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diff --git a/doc/protocol/draft-ietf-tls-srp-07.txt b/doc/protocol/draft-ietf-tls-srp-07.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b6f3255194 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/protocol/draft-ietf-tls-srp-07.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1179 @@ + + +TLS Working Group D. Taylor +Internet-Draft Forge Research Pty Ltd +Expires: December 6, 2004 T. Wu + Arcot Systems + N. Mavroyanopoulos + T. Perrin + June 7, 2004 + + + Using SRP for TLS Authentication + draft-ietf-tls-srp-07 + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. + + Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering + Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that + other groups may also distribute working documents as + Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + + This Internet-Draft will expire on December 6, 2004. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved. + +Abstract + + This memo presents a technique for using the Secure Remote Password + protocol ([SRP], [SRP-6]) as an authentication method for the + Transport Layer Security protocol [TLS]. + + + + + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 1] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2004 + + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 + 2. SRP Authentication in TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 2.1 Notation and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 2.2 Handshake Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 2.3 Text Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 2.4 SRP Verifier Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 2.5 Changes to the Handshake Message Contents . . . . . . . . 5 + 2.5.1 Client Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 2.5.2 Server Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 2.5.3 Server Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 2.5.4 Client Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 2.6 Calculating the Pre-master Secret . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 2.7 Cipher Suite Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 2.8 New Message Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 2.8.1 Client Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 2.8.2 Server Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 2.8.3 Client Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 2.9 Error Alerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 4. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 4.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 4.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + A. SRP Group Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 20 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 2] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2004 + + +1. Introduction + + At the time of writing TLS [TLS] uses public key certificates, or + Kerberos, for authentication. + + These authentication methods do not seem well suited to the + applications now being adapted to use TLS ([IMAP] or [FTP], for + example). Given that these protocols are designed to use the user + name and password method of authentication, being able to safely use + user names and passwords provides an easier route to additional + security. + + SRP ([SRP], [SRP-6]) is an authentication method that allows the use + of user names and passwords over unencrypted channels without + revealing the password to an eavesdropper. SRP also supplies a + shared secret at the end of the authentication sequence that can be + used to generate encryption keys. + + This document describes the use of the SRP authentication method for + TLS. + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this + document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 3] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2004 + + +2. SRP Authentication in TLS + +2.1 Notation and Terminology + + The version of SRP used here is sometimes referred to as "SRP-6" + [SRP-6]. This version is a slight improvement over "SRP-3", which + was described in [SRP] and [RFC2945]. + + This document uses the variable names defined in [SRP-6]: + + N, g: group parameters (prime and generator) + s: salt + B, b: server's public and private values + A, a: client's public and private values + I: user name (aka "identity") + P: password + v: verifier + + The | symbol indicates string concatenation, the ^ operator is the + exponentiation operation, and the % operator is the integer remainder + operation. Conversion between integers and byte-strings assumes the + most-significant bytes are stored first, as per [TLS] and [RFC2945]. + +2.2 Handshake Protocol Overview + + The advent of [SRP-6] allows the SRP protocol to be implemented using + the standard sequence of handshake messages defined in [TLS]. + + The parameters to various messages are given in the following + diagram. + + Client Server + | | + Client Hello (I) ------------------------> | + | <---------------------------- Server Hello + | <---------------------------- Certificate* + | <---------------------------- Server Key Exchange (N, g, s, B) + | <---------------------------- Server Hello Done + Client Key Exchange (A) -----------------> | + [Change cipher spec] | + Finished --------------------------------> | + | [Change cipher spec] + | <---------------------------- Finished + | | + Application Data <--------------> Application Data + + * Indicates an optional message which is not always sent. + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 4] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2004 + + + Figure 1 + + +2.3 Text Preparation + + The user name and password strings shall be UTF-8 encoded Unicode, + prepared using the [SASLPrep] profile of [StringPrep]. + +2.4 SRP Verifier Creation + + The verifier is calculated as described in section 3 of [RFC2945]. + We give the algorithm here for convenience. + + The verifier (v) is computed based on the salt (s), user name (I), + password (P), and group parameters (N, g). The computation uses the + [SHA1] hash algorithm: + + x = SHA1(s | SHA1(I | ":" | P)) + v = g^x % N + +2.5 Changes to the Handshake Message Contents + + This section describes the changes to the TLS handshake message + contents when SRP is being used for authentication. The definitions + of the new message contents and the on-the-wire changes are given in + Section 2.8. + +2.5.1 Client Hello + + The user name is appended to the standard client hello message using + the hello message extension mechanism defined in [TLSEXT] (see + Section 2.8.1). + +2.5.1.1 Session Resumption + + When a client attempts to resume a session that uses SRP + authentication, the client MUST include the user name extension in + the client hello message, in case the server cannot or will not allow + session resumption, meaning a full handshake is required. + + If the server does agree to resume an existing session the server + MUST ignore the information in the SRP extension of the client hello + message, except for its inclusion in the finished message hashes. + This is to ensure attackers cannot replace the authenticated identity + without supplying the proper authentication information. + + + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 5] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2004 + + +2.5.1.2 Missing SRP Username + + The client may offer SRP ciphersuites in the hello message but omit + the SRP extension. If the server would like to select an SRP + ciphersuite in this case, the server MAY return a + missing_srp_username alert (see Section 2.9) immediately after + processing the client hello message. This alert signals the client + to resend the hello message, this time with the SRP extension. This + allows the client to advertise that it supports SRP, but not have to + prompt the user for his user name and password, nor expose the user + name in the clear, unless necessary. + + After sending the missing_srp_username alert, the server MUST leave + the TLS connection open, yet reset its handshake protocol state so it + is prepared to receive a second client hello message. Upon receiving + the missing_srp_username alert, the client MUST either send a second + client hello message, or send a fatal user_cancelled alert. + + If the client sends a second hello message, the second hello message + MUST offer SRP ciphersuites, and MUST contain the SRP extension, and + the server MUST choose one of the SRP ciphersuites. Both client + hello messages MUST be treated as handshake messages and included in + the hash calculations for the TLS Finished message. The premaster + and master secret calculations will use the random value from the + second client hello message, not the first. + +2.5.1.3 Unknown SRP Username + + If the server doesn't have a verifier for the given user name, the + server MAY abort the handshake with an unknown_srp_username alert + (see Section 2.9). Alternatively, if the server wishes to hide the + fact that this user name doesn't have a verifier, the server MAY + simulate the protocol as if a verifier existed, but then reject the + client's finished message with a bad_record_mac alert, as if the + password was incorrect. + + To simulate the existence of an entry for each user name, the server + must consistently return the same salt (s) and group (N, g) values + for the same user name. For example, the server could store a secret + "seed key" and then use HMAC-SHA1(seed_key, "salt" | user_name) to + generate the salts [HMAC]. For B, the server can return a random + value between 1 and N-1 inclusive. However, the server should take + care to simulate computation delays. One way to do this is to + generate a fake verifier using the "seed key" approach, and then + proceed with the protocol as usual. + + + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 6] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2004 + + +2.5.2 Server Certificate + + The server MUST send a certificate if it agrees to an SRP cipher + suite that requires the server to provide additional authentication + in the form of a digital signature. See Section 2.7 for details of + which ciphersuites defined in this document require a server + certificate to be sent. + +2.5.3 Server Key Exchange + + The server key exchange message contains the prime (N), the generator + (g), and the salt value (s) read from the SRP password file based on + the user name (I) received in the client hello extension. + + The server key exchange message also contains the server's public + value (B). The server calculates this value as B = k*v + g^b % N, + where b is a random number which SHOULD be at least 256 bits in + length, and k = SHA1(N | g). + + If the server has sent a certificate message, the server key exchange + message MUST be signed. + + The group parameters (N, g) sent in this message MUST have N as a + safe prime (a prime of the form N=2q+1, where q is also prime). The + integers from 1 to N-1 will form a group under multiplication % N, + and g MUST be a generator of this group. The SRP group parameters in + Appendix A are proven to have these properties, so the client SHOULD + accept any parameters from this Appendix which have large enough N + values to meet his security requirements. The client MAY accept + other group parameters from the server, either by prior arrangement, + or by checking the parameters himself. + + To check that N is a safe prime, the client should use some method + such as performing 64 iterations of the Miller-Rabin test with random + bases (selected from 2 to N-2) on both N and q (by performing 64 + iterations, the probability of a false positive is no more than + 2^-128). To check that g is a generator of the group, the client can + check that 1 < g < N-1, and g^q % N equals N-1. Performing these + checks may be time-consuming; after checking new parameters, the + client may want to add them to a known-good list. + + Group parameters that are not accepted via one of the above methods + MUST be rejected with an untrusted_srp_parameters alert (see Section + 2.9). + + The client MUST abort the handshake with an illegal_parameter alert + if B % N = 0. + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 7] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2004 + + +2.5.4 Client Key Exchange + + The client key exchange message carries the client's public value + (A). The client calculates this value as A = g^a % N, where a is a + random number which SHOULD be at least 256 bits in length. + + The server MUST abort the handshake with an illegal_parameter alert + if A % N = 0. + +2.6 Calculating the Pre-master Secret + + The pre-master secret is calculated by the client as follows: + + I, P = <read from user> + N, g, s, B = <read from server> + a = random() + A = g^a % N + u = SHA1(A | B) + k = SHA1(N | g) + x = SHA1(s | SHA1(I | ":" | P)) + <premaster secret> = (B - (k * g^x)) ^ (a + (u * x)) % N + + The pre-master secret is calculated by the server as follows: + + N, g, s, v = <read from password file> + b = random() + k = SHA1(N | g) + B = k*v + g^b % N + A = <read from client> + u = SHA1(A | B) + <premaster secret> = (A * v^u) ^ b % N + + The finished messages perform the same function as the client and + server evidence messages (M1 and M2) specified in [RFC2945]. If + either the client or the server calculate an incorrect premaster + secret, the finished messages will fail to decrypt properly, and the + other party will return a bad_record_mac alert. + + If a client application receives a bad_record_mac alert when + performing an SRP handshake, it should inform the user that the + entered user name and password are incorrect. + +2.7 Cipher Suite Definitions + + The following cipher suites are added by this draft. The usage of + AES ciphersuites is as defined in [RFC3268]. + + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 8] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2004 + + + CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x50 }; + CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x51 }; + CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x52 }; + CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x53 }; + CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x54 }; + CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x55 }; + CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x56 }; + CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x57 }; + CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,0x58 }; + + Cipher suites that begin with TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA or TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS + require the server to send a certificate message containing a + certificate with the specified type of public key, and to sign the + server key exchange message using a matching private key. + + Cipher suites that do not include a digital signature algorithm + identifier assume the server is authenticated by its possesion of the + SRP verifier. + + Implementations conforming to this specification MUST implement the + TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ciphersuite, SHOULD implement the + TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA and TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + ciphersuites, and MAY implement the remaining ciphersuites. + +2.8 New Message Structures + + This section shows the structure of the messages passed during a + handshake that uses SRP for authentication. The representation + language used is the same as that used in [TLS]. + +2.8.1 Client Hello + + A new value, "srp(6)", has been added to the enumerated ExtensionType + defined in [TLSEXT]. This value MUST be used as the extension number + for the SRP extension. + + The "extension_data" field of the SRP extension SHALL contain: + + opaque srp_I<1..2^8-1> + + where srp_I is the user name, encoded per Section 2.4. + +2.8.2 Server Key Exchange + + A new value, "srp", has been added to the enumerated + KeyExchangeAlgorithm originally defined in [TLS]. + + When the value of KeyExchangeAlgorithm is set to "srp", the server's + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 9] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2004 + + + SRP parameters are sent in the server key exchange message, encoded + in a ServerSRPParams structure. + + If a certificate is sent to the client the server key exchange + message must be signed. + + enum { rsa, diffie_hellman, srp } KeyExchangeAlgorithm; + + struct { + select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) { + case diffie_hellman: + ServerDHParams params; + Signature signed_params; + case rsa: + ServerRSAParams params; + Signature signed_params; + case srp: /* new entry */ + ServerSRPParams params; + Signature signed_params; + }; + } ServerKeyExchange; + + struct { + opaque srp_N<1..2^16-1>; + opaque srp_g<1..2^16-1>; + opaque srp_s<1..2^8-1> + opaque srp_B<1..2^16-1>; + } ServerSRPParams; /* SRP parameters */ + +2.8.3 Client Key Exchange + + When the value of KeyExchangeAlgorithm is set to "srp", the client's + public value (A) is sent in the client key exchange message, encoded + in a ClientSRPPublic structure. + + struct { + select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) { + case rsa: EncryptedPreMasterSecret; + case diffie_hellman: ClientDiffieHellmanPublic; + case srp: ClientSRPPublic; /* new entry */ + } exchange_keys; + } ClientKeyExchange; + + struct { + opaque srp_A<1..2^16-1>; + } ClientSRPPublic; + + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 10] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2004 + + +2.9 Error Alerts + + Three new error alerts are defined: + + o "unknown_srp_username" (120) - this alert MAY be sent by a server + that receives an unknown user name. This alert is always fatal. + See Section 2.5.1.3 for details. + o "missing_srp_username" (121) - this alert MAY be sent by a server + that would like to select an offered SRP ciphersuite, if the SRP + extension is absent from the client's hello message. This alert + is always a warning. Upon receiving this alert, the client MAY + send a new hello message on the same connection, this time + including the SRP extension. See Section 2.5.1.2 for details. + o "untrusted_srp_parameters" (122) - this alert MUST be sent by a + client that receives unknown or untrusted (N, g) values. This + alert is always fatal. See Section 2.5.3 for details. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 11] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2004 + + +3. Security Considerations + + If an attacker is able to steal the SRP verifier file, the attacker + can masquerade as the real server, and can also use dictionary + attacks to recover client passwords. + + An attacker could repeatedly contact an SRP server and try to guess a + legitimate user's password. Servers SHOULD take steps to prevent + this, such as limiting the rate of authentication attempts from a + particular IP address, or against a particular user account, or + locking the user account once a threshold of failed attempts is + reached. + + The client's user name is sent in the clear in the Client Hello + message. To avoid sending the user name in the clear, the client + could first open a conventional anonymous, or server-authenticated + connection, then renegotiate an SRP-authenticated connection with the + handshake protected by the first connection. + + The checks described in Section 2.5.3 and Section 2.5.4 on the + received values for A and B are crucial for security and MUST be + performed. + + The private values a and b SHOULD be at least 256 bit random numbers, + to give approximately 128 bits of security against certain methods of + calculating discrete logarithms. + + If the client receives a missing_srp_username alert, the client + should be aware that unless the handshake protocol is run to + completion, this alert may have been inserted by an attacker. If the + handshake protocol is not run to completion, the client should not + make any decisions, nor form any assumptions, based on receiving this + alert. + + It is possible to choose a (user name, password) pair such that the + resulting verifier will also match other, related, (user name, + password) pairs. Thus, anyone using verifiers should be careful not + to assume that only a single (user name, password) pair matches the + verifier. + + + + + + + + + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 12] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2004 + + +4. References + +4.1 Normative References + + [TLS] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol", RFC 2246, + January 1999. + + [SRP-6] Wu, T., "SRP-6: Improvements and Refinements to the Secure + Remote Password Protocol", October 2002, + <http://srp.stanford.edu/srp6.ps>. + + [TLSEXT] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J. + and T. Wright, "TLS Extensions", RFC 3546, June 2003. + + [StringPrep] + Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of + Internationalized Strings ("stringprep")", RFC 3454, + December 2002. + + [SASLPrep] + Zeilenga, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep profile for user names + and passwords", draft-ietf-sasl-saslprep-09 (work in + progress), April 2004. + + [RFC2945] Wu, T., "The SRP Authentication and Key Exchange System", + RFC 2945, September 2000. + + [SHA1] "Announcing the Secure Hash Standard", FIPS 180-1, + September 2000. + + [HMAC] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M. and R. Canetti, "HMAC: + Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, + February 1997. + + [RFC3268] Chown, P., "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) + Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC + 3268, June 2002. + + [MODP] Kivinen, T. and M. Kojo, "More Modular Exponentiation + (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange + (IKE)", RFC 3526, May 2003. + +4.2 Informative References + + [IMAP] Newman, C., "Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP", RFC 2595, + June 1999. + + [FTP] Ford-Hutchinson, P., Carpenter, M., Hudson, T., Murray, E. + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 13] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2004 + + + and V. Wiegand, "Securing FTP with TLS", + draft-murray-auth-ftp-ssl-13 (work in progress), March 2004. + + [SRP] Wu, T., "The Secure Remote Password Protocol", Proceedings of + the 1998 Internet Society Network and Distributed System + Security Symposium pp. 97-111, March 1998. + + +Authors' Addresses + + David Taylor + Forge Research Pty Ltd + + EMail: DavidTaylor@forge.com.au + URI: http://www.forge.com.au/ + + + Tom Wu + Arcot Systems + + EMail: tom@arcot.com + URI: http://www.arcot.com/ + + + Nikos Mavroyanopoulos + + EMail: nmav@gnutls.org + URI: http://www.gnutls.org/ + + + Trevor Perrin + + EMail: trevp@trevp.net + URI: http://trevp.net/ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 14] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2004 + + +Appendix A. SRP Group Parameters + + The 1024, 1536, and 2048-bit groups are taken from software developed + by Tom Wu and Eugene Jhong for the Stanford SRP distribution, and + subsequently proven to be prime. The larger primes are taken from + [MODP], but generators have been calculated that are primitive roots + of N, unlike the generators in [MODP]. + + The 1024-bit and 1536-bit groups MUST be supported. + + 1. 1024-bit Group + + The hexadecimal value is: + EEAF0AB9 ADB38DD6 9C33F80A FA8FC5E8 60726187 75FF3C0B 9EA2314C + 9C256576 D674DF74 96EA81D3 383B4813 D692C6E0 E0D5D8E2 50B98BE4 + 8E495C1D 6089DAD1 5DC7D7B4 6154D6B6 CE8EF4AD 69B15D49 82559B29 + 7BCF1885 C529F566 660E57EC 68EDBC3C 05726CC0 2FD4CBF4 976EAA9A + FD5138FE 8376435B 9FC61D2F C0EB06E3 + The generator is: 2. + 2. 1536-bit Group + + The hexadecimal value is: + 9DEF3CAF B939277A B1F12A86 17A47BBB DBA51DF4 99AC4C80 BEEEA961 + 4B19CC4D 5F4F5F55 6E27CBDE 51C6A94B E4607A29 1558903B A0D0F843 + 80B655BB 9A22E8DC DF028A7C EC67F0D0 8134B1C8 B9798914 9B609E0B + E3BAB63D 47548381 DBC5B1FC 764E3F4B 53DD9DA1 158BFD3E 2B9C8CF5 + 6EDF0195 39349627 DB2FD53D 24B7C486 65772E43 7D6C7F8C E442734A + F7CCB7AE 837C264A E3A9BEB8 7F8A2FE9 B8B5292E 5A021FFF 5E91479E + 8CE7A28C 2442C6F3 15180F93 499A234D CF76E3FE D135F9BB + The generator is: 2. + 3. 2048-bit Group + + The hexadecimal value is: + AC6BDB41 324A9A9B F166DE5E 1389582F AF72B665 1987EE07 FC319294 + 3DB56050 A37329CB B4A099ED 8193E075 7767A13D D52312AB 4B03310D + CD7F48A9 DA04FD50 E8083969 EDB767B0 CF609517 9A163AB3 661A05FB + D5FAAAE8 2918A996 2F0B93B8 55F97993 EC975EEA A80D740A DBF4FF74 + 7359D041 D5C33EA7 1D281E44 6B14773B CA97B43A 23FB8016 76BD207A + 436C6481 F1D2B907 8717461A 5B9D32E6 88F87748 544523B5 24B0D57D + 5EA77A27 75D2ECFA 032CFBDB F52FB378 61602790 04E57AE6 AF874E73 + 03CE5329 9CCC041C 7BC308D8 2A5698F3 A8D0C382 71AE35F8 E9DBFBB6 + 94B5C803 D89F7AE4 35DE236D 525F5475 9B65E372 FCD68EF2 0FA7111F + 9E4AFF73 + The generator is: 2. + 4. 3072-bit Group + + This prime is: 2^3072 - 2^3008 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^2942 pi] + + 1690314 } + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 15] + + + Its hexadecimal value is: + FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08 + 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B + 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 + A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 + 49286651 ECE45B3D C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 + FD24CF5F 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D + 670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B E39E772C + 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9 DE2BCBF6 95581718 + 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510 15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D + 04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64 ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D + B3970F85 A6E1E4C7 ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226 + 1AD2EE6B F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C + BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31 43DB5BFC + E0FD108E 4B82D120 A93AD2CA FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF + The generator is: 5. + 5. 4096-bit Group + + This prime is: 2^4096 - 2^4032 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^3966 pi] + + 240904 } + + Its hexadecimal value is: + FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08 + 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B + 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 + A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 + 49286651 ECE45B3D C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 + FD24CF5F 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D + 670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B E39E772C + 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9 DE2BCBF6 95581718 + 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510 15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D + 04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64 ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D + B3970F85 A6E1E4C7 ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226 + 1AD2EE6B F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C + BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31 43DB5BFC + E0FD108E 4B82D120 A9210801 1A723C12 A787E6D7 88719A10 BDBA5B26 + 99C32718 6AF4E23C 1A946834 B6150BDA 2583E9CA 2AD44CE8 DBBBC2DB + 04DE8EF9 2E8EFC14 1FBECAA6 287C5947 4E6BC05D 99B2964F A090C3A2 + 233BA186 515BE7ED 1F612970 CEE2D7AF B81BDD76 2170481C D0069127 + D5B05AA9 93B4EA98 8D8FDDC1 86FFB7DC 90A6C08F 4DF435C9 34063199 + FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF + The generator is: 5. + 6. 6144-bit Group + + This prime is: 2^6144 - 2^6080 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^6014 pi] + + 929484 } + + Its hexadecimal value is: + FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08 + 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 16] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2004 + + + 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 + A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 + 49286651 ECE45B3D C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 + FD24CF5F 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D + 670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B E39E772C + 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9 DE2BCBF6 95581718 + 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510 15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D + 04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64 ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D + B3970F85 A6E1E4C7 ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226 + 1AD2EE6B F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C + BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31 43DB5BFC + E0FD108E 4B82D120 A9210801 1A723C12 A787E6D7 88719A10 BDBA5B26 + 99C32718 6AF4E23C 1A946834 B6150BDA 2583E9CA 2AD44CE8 DBBBC2DB + 04DE8EF9 2E8EFC14 1FBECAA6 287C5947 4E6BC05D 99B2964F A090C3A2 + 233BA186 515BE7ED 1F612970 CEE2D7AF B81BDD76 2170481C D0069127 + D5B05AA9 93B4EA98 8D8FDDC1 86FFB7DC 90A6C08F 4DF435C9 34028492 + 36C3FAB4 D27C7026 C1D4DCB2 602646DE C9751E76 3DBA37BD F8FF9406 + AD9E530E E5DB382F 413001AE B06A53ED 9027D831 179727B0 865A8918 + DA3EDBEB CF9B14ED 44CE6CBA CED4BB1B DB7F1447 E6CC254B 33205151 + 2BD7AF42 6FB8F401 378CD2BF 5983CA01 C64B92EC F032EA15 D1721D03 + F482D7CE 6E74FEF6 D55E702F 46980C82 B5A84031 900B1C9E 59E7C97F + BEC7E8F3 23A97A7E 36CC88BE 0F1D45B7 FF585AC5 4BD407B2 2B4154AA + CC8F6D7E BF48E1D8 14CC5ED2 0F8037E0 A79715EE F29BE328 06A1D58B + B7C5DA76 F550AA3D 8A1FBFF0 EB19CCB1 A313D55C DA56C9EC 2EF29632 + 387FE8D7 6E3C0468 043E8F66 3F4860EE 12BF2D5B 0B7474D6 E694F91E + 6DCC4024 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF + The generator is: 5. + 7. 8192-bit Group + + This prime is: 2^8192 - 2^8128 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^8062 pi] + + 4743158 } + + Its hexadecimal value is: + FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08 + 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B + 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 + A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 + 49286651 ECE45B3D C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 + FD24CF5F 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D + 670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B E39E772C + 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9 DE2BCBF6 95581718 + 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510 15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D + 04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64 ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D + B3970F85 A6E1E4C7 ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226 + 1AD2EE6B F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C + BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31 43DB5BFC + E0FD108E 4B82D120 A9210801 1A723C12 A787E6D7 88719A10 BDBA5B26 + 99C32718 6AF4E23C 1A946834 B6150BDA 2583E9CA 2AD44CE8 DBBBC2DB + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 17] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2004 + + + 04DE8EF9 2E8EFC14 1FBECAA6 287C5947 4E6BC05D 99B2964F A090C3A2 + 233BA186 515BE7ED 1F612970 CEE2D7AF B81BDD76 2170481C D0069127 + D5B05AA9 93B4EA98 8D8FDDC1 86FFB7DC 90A6C08F 4DF435C9 34028492 + 36C3FAB4 D27C7026 C1D4DCB2 602646DE C9751E76 3DBA37BD F8FF9406 + AD9E530E E5DB382F 413001AE B06A53ED 9027D831 179727B0 865A8918 + DA3EDBEB CF9B14ED 44CE6CBA CED4BB1B DB7F1447 E6CC254B 33205151 + 2BD7AF42 6FB8F401 378CD2BF 5983CA01 C64B92EC F032EA15 D1721D03 + F482D7CE 6E74FEF6 D55E702F 46980C82 B5A84031 900B1C9E 59E7C97F + BEC7E8F3 23A97A7E 36CC88BE 0F1D45B7 FF585AC5 4BD407B2 2B4154AA + CC8F6D7E BF48E1D8 14CC5ED2 0F8037E0 A79715EE F29BE328 06A1D58B + B7C5DA76 F550AA3D 8A1FBFF0 EB19CCB1 A313D55C DA56C9EC 2EF29632 + 387FE8D7 6E3C0468 043E8F66 3F4860EE 12BF2D5B 0B7474D6 E694F91E + 6DBE1159 74A3926F 12FEE5E4 38777CB6 A932DF8C D8BEC4D0 73B931BA + 3BC832B6 8D9DD300 741FA7BF 8AFC47ED 2576F693 6BA42466 3AAB639C + 5AE4F568 3423B474 2BF1C978 238F16CB E39D652D E3FDB8BE FC848AD9 + 22222E04 A4037C07 13EB57A8 1A23F0C7 3473FC64 6CEA306B 4BCBC886 + 2F8385DD FA9D4B7F A2C087E8 79683303 ED5BDD3A 062B3CF5 B3A278A6 + 6D2A13F8 3F44F82D DF310EE0 74AB6A36 4597E899 A0255DC1 64F31CC5 + 0846851D F9AB4819 5DED7EA1 B1D510BD 7EE74D73 FAF36BC3 1ECFA268 + 359046F4 EB879F92 4009438B 481C6CD7 889A002E D5EE382B C9190DA6 + FC026E47 9558E447 5677E9AA 9E3050E2 765694DF C81F56E8 80B96E71 + 60C980DD 98EDD3DF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF + The generator is: 19 (decimal). + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 18] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2004 + + +Appendix B. Acknowledgements + + Thanks to all on the IETF tls mailing list for ideas and analysis. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 19] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2004 + + +Intellectual Property Statement + + The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any + intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to + pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in + this document or the extent to which any license under such rights + might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it + has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the + IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and + standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of + claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of + licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to + obtain a general license or permission for the use of such + proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can + be obtained from the IETF Secretariat. + + The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any + copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary + rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice + this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive + Director. + + +Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved. + + This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to + others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it + or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published + and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any + kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are + included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this + document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing + the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other + Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of + developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for + copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be + followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than + English. + + The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be + revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assignees. + + This document and the information contained herein is provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING + TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 20] + +Internet-Draft Using SRP for TLS Authentication June 2004 + + + HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + + +Acknowledgment + + Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the + Internet Society. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Taylor, et al. Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 21] + + +
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