diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'REORG.TODO/sunrpc/key_call.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | REORG.TODO/sunrpc/key_call.c | 576 |
1 files changed, 576 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/REORG.TODO/sunrpc/key_call.c b/REORG.TODO/sunrpc/key_call.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b871c04648 --- /dev/null +++ b/REORG.TODO/sunrpc/key_call.c @@ -0,0 +1,576 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010, Oracle America, Inc. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are + * met: + * + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above + * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following + * disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials + * provided with the distribution. + * * Neither the name of the "Oracle America, Inc." nor the names of its + * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived + * from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE + * COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, + * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE + * GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE + * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +/* + * The original source is from the RPCSRC 4.0 package from Sun Microsystems. + * The Interface to keyserver protocoll 2, RPC over AF_UNIX and Linux/doors + * was added by Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@suse.de> + * Since the Linux/doors project was stopped, I doubt that this code will + * ever be useful <kukuk@suse.de>. + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <signal.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <rpc/rpc.h> +#include <rpc/auth.h> +#include <sys/wait.h> +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <rpc/key_prot.h> +#include <libc-lock.h> +#include <shlib-compat.h> + +#define KEY_TIMEOUT 5 /* per-try timeout in seconds */ +#define KEY_NRETRY 12 /* number of retries */ + +#define debug(msg) /* turn off debugging */ + +#ifndef SO_PASSCRED +extern int _openchild (const char *command, FILE **fto, FILE **ffrom); +#endif + +static int key_call (u_long, xdrproc_t xdr_arg, char *, + xdrproc_t xdr_rslt, char *) internal_function; + +static const struct timeval trytimeout = {KEY_TIMEOUT, 0}; +static const struct timeval tottimeout = {KEY_TIMEOUT *KEY_NRETRY, 0}; + +int +key_setsecret (char *secretkey) +{ + keystatus status; + + if (!key_call ((u_long) KEY_SET, (xdrproc_t) xdr_keybuf, secretkey, + (xdrproc_t) xdr_keystatus, (char *) &status)) + return -1; + if (status != KEY_SUCCESS) + { + debug ("set status is nonzero"); + return -1; + } + return 0; +} +libc_hidden_nolink_sunrpc (key_setsecret, GLIBC_2_1) + +/* key_secretkey_is_set() returns 1 if the keyserver has a secret key + * stored for the caller's effective uid; it returns 0 otherwise + * + * N.B.: The KEY_NET_GET key call is undocumented. Applications shouldn't + * be using it, because it allows them to get the user's secret key. + */ +int +key_secretkey_is_set (void) +{ + struct key_netstres kres; + + memset (&kres, 0, sizeof (kres)); + if (key_call ((u_long) KEY_NET_GET, (xdrproc_t) xdr_void, + (char *) NULL, (xdrproc_t) xdr_key_netstres, + (char *) &kres) && + (kres.status == KEY_SUCCESS) && + (kres.key_netstres_u.knet.st_priv_key[0] != 0)) + { + /* avoid leaving secret key in memory */ + memset (kres.key_netstres_u.knet.st_priv_key, 0, HEXKEYBYTES); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} +#ifdef EXPORT_RPC_SYMBOLS +libc_hidden_def (key_secretkey_is_set) +#else +libc_hidden_nolink_sunrpc (key_secretkey_is_set, GLIBC_2_1) +#endif + +int +key_encryptsession (char *remotename, des_block *deskey) +{ + cryptkeyarg arg; + cryptkeyres res; + + arg.remotename = remotename; + arg.deskey = *deskey; + if (!key_call ((u_long) KEY_ENCRYPT, (xdrproc_t) xdr_cryptkeyarg, + (char *) &arg, (xdrproc_t) xdr_cryptkeyres, + (char *) &res)) + return -1; + + if (res.status != KEY_SUCCESS) + { + debug ("encrypt status is nonzero"); + return -1; + } + *deskey = res.cryptkeyres_u.deskey; + return 0; +} +libc_hidden_nolink_sunrpc (key_encryptsession, GLIBC_2_1) + +int +key_decryptsession (char *remotename, des_block *deskey) +{ + cryptkeyarg arg; + cryptkeyres res; + + arg.remotename = remotename; + arg.deskey = *deskey; + if (!key_call ((u_long) KEY_DECRYPT, (xdrproc_t) xdr_cryptkeyarg, + (char *) &arg, (xdrproc_t) xdr_cryptkeyres, + (char *) &res)) + return -1; + if (res.status != KEY_SUCCESS) + { + debug ("decrypt status is nonzero"); + return -1; + } + *deskey = res.cryptkeyres_u.deskey; + return 0; +} +libc_hidden_nolink_sunrpc (key_decryptsession, GLIBC_2_1) + +int +key_encryptsession_pk (char *remotename, netobj *remotekey, + des_block *deskey) +{ + cryptkeyarg2 arg; + cryptkeyres res; + + arg.remotename = remotename; + arg.remotekey = *remotekey; + arg.deskey = *deskey; + if (!key_call ((u_long) KEY_ENCRYPT_PK, (xdrproc_t) xdr_cryptkeyarg2, + (char *) &arg, (xdrproc_t) xdr_cryptkeyres, + (char *) &res)) + return -1; + + if (res.status != KEY_SUCCESS) + { + debug ("encrypt status is nonzero"); + return -1; + } + *deskey = res.cryptkeyres_u.deskey; + return 0; +} +libc_hidden_nolink_sunrpc (key_encryptsession_pk, GLIBC_2_1) + +int +key_decryptsession_pk (char *remotename, netobj *remotekey, + des_block *deskey) +{ + cryptkeyarg2 arg; + cryptkeyres res; + + arg.remotename = remotename; + arg.remotekey = *remotekey; + arg.deskey = *deskey; + if (!key_call ((u_long) KEY_DECRYPT_PK, (xdrproc_t) xdr_cryptkeyarg2, + (char *) &arg, (xdrproc_t) xdr_cryptkeyres, + (char *) &res)) + return -1; + + if (res.status != KEY_SUCCESS) + { + debug ("decrypt status is nonzero"); + return -1; + } + *deskey = res.cryptkeyres_u.deskey; + return 0; +} +libc_hidden_nolink_sunrpc (key_decryptsession_pk, GLIBC_2_1) + +int +key_gendes (des_block *key) +{ + struct sockaddr_in sin; + CLIENT *client; + int socket; + enum clnt_stat stat; + + sin.sin_family = AF_INET; + sin.sin_port = 0; + sin.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl (INADDR_LOOPBACK); + __bzero (sin.sin_zero, sizeof (sin.sin_zero)); + socket = RPC_ANYSOCK; + client = clntudp_bufcreate (&sin, (u_long) KEY_PROG, (u_long) KEY_VERS, + trytimeout, &socket, RPCSMALLMSGSIZE, + RPCSMALLMSGSIZE); + if (client == NULL) + return -1; + + stat = clnt_call (client, KEY_GEN, (xdrproc_t) xdr_void, NULL, + (xdrproc_t) xdr_des_block, (caddr_t) key, + tottimeout); + clnt_destroy (client); + __close (socket); + if (stat != RPC_SUCCESS) + return -1; + + return 0; +} +#ifdef EXPORT_RPC_SYMBOLS +libc_hidden_def (key_gendes) +#else +libc_hidden_nolink_sunrpc (key_gendes, GLIBC_2_1) +#endif + +int +key_setnet (struct key_netstarg *arg) +{ + keystatus status; + + if (!key_call ((u_long) KEY_NET_PUT, (xdrproc_t) xdr_key_netstarg, + (char *) arg,(xdrproc_t) xdr_keystatus, + (char *) &status)) + return -1; + + if (status != KEY_SUCCESS) + { + debug ("key_setnet status is nonzero"); + return -1; + } + return 1; +} +libc_hidden_nolink_sunrpc (key_setnet, GLIBC_2_1) + +int +key_get_conv (char *pkey, des_block *deskey) +{ + cryptkeyres res; + + if (!key_call ((u_long) KEY_GET_CONV, (xdrproc_t) xdr_keybuf, pkey, + (xdrproc_t) xdr_cryptkeyres, (char *) &res)) + return -1; + + if (res.status != KEY_SUCCESS) + { + debug ("get_conv status is nonzero"); + return -1; + } + *deskey = res.cryptkeyres_u.deskey; + return 0; +} +libc_hidden_nolink_sunrpc (key_get_conv, GLIBC_2_1) + +/* + * Hack to allow the keyserver to use AUTH_DES (for authenticated + * NIS+ calls, for example). The only functions that get called + * are key_encryptsession_pk, key_decryptsession_pk, and key_gendes. + * + * The approach is to have the keyserver fill in pointers to local + * implementations of these functions, and to call those in key_call(). + */ + +cryptkeyres *(*__key_encryptsession_pk_LOCAL) (uid_t, char *); +cryptkeyres *(*__key_decryptsession_pk_LOCAL) (uid_t, char *); +des_block *(*__key_gendes_LOCAL) (uid_t, char *); + +#ifndef SO_PASSCRED +static int +internal_function +key_call_keyenvoy (u_long proc, xdrproc_t xdr_arg, char *arg, + xdrproc_t xdr_rslt, char *rslt) +{ + XDR xdrargs; + XDR xdrrslt; + FILE *fargs; + FILE *frslt; + sigset_t oldmask, mask; + int status; + int pid; + int success; + uid_t ruid; + uid_t euid; + static const char MESSENGER[] = "/usr/etc/keyenvoy"; + + success = 1; + sigemptyset (&mask); + sigaddset (&mask, SIGCHLD); + __sigprocmask (SIG_BLOCK, &mask, &oldmask); + + /* + * We are going to exec a set-uid program which makes our effective uid + * zero, and authenticates us with our real uid. We need to make the + * effective uid be the real uid for the setuid program, and + * the real uid be the effective uid so that we can change things back. + */ + euid = __geteuid (); + ruid = __getuid (); + __setreuid (euid, ruid); + pid = _openchild (MESSENGER, &fargs, &frslt); + __setreuid (ruid, euid); + if (pid < 0) + { + debug ("open_streams"); + __sigprocmask (SIG_SETMASK, &oldmask, NULL); + return (0); + } + xdrstdio_create (&xdrargs, fargs, XDR_ENCODE); + xdrstdio_create (&xdrrslt, frslt, XDR_DECODE); + + if (!xdr_u_long (&xdrargs, &proc) || !(*xdr_arg) (&xdrargs, arg)) + { + debug ("xdr args"); + success = 0; + } + fclose (fargs); + + if (success && !(*xdr_rslt) (&xdrrslt, rslt)) + { + debug ("xdr rslt"); + success = 0; + } + fclose(frslt); + + wait_again: + if (__wait4 (pid, &status, 0, NULL) < 0) + { + if (errno == EINTR) + goto wait_again; + debug ("wait4"); + if (errno == ECHILD || errno == ESRCH) + perror ("wait"); + else + success = 0; + } + else + if (status != 0) + { + debug ("wait4 1"); + success = 0; + } + __sigprocmask (SIG_SETMASK, &oldmask, NULL); + + return success; +} +#endif + +struct key_call_private { + CLIENT *client; /* Client handle */ + pid_t pid; /* process-id at moment of creation */ + uid_t uid; /* user-id at last authorization */ +}; +#ifdef _RPC_THREAD_SAFE_ +#define key_call_private_main RPC_THREAD_VARIABLE(key_call_private_s) +#else +static struct key_call_private *key_call_private_main; +#endif +__libc_lock_define_initialized (static, keycall_lock) + +/* + * Keep the handle cached. This call may be made quite often. + */ +static CLIENT * +getkeyserv_handle (int vers) +{ + struct key_call_private *kcp = key_call_private_main; + struct timeval wait_time; + int fd; + struct sockaddr_un name; + socklen_t namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_un); + +#define TOTAL_TIMEOUT 30 /* total timeout talking to keyserver */ +#define TOTAL_TRIES 5 /* Number of tries */ + + if (kcp == (struct key_call_private *)NULL) + { + kcp = (struct key_call_private *)malloc (sizeof (*kcp)); + if (kcp == (struct key_call_private *)NULL) + return (CLIENT *) NULL; + + key_call_private_main = kcp; + kcp->client = NULL; + } + + /* if pid has changed, destroy client and rebuild */ + if (kcp->client != NULL && kcp->pid != __getpid ()) + { + auth_destroy (kcp->client->cl_auth); + clnt_destroy (kcp->client); + kcp->client = NULL; + } + + if (kcp->client != NULL) + { + /* if other side closed socket, build handle again */ + clnt_control (kcp->client, CLGET_FD, (char *)&fd); + if (__getpeername (fd,(struct sockaddr *)&name,&namelen) == -1) + { + auth_destroy (kcp->client->cl_auth); + clnt_destroy (kcp->client); + kcp->client = NULL; + } + } + + if (kcp->client != NULL) + { + /* if uid has changed, build client handle again */ + if (kcp->uid != __geteuid ()) + { + kcp->uid = __geteuid (); + auth_destroy (kcp->client->cl_auth); + kcp->client->cl_auth = + authunix_create ((char *)"", kcp->uid, 0, 0, NULL); + if (kcp->client->cl_auth == NULL) + { + clnt_destroy (kcp->client); + kcp->client = NULL; + return ((CLIENT *) NULL); + } + } + /* Change the version number to the new one */ + clnt_control (kcp->client, CLSET_VERS, (void *)&vers); + return kcp->client; + } + + if ((kcp->client == (CLIENT *) NULL)) + /* Use the AF_UNIX transport */ + kcp->client = clnt_create ("/var/run/keyservsock", KEY_PROG, vers, "unix"); + + if (kcp->client == (CLIENT *) NULL) + return (CLIENT *) NULL; + + kcp->uid = __geteuid (); + kcp->pid = __getpid (); + kcp->client->cl_auth = authunix_create ((char *)"", kcp->uid, 0, 0, NULL); + if (kcp->client->cl_auth == NULL) + { + clnt_destroy (kcp->client); + kcp->client = NULL; + return (CLIENT *) NULL; + } + + wait_time.tv_sec = TOTAL_TIMEOUT/TOTAL_TRIES; + wait_time.tv_usec = 0; + clnt_control (kcp->client, CLSET_RETRY_TIMEOUT, + (char *)&wait_time); + if (clnt_control (kcp->client, CLGET_FD, (char *)&fd)) + __fcntl (fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); /* make it "close on exec" */ + + return kcp->client; +} + +/* returns 0 on failure, 1 on success */ +static int +internal_function +key_call_socket (u_long proc, xdrproc_t xdr_arg, char *arg, + xdrproc_t xdr_rslt, char *rslt) +{ + CLIENT *clnt; + struct timeval wait_time; + int result = 0; + + __libc_lock_lock (keycall_lock); + if ((proc == KEY_ENCRYPT_PK) || (proc == KEY_DECRYPT_PK) || + (proc == KEY_NET_GET) || (proc == KEY_NET_PUT) || + (proc == KEY_GET_CONV)) + clnt = getkeyserv_handle(2); /* talk to version 2 */ + else + clnt = getkeyserv_handle(1); /* talk to version 1 */ + + if (clnt != NULL) + { + wait_time.tv_sec = TOTAL_TIMEOUT; + wait_time.tv_usec = 0; + + if (clnt_call (clnt, proc, xdr_arg, arg, xdr_rslt, rslt, + wait_time) == RPC_SUCCESS) + result = 1; + } + + __libc_lock_unlock (keycall_lock); + + return result; +} + + +/* returns 0 on failure, 1 on success */ +static int +internal_function +key_call (u_long proc, xdrproc_t xdr_arg, char *arg, + xdrproc_t xdr_rslt, char *rslt) +{ +#ifndef SO_PASSCRED + static int use_keyenvoy; +#endif + + if (proc == KEY_ENCRYPT_PK && __key_encryptsession_pk_LOCAL) + { + cryptkeyres *res; + res = (*__key_encryptsession_pk_LOCAL) (__geteuid (), arg); + *(cryptkeyres *) rslt = *res; + return 1; + } + else if (proc == KEY_DECRYPT_PK && __key_decryptsession_pk_LOCAL) + { + cryptkeyres *res; + res = (*__key_decryptsession_pk_LOCAL) (__geteuid (), arg); + *(cryptkeyres *) rslt = *res; + return 1; + } + else if (proc == KEY_GEN && __key_gendes_LOCAL) + { + des_block *res; + res = (*__key_gendes_LOCAL) (__geteuid (), 0); + *(des_block *) rslt = *res; + return 1; + } + +#ifdef SO_PASSCRED + return key_call_socket (proc, xdr_arg, arg, xdr_rslt, rslt); +#else + if (!use_keyenvoy) + { + if (key_call_socket (proc, xdr_arg, arg, xdr_rslt, rslt)) + return 1; + use_keyenvoy = 1; + } + return key_call_keyenvoy (proc, xdr_arg, arg, xdr_rslt, rslt); +#endif +} + +#ifdef _RPC_THREAD_SAFE_ +void +__rpc_thread_key_cleanup (void) +{ + struct key_call_private *kcp = RPC_THREAD_VARIABLE(key_call_private_s); + + if (kcp) { + if (kcp->client) { + if (kcp->client->cl_auth) + auth_destroy (kcp->client->cl_auth); + clnt_destroy(kcp->client); + } + free (kcp); + } +} +#endif /* _RPC_THREAD_SAFE_ */ |