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authorKarl Heuer <kwzh@gnu.org>1998-04-06 22:16:30 +0000
committerKarl Heuer <kwzh@gnu.org>1998-04-06 22:16:30 +0000
commitb84fb9f4d0a29ce8a6d2e3b9fcc7471b4969306e (patch)
treebcdde22f6f142086afed28a88ce2c7458ba618e8 /lib-src
parent359e08be241d34fd99999d567dfadf2dec21b0e0 (diff)
downloademacs-b84fb9f4d0a29ce8a6d2e3b9fcc7471b4969306e.tar.gz
Integrate support for GSS-API
authentication, implemented by Kevin L. Mitchel <klmitch@mit.edu>.
Diffstat (limited to 'lib-src')
-rw-r--r--lib-src/Makefile.in17
-rw-r--r--lib-src/pop.c998
-rw-r--r--lib-src/pop.h25
3 files changed, 1016 insertions, 24 deletions
diff --git a/lib-src/Makefile.in b/lib-src/Makefile.in
index 24730fb42fe..e4d2179967c 100644
--- a/lib-src/Makefile.in
+++ b/lib-src/Makefile.in
@@ -205,12 +205,21 @@ MOVE_FLAGS=
# ifdef HAVE_LIBCOM_ERR
COM_ERRLIB = -lcom_err
# endif
-#endif /* KERBEROS
+# ifdef HAVE_LIBGSSAPI_KRB5
+ GSSAPI_KRB5LIB = -lgssapi_krb5
+# endif
+#endif /* KERBEROS */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBGSSAPI
+ GSSAPILIB = -lgssapi
+#endif
-/* If HESIOD is defined, set this to "-lhesiod". */
-HESIODLIB=
+#ifdef HESIOD
+HESIODLIB= -lhesiod
+#endif
-MOVE_LIBS=$(KRB4LIB) $(DESLIB) $(KRB5LIB) $(CRYPTOLIB) $(COM_ERRLIB) $(HESIODLIB)
+MOVE_LIBS=$(GSSAPI_KRB5LIB) $(GSSAPILIB) $(KRB4LIB) $(DESLIB) $(KRB5LIB) \
+ $(CRYPTOLIB) $(COM_ERRLIB) $(HESIODLIB)
#ifdef HAVE_LIBMAIL
LIBMAIL=-lmail
diff --git a/lib-src/pop.c b/lib-src/pop.c
index 69e6e465234..499e8ef9164 100644
--- a/lib-src/pop.c
+++ b/lib-src/pop.c
@@ -161,6 +161,57 @@ static char *find_crlf _P((char *, int));
#define KPOP_SERVICE "kpop"
#endif
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+# ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
+# include <gssapi.h>
+# else
+# include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+# endif
+#define GSSAPI_SERVICE "pop"
+static int pop_auth (/* popserver server, char *user,
+ char *host, int flags */);
+static void gen_gss_error (/* char *msg, OM_uint32 major, OM_uint32 minor */);
+struct _pop_gssapi
+{
+ int gss_flags; /* encryption? integrity protection? */
+ OM_uint32 max_size; /* max size we can send the server */
+ gss_ctx_id_t gss_context; /* the security context */
+};
+#define GSSAPI_NOPROT 0x01
+#define GSSAPI_INTEGRITY 0x02
+#define GSSAPI_PRIVACY 0x04
+#define GSSAPI_NEEDWRAP (GSSAPI_INTEGRITY|GSSAPI_PRIVACY)
+#define GSSAPI_PROTECTION (GSSAPI_NOPROT|GSSAPI_INTEGRITY|GSSAPI_PRIVACY)
+#define GSSAPI_RCVBUF 1024
+#define GSSAPI_SVC_TYPE {10, "\052\206\110\206\367\022\001\002\001\004"}
+#define Gssapi(data) ((struct _pop_gssapi *) (data))
+
+static int b64_decode (/* char *enc, gss_buffer_t dec */);
+static int b64_encode (/* gss_buffer_t dec, char **enc */);
+#define B64_SUCCESS 0
+#define B64_BADPARAM 1
+#define B64_BADCHAR 2
+#define B64_BADPAD 3
+#define B64_BADLEN 4
+#define B64_NOMEM 5
+static char *b64_error[] =
+{
+ "Success",
+ "Bad parameters",
+ "Bad characters in encoding",
+ "Bad padding in encoding",
+ "Bad length",
+ "Out of memory"
+};
+
+/*
+ * This function is only needed if you are using the GSSAPI protection
+ * mechanisms; it keeps trying until it has read the requested number
+ * bytes from the passed-in fd.
+ */
+static int fullread (/* int fd, char *buf, int nbytes */);
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+
char pop_error[ERROR_MAX];
int pop_debug = 0;
@@ -269,10 +320,22 @@ pop_open (host, username, password, flags)
}
/* Determine the password */
-#ifdef KERBEROS
-#define DONT_NEED_PASSWORD (! (flags & POP_NO_KERBEROS))
+#if defined(KERBEROS) || defined(GSSAPI)
+# ifdef KERBEROS
+# define NO_KERBEROS POP_NO_KERBEROS
+# else
+# define NO_KERBEROS 0
+# endif /* KERBEROS */
+
+# ifdef GSSAPI
+# define NO_GSSAPI POP_NO_GSSAPI
+# else
+# define NO_GSSAPI 0
+# endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+# define DONT_NEED_PASSWORD (! (flags & (NO_KERBEROS | NO_GSSAPI)))
#else
-#define DONT_NEED_PASSWORD 0
+# define DONT_NEED_PASSWORD 0
#endif
if ((! password) && (! DONT_NEED_PASSWORD))
@@ -288,7 +351,7 @@ pop_open (host, username, password, flags)
}
}
if (password)
- flags |= POP_NO_KERBEROS;
+ flags |= POP_NO_KERBEROS | (!(flags & POP_NO_NOPROT) ? POP_NO_GSSAPI : 0);
else
password = username;
@@ -316,10 +379,46 @@ pop_open (host, username, password, flags)
server->buffer_size = GETLINE_MIN;
server->in_multi = 0;
server->trash_started = 0;
+ server->extra = 0;
if (getok (server))
return (0);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ /*
+ * unless forbidden to use GSSAPI, try the GSSAPI AUTH mechanism..first.
+ */
+ pop_error[0] = '\0'; /* so we can detect errors later... */
+ if (! (flags & POP_NO_GSSAPI))
+ {
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = pop_auth (server, username, host, flags);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ {
+ return (server);
+ }
+ else if (ret == -2)
+ {
+ pop_close (server);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+ /*
+ * POP_NO_NOPROT is used in the case that we want protection; if
+ * the authentication negotiation failed, then we want to fail now.
+ */
+ if ((flags & POP_NO_NOPROT))
+ {
+ pop_close (server);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ if (pop_error[0] == '\0')
+#endif
+ strcpy (pop_error, "Unable to provide protection");
+ return (0);
+ }
+
/*
* I really shouldn't use the pop_error variable like this, but....
*/
@@ -1004,6 +1103,17 @@ pop_quit (server)
if (server->buffer)
free (server->buffer);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ if (server->extra)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 minor;
+
+ if (Gssapi (server->extra)->gss_context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ gss_delete_sec_context (&minor, &(Gssapi (server->extra)->gss_context),
+ GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ free ((char *) server->extra);
+ }
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
free ((char *) server);
return (ret);
@@ -1332,22 +1442,102 @@ pop_getline (server, line)
while (1)
{
- /* There's a "- 1" here to leave room for the null that we put
- at the end of the read data below. We put the null there so
- that find_crlf knows where to stop when we call it. */
- if (server->data == server->buffer_size - 1)
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ /*
+ * We might be playing with a protected connection. If we are, then
+ * we need to first read a chunk of ciphertext from the server,
+ * unwrap it, and stuff it into the buffer.
+ */
+ if (server->extra &&
+ ((Gssapi (server->extra)->gss_flags) & GSSAPI_NEEDWRAP))
{
- server->buffer_size += GETLINE_INCR;
- server->buffer = (char *)realloc (server->buffer, server->buffer_size);
- if (! server->buffer)
+ char rcvbuf[GSSAPI_RCVBUF];
+ OM_uint32 major, minor, length;
+ gss_buffer_desc in_tok, out_tok;
+ struct _pop_gssapi *gss_data = Gssapi (server->extra);
+
+ ret = fullread (server->file, (char *) &length, sizeof (length));
+
+ if (ret == sizeof (length))
{
- strcpy (pop_error, "Out of memory in pop_getline");
- pop_trash (server);
- return (-1);
+ in_tok.length = ntohl (length);
+
+ if (in_tok.length <= GSSAPI_RCVBUF)
+ {
+ ret = fullread (server->file, rcvbuf, in_tok.length);
+
+ if (ret == in_tok.length)
+ {
+ in_tok.value = (void *) rcvbuf;
+
+ major = gss_unwrap (&minor, gss_data->gss_context,
+ &in_tok, &out_tok, 0, 0);
+
+ if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ {
+ pop_trash (server);
+ gen_gss_error ("unwrapping", major, minor);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ while (server->data + out_tok.length >=
+ server->buffer_size - 1)
+ server->buffer_size += GETLINE_INCR;
+
+ server->buffer = (char *)realloc (server->buffer,
+ server->buffer_size);
+
+ if (! server->buffer)
+ {
+ gss_release_buffer (&minor, &out_tok);
+ pop_trash (server);
+ strcpy (pop_error, "Out of memory in pop_getline");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ bcopy (out_tok.value, server->buffer + server->data,
+ out_tok.length);
+
+ ret = out_tok.length;
+
+ gss_release_buffer (&minor, &out_tok);
+ }
+ else
+ ret = 0; /* force detection of unexpected EOF */
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ pop_trash (server);
+ strcpy (pop_error, "Token from server too long in pop_getline");
+ return (-1);
+ }
}
+ else
+ ret = 0; /* force detection of unexpected EOF */
}
- ret = RECV (server->file, server->buffer + server->data,
- server->buffer_size - server->data - 1, 0);
+ else
+ {
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+ /* There's a "- 1" here to leave room for the null that we put
+ at the end of the read data below. We put the null there so
+ that find_crlf knows where to stop when we call it. */
+ if (server->data == server->buffer_size - 1)
+ {
+ server->buffer_size += GETLINE_INCR;
+ server->buffer = (char *)realloc (server->buffer,
+ server->buffer_size);
+ if (! server->buffer)
+ {
+ strcpy (pop_error, "Out of memory in pop_getline");
+ pop_trash (server);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+ ret = RECV (server->file, server->buffer + server->data,
+ server->buffer_size - server->data - 1, 0);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ }
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
if (ret < 0)
{
strcpy (pop_error, GETLINE_ERROR);
@@ -1391,6 +1581,37 @@ pop_getline (server, line)
/* NOTREACHED */
}
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+/*
+ * Function: fullread
+ *
+ * Purpose: Just like read, but keeps trying until the specified number
+ * number of bytes has been read into the buffer. This function is
+ * only needed if you are using the GSSAPI protection mechanisms.
+ *
+ * Return value: Same as read. Pop_error is not set.
+ */
+static int
+fullread (fd, buf, nbytes)
+ int fd;
+ char *buf;
+ int nbytes;
+{
+ char *cp;
+ int ret;
+
+ cp = buf;
+
+ while (nbytes > 0 && (ret = RECV (fd, cp, nbytes, 0)) > 0)
+ {
+ cp += ret;
+ nbytes -= ret;
+ }
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+
/*
* Function: sendline
*
@@ -1417,11 +1638,87 @@ sendline (server, line)
#define SENDLINE_ERROR "Error writing to POP server: "
int ret;
- ret = fullwrite (server->file, line, strlen (line));
- if (ret >= 0)
- { /* 0 indicates that a blank line was written */
- ret = fullwrite (server->file, "\r\n", 2);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ /*
+ * We might be playing with a protected connection. If we are, then we
+ * need to build our full plaintext, parse it into chunks small enough
+ * for the server to swallow, wrap each one, and send it over the net as
+ * specified by the RFC.
+ */
+ if (server->extra && ((Gssapi (server->extra)->gss_flags) & GSSAPI_NEEDWRAP))
+ {
+ char *sendbuf, *ptr;
+ OM_uint32 major, minor, length;
+ gss_buffer_desc in_tok, out_tok;
+ int len = 0, tot_len;
+ struct _pop_gssapi *gss_data = Gssapi (server->extra);
+
+ sendbuf = malloc (strlen (line) + 3);
+
+ if (! sendbuf)
+ {
+ pop_trash (server);
+ strcpy (pop_error, "Out of memory in sendline");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ tot_len = sprintf (sendbuf, "%s\r\n", line);
+
+ for (ptr = sendbuf; tot_len > 0; tot_len -= len, ptr += len)
+ {
+ len = ((tot_len > gss_data->max_size) ?
+ gss_data->max_size : tot_len);
+
+ in_tok.value = (void *) ptr;
+ in_tok.length = len;
+
+ major = gss_wrap (&minor, gss_data->gss_context,
+ (gss_data->gss_flags & GSSAPI_PRIVACY) ? 1 : 0,
+ GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &in_tok, 0, &out_tok);
+
+ if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ {
+ free (sendbuf);
+ pop_trash (server);
+ gen_gss_error ("wrapping", major, minor);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * "Once the protection mechanism is in effect, the stream of
+ * command and response octets is processed into buffers of
+ * ciphertext. Each buffer is transferred over the connection
+ * as a stream of octets prepended with a four octet field in
+ * network byte order that represents the length of the
+ * following data." - RFC 1734, section 2
+ */
+ length = htonl (out_tok.length);
+ ret = fullwrite (server->file, (char *) &length, sizeof (length));
+ if (ret == sizeof (length))
+ {
+ ret = fullwrite (server->file, (char *) out_tok.value,
+ out_tok.length);
+ }
+
+ gss_release_buffer (&minor, &out_tok);
+
+ if (ret < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ free (sendbuf);
}
+ else
+ {
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+ ret = fullwrite (server->file, line, strlen (line));
+ if (ret >= 0)
+ { /* 0 indicates that a blank line was written */
+ ret = fullwrite (server->file, "\r\n", 2);
+ }
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ }
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
if (ret < 0)
{
@@ -1589,6 +1886,19 @@ pop_trash (server)
free (server->buffer);
server->buffer = 0;
}
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ if (server->extra)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 minor;
+
+ if (Gssapi (server->extra)->gss_context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ gss_delete_sec_context (&minor,
+ &(Gssapi (server->extra)->gss_context),
+ GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ free ((char *) server->extra);
+ server->extra = 0;
+ }
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
}
#ifdef WINDOWSNT
@@ -1597,6 +1907,654 @@ pop_trash (server)
#endif
}
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+/*
+ * Function: pop_auth
+ *
+ * Purpose: To perform a GSSAPI authentication handshake with a POP server.
+ * If the negotiation is successful, it will return 0; otherwise, it
+ * will fill in pop_error with the error message and return either -1,
+ * indicating a potentially recoverable error, or -2, indicating an
+ * unrecoverable error.
+ *
+ * Side effects: The server may choose to close the connection if the
+ * handshake fails. The connection will be trashed if the error is
+ * unrecoverable.
+ */
+static int
+pop_auth (server, username, host, flags)
+ popserver server;
+ char *username, *host;
+ int flags;
+{
+ int gss_flags, ret;
+ char *fromserver;
+ OM_uint32 max_size, t_flags;
+ gss_ctx_id_t gss_context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
+ gss_buffer_desc in_tok, out_tok;
+ gss_name_t svc_name;
+ OM_uint32 major, minor, t_minor;
+
+ /* calculate usable protection mechanisms */
+ gss_flags = (GSSAPI_PROTECTION &
+ ~(((flags & POP_NO_NOPROT) ? GSSAPI_NOPROT : 0) |
+ ((flags & POP_NO_INTEG) ? GSSAPI_INTEGRITY : 0) |
+ ((flags & POP_NO_ENCRYPT) ? GSSAPI_PRIVACY : 0)));
+
+ if (gss_flags == 0)
+ {
+ strcpy (pop_error, "Unable to provide selected protection level");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /* import service name of pop server */
+ in_tok.value = (void *) malloc (strlen (host) + sizeof (GSSAPI_SERVICE) + 2);
+
+ if (! in_tok.value)
+ {
+ strcpy (pop_error, "Out of memory in pop_auth");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ sprintf ((char *) in_tok.value, "%s@%s", GSSAPI_SERVICE, host);
+ in_tok.length = strlen ((char *) in_tok.value);
+
+ {
+ gss_OID_desc svc_name_oid = GSSAPI_SVC_TYPE;
+
+ major = gss_import_name (&minor, &in_tok, &svc_name_oid, &svc_name);
+ }
+
+ free ((char *) in_tok.value);
+
+ if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ {
+ gen_gss_error ("parsing name", major, minor);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /* begin GSSAPI authentication handshake */
+ if (sendline (server, "AUTH GSSAPI") || (pop_getline (server, &fromserver) < 0))
+ {
+ gss_release_name (&t_minor, &svc_name);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ do
+ {
+ /* sanity-check server response */
+ if (strncmp (fromserver, "+ ", 2))
+ {
+ gss_release_name (&t_minor, &svc_name);
+ if (gss_context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ gss_delete_sec_context (&t_minor, &gss_context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ if (0 == strncmp (fromserver, "-ERR", 4))
+ {
+ strncpy (pop_error, fromserver, ERROR_MAX);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ pop_trash (server);
+ strcpy (pop_error,
+ "Unexpected response from POP server in pop_auth");
+ return (-2);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (strlen (fromserver) > 2)
+ {
+ /* base 64 decode the response... */
+ ret = b64_decode (fromserver + 2, &in_tok);
+ if (ret != B64_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ gss_release_name (&t_minor, &svc_name);
+ if (gss_context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ gss_delete_sec_context (&t_minor, &gss_context,
+ GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ sendline (server, "*");
+ strcpy (pop_error, b64_error[ret]);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ in_tok.length = 0;
+ in_tok.value = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* call init_sec_context */
+ major = gss_init_sec_context (&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &gss_context,
+ svc_name, GSS_C_NULL_OID,
+ GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG, 0,
+ GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
+ in_tok.length ? & in_tok : GSS_C_NO_BUFFER,
+ 0, &out_tok, 0, 0);
+
+ if (in_tok.length != 0)
+ free ((char *) in_tok.value);
+
+ /* check for error */
+ if (GSS_ERROR (major))
+ {
+ gss_release_name (&t_minor, &svc_name);
+ if (gss_context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ gss_delete_sec_context (&t_minor, &gss_context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ sendline (server, "*");
+ gen_gss_error ("in init_sec_context", major, minor);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ if (out_tok.length != 0)
+ {
+ /* base 64 encode output token, if any */
+ ret = b64_encode (&out_tok, &fromserver);
+
+ gss_release_buffer (&t_minor, &out_tok);
+
+ if (ret != B64_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ gss_release_name (&t_minor, &svc_name);
+ if (gss_context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ gss_delete_sec_context (&t_minor, &gss_context,
+ GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ sendline (server, "*");
+ strcpy (pop_error, b64_error[ret]);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /* send output token... */
+ ret = sendline (server, fromserver);
+
+ free (fromserver);
+ }
+ else
+ /* empty output token... */
+ ret = sendline (server, "");
+
+ /* get next token from server */
+ if (ret || (pop_getline (server, &fromserver) < 0))
+ {
+ gss_release_name (&t_minor, &svc_name);
+ if (gss_context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ gss_delete_sec_context (&t_minor, &gss_context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ } while ((major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED));
+
+ /* release name... */
+ gss_release_name (&t_minor, &svc_name);
+
+ /* get final response from server */
+ if (strncmp (fromserver, "+ ", 2))
+ {
+ gss_delete_sec_context (&t_minor, &gss_context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ if (0 == strncmp (fromserver, "-ERR", 4))
+ {
+ strncpy (pop_error, fromserver, ERROR_MAX);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ pop_trash (server);
+ strcpy (pop_error,
+ "Unexpected response from POP server in pop_auth");
+ return (-2);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* base 64 decode... */
+ ret = b64_decode (fromserver + 2, &in_tok);
+ if (ret != B64_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ gss_delete_sec_context (&t_minor, &gss_context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ sendline (server, "*");
+ strcpy (pop_error, b64_error[ret]);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /* unwrap... */
+ major = gss_unwrap (&minor, gss_context, &in_tok, &out_tok, 0, 0);
+
+ free ((char *) in_tok.value);
+
+ if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE || out_tok.length != sizeof (t_flags))
+ {
+ if (out_tok.length != 0)
+ gss_release_buffer (&t_minor, &out_tok);
+ gss_delete_sec_context (&t_minor, &gss_context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ sendline (server, "*");
+ gen_gss_error ("in gss_unwrap", major, minor);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /* get and check flags/size */
+ bcopy ((void *) out_tok.value, (void *) &t_flags, sizeof (t_flags));
+
+ gss_release_buffer (&t_minor, &out_tok);
+
+ max_size = ntohl (t_flags);
+
+ t_flags = ((max_size & 0xFF000000) >> 24) & gss_flags;
+ max_size &= 0x00FFFFFF;
+
+ if ((t_flags & GSSAPI_PRIVACY))
+ gss_flags = GSSAPI_PRIVACY;
+
+ else if ((t_flags & GSSAPI_INTEGRITY))
+ gss_flags = GSSAPI_INTEGRITY;
+
+ else if ((t_flags & GSSAPI_NOPROT))
+ gss_flags = GSSAPI_NOPROT;
+
+ else
+ {
+ gss_delete_sec_context (&t_minor, &gss_context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ sendline (server, "*");
+ strcpy (pop_error, "Server does not provide selected protection level");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ if (max_size == 0)
+ {
+ gss_delete_sec_context (&t_minor, &gss_context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ sendline (server, "*");
+ strcpy (pop_error, "Bad server max length");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ if ((gss_flags & GSSAPI_NEEDWRAP))
+ {
+ major = gss_wrap_size_limit (&t_minor, gss_context,
+ (gss_flags & GSSAPI_PRIVACY) ? 1 : 0,
+ GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
+ (max_size < GSSAPI_RCVBUF) ? max_size :
+ GSSAPI_RCVBUF, &max_size);
+ if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ {
+ gss_delete_sec_context (&t_minor, &gss_context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ sendline (server, "*");
+ gen_gss_error ("getting max size", major, minor);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* generate return flags */
+ {
+ OM_uint32 tmp;
+
+ tmp = (((gss_flags << 24) & 0xFF000000) | (GSSAPI_RCVBUF & 0x00FFFFFF));
+ t_flags = ntohl (tmp);
+ }
+
+ in_tok.length = sizeof (t_flags) + strlen (username);
+ in_tok.value = (void *) malloc (in_tok.length);
+
+ if (! in_tok.value)
+ {
+ gss_delete_sec_context (&t_minor, &gss_context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ sendline (server, "*");
+ strcpy (pop_error, "Out of memory in pop_auth");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ bcopy ((void *) &t_flags, in_tok.value, sizeof (t_flags));
+ bcopy ((void *) username,
+ (void *) (((char *) in_tok.value) + sizeof (t_flags)),
+ in_tok.length - sizeof (t_flags));
+
+ /* wrap result */
+ major = gss_wrap (&minor, gss_context, 0, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
+ &in_tok, 0, &out_tok);
+
+ free ((char *) in_tok.value);
+
+ if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE || out_tok.length == 0)
+ {
+ if (out_tok.length != 0)
+ gss_release_buffer (&t_minor, &out_tok);
+ gss_delete_sec_context (&t_minor, &gss_context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ sendline (server, "*");
+ gen_gss_error ("in gss_wrap", major, minor);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /* base 64 encode... */
+ ret = b64_encode (&out_tok, &fromserver);
+
+ gss_release_buffer (&t_minor, &out_tok);
+
+ if (ret != B64_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ gss_delete_sec_context (&t_minor, &gss_context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ sendline (server, "*");
+ strcpy (pop_error, b64_error[ret]);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /* send to server */
+ ret = sendline (server, fromserver);
+
+ free (fromserver);
+
+ /* see if the server likes me... */
+ if (ret || getok (server))
+ {
+ gss_delete_sec_context (&t_minor, &gss_context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /* stash context */
+ {
+ struct _pop_gssapi *gss_data;
+
+ gss_data = (struct _pop_gssapi *) malloc (sizeof (struct _pop_gssapi));
+
+ if (! gss_data)
+ {
+ pop_trash (server);
+ gss_delete_sec_context (&t_minor, &gss_context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ strcpy (pop_error, "Out of memory in pop_auth");
+ return (-2);
+ }
+
+ gss_data->gss_flags = gss_flags;
+ gss_data->max_size = max_size;
+ gss_data->gss_context = gss_context;
+
+ server->extra = gss_data;
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add as much error text to pop_error as will fit, but only put complete
+ * messages
+ */
+static void
+gen_gss_error (msg, major, minor)
+ char *msg;
+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
+{
+ char *p = pop_error, *t, *saved;
+ int max = ERROR_MAX - 1; /* for \0 */
+ OM_uint32 t_minor, msg_ctx = 0;
+ gss_buffer_desc gss_msg;
+
+ while (*msg && max)
+ {
+ *p++ = *msg++;
+ max--;
+ }
+
+ if (max >= 2)
+ {
+ saved = p;
+ *p++ = ':';
+ *p++ = ' ';
+ max -= 2;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ *p = '\0';
+ return;
+ }
+
+ do
+ {
+ gss_display_status (&t_minor, major, GSS_C_GSS_CODE, GSS_C_NO_OID,
+ &msg_ctx, &gss_msg);
+ for (t = (char *) gss_msg.value; *t && max; max--)
+ {
+ *p++ = *t++;
+ }
+ gss_release_buffer (&t_minor, &gss_msg);
+ if (max == 0)
+ {
+ *saved = '\0';
+ return;
+ }
+ } while (msg_ctx);
+
+ saved = p;
+
+ do
+ {
+ gss_display_status (&t_minor, minor, GSS_C_MECH_CODE, GSS_C_NO_OID,
+ &msg_ctx, &gss_msg);
+ for (t = (char *) gss_msg.value; *t && max; max--)
+ {
+ *p++ = *t++;
+ }
+ gss_release_buffer (&t_minor, &gss_msg);
+ if (max == 0)
+ {
+ *saved = '\0';
+ return;
+ }
+ } while (msg_ctx);
+
+ *p = '\0';
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * table-based base64 decoding function; takes 4 characters from in and
+ * writes from 1 to 3 bytes to out, storing the amount written in len
+ */
+static int
+b64_d (in, out, len)
+ char *in, *out;
+ int *len;
+{
+ int decodearray[] =
+ {
+ 0x3e, -1, -1, -1, 0x3f, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3a,
+ 0x3b, 0x3c, 0x3d, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d,
+ 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19,
+ -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f,
+ 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b,
+ 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33
+ };
+
+ int d;
+
+ if (!in || !out || !len)
+ return (B64_BADPARAM);
+
+ if (*in < '+' || *in > 'z')
+ return (B64_BADCHAR);
+
+ d = decodearray[*(in++) - '+'];
+ if (d == -1)
+ return (B64_BADCHAR);
+ *out = d << 2;
+
+ if (*in < '+' || *in > 'z')
+ return (B64_BADCHAR);
+
+ d = decodearray[*(in++) - '+'];
+ if (d == -1)
+ return (B64_BADCHAR);
+ *(out++) |= d >> 4;
+ *out = (d & 15) << 4;
+
+ if (*in < '+' || *in > 'z')
+ return (B64_BADCHAR);
+ else if (*in == '=')
+ if (*(in + 1) != '=')
+ return (B64_BADPAD);
+ else
+ {
+ *len = 1;
+ return (B64_SUCCESS);
+ }
+
+ d = decodearray[*(in++) - '+'];
+ if (d == -1)
+ return (B64_BADCHAR);
+ *(out++) |= d >> 2;
+ *out = (d & 3) << 6;
+
+ if (*in < '+' || *in > 'z')
+ return (B64_BADCHAR);
+ else if (*in == '=')
+ {
+ *len = 2;
+ return (B64_SUCCESS);
+ }
+
+ d = decodearray[*in - '+'];
+ if (d == -1)
+ return (B64_BADCHAR);
+ *out |= d;
+
+ *len = 3;
+ return (B64_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+/*
+ * simple base64 encoding function that takes from 0 to 3 bytes and
+ * outputs 4 encoded characters, with appropriate padding
+ */
+static int
+b64_e (in, out, len)
+ unsigned char *in, *out;
+ int len;
+{
+ unsigned char codearray[] =
+ "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
+
+ if (!in || !out || len <= 0 || len > 3)
+ return (B64_BADPARAM);
+
+ *(out++) = codearray[((*in) >> 2)];
+
+ if (--len == 0)
+ {
+ *(out++) = codearray[(((*in) & 3) << 4)];
+ *(out++) = '=';
+ *out = '=';
+ return (B64_SUCCESS);
+ }
+
+ *(out++) = codearray[(((*in) & 3) << 4) | ((*(in + 1)) >> 4)];
+ in++;
+
+ if (--len == 0)
+ {
+ *(out++) = codearray[(((*in) & 15) << 2)];
+ *out = '=';
+ return (B64_SUCCESS);
+ }
+
+ *(out++) = codearray[(((*in) & 15) << 2) | ((*(in + 1)) >> 6)];
+ *out = codearray[((*(in + 1)) & 63)];
+
+ return (B64_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+/*
+ * given an input string, generate an output gss_buffer_t containing the
+ * decoded data and correct length; works by repeatedly driving b64_d ()
+ * over the input string
+ */
+static int
+b64_decode (enc, dec)
+ char *enc;
+ gss_buffer_t dec;
+{
+ char *tmp;
+ int inlen, outlen = 0, t_len, ret;
+
+ if (!enc || !dec)
+ return (B64_BADPARAM);
+
+ dec->value = 0;
+ dec->length = 0;
+
+ inlen = strlen (enc);
+ if ((inlen % 4))
+ return (B64_BADLEN);
+
+ dec->value = (void *) (tmp = (char *) malloc ((inlen / 4) * 3));
+
+ if (! tmp)
+ return (B64_NOMEM);
+
+ for (; inlen; inlen -= 4)
+ {
+ ret = b64_d (enc, tmp, &t_len);
+ if (ret != B64_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ free ((char *) dec->value);
+ dec->value = 0;
+ return (ret);
+ }
+ else if (t_len != 3)
+ {
+ dec->length = outlen + t_len;
+ return (B64_SUCCESS);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ enc += 4;
+ tmp += t_len;
+ outlen += t_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ dec->length = outlen;
+ return (B64_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+/*
+ * given a gss_buffer_t, generate an encoded string containing the data.
+ * works by repeatedly driving b64_e () over the contents of the buffer_t
+ */
+static int
+b64_encode (dec, enc)
+ gss_buffer_t dec;
+ char **enc;
+{
+ unsigned char *tmp, *in;
+ int ret, len;
+
+ if (!dec || !enc)
+ return (B64_BADPARAM);
+
+ in = (unsigned char *) dec->value;
+ len = dec->length;
+ *enc = (char *) (tmp = (unsigned char *) malloc (((len * 4) / 3) + 5));
+
+ if (! tmp)
+ return (B64_NOMEM);
+
+ do
+ {
+ ret = b64_e (in, tmp, len >= 3 ? 3 : len);
+ if (ret != B64_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ free (*enc);
+ *enc = 0;
+ return (ret);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ in += 3;
+ tmp += 4;
+ }
+ } while ((len -= 3) > 0);
+
+ *tmp = '\0';
+
+ return (B64_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+
/* Return a pointer to the first CRLF in IN_STRING, which can contain
embedded nulls and has LEN characters in it not including the final
null, or 0 if it does not contain one. */
diff --git a/lib-src/pop.h b/lib-src/pop.h
index cfd333ccafc..7a56947a36a 100644
--- a/lib-src/pop.h
+++ b/lib-src/pop.h
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ struct _popserver
int buffer_size, buffer_index;
int in_multi;
int trash_started;
+ void *extra;
};
typedef struct _popserver *popserver;
@@ -47,6 +48,30 @@ typedef struct _popserver *popserver;
#define POP_NO_KERBEROS (1<<0)
#define POP_NO_HESIOD (1<<1)
#define POP_NO_GETPASS (1<<2)
+#define POP_NO_GSSAPI (1<<3) /* don't use the GSSAPI */
+#define POP_NO_NOPROT (1<<4) /* prohibit no protection; this *only* */
+ /* makes sense if you use GSSAPI */
+#define POP_NO_INTEG (1<<5) /* don't use plain integrity */
+#define POP_NO_ENCRYPT (1<<6) /* don't use encryption */
+
+/*
+ * GSSAPI documentation
+ *
+ * This version will attempt to perform a GSSAPI handshake first; if this
+ * fails, then it will attempt standard POP authentication. Note that
+ * library conflicts may prevent the use of this with the Kerberos
+ * kpop hack.
+ *
+ * If you specify POP_NO_NOPROT and this library is unable to provide either
+ * integrity protection or encryption, pop_open() will fail. The pop_open()
+ * call will attempt the highest level protection available; i.e., if both
+ * server and client support encryption (and you do not provide the
+ * POP_NO_ENCRYPT flag), that will be used; if both server and client support
+ * integrity protection (and you do not provide the POP_NO_INTEG flag), that
+ * will be used. If neither of these are available, and you have not
+ * specified the POP_NO_NOPROT flag, then this will be a normal, unprotected
+ * connection.
+ */
#ifdef __STDC__
#define _ARGS(a) a