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author | SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com> | 2018-06-04 15:39:26 +0200 |
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committer | Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 2018-06-11 10:19:03 -0700 |
commit | 2f3cbcd8c5a00dc043aabc13f2af221c7c0e89ad (patch) | |
tree | 1b3bf3ca0a5c0ab00865f231fd9fb5b7af6b5e13 /t/t7612-merge-verify-signatures.sh | |
parent | 9dd39821e3d0adf3f160642589291965c73a529e (diff) | |
download | git-2f3cbcd8c5a00dc043aabc13f2af221c7c0e89ad.tar.gz |
tests: make forging GPG signed commits and tags more robust
A couple of test scripts create forged GPG signed commits or tags to
check that such forgery can't fool various git commands' signature
verification. All but one of those test scripts are prone to
occasional failures because the forgery creates a bogus GPG signature,
and git commands error out with an unexpected error message, e.g.
"Commit deadbeef does not have a GPG signature" instead of "... has a
bad GPG signature".
't5573-pull-verify-signatures.sh', 't7510-signed-commit.sh' and
't7612-merge-verify-signatures.sh' create forged signed commits like
this:
git commit -S -m "bad on side" &&
git cat-file commit side-bad >raw &&
sed -e "s/bad/forged bad/" raw >forged &&
git hash-object -w -t commit forged >forged.commit
On rare occasions the given pattern occurs not only in the commit
message but in the GPG signature as well, and after it's replaced in
the signature the resulting signature becomes invalid, GPG will report
CRC error and that it couldn't find any signature, which will then
ultimately cause the test failure.
Since in all three cases the pattern to be replaced during the forgery
is the first word of the commit message's subject line, and since the
GPG signature in the commit object is indented by a space, let's just
anchor those patterns to the beginning of the line to prevent this
issue.
The test script 't7030-verify-tag.sh' creates a forged signed tag
object in a similar way by replacing the pattern "seventh", but the
GPG signature in tag objects is not indented by a space, so the above
solution is not applicable in this case. However, in the tag object
in question the pattern "seventh" occurs not only in the tag message
but in the 'tag' header as well. To create a forged tag object it's
sufficient to replace only one of the two occurences, so modify the
sed script to limit the pattern to the 'tag' header (i.e. a line
beginning with "tag ", which, because of the space character, can
never occur in the base64-encoded GPG signature).
Note that the forgery in 't7004-tag.sh' is not affected by this issue:
while 't7004' does create a forged signed tag kind of the same way,
it replaces "signed-tag" in the tag object, which, because of the '-'
character, can never occur in the base64-encoded GPG signarute.
Signed-off-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Diffstat (limited to 't/t7612-merge-verify-signatures.sh')
-rwxr-xr-x | t/t7612-merge-verify-signatures.sh | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/t/t7612-merge-verify-signatures.sh b/t/t7612-merge-verify-signatures.sh index e797c74112..e2b1df817a 100755 --- a/t/t7612-merge-verify-signatures.sh +++ b/t/t7612-merge-verify-signatures.sh @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ test_expect_success GPG 'create signed commits' ' echo 3 >bar && git add bar && test_tick && git commit -S -m "bad on side" && git cat-file commit side-bad >raw && - sed -e "s/bad/forged bad/" raw >forged && + sed -e "s/^bad/forged bad/" raw >forged && git hash-object -w -t commit forged >forged.commit && git checkout initial && |