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| author | Jeff King <peff@peff.net> | 2017-03-24 13:26:40 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 2017-03-24 12:34:07 -0700 |
| commit | 7202a6fa8773fdcf3f374625def3c15276250b67 (patch) | |
| tree | 96063a317f76e15fac6e73a0d1754b55f499ee87 /pack.h | |
| parent | 98718242cfd18f106dfcd7663282fb9906fd38a5 (diff) | |
| download | git-7202a6fa8773fdcf3f374625def3c15276250b67.tar.gz | |
encode_in_pack_object_header: respect output buffer length
The encode_in_pack_object_header() writes a variable-length
header to an output buffer, but it doesn't actually know
long the buffer is. At first glance, this looks like it
might be possible to overflow.
In practice, this is probably impossible. The smallest
buffer we use is 10 bytes, which would hold the header for
an object up to 2^67 bytes. Obviously we're not likely to
see such an object, but we might worry that an object could
lie about its size (causing us to overflow before we realize
it does not actually have that many bytes). But the argument
is passed as a uintmax_t. Even on systems that have __int128
available, uintmax_t is typically restricted to 64-bit by
the ABI.
So it's unlikely that a system exists where this could be
exploited. Still, it's easy enough to use a normal out/len
pair and make sure we don't write too far. That protects the
hypothetical 128-bit system, makes it harder for callers to
accidentally specify a too-small buffer, and makes the
resulting code easier to audit.
Note that the one caller in fast-import tried to catch such
a case, but did so _after_ the call (at which point we'd
have already overflowed!). This check can now go away.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'pack.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | pack.h | 3 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
@@ -84,7 +84,8 @@ extern int verify_pack(struct packed_git *, verify_fn fn, struct progress *, uin extern off_t write_pack_header(struct sha1file *f, uint32_t); extern void fixup_pack_header_footer(int, unsigned char *, const char *, uint32_t, unsigned char *, off_t); extern char *index_pack_lockfile(int fd); -extern int encode_in_pack_object_header(enum object_type, uintmax_t, unsigned char *); +extern int encode_in_pack_object_header(unsigned char *hdr, int hdr_len, + enum object_type, uintmax_t); #define PH_ERROR_EOF (-1) #define PH_ERROR_PACK_SIGNATURE (-2) |