| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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That replaces the EC curve extension negotiation with
the negotiated groups extensions, introduces handling
for groups as priority strings, as well as using and
checking of RFC7919 DH parameters once negotiated.
Resolves: #37
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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That is, when a signature algorithm is available which was not
asked by the peer, then return GNUTLS_E_UNWANTED_ALGORITHM
instead of the UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM.
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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This makes server respond with GNUTLS_A_DECRYPT_ERROR on malformed signatures,
which is the expected behavior. Hinted by Hubert Kario.
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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This is the closest to use alert when no certificate is found; at least
it is closer according to tlsfuzzer and rfc5246 text on insuficient_security
alert.
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Introduced GNUTLS_E_RECORD_OVERFLOW.
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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the peer
That is, do not attempt to proceed assuming that the peer supports SHA-1.
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To better test support for server_name extension in TLS, it's
necessary to be able to differentiate between name being rejected
because it is unknown to the server and it being malformed.
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That is, unless GNUTLS_ALLOW_ID_CHANGE is specified, during a rehandshake
clients will not be allowed to present another certificate than the original,
or change their username for PSK or SRP ciphersuites.
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That is, move from a parsing error tolerance to a more strict
decoding approach.
Relates #40
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auto-verification functions
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