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Diffstat (limited to 'lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl | 432 |
1 files changed, 432 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2395e98642 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl @@ -0,0 +1,432 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2013. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License, +%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in +%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the +%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be +%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/. +%% +%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" +%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See +%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations +%% under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% + +%% +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Purpose: Handles tls1 encryption. +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +-module(tls_v1). + +-include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). +-include("ssl_internal.hrl"). +-include("ssl_record.hrl"). + +-export([master_secret/4, finished/5, certificate_verify/3, mac_hash/7, + setup_keys/8, suites/1, prf/5, + ecc_curves/1, oid_to_enum/1, enum_to_oid/1]). + +%%==================================================================== +%% Internal application API +%%==================================================================== + +-spec master_secret(integer(), binary(), binary(), binary()) -> binary(). + +master_secret(PrfAlgo, PreMasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) -> + %% RFC 2246 & 4346 && RFC 5246 - 8.1 %% master_secret = PRF(pre_master_secret, + %% "master secret", ClientHello.random + + %% ServerHello.random)[0..47]; + + prf(PrfAlgo, PreMasterSecret, <<"master secret">>, + [ClientRandom, ServerRandom], 48). + +-spec finished(client | server, integer(), integer(), binary(), [binary()]) -> binary(). + +finished(Role, Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) + when Version == 1; Version == 2; PrfAlgo == ?MD5SHA -> + %% RFC 2246 & 4346 - 7.4.9. Finished + %% struct { + %% opaque verify_data[12]; + %% } Finished; + %% + %% verify_data + %% PRF(master_secret, finished_label, MD5(handshake_messages) + + %% SHA-1(handshake_messages)) [0..11]; + MD5 = crypto:hash(md5, Handshake), + SHA = crypto:hash(sha, Handshake), + prf(?MD5SHA, MasterSecret, finished_label(Role), [MD5, SHA], 12); + +finished(Role, Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) + when Version == 3 -> + %% RFC 5246 - 7.4.9. Finished + %% struct { + %% opaque verify_data[12]; + %% } Finished; + %% + %% verify_data + %% PRF(master_secret, finished_label, Hash(handshake_messages)) [0..11]; + Hash = crypto:hash(mac_algo(PrfAlgo), Handshake), + prf(PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, finished_label(Role), Hash, 12). + +-spec certificate_verify(md5sha | sha, integer(), [binary()]) -> binary(). + +certificate_verify(md5sha, _Version, Handshake) -> + MD5 = crypto:hash(md5, Handshake), + SHA = crypto:hash(sha, Handshake), + <<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>; + +certificate_verify(HashAlgo, _Version, Handshake) -> + crypto:hash(HashAlgo, Handshake). + +-spec setup_keys(integer(), integer(), binary(), binary(), binary(), integer(), + integer(), integer()) -> {binary(), binary(), binary(), + binary(), binary(), binary()}. + +setup_keys(Version, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, + KeyMatLen, IVSize) + when Version == 1 -> + %% RFC 2246 - 6.3. Key calculation + %% key_block = PRF(SecurityParameters.master_secret, + %% "key expansion", + %% SecurityParameters.server_random + + %% SecurityParameters.client_random); + %% Then the key_block is partitioned as follows: + %% client_write_MAC_secret[SecurityParameters.hash_size] + %% server_write_MAC_secret[SecurityParameters.hash_size] + %% client_write_key[SecurityParameters.key_material_length] + %% server_write_key[SecurityParameters.key_material_length] + %% client_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size] + %% server_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size] + WantedLength = 2 * (HashSize + KeyMatLen + IVSize), + KeyBlock = prf(?MD5SHA, MasterSecret, "key expansion", + [ServerRandom, ClientRandom], WantedLength), + <<ClientWriteMacSecret:HashSize/binary, + ServerWriteMacSecret:HashSize/binary, + ClientWriteKey:KeyMatLen/binary, ServerWriteKey:KeyMatLen/binary, + ClientIV:IVSize/binary, ServerIV:IVSize/binary>> = KeyBlock, + {ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteKey, + ServerWriteKey, ClientIV, ServerIV}; + +%% TLS v1.1 +setup_keys(Version, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, + KeyMatLen, IVSize) + when Version == 2 -> + %% RFC 4346 - 6.3. Key calculation + %% key_block = PRF(SecurityParameters.master_secret, + %% "key expansion", + %% SecurityParameters.server_random + + %% SecurityParameters.client_random); + %% Then the key_block is partitioned as follows: + %% client_write_MAC_secret[SecurityParameters.hash_size] + %% server_write_MAC_secret[SecurityParameters.hash_size] + %% client_write_key[SecurityParameters.key_material_length] + %% server_write_key[SecurityParameters.key_material_length] + %% + %% RFC 4346 is incomplete, the client and server IVs have to + %% be generated just like for TLS 1.0 + WantedLength = 2 * (HashSize + KeyMatLen + IVSize), + KeyBlock = prf(?MD5SHA, MasterSecret, "key expansion", + [ServerRandom, ClientRandom], WantedLength), + <<ClientWriteMacSecret:HashSize/binary, + ServerWriteMacSecret:HashSize/binary, + ClientWriteKey:KeyMatLen/binary, ServerWriteKey:KeyMatLen/binary, + ClientIV:IVSize/binary, ServerIV:IVSize/binary>> = KeyBlock, + {ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteKey, + ServerWriteKey, ClientIV, ServerIV}; + +%% TLS v1.2 +setup_keys(Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, + KeyMatLen, IVSize) + when Version == 3 -> + %% RFC 5246 - 6.3. Key calculation + %% key_block = PRF(SecurityParameters.master_secret, + %% "key expansion", + %% SecurityParameters.server_random + + %% SecurityParameters.client_random); + %% Then the key_block is partitioned as follows: + %% client_write_MAC_secret[SecurityParameters.hash_size] + %% server_write_MAC_secret[SecurityParameters.hash_size] + %% client_write_key[SecurityParameters.key_material_length] + %% server_write_key[SecurityParameters.key_material_length] + %% client_write_IV[SecurityParameters.fixed_iv_length] + %% server_write_IV[SecurityParameters.fixed_iv_length] + WantedLength = 2 * (HashSize + KeyMatLen + IVSize), + KeyBlock = prf(PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, "key expansion", + [ServerRandom, ClientRandom], WantedLength), + <<ClientWriteMacSecret:HashSize/binary, + ServerWriteMacSecret:HashSize/binary, + ClientWriteKey:KeyMatLen/binary, ServerWriteKey:KeyMatLen/binary, + ClientIV:IVSize/binary, ServerIV:IVSize/binary>> = KeyBlock, + {ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteKey, + ServerWriteKey, ClientIV, ServerIV}. + +-spec mac_hash(integer(), binary(), integer(), integer(), tls_version(), + integer(), binary()) -> binary(). + +mac_hash(Method, Mac_write_secret, Seq_num, Type, {Major, Minor}, + Length, Fragment) -> + %% RFC 2246 & 4346 - 6.2.3.1. + %% HMAC_hash(MAC_write_secret, seq_num + TLSCompressed.type + + %% TLSCompressed.version + TLSCompressed.length + + %% TLSCompressed.fragment)); + Mac = hmac_hash(Method, Mac_write_secret, + [<<?UINT64(Seq_num), ?BYTE(Type), + ?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), ?UINT16(Length)>>, + Fragment]), + Mac. + +-spec suites(1|2|3) -> [cipher_suite()]. + +suites(Minor) when Minor == 1; Minor == 2-> + case sufficent_ec_support() of + true -> + all_suites(Minor); + false -> + no_ec_suites(Minor) + end; + +suites(Minor) when Minor == 3 -> + case sufficent_ec_support() of + true -> + all_suites(3) ++ all_suites(2); + false -> + no_ec_suites(3) ++ no_ec_suites(2) + end. + +all_suites(Minor) when Minor == 1; Minor == 2-> + [ + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA + ]; +all_suites(3) -> + [ + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, + + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + ]. + +no_ec_suites(Minor) when Minor == 1; Minor == 2-> + [ + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA + ]; +no_ec_suites(3) -> + [ + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + ]. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%% Internal functions +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%%% HMAC and the Pseudorandom Functions RFC 2246 & 4346 - 5.%%%% +hmac_hash(?NULL, _, _) -> + <<>>; +hmac_hash(Alg, Key, Value) -> + crypto:hmac(mac_algo(Alg), Key, Value). + +mac_algo(?MD5) -> md5; +mac_algo(?SHA) -> sha; +mac_algo(?SHA256) -> sha256; +mac_algo(?SHA384) -> sha384; +mac_algo(?SHA512) -> sha512. + +% First, we define a data expansion function, P_hash(secret, data) that +% uses a single hash function to expand a secret and seed into an +% arbitrary quantity of output: +%% P_hash(secret, seed) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) + seed) + +%% HMAC_hash(secret, A(2) + seed) + +%% HMAC_hash(secret, A(3) + seed) + ... + +p_hash(Secret, Seed, WantedLength, Method) -> + p_hash(Secret, Seed, WantedLength, Method, 0, []). + +p_hash(_Secret, _Seed, WantedLength, _Method, _N, []) + when WantedLength =< 0 -> + []; +p_hash(_Secret, _Seed, WantedLength, _Method, _N, [Last | Acc]) + when WantedLength =< 0 -> + Keep = byte_size(Last) + WantedLength, + <<B:Keep/binary, _/binary>> = Last, + list_to_binary(lists:reverse(Acc, [B])); +p_hash(Secret, Seed, WantedLength, Method, N, Acc) -> + N1 = N+1, + Bin = hmac_hash(Method, Secret, [a(N1, Secret, Seed, Method), Seed]), + p_hash(Secret, Seed, WantedLength - byte_size(Bin), Method, N1, [Bin|Acc]). + + +%% ... Where A(0) = seed +%% A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) +%% a(0, _Secret, Seed, _Method) -> +%% Seed. +%% a(N, Secret, Seed, Method) -> +%% hmac_hash(Method, Secret, a(N-1, Secret, Seed, Method)). +a(0, _Secret, Seed, _Method) -> + Seed; +a(N, Secret, Seed0, Method) -> + Seed = hmac_hash(Method, Secret, Seed0), + a(N-1, Secret, Seed, Method). + +split_secret(BinSecret) -> + %% L_S = length in bytes of secret; + %% L_S1 = L_S2 = ceil(L_S / 2); + %% The secret is partitioned into two halves (with the possibility of + %% one shared byte) as described above, S1 taking the first L_S1 bytes, + %% and S2 the last L_S2 bytes. + Length = byte_size(BinSecret), + Div = Length div 2, + EvenLength = Length - Div, + <<Secret1:EvenLength/binary, _/binary>> = BinSecret, + <<_:Div/binary, Secret2:EvenLength/binary>> = BinSecret, + {Secret1, Secret2}. + +prf(?MD5SHA, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> + %% PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_MD5(S1, label + seed) XOR + %% P_SHA-1(S2, label + seed); + {S1, S2} = split_secret(Secret), + LS = list_to_binary([Label, Seed]), + crypto:exor(p_hash(S1, LS, WantedLength, ?MD5), + p_hash(S2, LS, WantedLength, ?SHA)); + +prf(MAC, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> + %% PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_SHA256(secret, label + seed); + LS = list_to_binary([Label, Seed]), + p_hash(Secret, LS, WantedLength, MAC). + +%%%% Misc help functions %%%% + +finished_label(client) -> + <<"client finished">>; +finished_label(server) -> + <<"server finished">>. + +%% list ECC curves in prefered order +ecc_curves(_Minor) -> + [?sect571r1,?sect571k1,?secp521r1,?sect409k1,?sect409r1, + ?secp384r1,?sect283k1,?sect283r1,?secp256k1,?secp256r1, + ?sect239k1,?sect233k1,?sect233r1,?secp224k1,?secp224r1, + ?sect193r1,?sect193r2,?secp192k1,?secp192r1,?sect163k1, + ?sect163r1,?sect163r2,?secp160k1,?secp160r1,?secp160r2]. + +%% ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) +oid_to_enum(?sect163k1) -> 1; +oid_to_enum(?sect163r1) -> 2; +oid_to_enum(?sect163r2) -> 3; +oid_to_enum(?sect193r1) -> 4; +oid_to_enum(?sect193r2) -> 5; +oid_to_enum(?sect233k1) -> 6; +oid_to_enum(?sect233r1) -> 7; +oid_to_enum(?sect239k1) -> 8; +oid_to_enum(?sect283k1) -> 9; +oid_to_enum(?sect283r1) -> 10; +oid_to_enum(?sect409k1) -> 11; +oid_to_enum(?sect409r1) -> 12; +oid_to_enum(?sect571k1) -> 13; +oid_to_enum(?sect571r1) -> 14; +oid_to_enum(?secp160k1) -> 15; +oid_to_enum(?secp160r1) -> 16; +oid_to_enum(?secp160r2) -> 17; +oid_to_enum(?secp192k1) -> 18; +oid_to_enum(?secp192r1) -> 19; +oid_to_enum(?secp224k1) -> 20; +oid_to_enum(?secp224r1) -> 21; +oid_to_enum(?secp256k1) -> 22; +oid_to_enum(?secp256r1) -> 23; +oid_to_enum(?secp384r1) -> 24; +oid_to_enum(?secp521r1) -> 25. + +enum_to_oid(1) -> ?sect163k1; +enum_to_oid(2) -> ?sect163r1; +enum_to_oid(3) -> ?sect163r2; +enum_to_oid(4) -> ?sect193r1; +enum_to_oid(5) -> ?sect193r2; +enum_to_oid(6) -> ?sect233k1; +enum_to_oid(7) -> ?sect233r1; +enum_to_oid(8) -> ?sect239k1; +enum_to_oid(9) -> ?sect283k1; +enum_to_oid(10) -> ?sect283r1; +enum_to_oid(11) -> ?sect409k1; +enum_to_oid(12) -> ?sect409r1; +enum_to_oid(13) -> ?sect571k1; +enum_to_oid(14) -> ?sect571r1; +enum_to_oid(15) -> ?secp160k1; +enum_to_oid(16) -> ?secp160r1; +enum_to_oid(17) -> ?secp160r2; +enum_to_oid(18) -> ?secp192k1; +enum_to_oid(19) -> ?secp192r1; +enum_to_oid(20) -> ?secp224k1; +enum_to_oid(21) -> ?secp224r1; +enum_to_oid(22) -> ?secp256k1; +enum_to_oid(23) -> ?secp256r1; +enum_to_oid(24) -> ?secp384r1; +enum_to_oid(25) -> ?secp521r1. + +sufficent_ec_support() -> + CryptoSupport = crypto:supports(), + proplists:get_bool(ecdh, proplists:get_value(public_keys, CryptoSupport)). |