| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Previously, the hash table indexed by uid (or gid) took ownership of the
single reference to the heap-allocated struct, and the hash table
indexed by username (or group name) had a borrowed pointer to the same
struct that exists in the other hash table.
However, this can break down if you have two or more distinct usernames
that share a numeric identifier. This is generally a bad idea, because
the user-space model in such situations does not match the kernel-space
reality, and in particular there is no effective kernel-level security
boundary between such users, but it is sometimes done anyway.
In this case, when the second username is looked up in the userdb, it
overwrites (replaces) the entry in the hash table that is indexed by
uid, freeing the DBusUserInfo. This results in both the key and the
value in the hash table that is indexed by username becoming dangling
pointers (use-after-free), leading to undefined behaviour, which is
certainly not what we want to see when doing access control.
An equivalent situation can occur with groups, in the rare case where
a numeric group ID has two names (although I have not heard of this
being done in practice).
Solve this by reference-counting the data structure. There are up to
three references in practice: one held temporarily while the lookup
function is populating and storing it, one held by the hash table that
is indexed by uid, and one held by the hash table that is indexed by
name.
Closes: dbus#305
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2b7948ef907669e844b52c4fa2268d6e3162a70c)
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This makes it more obvious that the returned pointer points to a
struct owned by the userdb, which must not be freed or have its
contents modified, and is only valid to dereference until the next
modification to the userdb's underlying hash tables (which in practice
means until the lock is released, because after that we have no
guarantees about what might be going on in another thread).
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6ee66ff7bcc91803111d950512f02651e664f74f)
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(cherry picked from commit b96ef23e406baa08648339a53b0161fc80de7ce4)
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MSG_CTRUNC indicates that we have received fewer fds that we should
have done because the buffer was too small, but we were treating it
as though it indicated that we received *no* fds. If we received any,
we still have to make sure we close them, otherwise they will be leaked.
On the system bus, if an attacker can induce us to leak fds in this
way, that's a local denial of service via resource exhaustion.
[Backport to dbus-1.10: Change signedness of iterator due to
commit ab8cb96e "_dbus_read_socket_with_unix_fds: make n_fds unsigned"
not having been applied to this branch.]
Reported-by: Kevin Backhouse, GitHub Security Lab
Fixes: dbus#294
Fixes: CVE-2020-12049
Fixes: GHSL-2020-057
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We don't actually complete successful authentication, because that
would require us to generate a cookie and compute the correct SHA1,
which is difficult to do in a deterministic authentication script.
However, we do assert that dbus#269 (CVE-2019-12749) has been fixed.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
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The DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 authentication mechanism aims to prove ownership
of a shared home directory by having the server write a secret "cookie"
into a .dbus-keyrings subdirectory of the desired identity's home
directory with 0700 permissions, and having the client prove that it can
read the cookie. This never actually worked for non-malicious clients in
the case where server uid != client uid (unless the server and client
both have privileges, such as Linux CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE or traditional
Unix uid 0) because an unprivileged server would fail to write out the
cookie, and an unprivileged client would be unable to read the resulting
file owned by the server.
Additionally, since dbus 1.7.10 we have checked that ~/.dbus-keyrings
is owned by the uid of the server (a side-effect of a check added to
harden our use of XDG_RUNTIME_DIR), further ruling out successful use
by a non-malicious client with a uid differing from the server's.
Joe Vennix of Apple Information Security discovered that the
implementation of DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 was susceptible to a symbolic link
attack: a malicious client with write access to its own home directory
could manipulate a ~/.dbus-keyrings symlink to cause the DBusServer to
read and write in unintended locations. In the worst case this could
result in the DBusServer reusing a cookie that is known to the
malicious client, and treating that cookie as evidence that a subsequent
client connection came from an attacker-chosen uid, allowing
authentication bypass.
This is mitigated by the fact that by default, the well-known system
dbus-daemon (since 2003) and the well-known session dbus-daemon (in
stable releases since dbus 1.10.0 in 2015) only accept the EXTERNAL
authentication mechanism, and as a result will reject DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1
at an early stage, before manipulating cookies. As a result, this
vulnerability only applies to:
* system or session dbus-daemons with non-standard configuration
* third-party dbus-daemon invocations such as at-spi2-core (although
in practice at-spi2-core also only accepts EXTERNAL by default)
* third-party uses of DBusServer such as the one in Upstart
Avoiding symlink attacks in a portable way is difficult, because APIs
like openat() and Linux /proc/self/fd are not universally available.
However, because DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 already doesn't work in practice for
a non-matching uid, we can solve this vulnerability in an easier way
without regressions, by rejecting it early (before looking at
~/.dbus-keyrings) whenever the requested identity doesn't match the
identity of the process hosting the DBusServer.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/issues/269
Closes: CVE-2019-12749
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Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tdz@users.sourceforge.net>
Reviewed-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=97357
(cherry picked from commit ddbc44adb2709f6dc248364f02b8b4207ea5a1af)
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As noted in GLib commit c879f50f, gcc's interpretation of the malloc
attribute has become more strict over time, which could result in
miscompilation. The new definition is that in addition to assuming
that the returned memory block is newly-allocated, gcc now assumes
that it does not contain any valid pointers. This is OK for
uninitialized or zero-initialized memory returned by dbus_malloc()
or dbus_malloc0(), but not valid for dbus_realloc(), which might be
used for a dynamically-sized array of (structures containing)
valid pointers.
See https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/issues/1465
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107741
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Running the "embedded tests" through valgrind revealed that before this
commit, we would have been willing to read up to 3 bytes off the end of
a message if the message is truncated part way through a boolean. Any
practical allocator will round up allocations to the next 32-bit (or
larger) boundary, so in practice this will not leave the memory buffer
(and in particular did not crash during unit testing), but it could read
uninitialized contents.
On little-endian CPUs, an attacker might be able to use this to learn
whether up to 3 bytes of uninitialized memory in the dbus-daemon
were all-zero (their crafted message would be relayed) or not (their
connection would be disconnected for sending an invalid message). On
big-endian CPUs, an attacker might be able to use this to learn whether
up to 3 bytes were all-zeroes (relayed to a cooperating peer), 0-2
bytes of all-zeroes followed by 0x01 (relayed to a cooperating peer),
or something else (disconnected). This is not believed to be exploitable
to leak interesting information.
Fixes: 62e46533 "hardcode dbus_bool_t to 32 bits"
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107332
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Macieira <thiago@kde.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
(cherry picked from commit e93a775e68daeda5c95984452aee6327e31c17dd)
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Using strncpy (buffer, str, strlen (str)) is a "code smell" that
might indicate a serious bug (it effectively turns strncpy into
strcpy), and gcc 8 now warns about it. In fact we avoided the bug
here, but it wasn't at all obvious.
We already checked that path_len is less than or equal to
_DBUS_MAX_SUN_PATH_LENGTH, which is 99, chosen to be strictly less
than the POSIX minimum sizeof(sun_path) >= 100, so we couldn't
actually be overflowing the available buffer.
The new static assertion in this commit matches a comment above the
definition of _DBUS_MAX_SUN_PATH_LENGTH: we define
_DBUS_MAX_SUN_PATH_LENGTH to 99, because POSIX says struct
sockaddr_un's sun_path member is at least 100 bytes (including space
for a \0 terminator). dbus will now fail to compile on
platforms that are non-POSIX-compliant in this way, except for Windows.
We zeroed the struct sockaddr_un before writing into it, so stopping
one byte short of the end of sun_path ensures that we get \0
termination.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107350
Reviewed-by: Thiago Macieira <thiago@kde.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
(cherry picked from commit f429631365ba59a1749438af2184cab138a31772)
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dbus-sysdeps-unix.c: In function ‘_dbus_read_credentials_socket’:
dbus-sysdeps-unix.c:2061:9: error: ISO C90 forbids mixed declarations and code [-Werror=declaration-after-statement]
adt_session_data_t *adth = NULL;
^
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102145
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
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Previously, the listen() backlog was set to an arbitrary 30. This means
that if dbus-daemon is overloaded only 30 more connections may be queued
by the kernel, before connect() fails with EAGAIN. (Note that EAGAIN !=
EINPROGRESS -- the latter is what is returned if a connection is queued
and being processed for asynchronous sockets; EAGAIN in this case is
really an error, that cannot be recovered from).
Most software simply sets SOMAXCONN as backlog for AF_UNIX sockets, to
allow queuing of as many connections as the kernel allows. SOMAXCONN is
128 on Linux, which is not particularly high, but at least higher than
30.
This patch changes dbus-daemon to do the same.
I noticed this when flooding dbus-daemon with a lot of connections,
where it pretty quickly ceased to respond, much earlier than it really
should.
Note that the backlog has nothing to do with the number of concurrent
connections allowed, it simply controls how many queued, but not
accept()ed connections there may be on the listening socket.
(cherry picked from commit 12bd6e893c91430fdbdf8a27087d4a792b04eef9)
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95264
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/872144
Reviewed-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Macieira <thiago@kde.org>
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If we run out of memory while calling _dbus_type_writer_recurse()
(which is impossible for most contained types, but can happen for
structs and dict-entries), then the memory we allocated in the call to
_dbus_message_iter_open_signature() will still be allocated, and we
have to free it in order to return to the state of the world prior to
calling open_container().
One might reasonably worry that this change can break callers that use
this (incorrect) pattern:
if (!dbus_message_iter_open_container (outer, ..., inner))
{
dbus_message_iter_abandon_container (outer, inner);
goto fail;
}
/* now we know inner is open, and we must close it later */
However, testing that pattern with _dbus_test_oom_handling()
demonstrates that it already dies with a DBusString assertion failure
even before this commit.
This is all concerningly fragile, and I think the next step should be
to zero out DBusMessageIter instances when they are invalidated, so
that a "double-free" is always detected.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=101568
(cherry picked from commit 031aa2ceb3dfff373e7b398dfc5d020d77262512)
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Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=101568
(cherry picked from commit 8384e795516066960bb9fcfbfe138f569420edb9)
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Found by source code inspection while trying to debug an unrelated
leak.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=101568
(cherry picked from commit 6b7bdb105b120b3db312de93af94af1bb6a2a474)
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If we somehow get an autolaunch address with multiple
semicolon-separated components, and one of them fails, then we will
hit an assertion failure when we try the next one.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=101257
(cherry picked from commit ecdcb86bff42d2bb9cac617bf79f0aa3d47676d9)
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The error message was leaked when blocking on a pending call after
the connection was disconnected.
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
[smcv: re-word commit message]
Reviewed-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=101481
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If we don't trap EEXIST and its Windows equivalent, we are unable to
detect the situation where we create an ostensibly unique
subdirectory in a shared /tmp, but an attacker has already created it.
This affects dbus-nonce (the nonce-tcp transport) and the activation
reload test.
Add a new _dbus_ensure_directory() for the one case where we want it to
succeed even on EEXIST: the DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 keyring, which we know
we are creating in our own trusted "official" $HOME. In the new
transient service support on Bug #99825, ensure_owned_directory()
would need the same treatment.
We are not treating this as a serious security problem, because the
nonce-tcp transport is rarely enabled on Unix and there are multiple
mitigations.
The nonce-tcp transport creates a new unique file with O_EXCL and 0600
(private to user) permissions, then overwrites the requested filename
via atomic-overwrite, so the worst that could happen there is that an
attacker could place a symbolic link matching the name of a directory
we are going to create, causing a dbus-daemon configured for nonce-tcp
to traverse the symlink and atomically overwrite a file named "nonce"
in a directory of the attacker's choice, with new random contents that
are not known to the attacker. This seems unlikely to be exploitable
for anything worse than denial of service in practice. In mainline
Linux since 3.6, this attack is also defeated by the
fs.protected_symlinks sysctl, which many distributions enable by default.
The activation reload test suffers from a classic symlink attack
due to time-of-check/time-of-use errors in its implementation, but as
part of the developer-only "embedded tests" that are only intended
to be run on a trusted machine, it is not treated as security-sensitive.
That code path will be fixed in a subsequent commit.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=99828
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
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_dbus_header_set_field_basic()
The const void* 'value' pointer that is passed the address of a
uint32_t here eventually ends up in _dbus_marshal_write_basic(), which
casts it to a DBusBasicValue, a union type that has an alignment of
eight on 64-bit platforms and is therefore more-aligned than the
uint32.
The read of a value of a more-aligned type through a pointer to a less
-aligned type is undefined behaviour.
Fix by storing the uint32 in a DBusBasicValue and passing that instead.
Found by UBSan:
dbus/dbus/dbus-marshal-basic.c:832:14: runtime error: member access within misaligned address 0x7fdb8dac3a04 for type 'const union DBusBasicValue', which requires 8 byte alignment
0x7fdb8dac3a04: note: pointer points here
4a 87 b5 71 01 00 00 00 40 7d 01 00 00 61 00 00 10 3b ac 8d db 7f 00 00 2c 2a 3e 94 db 7f 00 00
^
#0 0x7fdb9444a2c3 in _dbus_marshal_write_basic dbus/dbus/dbus-marshal-basic.c:832
#1 0x7fdb943d22fb in _dbus_type_writer_write_basic_no_typecode dbus/dbus/dbus-marshal-recursive.c:1605
#2 0x7fdb943d64e9 in _dbus_type_writer_write_basic dbus/dbus/dbus-marshal-recursive.c:2327
#3 0x7fdb943c52a6 in write_basic_field dbus/dbus/dbus-marshal-header.c:318
#4 0x7fdb943c919e in _dbus_header_set_field_basic dbus/dbus/dbus-marshal-header.c:1321
#5 0x7fdb943e1349 in dbus_message_set_reply_serial dbus/dbus/dbus-message.c:1173
Signed-off-by: Marc Mutz <marc@kdab.net>
Reviewed-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=98035
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This function opens stdin, stdout, stderr pointing to /dev/null
if they aren't already open. Optionally, it can also replace
whatever is available on those fds with /dev/null.
To allow for use in contexts where only async-signal-safe functions
should be used, such as between fork() and a following exec(),
this function does not use conventional libdbus error handling
(which would require malloc). Instead, it sets errno and returns
an explanatory string.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=97008
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Macieira <thiago@kde.org>
(cherry picked from commit 69123a6bd2adabbaec1f770fc4573fc3ed4ceca6)
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It should probably be used (see #97298) but the fact that it isn't
is breaking compatibility with gcc 6, so apply a quick workaround
while we look into what's wrong here.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=97282
(cherry picked from commit 21d61180819c141e779d6ecf9919e62e768b6fd9)
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If dbus is running as systemd service, dbus daemon is running with
oom_score_adj -900 by OOMScoreAdjust=-900. And children will also have
same value with dbus daemon.
To avoid this, set the child itself values after fork () to 0.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32851
Reviewed-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
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Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95191
Reviewed-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
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safe.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95191
Reviewed-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
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babysitter() on Windows.
Ensure that the babysitter thread already owns its one reference to the
babysitter when it starts up, and eliminates the race condition.
This patch requires that DBusBabysitter refcounting is thread-safe
and is based on an analysis and proposal of Simon Mc Vittie.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95191
Reviewed-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
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Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95160
Reviewed-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
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Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Macieira <thiago@kde.org>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=94136
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Previously, 64-bit (LP64 or LLP64) platforms would have had 32 bits
of padding between pad2 and pad3. We want to guarantee that an ISO C
compiler will copy the entire struct when assigning between structs,
but padding is not guaranteed to be copied, so we want to ensure that
the struct is "packed".
Statically assert that the old ABI is compatible with the new ABI.
Reviewed-by: Thiago Macieira <thiago@kde.org>
[smcv: change >= to == as Thiago requested]
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=94136
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We already asserted that DBusMessageIter must be at least as large
as DBusMessageRealIter (so that casting DBusMessageIter * to
DBusMessageRealIter * does not result in overflowing the stack
variable). Also assert that it must have alignment requirements at
least as strict as those of DBusMessageRealIter * (so that casting
does not increase the required alignment).
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Macieira <thiago@kde.org>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=94136
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This is useful when making static assertions about our types'
properties.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Macieira <thiago@kde.org>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=94136
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This reverts commit 8fd2be6013e3d0ff6a6ff63ea022f9606d9a87c6.
This change was intended for 1.11.
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and move it to dbus-internals.c."
This reverts commit 1370b44035da90a7fbcebea17074c66c832de0b1.
This change was intended for 1.11.
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_dbus_hash_table_from_array() from related activation code."
This reverts commit 610ff8d9646c1bb944bc5e56f22750f1754b308e.
This change was intended for 1.11.
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_dbus_hash_table_from_array() from related activation code.
These functions are required for dbus-run-session.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92899
Reviewed-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
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move it to dbus-internals.c.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92899
Reviewed-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
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Instead of using $DBUS_USE_TEST_BINARY to control whether to use the
hard-coded test binary TEST_BUS_LAUNCH_BINARY, we can just use
$DBUS_TEST_DBUS_LAUNCH to control what we launch directly, as we
were already doing for $DBUS_TEST_DAEMON.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92899
Reviewed-by: Ralf Habacker <ralf.habacker@freenet.de>
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Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=93908
Reviewed-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
[smcv: Re-enable the failing test that Nick disabled, and fix the
expected result; the result given by our current implementation is
reasonable.]
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We documented DBUS_TEST_MALLOC_FAILURES=0 in HACKING, but it didn't
actually work: we'd iterate from i=-1 to i=0.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=93194
Reviewed-by: Ralf Habacker <ralf.habacker@freenet.de>
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This makes them semi-command-line-compatible with a way we can
invoke the GLib-based tests to get more useful debug logs.
These tests still do not actually produce TAP output yet; I tried
implementing that, but it requires changing a lot of noise on stdout
to come out of stderr, and there was something weird going on with
subprocesses restarting the test numbering which will need further
investigation before making that change.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=93194
Reviewed-by: Ralf Habacker <ralf.habacker@freenet.de>
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Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92899
Reviewed-by: Ralf Habacker <ralf.habacker@freenet.de>
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Attempting to call SetEnvironment on systemd causes it to inquire
about the caller's connection UID and PID. If this check fails,
the call is rejected.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92857
Reviewed-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
[smcv: go back to DBUS_ERROR_UNIX_PROCESS_ID_UNKNOWN as the error code
for failure to determine the pid]
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Backtrace generator called _dbus_warn(), which calls
backtrace generator recursively with DBUS_FATAL_WARNINGS=1.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92721
Reviewed-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
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There is no need to make a local (leaked) copy of the message,
because dbus_set_error() already makes a copy of its parameters.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92721
Reviewed-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
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This commit fixes a regression introduced with commit 04b8a7a772cfa9ae8ea6ce452d1fb7f23e25fd3f.
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Only set valid child status in case exit code has been gotten from
child process, otherwise signal failure through thread return value.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92721
Reviewed-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
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The tests are run with _dbus_warn() fatal, so if a particular test is
not applicable on the current platform, we shouldn't call it.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92721
Reviewed-by: Ralf Habacker <ralf.habacker@freenet.de>
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