PSK key exchange algorithms, and updated
      other text accordingly

   o  Removed SHA-1 hash from PSK key exchange premaster secret
      construction (since premaster secret doesn't need to be 48 bytes).

   o  Added unknown_psk_identity alert message.

   o  Updated IANA considerations section.

   Changes from draft-eronen-tls-psk-00 to draft-ietf-tls-psk-00:

   o  Updated dictionary attack considerations based on comments from
      David Jablon.

   o  Added a recommendation about using UTF-8 in the identity field.




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   o  Removed Appendix A comparing this document with
      draft-ietf-tls-sharedkeys-02.

   o  Removed IPR comment about SPR.

   o  Minor editorial changes.













































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