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author | Knut Franke <k.franke@science-computing.de> | 2016-01-26 13:02:48 +0000 |
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committer | Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 2016-01-26 10:53:25 -0800 |
commit | 372370f1675c2b935fb703665358dd5567641107 (patch) | |
tree | ccd3d55be8f8d0be64f24cdb8f75a69da0f1e94c /http.c | |
parent | ef976395e26a25fb6d048d859a1c8cddb2640b9a (diff) | |
download | git-372370f1675c2b935fb703665358dd5567641107.tar.gz |
http: use credential API to handle proxy authenticationkf/http-proxy-auth-methods
Currently, the only way to pass proxy credentials to curl is by including them
in the proxy URL. Usually, this means they will end up on disk unencrypted, one
way or another (by inclusion in ~/.gitconfig, shell profile or history). Since
proxy authentication often uses a domain user, credentials can be security
sensitive; therefore, a safer way of passing credentials is desirable.
If the configured proxy contains a username but not a password, query the
credential API for one. Also, make sure we approve/reject proxy credentials
properly.
For consistency reasons, add parsing of http_proxy/https_proxy/all_proxy
environment variables, which would otherwise be evaluated as a fallback by curl.
Without this, we would have different semantics for git configuration and
environment variables.
Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Helped-by: Eric Sunshine <sunshine@sunshineco.com>
Helped-by: Elia Pinto <gitter.spiros@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Knut Franke <k.franke@science-computing.de>
Signed-off-by: Elia Pinto <gitter.spiros@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'http.c')
-rw-r--r-- | http.c | 77 |
1 files changed, 77 insertions, 0 deletions
@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ static struct { * here, too */ }; +static struct credential proxy_auth = CREDENTIAL_INIT; +static const char *curl_proxyuserpwd; static const char *curl_cookie_file; static int curl_save_cookies; struct credential http_auth = CREDENTIAL_INIT; @@ -177,6 +179,9 @@ static void finish_active_slot(struct active_request_slot *slot) #else slot->results->auth_avail = 0; #endif + + curl_easy_getinfo(slot->curl, CURLINFO_HTTP_CONNECTCODE, + &slot->results->http_connectcode); } /* Run callback if appropriate */ @@ -334,8 +339,32 @@ static void var_override(const char **var, char *value) } } +static void set_proxyauth_name_password(CURL *result) +{ +#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071301 + curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_PROXYUSERNAME, + proxy_auth.username); + curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_PROXYPASSWORD, + proxy_auth.password); +#else + struct strbuf s = STRBUF_INIT; + + strbuf_addstr_urlencode(&s, proxy_auth.username, 1); + strbuf_addch(&s, ':'); + strbuf_addstr_urlencode(&s, proxy_auth.password, 1); + curl_proxyuserpwd = strbuf_detach(&s, NULL); + curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_PROXYUSERPWD, curl_proxyuserpwd); +#endif +} + static void init_curl_proxy_auth(CURL *result) { + if (proxy_auth.username) { + if (!proxy_auth.password) + credential_fill(&proxy_auth); + set_proxyauth_name_password(result); + } + var_override(&http_proxy_authmethod, getenv("GIT_HTTP_PROXY_AUTHMETHOD")); #if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x070a07 /* CURLOPT_PROXYAUTH and CURLAUTH_ANY */ @@ -517,6 +546,31 @@ static CURL *get_curl_handle(void) curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_USE_SSL, CURLUSESSL_TRY); #endif + /* + * CURL also examines these variables as a fallback; but we need to query + * them here in order to decide whether to prompt for missing password (cf. + * init_curl_proxy_auth()). + * + * Unlike many other common environment variables, these are historically + * lowercase only. It appears that CURL did not know this and implemented + * only uppercase variants, which was later corrected to take both - with + * the exception of http_proxy, which is lowercase only also in CURL. As + * the lowercase versions are the historical quasi-standard, they take + * precedence here, as in CURL. + */ + if (!curl_http_proxy) { + if (!strcmp(http_auth.protocol, "https")) { + var_override(&curl_http_proxy, getenv("HTTPS_PROXY")); + var_override(&curl_http_proxy, getenv("https_proxy")); + } else { + var_override(&curl_http_proxy, getenv("http_proxy")); + } + if (!curl_http_proxy) { + var_override(&curl_http_proxy, getenv("ALL_PROXY")); + var_override(&curl_http_proxy, getenv("all_proxy")); + } + } + if (curl_http_proxy) { curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_PROXY, curl_http_proxy); #if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071800 @@ -530,6 +584,16 @@ static CURL *get_curl_handle(void) curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_PROXYTYPE, CURLPROXY_SOCKS4); #endif + if (strstr(curl_http_proxy, "://")) + credential_from_url(&proxy_auth, curl_http_proxy); + else { + struct strbuf url = STRBUF_INIT; + strbuf_addf(&url, "http://%s", curl_http_proxy); + credential_from_url(&proxy_auth, url.buf); + strbuf_release(&url); + } + + curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_PROXY, proxy_auth.host); } init_curl_proxy_auth(result); @@ -673,6 +737,15 @@ void http_cleanup(void) curl_http_proxy = NULL; } + if (proxy_auth.password) { + memset(proxy_auth.password, 0, strlen(proxy_auth.password)); + free(proxy_auth.password); + proxy_auth.password = NULL; + } + + free((void *)curl_proxyuserpwd); + curl_proxyuserpwd = NULL; + free((void *)http_proxy_authmethod); http_proxy_authmethod = NULL; @@ -1005,6 +1078,8 @@ static int handle_curl_result(struct slot_results *results) if (results->curl_result == CURLE_OK) { credential_approve(&http_auth); + if (proxy_auth.password) + credential_approve(&proxy_auth); return HTTP_OK; } else if (missing_target(results)) return HTTP_MISSING_TARGET; @@ -1019,6 +1094,8 @@ static int handle_curl_result(struct slot_results *results) return HTTP_REAUTH; } } else { + if (results->http_connectcode == 407) + credential_reject(&proxy_auth); #if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x070c00 if (!curl_errorstr[0]) strlcpy(curl_errorstr, |