diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/algorithms/ciphersuites.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/auth.c | 23 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/auth/cert.c | 68 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/auth/cert.h | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/gnutls_int.h | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/handshake.c | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/tls-sig.c | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/tls-sig.h | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/tls13-sig.c | 11 |
9 files changed, 109 insertions, 32 deletions
diff --git a/lib/algorithms/ciphersuites.c b/lib/algorithms/ciphersuites.c index b97bbc82db..7269861ffe 100644 --- a/lib/algorithms/ciphersuites.c +++ b/lib/algorithms/ciphersuites.c @@ -1578,7 +1578,7 @@ _gnutls_figure_common_ciphersuite(gnutls_session_t session, /* RFC7919 requires that we reply with insufficient security if we have * negotiated an FFDHE group, but cannot find a common ciphersuite. However, * we must also distinguish between not matching a ciphersuite due to an - * incompatible certificate which we traditionally return GNUTLS_E_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY. + * incompatible certificate which we traditionally return GNUTLS_E_NO_CIPHER_SUITES. */ if (!no_cert_found && (session->internals.hsk_flags & HSK_HAVE_FFDHE) && session->internals.priorities->groups.have_ffdhe && !version->tls13_sem) diff --git a/lib/auth.c b/lib/auth.c index 91a67c9afa..dd3fc861fb 100644 --- a/lib/auth.c +++ b/lib/auth.c @@ -138,6 +138,29 @@ gnutls_credentials_set(gnutls_session_t session, } } + /* sanity tests */ + if (type == GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE) { + gnutls_certificate_credentials_t c = cred; + unsigned i; + bool allow_tls13 = 0; + unsigned key_usage; + + if (c != NULL && c->ncerts != 0) { + for (i = 0; i < c->ncerts; i++) { + key_usage = get_key_usage(session, c->certs[i].cert_list[0].pubkey); + if (key_usage == 0 || (key_usage & GNUTLS_KEY_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { + allow_tls13 = 1; + break; + } + } + + if (!allow_tls13) { + /* to prevent the server random indicate TLS1.3 support */ + session->internals.flags |= INT_FLAG_NO_TLS13; + } + } + } + return 0; } diff --git a/lib/auth/cert.c b/lib/auth/cert.c index b6bd3bf91e..5868ca244d 100644 --- a/lib/auth/cert.c +++ b/lib/auth/cert.c @@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ find_x509_client_cert(gnutls_session_t session, ssize_t data_size = _data_size; unsigned i, j; int result, cert_pk; + unsigned key_usage; *indx = -1; @@ -191,8 +192,16 @@ find_x509_client_cert(gnutls_session_t session, (data_size == 0 || (session->internals.flags & GNUTLS_FORCE_CLIENT_CERT))) { if (cred->certs[0].cert_list[0].type == GNUTLS_CRT_X509) { - /* This check is necessary to prevent sending other certificate - * credentials that are set (e.g. raw public-key). */ + + key_usage = get_key_usage(session, cred->certs[0].cert_list[0].pubkey); + + /* For client certificates we require signatures */ + result = _gnutls_check_key_usage_for_sig(session, key_usage, 1); + if (result < 0) { + _gnutls_debug_log("Client certificate is not suitable for signing\n"); + return gnutls_assert_val(result); + } + *indx = 0; return 0; } @@ -221,6 +230,14 @@ find_x509_client_cert(gnutls_session_t session, if (odn.size == 0 || odn.size != asked_dn.size) continue; + key_usage = get_key_usage(session, cred->certs[i].cert_list[0].pubkey); + + /* For client certificates we require signatures */ + if (_gnutls_check_key_usage_for_sig(session, key_usage, 1) < 0) { + _gnutls_debug_log("Client certificate is not suitable for signing\n"); + continue; + } + /* If the DN matches and * the *_SIGN algorithm matches * the cert is our cert! @@ -268,6 +285,7 @@ find_rawpk_client_cert(gnutls_session_t session, int pk_algos_length, int* indx) { unsigned i; + int ret; gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk; *indx = -1; @@ -276,15 +294,22 @@ find_rawpk_client_cert(gnutls_session_t session, /* We know that our list length will be 1, therefore we can * ignore the rest. */ - if (cred->certs[i].cert_list_length == 1) { - pk = gnutls_pubkey_get_pk_algorithm(cred->certs[i]. - cert_list[0].pubkey, NULL); + if (cred->certs[i].cert_list_length == 1 && cred->certs[i].cert_list[0].type == GNUTLS_CRT_RAWPK) { + pk = gnutls_pubkey_get_pk_algorithm(cred->certs[i].cert_list[0].pubkey, NULL); + + /* For client certificates we require signatures */ + ret = _gnutls_check_key_usage_for_sig(session, get_key_usage(session, cred->certs[i].cert_list[0].pubkey), 1); + if (ret < 0) { + /* we return an error instead of skipping so that the user is notified about + * the key incompatibility */ + _gnutls_debug_log("Client certificate is not suitable for signing\n"); + return gnutls_assert_val(ret); + } /* Check whether the public-key algorithm of our credential is in * the list with supported public-key algorithms and whether the * cert type matches. */ - if ((check_pk_algo_in_list(pk_algos, pk_algos_length, pk) == 0) - && (cred->certs[i].cert_list[0].type == GNUTLS_CRT_RAWPK)) { + if ((check_pk_algo_in_list(pk_algos, pk_algos_length, pk) == 0)) { // We found a compatible credential *indx = i; break; @@ -643,21 +668,24 @@ _gnutls_gen_rawpk_crt(gnutls_session_t session, gnutls_buffer_st* data) /* Since we are transmitting a raw public key with no additional * certificate credentials attached to it, it doesn't make sense to * have more than one certificate set (i.e. to have a certificate chain). - * This is enforced by the API so having a value other than 1 should - * be an impossible situation. */ - assert(apr_cert_list_length == 1); - + assert(apr_cert_list_length <= 1); + /* Write our certificate containing only the SubjectPublicKeyInfo to * the output buffer. We always have exactly one certificate that * contains our raw public key. Our message looks like: * <length++certificate> where - * length = 3 bytes and + * length = 3 bytes (or 24 bits) and * certificate = length bytes. */ - ret = _gnutls_buffer_append_data_prefix(data, 24, - apr_cert_list[0].cert.data, - apr_cert_list[0].cert.size); + if (apr_cert_list_length == 0) { + ret = _gnutls_buffer_append_prefix(data, 24, 0); + } else { + ret = _gnutls_buffer_append_data_prefix(data, 24, + apr_cert_list[0].cert.data, + apr_cert_list[0].cert.size); + } + if (ret < 0) return gnutls_assert_val(ret); @@ -1462,11 +1490,11 @@ int cert_select_sign_algorithm(gnutls_session_t session, return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INSUFFICIENT_CREDENTIALS); } - if (unlikely(session->internals.priorities->allow_server_key_usage_violation)) { - key_usage = 0; - } else { - key_usage = pubkey->key_usage; - } + key_usage = get_key_usage(session, pubkey); + + /* In TLS1.3 we support only signatures; ensure the selected key supports them */ + if (ver->tls13_sem && _gnutls_check_key_usage_for_sig(session, key_usage, 1) < 0) + return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INSUFFICIENT_CREDENTIALS); if (!ver->tls13_sem && !_gnutls_kx_supports_pk_usage(cs->kx_algorithm, pk, key_usage)) { return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INSUFFICIENT_CREDENTIALS); diff --git a/lib/auth/cert.h b/lib/auth/cert.h index 3f57ec1c74..fd66628820 100644 --- a/lib/auth/cert.h +++ b/lib/auth/cert.h @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* * Copyright (C) 2002-2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc. - * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Red Hat, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Red Hat, Inc. * * Author: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos * @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include <gnutls/abstract.h> #include <gnutls/compat.h> #include <str_array.h> +#include "abstract_int.h" #define MAX_OCSP_RESPONSES 8 @@ -171,5 +172,13 @@ int _gnutls_gen_rawpk_crt(gnutls_session_t session, gnutls_buffer_st* data); int _gnutls_proc_rawpk_crt(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data, size_t data_size); +inline static unsigned get_key_usage(gnutls_session_t session, gnutls_pubkey_t pubkey) +{ + if (unlikely(session->internals.priorities && + session->internals.priorities->allow_server_key_usage_violation)) + return 0; + else + return pubkey->key_usage; +} #endif diff --git a/lib/gnutls_int.h b/lib/gnutls_int.h index a0c47efa0f..93ffd7cee9 100644 --- a/lib/gnutls_int.h +++ b/lib/gnutls_int.h @@ -1566,9 +1566,9 @@ inline static size_t max_user_send_size(gnutls_session_t session, * * This function is made static inline for optimization reasons. */ -static inline gnutls_certificate_type_t +inline static gnutls_certificate_type_t get_certificate_type(gnutls_session_t session, - gnutls_ctype_target_t target) + gnutls_ctype_target_t target) { switch (target) { case GNUTLS_CTYPE_CLIENT: diff --git a/lib/handshake.c b/lib/handshake.c index 70b4486266..481210ebc0 100644 --- a/lib/handshake.c +++ b/lib/handshake.c @@ -444,6 +444,9 @@ _gnutls_negotiate_version(gnutls_session_t session, if (aversion && aversion->id == GNUTLS_TLS1_2) { vers = _gnutls_version_max(session); + if (unlikely(vers == NULL)) + return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_NO_CIPHER_SUITES); + if (vers->id >= GNUTLS_TLS1_2) { session->security_parameters.pversion = aversion; return 0; @@ -2138,7 +2141,10 @@ static int send_client_hello(gnutls_session_t session, int again) if (hver == NULL) { gnutls_assert(); - ret = GNUTLS_E_NO_PRIORITIES_WERE_SET; + if (session->internals.flags & INT_FLAG_NO_TLS13) + ret = GNUTLS_E_INSUFFICIENT_CREDENTIALS; + else + ret = GNUTLS_E_NO_PRIORITIES_WERE_SET; goto cleanup; } diff --git a/lib/tls-sig.c b/lib/tls-sig.c index 19357c06a1..73ca4314a3 100644 --- a/lib/tls-sig.c +++ b/lib/tls-sig.c @@ -40,8 +40,7 @@ #include <x509/common.h> #include <abstract_int.h> -static -int check_key_usage_for_sig(gnutls_session_t session, unsigned key_usage, unsigned our_cert) +int _gnutls_check_key_usage_for_sig(gnutls_session_t session, unsigned key_usage, unsigned our_cert) { const char *lstr; unsigned allow_key_usage_violation; @@ -192,7 +191,7 @@ _gnutls_handshake_sign_data(gnutls_session_t session, gnutls_pubkey_get_key_usage(cert->pubkey, &key_usage); - ret = check_key_usage_for_sig(session, key_usage, 1); + ret = _gnutls_check_key_usage_for_sig(session, key_usage, 1); if (ret < 0) return gnutls_assert_val(ret); @@ -336,7 +335,7 @@ _gnutls_handshake_verify_data(gnutls_session_t session, gnutls_pubkey_get_key_usage(cert->pubkey, &key_usage); - ret = check_key_usage_for_sig(session, key_usage, 0); + ret = _gnutls_check_key_usage_for_sig(session, key_usage, 0); if (ret < 0) return gnutls_assert_val(ret); @@ -497,7 +496,7 @@ _gnutls_handshake_verify_crt_vrfy(gnutls_session_t session, gnutls_pubkey_get_key_usage(cert->pubkey, &key_usage); - ret = check_key_usage_for_sig(session, key_usage, 0); + ret = _gnutls_check_key_usage_for_sig(session, key_usage, 0); if (ret < 0) return gnutls_assert_val(ret); @@ -708,7 +707,7 @@ _gnutls_handshake_sign_crt_vrfy(gnutls_session_t session, gnutls_pubkey_get_key_usage(cert->pubkey, &key_usage); - ret = check_key_usage_for_sig(session, key_usage, 1); + ret = _gnutls_check_key_usage_for_sig(session, key_usage, 1); if (ret < 0) return gnutls_assert_val(ret); diff --git a/lib/tls-sig.h b/lib/tls-sig.h index afea4ebaf9..6e0564de1b 100644 --- a/lib/tls-sig.h +++ b/lib/tls-sig.h @@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ */ #define MAX_SIG_SIZE (19 + MAX_HASH_SIZE) +int _gnutls_check_key_usage_for_sig(gnutls_session_t session, unsigned key_usage, + unsigned our_cert); + int _gnutls_handshake_sign_crt_vrfy(gnutls_session_t session, gnutls_pcert_st * cert, gnutls_privkey_t pkey, diff --git a/lib/tls13-sig.c b/lib/tls13-sig.c index 8eea6166b3..1f3a74bb5e 100644 --- a/lib/tls13-sig.c +++ b/lib/tls13-sig.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright (C) 2017-2018 Red Hat, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2017-2019 Red Hat, Inc. * * Author: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos * @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include <ext/signature.h> #include <abstract_int.h> #include "tls13-sig.h" +#include "tls-sig.h" #include "hash_int.h" #undef PREFIX_SIZE @@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ _gnutls13_handshake_verify_data(gnutls_session_t session, const version_entry_st *ver = get_version(session); gnutls_buffer_st buf; uint8_t prefix[PREFIX_SIZE]; + unsigned key_usage = 0; gnutls_datum_t p; _gnutls_handshake_log @@ -75,6 +77,12 @@ _gnutls13_handshake_verify_data(gnutls_session_t session, if (se->tls13_ok == 0) /* explicitly prohibited */ return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_RECEIVED_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + gnutls_pubkey_get_key_usage(cert->pubkey, &key_usage); + + ret = _gnutls_check_key_usage_for_sig(session, key_usage, 0); + if (ret < 0) + return gnutls_assert_val(ret); + _gnutls_buffer_init(&buf); memset(prefix, 0x20, sizeof(prefix)); @@ -150,6 +158,7 @@ _gnutls13_handshake_sign_data(gnutls_session_t session, if (unlikely(sign_supports_priv_pk_algorithm(se, pkey->pk_algorithm) == 0)) return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_RECEIVED_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + /* when we reach here we know we have a signing certificate */ _gnutls_handshake_log ("HSK[%p]: signing TLS 1.3 handshake data: using %s and PRF: %s\n", session, se->name, session->security_parameters.prf->name); |