path: root/doc/cha-intro-tls.texi

@node Introduction to TLS
@chapter Introduction to @acronym{TLS} and @acronym{DTLS}

@acronym{TLS} stands for ``Transport Layer Security'' and is the
successor of SSL, the Secure Sockets Layer protocol @xcite{SSL3}
designed by Netscape.  @acronym{TLS} is an Internet protocol, defined
by @acronym{IETF}@footnote{IETF, or Internet Engineering Task Force,
is a large open international community of network designers,
operators, vendors, and researchers concerned with the evolution of
the Internet architecture and the smooth operation of the Internet.
It is open to any interested individual.}, described in @xcite{RFC5246}.  
The protocol provides
confidentiality, and authentication layers over any reliable transport
layer.  The description, above, refers to @acronym{TLS} 1.0 but applies
to all other TLS versions as the differences between the protocols are not major.  

The @acronym{DTLS} protocol, or ``Datagram @acronym{TLS}'' @xcite{RFC4347} is a
protocol with identical goals as @acronym{TLS}, but can operate
under unreliable transport layers such as @acronym{UDP}. The
discussions below apply to this protocol as well, except when
noted otherwise.

@menu
* TLS layers::
* The transport layer::
* The TLS record protocol::
* The TLS Alert Protocol::
* The TLS Handshake Protocol::
* TLS Extensions::
* How to use TLS in application protocols::
* On SSL 2 and older protocols::
@end menu

@node TLS layers
@section TLS Layers
@cindex TLS layers

@acronym{TLS} is a layered protocol, and consists of the record
protocol, the handshake protocol and the alert protocol. The record
protocol is to serve all other protocols and is above the transport
layer.  The record protocol offers symmetric encryption, data
authenticity, and optionally compression.
The alert protocol offers some signaling to the other protocols. It
can help informing the peer for the cause of failures and other error
conditions.  @xref{The Alert Protocol}, for more information.  The
alert protocol is above the record protocol.

The handshake protocol is responsible for the security parameters'
negotiation, the initial key exchange and authentication.  
@xref{The Handshake Protocol}, for more information about the handshake
protocol.  The protocol layering in TLS is shown in @ref{fig-tls-layers}.

@float Figure,fig-tls-layers
@image{gnutls-layers,12cm}
@caption{The TLS protocol layers.}
@end float

@node The transport layer
@section The Transport Layer
@cindex transport protocol
@cindex transport layer

@acronym{TLS} is not limited to any transport layer and can be used
above any transport layer, as long as it is a reliable one.  @acronym{DTLS}
can be used over reliable and unreliable transport layers.
@acronym{GnuTLS} supports TCP and UDP layers transparently using
the Berkeley sockets API. However, any transport layer can be used
by providing callbacks for @acronym{GnuTLS} to access the transport layer 
(for details see @ref{Setting up the transport layer}).

@node The TLS record protocol
@section The TLS record protocol
@cindex record protocol

The record protocol is the secure communications provider. Its purpose
is to encrypt, authenticate and ---optionally--- compress packets.
The record layer functions can be called at any time after
the handshake process is finished, when there is need to receive
or send data. In @acronym{DTLS} however, due to re-transmission
timers used in the handshake out-of-order handshake data might
be received for some time (maximum 60 seconds) after the handshake
process is finished. 

The functions to access the record protocol are limited to send
and receive functions, which might, given 
the importance of this protocol in @acronym{TLS}, seem awkward.  This is because 
the record protocol's parameters are all set by the handshake protocol.
The record protocol initially starts with NULL parameters, which means
no encryption, and no MAC is used. Encryption and authentication begin
just after the handshake protocol has finished.

@menu
* Encryption algorithms used in the record layer::
* Compression algorithms used in the record layer::
* Weaknesses and countermeasures::
* On Record Padding::
@end menu

@node Encryption algorithms used in the record layer
@subsection Encryption algorithms used in the record layer
@cindex symmetric encryption algorithms

Confidentiality in the record layer is achieved by using symmetric
block encryption algorithms like @code{3DES}, @code{AES}
or stream algorithms like @code{ARCFOUR_128}.
 Ciphers are encryption algorithms that use a single, secret,
key to encrypt and decrypt data. Block algorithms in CBC mode also provide
protection against statistical analysis of the data.  Thus, if you're
using the @acronym{TLS} protocol, a random number of blocks will be
appended to data, to prevent eavesdroppers from guessing the actual
data size.

The supported in @acronym{GnuTLS} ciphers and MAC algorithms are shown in @ref{tab:ciphers} and
@ref{tab:macs}.

@float Table,tab:ciphers
@multitable @columnfractions .30 .60
@headitem Algorithm @tab Description
@item AES-128-CBC, AES-256-CBC @tab
AES or RIJNDAEL is the block cipher algorithm that replaces the old
DES algorithm.  It has 128 bits block size and is used in CBC mode.

@item AES-128-GCM, AES-256-GCM @tab
This is the AES algorithm in the authenticated encryption GCM mode.
This mode combines message authentication and encryption and can
be extremely fast on CPUs that support hardware acceleration.

@item AES-128-CCM, AES-256-CCM @tab
This is the AES algorithm in the authenticated encryption CCM mode.
This mode combines message authentication and encryption and is
often used by systems without AES or GCM acceleration support.

@item AES-128-CCM-8, AES-256-CCM-8 @tab
This is the AES algorithm in the authenticated encryption CCM mode
with a truncated to 64-bit authentication tag. This mode is for
communication with restricted systems.

@item CAMELLIA-128-CBC, CAMELLIA-256-CBC @tab
This is an 128-bit block cipher developed by Mitsubishi and NTT. It
is one of the approved ciphers of the European NESSIE and Japanese
CRYPTREC projects.

@item CHACHA20-POLY1305 @tab
CHACHA20-POLY1305 is an authenticated encryption algorithm based on CHACHA20 cipher and
POLY1305 MAC. CHACHA20 is a refinement of SALSA20 algorithm, an approved cipher by
the European ESTREAM project. POLY1305 is Wegman-Carter, one-time authenticator. The
combination provides a fast stream cipher suitable for systems where a hardware AES
accelerator is not available.

@item 3DES-CBC @tab
This is the DES block cipher algorithm used with triple
encryption (EDE). Has 64 bits block size and is used in CBC mode.

@item ARCFOUR-128 @tab
ARCFOUR-128 is a compatible algorithm with RSA's RC4 algorithm, which is considered to be a trade
secret. It is a considered to be broken, and is only used for compatibility
purposed. For this reason it is not enabled by default.

@end multitable
@caption{Supported ciphers in TLS.}
@end float


@float Table,tab:macs
@multitable @columnfractions .20 .70
@headitem Algorithm @tab Description
@item MAC-MD5 @tab
This is an HMAC based on MD5 a cryptographic hash algorithm designed 
by Ron Rivest. Outputs 128 bits of data.

@item MAC-SHA1 @tab
An HMAC based on the SHA1 cryptographic hash algorithm 
designed by NSA. Outputs 160 bits of data.

@item MAC-SHA256 @tab
An HMAC based on SHA2-256. Outputs 256 bits of data.

@item MAC-SHA384 @tab
An HMAC based on SHA2-384. Outputs 384 bits of data.

@item MAC-AEAD @tab
This indicates that an authenticated encryption algorithm, such as
GCM, is in use.

@end multitable
@caption{Supported MAC algorithms in TLS.}
@end float


@node Compression algorithms used in the record layer
@subsection Compression algorithms used in the record layer
@cindex compression algorithms

The TLS record layer also supports compression.  The algorithms
implemented in @acronym{GnuTLS} can be found in the table below.
The included algorithms perform really good when text, or other
compressible data are to be transferred, but offer nothing on already
compressed data, such as compressed images, zipped archives etc.
These compression algorithms, may be useful in high bandwidth TLS
tunnels, and in cases where network usage has to be minimized. It
should be noted however that compression increases latency.

The record layer compression in @acronym{GnuTLS} is implemented based
on @xcite{RFC3749}. The supported algorithms are shown below.

@showenumdesc{gnutls_compression_method_t,Supported compression algorithms}

Note that compression enables attacks such as traffic analysis, or even
plaintext recovery under certain circumstances. To avoid some of these
attacks GnuTLS allows each record to be compressed independently (i.e.,
stateless compression), by using the "%STATELESS_COMPRESSION" priority string,
in order to be used in cases where the attacker controlled data are
pt in separate records.

@node Weaknesses and countermeasures
@subsection Weaknesses and countermeasures

Some weaknesses that may affect the security of the record layer have
been found in @acronym{TLS} 1.0 protocol. These weaknesses can be
exploited by active attackers, and exploit the facts that

@enumerate

@item
@acronym{TLS} has separate alerts for ``decryption_failed'' and
``bad_record_mac''

@item
The decryption failure reason can be detected by timing the response
time.

@item
The IV for CBC encrypted packets is the last block of the previous
encrypted packet.

@end enumerate

Those weaknesses were solved in @acronym{TLS} 1.1 @xcite{RFC4346}
which is implemented in @acronym{GnuTLS}. For this reason we suggest
to always negotiate the highest supported TLS version with the 
peer@footnote{If this is not possible then please consult @ref{Interoperability}.}.
For a detailed discussion of the issues see the archives of the TLS 
Working Group mailing list and @xcite{CBCATT}.

@node On Record Padding
@subsection On record padding
@cindex record padding
@cindex bad_record_mac

The TLS protocol allows for extra padding of records in CBC ciphers, to prevent
statistical analysis based on the length of exchanged messages (see @xcite{RFC5246} section 6.2.3.2).  
GnuTLS appears to be one of few implementations that take advantage of this feature: 
the user can provide some plaintext data with a range of lengths she wishes to hide,
and GnuTLS adds extra padding to make sure the attacker cannot tell the real plaintext
length is in a range smaller than the user-provided one.
Use @funcref{gnutls_record_send_range} to send length-hidden messages and
@funcref{gnutls_record_can_use_length_hiding} to check whether the current
session supports length hiding. Using the standard @funcref{gnutls_record_send}
will only add minimal padding.

The TLS implementation in the Symbian operating system, frequently
used by Nokia and Sony-Ericsson mobile phones, cannot handle
non-minimal record padding.  What happens when one of these clients
handshake with a GnuTLS server is that the client will fail to compute
the correct MAC for the record.  The client sends a TLS alert
(@code{bad_record_mac}) and disconnects.  Typically this will result
in error messages such as 'A TLS fatal alert has been received', 'Bad
record MAC', or both, on the GnuTLS server side.

If compatibility with such devices is a concern, not sending length-hidden messages
solves the problem by using minimal padding.

If you implement an application that has a configuration file, we
recommend that you make it possible for users or administrators to
specify a GnuTLS protocol priority string, which is used by your
application via @funcref{gnutls_priority_set}.  To allow the best
flexibility, make it possible to have a different priority string for
different incoming IP addresses.


@node The TLS Alert Protocol
@section The TLS alert protocol
@anchor{The Alert Protocol}
@cindex alert protocol

The alert protocol is there to allow signals to be sent between peers.
These signals are mostly used to inform the peer about the cause of a
protocol failure. Some of these signals are used internally by the
protocol and the application protocol does not have to cope with them
(e.g. @code{GNUTLS_@-A_@-CLOSE_@-NOTIFY}), and others refer to the
application protocol solely (e.g. @code{GNUTLS_@-A_@-USER_@-CANCELLED}).  An
alert signal includes a level indication which may be either fatal or
warning. Fatal alerts always terminate the current connection, and
prevent future re-negotiations using the current session ID. All alert
messages are summarized in the table below.

The alert messages are protected by the record protocol, thus the
information that is included does not leak. You must take extreme care
for the alert information not to leak to a possible attacker, via
public log files etc. 

@include alerts.texi

@node The TLS Handshake Protocol
@section The TLS handshake protocol
@anchor{The Handshake Protocol}
@cindex handshake protocol

The handshake protocol is responsible for the ciphersuite negotiation,
the initial key exchange, and the authentication of the two peers.
This is fully controlled by the application layer, thus your program
has to set up the required parameters. The main handshake function
is @funcref{gnutls_handshake}. In the next paragraphs we elaborate on 
the handshake protocol, i.e., the ciphersuite negotiation.


@menu
* TLS Cipher Suites::           TLS session parameters.
* Authentication::              TLS authentication.
* Client Authentication::       Requesting a certificate from the client.
* Resuming Sessions::           Reusing previously established keys.
@end menu


@node TLS Cipher Suites
@subsection TLS ciphersuites

The handshake protocol of @acronym{TLS} negotiates cipher suites of
a special form illustrated by the @code{TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_CBC_SHA} cipher suite name.  A typical cipher
suite contains these parameters:

@itemize

@item The key exchange algorithm.
@code{DHE_RSA} in the example.

@item The Symmetric encryption algorithm and mode
@code{3DES_CBC} in this example.

@item The MAC@footnote{MAC stands for Message Authentication Code. It can be described as a keyed hash algorithm. See RFC2104.} algorithm used for authentication.
@code{MAC_SHA} is used in the above example.

@end itemize

The cipher suite negotiated in the handshake protocol will affect the
record protocol, by enabling encryption and data authentication.  Note
that you should not over rely on @acronym{TLS} to negotiate the
strongest available cipher suite. Do not enable ciphers and algorithms
that you consider weak.

All the supported ciphersuites are listed in @ref{ciphersuites}.

@node Authentication
@subsection Authentication

The key exchange algorithms of the @acronym{TLS} protocol offer
authentication, which is a prerequisite for a secure connection. 
The available authentication methods in @acronym{GnuTLS} follow.

@itemize

@item Certificate authentication: Authenticated key exchange using public key infrastructure and certificates (X.509 or OpenPGP).
@item @acronym{SRP} authentication: Authenticated key exchange using a password.
@item @acronym{PSK} authentication: Authenticated key exchange using a pre-shared key.
@item Anonymous authentication: Key exchange without peer authentication.

@end itemize

@node Client Authentication
@subsection Client authentication
@cindex client certificate authentication

In the case of ciphersuites that use certificate authentication, the
authentication of the client is optional in @acronym{TLS}.  A server
may request a certificate from the client using the
@funcref{gnutls_certificate_server_set_request} function. We elaborate 
in @ref{Certificate credentials}.

@node Resuming Sessions
@subsection Resuming sessions
@anchor{resume}
@cindex resuming sessions
@cindex session resumption

The TLS handshake process performs expensive calculations
and a busy server might easily be put under load. To 
reduce the load, session resumption may be used. This
is a feature of the @acronym{TLS} protocol which allows a
client to connect to a server after a successful handshake, without
the expensive calculations.  This is achieved by re-using the previously
established keys, meaning the server needs to store the state of established
connections (unless session tickets are used -- @ref{Session tickets}).

Session resumption is an integral part of @acronym{GnuTLS}, and 
@ref{Session resumption}, @ref{ex-resume-client} illustrate typical 
uses of it.

@node TLS Extensions
@section TLS extensions
@cindex TLS extensions

A number of extensions to the @acronym{TLS} protocol have been
proposed mainly in @xcite{TLSEXT}. The extensions supported
in @acronym{GnuTLS} are discussed in the subsections that follow.

@menu
* Maximum fragment length negotiation::
* Server name indication::
* Session tickets::
* HeartBeat::
* Safe renegotiation::
* OCSP status request::
* SRTP::
* False Start::
* Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN)::
* Extensions and Supplemental Data::
@end menu

@node Maximum fragment length negotiation
@subsection Maximum fragment length negotiation
@cindex TLS extensions
@cindex maximum fragment length

This extension allows a @acronym{TLS} implementation to negotiate a
smaller value for record packet maximum length. This extension may be
useful to clients with constrained capabilities. The functions shown
below can be used to control this extension.

@showfuncB{gnutls_record_get_max_size,gnutls_record_set_max_size}

@node Server name indication
@subsection Server name indication
@anchor{serverind}
@cindex TLS extensions
@cindex server name indication

A common problem in @acronym{HTTPS} servers is the fact that the
@acronym{TLS} protocol is not aware of the hostname that a client
connects to, when the handshake procedure begins. For that reason the
@acronym{TLS} server has no way to know which certificate to send.

This extension solves that problem within the @acronym{TLS} protocol,
and allows a client to send the HTTP hostname before the handshake
begins within the first handshake packet.  The functions
@funcref{gnutls_server_name_set} and @funcref{gnutls_server_name_get} can be
used to enable this extension, or to retrieve the name sent by a
client.

@showfuncB{gnutls_server_name_set,gnutls_server_name_get}

@node Session tickets
@subsection Session tickets
@cindex TLS extensions
@cindex session tickets
@cindex tickets

To resume a TLS session, the server normally stores session parameters.  This
complicates deployment, and can be avoided by delegating the storage
to the client. Because session parameters are sensitive they are encrypted
and authenticated with a key only known to the server and then sent to the
client. The Session Tickets extension is described in RFC 5077 @xcite{TLSTKT}.

A disadvantage of session tickets is that they eliminate the effects of
forward secrecy when a server uses the same key for long time. That is,
the secrecy of all sessions on a server using tickets depends on the ticket
key being kept secret. For that reason server keys should be rotated and discarded
regularly.

Since version 3.1.3 GnuTLS clients transparently support session tickets,
unless forward secrecy is explicitly requested (with the PFS priority string).

@node HeartBeat
@subsection HeartBeat
@cindex TLS extensions
@cindex heartbeat

This is a TLS extension that allows to ping and receive confirmation from the peer,
and is described in @xcite{RFC6520}. The extension is disabled by default and
@funcref{gnutls_heartbeat_enable} can be used to enable it. A policy
may be negotiated to only allow sending heartbeat messages or sending and receiving.
The current session policy can be checked with @funcref{gnutls_heartbeat_allowed}. 
The requests coming from the peer result to @code{GNUTLS_@-E_@-HEARTBEAT_@-PING_@-RECEIVED}
being returned from the receive function. Ping requests to peer can be send via
@funcref{gnutls_heartbeat_ping}. 

@showfuncB{gnutls_heartbeat_allowed,gnutls_heartbeat_enable}

@showfuncD{gnutls_heartbeat_ping,gnutls_heartbeat_pong,gnutls_heartbeat_set_timeouts,gnutls_heartbeat_get_timeout}

@node Safe renegotiation
@subsection Safe renegotiation
@cindex renegotiation
@cindex safe renegotiation

TLS gives the option to two communicating parties to renegotiate
and update their security parameters. One useful example of this feature
was for a client to initially connect using anonymous negotiation to a
server, and the renegotiate using some authenticated ciphersuite. This occurred
to avoid having the client sending its credentials in the clear.

However this renegotiation, as initially designed would not ensure that
the party one is renegotiating is the same as the one in the initial negotiation.
For example one server could forward all renegotiation traffic to an other
server who will see this traffic as an initial negotiation attempt.

This might be seen as a valid design decision, but it seems it was
not widely known or understood, thus today some application protocols use the TLS
renegotiation feature in a manner that enables a malicious server to insert
content of his choice in the beginning of a TLS session.

The most prominent vulnerability was with HTTPS. There servers request
a renegotiation to enforce an anonymous user to use a certificate in order
to access certain parts of a web site.  The
attack works by having the attacker simulate a client and connect to a
server, with server-only authentication, and send some data intended
to cause harm.  The server will then require renegotiation from him
in order to perform the request. 
When the proper client attempts to contact the server,
the attacker hijacks that connection and forwards traffic to
the initial server that requested renegotiation.  The
attacker will not be able to read the data exchanged between the
client and the server.  However, the server will (incorrectly) assume
that the initial request sent by the attacker was sent by the now authenticated
client.  The result is a prefix plain-text injection attack.

The above is just one example.  Other vulnerabilities exists that do
not rely on the TLS renegotiation to change the client's authenticated
status (either TLS or application layer).

While fixing these application protocols and implementations would be
one natural reaction, an extension to TLS has been designed that
cryptographically binds together any renegotiated handshakes with the
initial negotiation.  When the extension is used, the attack is
detected and the session can be terminated.  The extension is
specified in @xcite{RFC5746}.

GnuTLS supports the safe renegotiation extension.  The default
behavior is as follows.  Clients will attempt to negotiate the safe
renegotiation extension when talking to servers.  Servers will accept
the extension when presented by clients.  Clients and servers will
permit an initial handshake to complete even when the other side does
not support the safe renegotiation extension.  Clients and servers
will refuse renegotiation attempts when the extension has not been
negotiated.

Note that permitting clients to connect to servers when the safe
renegotiation extension is not enabled, is open up for attacks.
Changing this default behavior would prevent interoperability against
the majority of deployed servers out there.  We will reconsider this
default behavior in the future when more servers have been upgraded.
Note that it is easy to configure clients to always require the safe
renegotiation extension from servers.

To modify the default behavior, we have introduced some new priority
strings (see @ref{Priority Strings}).  
The @code{%UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION} priority string permits
(re-)handshakes even when the safe renegotiation extension was not
negotiated. The default behavior is @code{%PARTIAL_RENEGOTIATION} that will
prevent renegotiation with clients and servers not supporting the
extension. This is secure for servers but leaves clients vulnerable
to some attacks, but this is a trade-off between security and compatibility
with old servers. The @code{%SAFE_RENEGOTIATION} priority string makes
clients and servers require the extension for every handshake. The latter
is the most secure option for clients, at the cost of not being able
to connect to legacy servers. Servers will also deny clients that
do not support the extension from connecting.

It is possible to disable use of the extension completely, in both
clients and servers, by using the @code{%DISABLE_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION}
priority string however we strongly recommend you to only do this for
debugging and test purposes.

The default values if the flags above are not specified are:
@table @code

@item Server:
%PARTIAL_RENEGOTIATION

@item Client:
%PARTIAL_RENEGOTIATION

@end table

For applications we have introduced a new API related to safe
renegotiation.  The @funcref{gnutls_safe_renegotiation_status} function is
used to check if the extension has been negotiated on a session, and
can be used both by clients and servers.

@node OCSP status request
@subsection OCSP status request
@cindex OCSP status request
@cindex Certificate status request

The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) is a protocol that allows the
client to verify the server certificate for revocation without messing with
certificate revocation lists. Its drawback is that it requires the client
to connect to the server's CA OCSP server and request the status of the
certificate. This extension however, enables a TLS server to include
its CA OCSP server response in the handshake. That is an HTTPS server
may periodically run @code{ocsptool} (see @ref{ocsptool Invocation}) to obtain
its certificate revocation status and serve it to the clients. That
way a client avoids an additional connection to the OCSP server.

See @ref{OCSP stapling} for further information.

Since version 3.1.3 GnuTLS clients transparently support the certificate status
request.

@node SRTP
@subsection SRTP
@cindex SRTP
@cindex Secure RTP

The TLS protocol was extended in @xcite{RFC5764} to provide keying material to the
Secure RTP (SRTP) protocol. The SRTP protocol provides an encapsulation of encrypted
data that is optimized for voice data. With the SRTP TLS extension two peers can
negotiate keys using TLS or DTLS and obtain keying material for use with SRTP. The
available SRTP profiles are listed below.

@showenumdesc{gnutls_srtp_profile_t,Supported SRTP profiles}

To enable use the following functions.

@showfuncB{gnutls_srtp_set_profile,gnutls_srtp_set_profile_direct}

To obtain the negotiated keys use the function below.

@showfuncdesc{gnutls_srtp_get_keys}

Other helper functions are listed below.

@showfuncC{gnutls_srtp_get_selected_profile,gnutls_srtp_get_profile_name,gnutls_srtp_get_profile_id}

@node False Start
@subsection False Start
@cindex False Start
@cindex TLS False Start

The TLS protocol was extended in @xcite{draft-ietf-tls-falsestart-01} to allow the client
to send data to server in a single round trip. This change however operates on the borderline
of the TLS protocol security guarrantees and should be used for the cases where the reduced
latency outperforms the risk of an adversary intercepting the transferred data. In GnuTLS
applications can use the @acronym{GNUTLS_ENABLE_FALSE_START} as option to @funcref{gnutls_init}
to request an early return of the @funcref{gnutls_handshake} function. After that early
return the application is expected to transfer any data to be piggybacked on the last handshake
message.

After handshake's early termination, the application is expected to transmit
data using @funcref{gnutls_record_send}, and call @funcref{gnutls_record_recv} on
any received data as soon, to ensure that handshake completes timely. That is, especially
relevant for applications which set an explicit time limit for the handshake process
via @funcref{gnutls_handshake_set_timeout}.

Note however, that the API ensures that the early return will not happen
if the false start requirements are not satisfied. That is, on ciphersuites which are not
whitelisted for false start or on insufficient key sizes, the handshake
process will complete properly (i.e., no early return). To verify that false start was used you
may use @funcref{gnutls_session_get_flags} and check for the @acronym{GNUTLS_SFLAGS_FALSE_START}
flag. For GnuTLS the false start is whitelisted for the following
key exchange methods (see @xcite{draft-ietf-tls-falsestart-01} for rationale)
@itemize
@item DHE
@item ECDHE
@end itemize
but only when the negotiated parameters exceed @code{GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_HIGH}
--see @ref{tab:key-sizes}, and when under (D)TLS 1.2 or later.

@node Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN)
@subsection Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN)
@cindex ALPN
@cindex Application Layer Protocol Negotiation

The TLS protocol was extended in @code{RFC7301} 
to provide the application layer a method of
negotiating the application protocol version. This allows for negotiation
of the application protocol during the TLS handshake, thus reducing
round-trips. The application protocol is described by an opaque
string. To enable, use the following functions.

@showfuncB{gnutls_alpn_set_protocols,gnutls_alpn_get_selected_protocol}

Note that these functions are intended to be used with protocols that are
registered in the Application Layer Protocol Negotiation IANA registry. While
you can use them for other protocols (at the risk of collisions), it is preferable
to register them.

@node Extensions and Supplemental Data
@subsection Extensions and Supplemental Data
@cindex Supplemental data

It is possible to transfer supplemental data during the TLS handshake, following
@xcite{RFC4680}. This is for "custom" protocol modifications for applications which
may want to transfer additional data (e.g. additional authentication messages). Such
an exchange requires a custom extension to be registered. 
The provided API for this functionality is low-level and described in @ref{TLS Extension Handling}.

@include sec-tls-app.texi

@node On SSL 2 and older protocols
@section On SSL 2 and older protocols
@cindex SSL 2

One of the initial decisions in the @acronym{GnuTLS} development was
to implement the known security protocols for the transport layer.
Initially @acronym{TLS} 1.0 was implemented since it was the latest at
that time, and was considered to be the most advanced in security
properties.  Later the @acronym{SSL} 3.0 protocol was implemented
since it is still the only protocol supported by several servers and
there are no serious security vulnerabilities known.

One question that may arise is why we didn't implement @acronym{SSL}
2.0 in the library.  There are several reasons, most important being
that it has serious security flaws, unacceptable for a modern security
library.  Other than that, this protocol is barely used by anyone
these days since it has been deprecated since 1996.  The security
problems in @acronym{SSL} 2.0 include:

@itemize

@item Message integrity compromised.
The @acronym{SSLv2} message authentication uses the MD5 function, and
is insecure.

@item Man-in-the-middle attack.
There is no protection of the handshake in @acronym{SSLv2}, which
permits a man-in-the-middle attack.

@item Truncation attack.
@acronym{SSLv2} relies on TCP FIN to close the session, so the
attacker can forge a TCP FIN, and the peer cannot tell if it was a
legitimate end of data or not.

@item Weak message integrity for export ciphers.
The cryptographic keys in @acronym{SSLv2} are used for both message
authentication and encryption, so if weak encryption schemes are
negotiated (say 40-bit keys) the message authentication code uses the
same weak key, which isn't necessary.

@end itemize

@cindex PCT
Other protocols such as Microsoft's @acronym{PCT} 1 and @acronym{PCT}
2 were not implemented because they were also abandoned and deprecated
by @acronym{SSL} 3.0 and later @acronym{TLS} 1.0.