diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/vtls/ssluse.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/vtls/ssluse.c | 2731 |
1 files changed, 2731 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/vtls/ssluse.c b/lib/vtls/ssluse.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3743170a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/vtls/ssluse.c @@ -0,0 +1,2731 @@ +/*************************************************************************** + * _ _ ____ _ + * Project ___| | | | _ \| | + * / __| | | | |_) | | + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * + * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2013, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al. + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms + * are also available at http://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html. + * + * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell + * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is + * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file. + * + * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY + * KIND, either express or implied. + * + ***************************************************************************/ + +/* + * Source file for all OpenSSL-specific code for the TLS/SSL layer. No code + * but sslgen.c should ever call or use these functions. + */ + +/* + * The original SSLeay-using code for curl was written by Linas Vepstas and + * Sampo Kellomaki 1998. + */ + +#include "curl_setup.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H +#include <limits.h> +#endif + +#include "urldata.h" +#include "sendf.h" +#include "formdata.h" /* for the boundary function */ +#include "url.h" /* for the ssl config check function */ +#include "inet_pton.h" +#include "ssluse.h" +#include "connect.h" +#include "slist.h" +#include "strequal.h" +#include "select.h" +#include "vtls/sslgen.h" +#include "rawstr.h" +#include "hostcheck.h" + +#define _MPRINTF_REPLACE /* use the internal *printf() functions */ +#include <curl/mprintf.h> + +#ifdef USE_SSLEAY + +#ifdef USE_OPENSSL +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/x509v3.h> +#include <openssl/dsa.h> +#include <openssl/dh.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/md5.h> +#else +#include <rand.h> +#include <x509v3.h> +#include <md5.h> +#endif + +#include "warnless.h" +#include "curl_memory.h" +#include "non-ascii.h" /* for Curl_convert_from_utf8 prototype */ + +/* The last #include file should be: */ +#include "memdebug.h" + +#ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER +#error "OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER not defined" +#endif + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090581fL +#define HAVE_SSL_GET1_SESSION 1 +#else +#undef HAVE_SSL_GET1_SESSION +#endif + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00904100L +#define HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK 1 +#else +#undef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK +#endif + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907001L +/* ENGINE_load_private_key() takes four arguments */ +#define HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS +#include <openssl/ui.h> +#else +/* ENGINE_load_private_key() takes three arguments */ +#undef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS +#endif + +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00903001L) && defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_PKCS12_H) +/* OpenSSL has PKCS 12 support */ +#define HAVE_PKCS12_SUPPORT +#else +/* OpenSSL/SSLEay does not have PKCS12 support */ +#undef HAVE_PKCS12_SUPPORT +#endif + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00906001L +#define HAVE_ERR_ERROR_STRING_N 1 +#endif + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00909000L +#define SSL_METHOD_QUAL const +#else +#define SSL_METHOD_QUAL +#endif + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L +/* 0.9.6 didn't have X509_STORE_set_flags() */ +#define HAVE_X509_STORE_SET_FLAGS 1 +#else +#define X509_STORE_set_flags(x,y) Curl_nop_stmt +#endif + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10000000L +#define HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE 1 +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_SSLV2_CLIENT_METHOD +#undef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 /* undef first to avoid compiler warnings */ +#define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 +#endif + +/* + * Number of bytes to read from the random number seed file. This must be + * a finite value (because some entropy "files" like /dev/urandom have + * an infinite length), but must be large enough to provide enough + * entopy to properly seed OpenSSL's PRNG. + */ +#define RAND_LOAD_LENGTH 1024 + +#ifndef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK +static char global_passwd[64]; +#endif + +static int passwd_callback(char *buf, int num, int encrypting +#ifdef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK + /* This was introduced in 0.9.4, we can set this + using SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata() + */ + , void *global_passwd +#endif + ) +{ + DEBUGASSERT(0 == encrypting); + + if(!encrypting) { + int klen = curlx_uztosi(strlen((char *)global_passwd)); + if(num > klen) { + memcpy(buf, global_passwd, klen+1); + return klen; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * rand_enough() is a function that returns TRUE if we have seeded the random + * engine properly. We use some preprocessor magic to provide a seed_enough() + * macro to use, just to prevent a compiler warning on this function if we + * pass in an argument that is never used. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_RAND_STATUS +#define seed_enough(x) rand_enough() +static bool rand_enough(void) +{ + return (0 != RAND_status()) ? TRUE : FALSE; +} +#else +#define seed_enough(x) rand_enough(x) +static bool rand_enough(int nread) +{ + /* this is a very silly decision to make */ + return (nread > 500) ? TRUE : FALSE; +} +#endif + +static int ossl_seed(struct SessionHandle *data) +{ + char *buf = data->state.buffer; /* point to the big buffer */ + int nread=0; + + /* Q: should we add support for a random file name as a libcurl option? + A: Yes, it is here */ + +#ifndef RANDOM_FILE + /* if RANDOM_FILE isn't defined, we only perform this if an option tells + us to! */ + if(data->set.ssl.random_file) +#define RANDOM_FILE "" /* doesn't matter won't be used */ +#endif + { + /* let the option override the define */ + nread += RAND_load_file((data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE]? + data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE]: + RANDOM_FILE), + RAND_LOAD_LENGTH); + if(seed_enough(nread)) + return nread; + } + +#if defined(HAVE_RAND_EGD) + /* only available in OpenSSL 0.9.5 and later */ + /* EGD_SOCKET is set at configure time or not at all */ +#ifndef EGD_SOCKET + /* If we don't have the define set, we only do this if the egd-option + is set */ + if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET]) +#define EGD_SOCKET "" /* doesn't matter won't be used */ +#endif + { + /* If there's an option and a define, the option overrides the + define */ + int ret = RAND_egd(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET]? + data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET]:EGD_SOCKET); + if(-1 != ret) { + nread += ret; + if(seed_enough(nread)) + return nread; + } + } +#endif + + /* If we get here, it means we need to seed the PRNG using a "silly" + approach! */ + do { + unsigned char randb[64]; + int len = sizeof(randb); + RAND_bytes(randb, len); + RAND_add(randb, len, (len >> 1)); + } while(!RAND_status()); + + /* generates a default path for the random seed file */ + buf[0]=0; /* blank it first */ + RAND_file_name(buf, BUFSIZE); + if(buf[0]) { + /* we got a file name to try */ + nread += RAND_load_file(buf, RAND_LOAD_LENGTH); + if(seed_enough(nread)) + return nread; + } + + infof(data, "libcurl is now using a weak random seed!\n"); + return nread; +} + +int Curl_ossl_seed(struct SessionHandle *data) +{ + /* we have the "SSL is seeded" boolean static to prevent multiple + time-consuming seedings in vain */ + static bool ssl_seeded = FALSE; + + if(!ssl_seeded || data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE] || + data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET]) { + ossl_seed(data); + ssl_seeded = TRUE; + } + return 0; +} + + +#ifndef SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE +#define SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE 42 +#endif +#ifndef SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12 +#define SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12 43 +#endif +static int do_file_type(const char *type) +{ + if(!type || !type[0]) + return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM; + if(Curl_raw_equal(type, "PEM")) + return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM; + if(Curl_raw_equal(type, "DER")) + return SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1; + if(Curl_raw_equal(type, "ENG")) + return SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE; + if(Curl_raw_equal(type, "P12")) + return SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12; + return -1; +} + +#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H) && defined(HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS) +/* + * Supply default password to the engine user interface conversation. + * The password is passed by OpenSSL engine from ENGINE_load_private_key() + * last argument to the ui and can be obtained by UI_get0_user_data(ui) here. + */ +static int ssl_ui_reader(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis) +{ + const char *password; + switch(UI_get_string_type(uis)) { + case UIT_PROMPT: + case UIT_VERIFY: + password = (const char*)UI_get0_user_data(ui); + if(NULL != password && + UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD) { + UI_set_result(ui, uis, password); + return 1; + } + default: + break; + } + return (UI_method_get_reader(UI_OpenSSL()))(ui, uis); +} + +/* + * Suppress interactive request for a default password if available. + */ +static int ssl_ui_writer(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis) +{ + switch(UI_get_string_type(uis)) { + case UIT_PROMPT: + case UIT_VERIFY: + if(NULL != UI_get0_user_data(ui) && + UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD) { + return 1; + } + default: + break; + } + return (UI_method_get_writer(UI_OpenSSL()))(ui, uis); +} +#endif + +static +int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn, + SSL_CTX* ctx, + char *cert_file, + const char *cert_type, + char *key_file, + const char *key_type) +{ + struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data; + + int file_type = do_file_type(cert_type); + + if(cert_file != NULL || file_type == SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE) { + SSL *ssl; + X509 *x509; + int cert_done = 0; + + if(data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]) { +#ifndef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK + /* + * If password has been given, we store that in the global + * area (*shudder*) for a while: + */ + size_t len = strlen(data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]); + if(len < sizeof(global_passwd)) + memcpy(global_passwd, data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD], len+1); + else + global_passwd[0] = '\0'; +#else + /* + * We set the password in the callback userdata + */ + SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx, + data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]); +#endif + /* Set passwd callback: */ + SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ctx, passwd_callback); + } + + +#define SSL_CLIENT_CERT_ERR \ + "unable to use client certificate (no key found or wrong pass phrase?)" + + switch(file_type) { + case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM: + /* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() only works on PEM files */ + if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, + cert_file) != 1) { + failf(data, SSL_CLIENT_CERT_ERR); + return 0; + } + break; + + case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1: + /* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file() works with either PEM or ASN1, but + we use the case above for PEM so this can only be performed with + ASN1 files. */ + if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, + cert_file, + file_type) != 1) { + failf(data, SSL_CLIENT_CERT_ERR); + return 0; + } + break; + case SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE: +#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H) && defined(ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME) + { + if(data->state.engine) { + const char *cmd_name = "LOAD_CERT_CTRL"; + struct { + const char *cert_id; + X509 *cert; + } params; + + params.cert_id = cert_file; + params.cert = NULL; + + /* Does the engine supports LOAD_CERT_CTRL ? */ + if(!ENGINE_ctrl(data->state.engine, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME, + 0, (void *)cmd_name, NULL)) { + failf(data, "ssl engine does not support loading certificates"); + return 0; + } + + /* Load the certificate from the engine */ + if(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(data->state.engine, cmd_name, + 0, ¶ms, NULL, 1)) { + failf(data, "ssl engine cannot load client cert with id" + " '%s' [%s]", cert_file, + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + return 0; + } + + if(!params.cert) { + failf(data, "ssl engine didn't initialized the certificate " + "properly."); + return 0; + } + + if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, params.cert) != 1) { + failf(data, "unable to set client certificate"); + X509_free(params.cert); + return 0; + } + X509_free(params.cert); /* we don't need the handle any more... */ + } + else { + failf(data, "crypto engine not set, can't load certificate"); + return 0; + } + } + break; +#else + failf(data, "file type ENG for certificate not implemented"); + return 0; +#endif + + case SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12: + { +#ifdef HAVE_PKCS12_SUPPORT + FILE *f; + PKCS12 *p12; + EVP_PKEY *pri; + STACK_OF(X509) *ca = NULL; + int i; + + f = fopen(cert_file,"rb"); + if(!f) { + failf(data, "could not open PKCS12 file '%s'", cert_file); + return 0; + } + p12 = d2i_PKCS12_fp(f, NULL); + fclose(f); + + if(!p12) { + failf(data, "error reading PKCS12 file '%s'", cert_file ); + return 0; + } + + PKCS12_PBE_add(); + + if(!PKCS12_parse(p12, data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD], &pri, &x509, + &ca)) { + failf(data, + "could not parse PKCS12 file, check password, OpenSSL error %s", + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL) ); + PKCS12_free(p12); + return 0; + } + + PKCS12_free(p12); + + if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x509) != 1) { + failf(data, SSL_CLIENT_CERT_ERR); + goto fail; + } + + if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pri) != 1) { + failf(data, "unable to use private key from PKCS12 file '%s'", + cert_file); + goto fail; + } + + if(!SSL_CTX_check_private_key (ctx)) { + failf(data, "private key from PKCS12 file '%s' " + "does not match certificate in same file", cert_file); + goto fail; + } + /* Set Certificate Verification chain */ + if(ca && sk_X509_num(ca)) { + for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ca); i++) { + /* + * Note that sk_X509_pop() is used below to make sure the cert is + * removed from the stack properly before getting passed to + * SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(). Previously we used + * sk_X509_value() instead, but then we'd clean it in the subsequent + * sk_X509_pop_free() call. + */ + X509 *x = sk_X509_pop(ca); + if(!SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx, x)) { + failf(data, "cannot add certificate to certificate chain"); + goto fail; + } + /* SSL_CTX_add_client_CA() seems to work with either sk_* function, + * presumably because it duplicates what we pass to it. + */ + if(!SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx, x)) { + failf(data, "cannot add certificate to client CA list"); + goto fail; + } + } + } + + cert_done = 1; + fail: + EVP_PKEY_free(pri); + X509_free(x509); + sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free); + + if(!cert_done) + return 0; /* failure! */ +#else + failf(data, "file type P12 for certificate not supported"); + return 0; +#endif + } + default: + failf(data, "not supported file type '%s' for certificate", cert_type); + return 0; + } + + file_type = do_file_type(key_type); + + switch(file_type) { + case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM: + if(cert_done) + break; + if(key_file == NULL) + /* cert & key can only be in PEM case in the same file */ + key_file=cert_file; + case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1: + if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, key_file, file_type) != 1) { + failf(data, "unable to set private key file: '%s' type %s", + key_file, key_type?key_type:"PEM"); + return 0; + } + break; + case SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE: +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H + { /* XXXX still needs some work */ + EVP_PKEY *priv_key = NULL; + if(data->state.engine) { +#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS + UI_METHOD *ui_method = + UI_create_method((char *)"cURL user interface"); + if(NULL == ui_method) { + failf(data, "unable do create OpenSSL user-interface method"); + return 0; + } + UI_method_set_opener(ui_method, UI_method_get_opener(UI_OpenSSL())); + UI_method_set_closer(ui_method, UI_method_get_closer(UI_OpenSSL())); + UI_method_set_reader(ui_method, ssl_ui_reader); + UI_method_set_writer(ui_method, ssl_ui_writer); +#endif + /* the typecast below was added to please mingw32 */ + priv_key = (EVP_PKEY *) + ENGINE_load_private_key(data->state.engine,key_file, +#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS + ui_method, +#endif + data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]); +#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS + UI_destroy_method(ui_method); +#endif + if(!priv_key) { + failf(data, "failed to load private key from crypto engine"); + return 0; + } + if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, priv_key) != 1) { + failf(data, "unable to set private key"); + EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key); + return 0; + } + EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key); /* we don't need the handle any more... */ + } + else { + failf(data, "crypto engine not set, can't load private key"); + return 0; + } + } + break; +#else + failf(data, "file type ENG for private key not supported"); + return 0; +#endif + case SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12: + if(!cert_done) { + failf(data, "file type P12 for private key not supported"); + return 0; + } + break; + default: + failf(data, "not supported file type for private key"); + return 0; + } + + ssl=SSL_new(ctx); + if(NULL == ssl) { + failf(data,"unable to create an SSL structure"); + return 0; + } + + x509=SSL_get_certificate(ssl); + + /* This version was provided by Evan Jordan and is supposed to not + leak memory as the previous version: */ + if(x509 != NULL) { + EVP_PKEY *pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(x509); + EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp,SSL_get_privatekey(ssl)); + EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp); + } + + SSL_free(ssl); + + /* If we are using DSA, we can copy the parameters from + * the private key */ + + + /* Now we know that a key and cert have been set against + * the SSL context */ + if(!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) { + failf(data, "Private key does not match the certificate public key"); + return 0; + } +#ifndef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK + /* erase it now */ + memset(global_passwd, 0, sizeof(global_passwd)); +#endif + } + return 1; +} + +/* returns non-zero on failure */ +static int x509_name_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, size_t size) +{ +#if 0 + return X509_NAME_oneline(a, buf, size); +#else + BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + BUF_MEM *biomem; + int rc; + + if(!bio_out) + return 1; /* alloc failed! */ + + rc = X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_out, a, 0, XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC); + BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem); + + if((size_t)biomem->length < size) + size = biomem->length; + else + size--; /* don't overwrite the buffer end */ + + memcpy(buf, biomem->data, size); + buf[size]=0; + + BIO_free(bio_out); + + return !rc; +#endif +} + +static +int cert_verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) +{ + X509 *err_cert; + char buf[256]; + + err_cert=X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); + (void)x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, sizeof(buf)); + return ok; +} + +/* Return error string for last OpenSSL error + */ +static char *SSL_strerror(unsigned long error, char *buf, size_t size) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_ERR_ERROR_STRING_N + /* OpenSSL 0.9.6 and later has a function named + ERRO_error_string_n() that takes the size of the buffer as a + third argument */ + ERR_error_string_n(error, buf, size); +#else + (void) size; + ERR_error_string(error, buf); +#endif + return buf; +} + +#endif /* USE_SSLEAY */ + +#ifdef USE_SSLEAY +/** + * Global SSL init + * + * @retval 0 error initializing SSL + * @retval 1 SSL initialized successfully + */ +int Curl_ossl_init(void) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_BUILTIN_ENGINES + ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); +#endif + + /* Lets get nice error messages */ + SSL_load_error_strings(); + + /* Init the global ciphers and digests */ + if(!SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms()) + return 0; + + OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); + + return 1; +} + +#endif /* USE_SSLEAY */ + +#ifdef USE_SSLEAY + +/* Global cleanup */ +void Curl_ossl_cleanup(void) +{ + /* Free ciphers and digests lists */ + EVP_cleanup(); + +#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_CLEANUP + /* Free engine list */ + ENGINE_cleanup(); +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_CRYPTO_CLEANUP_ALL_EX_DATA + /* Free OpenSSL ex_data table */ + CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(); +#endif + + /* Free OpenSSL error strings */ + ERR_free_strings(); + + /* Free thread local error state, destroying hash upon zero refcount */ +#ifdef HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE + ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL); +#else + ERR_remove_state(0); +#endif +} + +/* + * This function uses SSL_peek to determine connection status. + * + * Return codes: + * 1 means the connection is still in place + * 0 means the connection has been closed + * -1 means the connection status is unknown + */ +int Curl_ossl_check_cxn(struct connectdata *conn) +{ + int rc; + char buf; + + rc = SSL_peek(conn->ssl[FIRSTSOCKET].handle, (void*)&buf, 1); + if(rc > 0) + return 1; /* connection still in place */ + + if(rc == 0) + return 0; /* connection has been closed */ + + return -1; /* connection status unknown */ +} + +/* Selects an OpenSSL crypto engine + */ +CURLcode Curl_ossl_set_engine(struct SessionHandle *data, const char *engine) +{ +#if defined(USE_SSLEAY) && defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H) + ENGINE *e; + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00909000L + e = ENGINE_by_id(engine); +#else + /* avoid memory leak */ + for(e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) { + const char *e_id = ENGINE_get_id(e); + if(!strcmp(engine, e_id)) + break; + } +#endif + + if(!e) { + failf(data, "SSL Engine '%s' not found", engine); + return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_NOTFOUND; + } + + if(data->state.engine) { + ENGINE_finish(data->state.engine); + ENGINE_free(data->state.engine); + data->state.engine = NULL; + } + if(!ENGINE_init(e)) { + char buf[256]; + + ENGINE_free(e); + failf(data, "Failed to initialise SSL Engine '%s':\n%s", + engine, SSL_strerror(ERR_get_error(), buf, sizeof(buf))); + return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_INITFAILED; + } + data->state.engine = e; + return CURLE_OK; +#else + (void)engine; + failf(data, "SSL Engine not supported"); + return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_NOTFOUND; +#endif +} + +/* Sets engine as default for all SSL operations + */ +CURLcode Curl_ossl_set_engine_default(struct SessionHandle *data) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H + if(data->state.engine) { + if(ENGINE_set_default(data->state.engine, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL) > 0) { + infof(data,"set default crypto engine '%s'\n", + ENGINE_get_id(data->state.engine)); + } + else { + failf(data, "set default crypto engine '%s' failed", + ENGINE_get_id(data->state.engine)); + return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_SETFAILED; + } + } +#else + (void) data; +#endif + return CURLE_OK; +} + +/* Return list of OpenSSL crypto engine names. + */ +struct curl_slist *Curl_ossl_engines_list(struct SessionHandle *data) +{ + struct curl_slist *list = NULL; +#if defined(USE_SSLEAY) && defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H) + struct curl_slist *beg; + ENGINE *e; + + for(e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) { + beg = curl_slist_append(list, ENGINE_get_id(e)); + if(!beg) { + curl_slist_free_all(list); + return NULL; + } + list = beg; + } +#endif + (void) data; + return list; +} + + +/* + * This function is called when an SSL connection is closed. + */ +void Curl_ossl_close(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) +{ + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex]; + + if(connssl->handle) { + (void)SSL_shutdown(connssl->handle); + SSL_set_connect_state(connssl->handle); + + SSL_free (connssl->handle); + connssl->handle = NULL; + } + if(connssl->ctx) { + SSL_CTX_free (connssl->ctx); + connssl->ctx = NULL; + } +} + +/* + * This function is called to shut down the SSL layer but keep the + * socket open (CCC - Clear Command Channel) + */ +int Curl_ossl_shutdown(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) +{ + int retval = 0; + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex]; + struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data; + char buf[120]; /* We will use this for the OpenSSL error buffer, so it has + to be at least 120 bytes long. */ + unsigned long sslerror; + ssize_t nread; + int buffsize; + int err; + int done = 0; + + /* This has only been tested on the proftpd server, and the mod_tls code + sends a close notify alert without waiting for a close notify alert in + response. Thus we wait for a close notify alert from the server, but + we do not send one. Let's hope other servers do the same... */ + + if(data->set.ftp_ccc == CURLFTPSSL_CCC_ACTIVE) + (void)SSL_shutdown(connssl->handle); + + if(connssl->handle) { + buffsize = (int)sizeof(buf); + while(!done) { + int what = Curl_socket_ready(conn->sock[sockindex], + CURL_SOCKET_BAD, SSL_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT); + if(what > 0) { + ERR_clear_error(); + + /* Something to read, let's do it and hope that it is the close + notify alert from the server */ + nread = (ssize_t)SSL_read(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, buf, + buffsize); + err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, (int)nread); + + switch(err) { + case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* this is not an error */ + case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* no more data */ + /* This is the expected response. There was no data but only + the close notify alert */ + done = 1; + break; + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: + /* there's data pending, re-invoke SSL_read() */ + infof(data, "SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ\n"); + break; + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: + /* SSL wants a write. Really odd. Let's bail out. */ + infof(data, "SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE\n"); + done = 1; + break; + default: + /* openssl/ssl.h says "look at error stack/return value/errno" */ + sslerror = ERR_get_error(); + failf(conn->data, "SSL read: %s, errno %d", + ERR_error_string(sslerror, buf), + SOCKERRNO); + done = 1; + break; + } + } + else if(0 == what) { + /* timeout */ + failf(data, "SSL shutdown timeout"); + done = 1; + } + else { + /* anything that gets here is fatally bad */ + failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO); + retval = -1; + done = 1; + } + } /* while()-loop for the select() */ + + if(data->set.verbose) { +#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_SHUTDOWN + switch(SSL_get_shutdown(connssl->handle)) { + case SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN: + infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN\n"); + break; + case SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN: + infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN\n"); + break; + case SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN: + infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|" + "SSL_RECEIVED__SHUTDOWN\n"); + break; + } +#endif + } + + SSL_free (connssl->handle); + connssl->handle = NULL; + } + return retval; +} + +void Curl_ossl_session_free(void *ptr) +{ + /* free the ID */ + SSL_SESSION_free(ptr); +} + +/* + * This function is called when the 'data' struct is going away. Close + * down everything and free all resources! + */ +int Curl_ossl_close_all(struct SessionHandle *data) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H + if(data->state.engine) { + ENGINE_finish(data->state.engine); + ENGINE_free(data->state.engine); + data->state.engine = NULL; + } +#else + (void)data; +#endif + return 0; +} + +static int asn1_output(const ASN1_UTCTIME *tm, + char *buf, + size_t sizeofbuf) +{ + const char *asn1_string; + int gmt=FALSE; + int i; + int year=0,month=0,day=0,hour=0,minute=0,second=0; + + i=tm->length; + asn1_string=(const char *)tm->data; + + if(i < 10) + return 1; + if(asn1_string[i-1] == 'Z') + gmt=TRUE; + for(i=0; i<10; i++) + if((asn1_string[i] > '9') || (asn1_string[i] < '0')) + return 2; + + year= (asn1_string[0]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[1]-'0'); + if(year < 50) + year+=100; + + month= (asn1_string[2]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[3]-'0'); + if((month > 12) || (month < 1)) + return 3; + + day= (asn1_string[4]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[5]-'0'); + hour= (asn1_string[6]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[7]-'0'); + minute= (asn1_string[8]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[9]-'0'); + + if((asn1_string[10] >= '0') && (asn1_string[10] <= '9') && + (asn1_string[11] >= '0') && (asn1_string[11] <= '9')) + second= (asn1_string[10]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[11]-'0'); + + snprintf(buf, sizeofbuf, + "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d %s", + year+1900, month, day, hour, minute, second, (gmt?"GMT":"")); + + return 0; +} + +/* ====================================================== */ + + +/* Quote from RFC2818 section 3.1 "Server Identity" + + If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present, that MUST + be used as the identity. Otherwise, the (most specific) Common Name + field in the Subject field of the certificate MUST be used. Although + the use of the Common Name is existing practice, it is deprecated and + Certification Authorities are encouraged to use the dNSName instead. + + Matching is performed using the matching rules specified by + [RFC2459]. If more than one identity of a given type is present in + the certificate (e.g., more than one dNSName name, a match in any one + of the set is considered acceptable.) Names may contain the wildcard + character * which is considered to match any single domain name + component or component fragment. E.g., *.a.com matches foo.a.com but + not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com but not bar.com. + + In some cases, the URI is specified as an IP address rather than a + hostname. In this case, the iPAddress subjectAltName must be present + in the certificate and must exactly match the IP in the URI. + +*/ +static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn, + X509 *server_cert) +{ + int matched = -1; /* -1 is no alternative match yet, 1 means match and 0 + means mismatch */ + int target = GEN_DNS; /* target type, GEN_DNS or GEN_IPADD */ + size_t addrlen = 0; + struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data; + STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altnames; +#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 + struct in6_addr addr; +#else + struct in_addr addr; +#endif + CURLcode res = CURLE_OK; + +#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 + if(conn->bits.ipv6_ip && + Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, conn->host.name, &addr)) { + target = GEN_IPADD; + addrlen = sizeof(struct in6_addr); + } + else +#endif + if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, conn->host.name, &addr)) { + target = GEN_IPADD; + addrlen = sizeof(struct in_addr); + } + + /* get a "list" of alternative names */ + altnames = X509_get_ext_d2i(server_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); + + if(altnames) { + int numalts; + int i; + + /* get amount of alternatives, RFC2459 claims there MUST be at least + one, but we don't depend on it... */ + numalts = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames); + + /* loop through all alternatives while none has matched */ + for(i=0; (i<numalts) && (matched != 1); i++) { + /* get a handle to alternative name number i */ + const GENERAL_NAME *check = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, i); + + /* only check alternatives of the same type the target is */ + if(check->type == target) { + /* get data and length */ + const char *altptr = (char *)ASN1_STRING_data(check->d.ia5); + size_t altlen = (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5); + + switch(target) { + case GEN_DNS: /* name/pattern comparison */ + /* The OpenSSL man page explicitly says: "In general it cannot be + assumed that the data returned by ASN1_STRING_data() is null + terminated or does not contain embedded nulls." But also that + "The actual format of the data will depend on the actual string + type itself: for example for and IA5String the data will be ASCII" + + Gisle researched the OpenSSL sources: + "I checked the 0.9.6 and 0.9.8 sources before my patch and + it always 0-terminates an IA5String." + */ + if((altlen == strlen(altptr)) && + /* if this isn't true, there was an embedded zero in the name + string and we cannot match it. */ + Curl_cert_hostcheck(altptr, conn->host.name)) + matched = 1; + else + matched = 0; + break; + + case GEN_IPADD: /* IP address comparison */ + /* compare alternative IP address if the data chunk is the same size + our server IP address is */ + if((altlen == addrlen) && !memcmp(altptr, &addr, altlen)) + matched = 1; + else + matched = 0; + break; + } + } + } + GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames); + } + + if(matched == 1) + /* an alternative name matched the server hostname */ + infof(data, "\t subjectAltName: %s matched\n", conn->host.dispname); + else if(matched == 0) { + /* an alternative name field existed, but didn't match and then + we MUST fail */ + infof(data, "\t subjectAltName does not match %s\n", conn->host.dispname); + failf(data, "SSL: no alternative certificate subject name matches " + "target host name '%s'", conn->host.dispname); + res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; + } + else { + /* we have to look to the last occurrence of a commonName in the + distinguished one to get the most significant one. */ + int j,i=-1 ; + +/* The following is done because of a bug in 0.9.6b */ + + unsigned char *nulstr = (unsigned char *)""; + unsigned char *peer_CN = nulstr; + + X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(server_cert) ; + if(name) + while((j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i))>=0) + i=j; + + /* we have the name entry and we will now convert this to a string + that we can use for comparison. Doing this we support BMPstring, + UTF8 etc. */ + + if(i>=0) { + ASN1_STRING *tmp = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(name,i)); + + /* In OpenSSL 0.9.7d and earlier, ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 fails if the input + is already UTF-8 encoded. We check for this case and copy the raw + string manually to avoid the problem. This code can be made + conditional in the future when OpenSSL has been fixed. Work-around + brought by Alexis S. L. Carvalho. */ + if(tmp) { + if(ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) { + j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp); + if(j >= 0) { + peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(j+1); + if(peer_CN) { + memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_data(tmp), j); + peer_CN[j] = '\0'; + } + } + } + else /* not a UTF8 name */ + j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_CN, tmp); + + if(peer_CN && (curlx_uztosi(strlen((char *)peer_CN)) != j)) { + /* there was a terminating zero before the end of string, this + cannot match and we return failure! */ + failf(data, "SSL: illegal cert name field"); + res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; + } + } + } + + if(peer_CN == nulstr) + peer_CN = NULL; + else { + /* convert peer_CN from UTF8 */ + CURLcode rc = Curl_convert_from_utf8(data, peer_CN, strlen(peer_CN)); + /* Curl_convert_from_utf8 calls failf if unsuccessful */ + if(rc) { + OPENSSL_free(peer_CN); + return rc; + } + } + + if(res) + /* error already detected, pass through */ + ; + else if(!peer_CN) { + failf(data, + "SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate"); + res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; + } + else if(!Curl_cert_hostcheck((const char *)peer_CN, conn->host.name)) { + failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name '%s' does not match " + "target host name '%s'", peer_CN, conn->host.dispname); + res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; + } + else { + infof(data, "\t common name: %s (matched)\n", peer_CN); + } + if(peer_CN) + OPENSSL_free(peer_CN); + } + return res; +} +#endif /* USE_SSLEAY */ + +/* The SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK doesn't exist in ancient OpenSSL versions + and thus this cannot be done there. */ +#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK + +static const char *ssl_msg_type(int ssl_ver, int msg) +{ + if(ssl_ver == SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR) { + switch (msg) { + case SSL2_MT_ERROR: + return "Error"; + case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO: + return "Client hello"; + case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY: + return "Client key"; + case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED: + return "Client finished"; + case SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO: + return "Server hello"; + case SSL2_MT_SERVER_VERIFY: + return "Server verify"; + case SSL2_MT_SERVER_FINISHED: + return "Server finished"; + case SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE: + return "Request CERT"; + case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: + return "Client CERT"; + } + } + else if(ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { + switch (msg) { + case SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST: + return "Hello request"; + case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO: + return "Client hello"; + case SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO: + return "Server hello"; + case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE: + return "CERT"; + case SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE: + return "Server key exchange"; + case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE: + return "Client key exchange"; + case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: + return "Request CERT"; + case SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE: + return "Server finished"; + case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + return "CERT verify"; + case SSL3_MT_FINISHED: + return "Finished"; + } + } + return "Unknown"; +} + +static const char *tls_rt_type(int type) +{ + return ( + type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ? "TLS change cipher, " : + type == SSL3_RT_ALERT ? "TLS alert, " : + type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ? "TLS handshake, " : + type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ? "TLS app data, " : + "TLS Unknown, "); +} + + +/* + * Our callback from the SSL/TLS layers. + */ +static void ssl_tls_trace(int direction, int ssl_ver, int content_type, + const void *buf, size_t len, const SSL *ssl, + struct connectdata *conn) +{ + struct SessionHandle *data; + const char *msg_name, *tls_rt_name; + char ssl_buf[1024]; + int ver, msg_type, txt_len; + + if(!conn || !conn->data || !conn->data->set.fdebug || + (direction != 0 && direction != 1)) + return; + + data = conn->data; + ssl_ver >>= 8; + ver = (ssl_ver == SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR ? '2' : + ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR ? '3' : '?'); + + /* SSLv2 doesn't seem to have TLS record-type headers, so OpenSSL + * always pass-up content-type as 0. But the interesting message-type + * is at 'buf[0]'. + */ + if(ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && content_type != 0) + tls_rt_name = tls_rt_type(content_type); + else + tls_rt_name = ""; + + msg_type = *(char*)buf; + msg_name = ssl_msg_type(ssl_ver, msg_type); + + txt_len = snprintf(ssl_buf, sizeof(ssl_buf), "SSLv%c, %s%s (%d):\n", + ver, tls_rt_name, msg_name, msg_type); + Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_TEXT, ssl_buf, (size_t)txt_len, NULL); + + Curl_debug(data, (direction == 1) ? CURLINFO_SSL_DATA_OUT : + CURLINFO_SSL_DATA_IN, (char *)buf, len, NULL); + (void) ssl; +} +#endif + +#ifdef USE_SSLEAY +/* ====================================================== */ + +#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME +# define use_sni(x) sni = (x) +#else +# define use_sni(x) Curl_nop_stmt +#endif + +static CURLcode +ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, + int sockindex) +{ + CURLcode retcode = CURLE_OK; + + struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data; + SSL_METHOD_QUAL SSL_METHOD *req_method=NULL; + void *ssl_sessionid=NULL; + X509_LOOKUP *lookup=NULL; + curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex]; + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex]; + long ctx_options; +#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME + bool sni; +#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 + struct in6_addr addr; +#else + struct in_addr addr; +#endif +#endif + + DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state); + + /* Make funny stuff to get random input */ + Curl_ossl_seed(data); + + /* check to see if we've been told to use an explicit SSL/TLS version */ + + switch(data->set.ssl.version) { + default: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2: + /* it will be handled later with the context options */ + req_method = SSLv23_client_method(); + use_sni(TRUE); + break; + case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2: +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 + failf(data, "OpenSSL was built without SSLv2 support"); + return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; +#else +#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP + if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; +#endif + req_method = SSLv2_client_method(); + use_sni(FALSE); + break; +#endif + case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3: +#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP + if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; +#endif + req_method = SSLv3_client_method(); + use_sni(FALSE); + break; + } + + if(connssl->ctx) + SSL_CTX_free(connssl->ctx); + connssl->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(req_method); + + if(!connssl->ctx) { + failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context: %s", + ERR_error_string(ERR_peek_error(), NULL)); + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + +#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS + SSL_CTX_set_mode(connssl->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS); +#endif + +#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK + if(data->set.fdebug && data->set.verbose) { + /* the SSL trace callback is only used for verbose logging so we only + inform about failures of setting it */ + if(!SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(connssl->ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, + (void (*)(void))ssl_tls_trace)) { + infof(data, "SSL: couldn't set callback!\n"); + } + else if(!SSL_CTX_ctrl(connssl->ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, + conn)) { + infof(data, "SSL: couldn't set callback argument!\n"); + } + } +#endif + + /* OpenSSL contains code to work-around lots of bugs and flaws in various + SSL-implementations. SSL_CTX_set_options() is used to enabled those + work-arounds. The man page for this option states that SSL_OP_ALL enables + all the work-arounds and that "It is usually safe to use SSL_OP_ALL to + enable the bug workaround options if compatibility with somewhat broken + implementations is desired." + + The "-no_ticket" option was introduced in Openssl0.9.8j. It's a flag to + disable "rfc4507bis session ticket support". rfc4507bis was later turned + into the proper RFC5077 it seems: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077 + + The enabled extension concerns the session management. I wonder how often + libcurl stops a connection and then resumes a TLS session. also, sending + the session data is some overhead. .I suggest that you just use your + proposed patch (which explicitly disables TICKET). + + If someone writes an application with libcurl and openssl who wants to + enable the feature, one can do this in the SSL callback. + + SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG option enabling allowed proper + interoperability with web server Netscape Enterprise Server 2.0.1 which + was released back in 1996. + + Due to CVE-2010-4180, option SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG has + become ineffective as of OpenSSL 0.9.8q and 1.0.0c. In order to mitigate + CVE-2010-4180 when using previous OpenSSL versions we no longer enable + this option regardless of OpenSSL version and SSL_OP_ALL definition. + + OpenSSL added a work-around for a SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability + (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt). In 0.9.6e they added a bit to + SSL_OP_ALL that _disables_ that work-around despite the fact that + SSL_OP_ALL is documented to do "rather harmless" workarounds. In order to + keep the secure work-around, the SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS bit + must not be set. + */ + + ctx_options = SSL_OP_ALL; + +#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; +#endif + +#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION; +#endif + +#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG + /* mitigate CVE-2010-4180 */ + ctx_options &= ~SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG; +#endif + +#ifdef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS + /* unless the user explicitly ask to allow the protocol vulnerability we + use the work-around */ + if(!conn->data->set.ssl_enable_beast) + ctx_options &= ~SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS; +#endif + + switch(data->set.ssl.version) { + case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT: + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2; +#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP + if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) { + infof(data, "Set version TLSv1.x for SRP authorisation\n"); + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3; + } +#endif + break; + + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1: + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2; + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3; + break; + + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0: + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2; + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3; +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1; + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2; +#endif + break; + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1: + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2; + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3; + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1; + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2; + break; + + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2: + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2; + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3; + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1; + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1; + break; +#endif + + default: + failf(data, "Unsupported SSL protocol version"); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + + SSL_CTX_set_options(connssl->ctx, ctx_options); + + if(data->set.str[STRING_CERT] || data->set.str[STRING_CERT_TYPE]) { + if(!cert_stuff(conn, + connssl->ctx, + data->set.str[STRING_CERT], + data->set.str[STRING_CERT_TYPE], + data->set.str[STRING_KEY], + data->set.str[STRING_KEY_TYPE])) { + /* failf() is already done in cert_stuff() */ + return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM; + } + } + + if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CIPHER_LIST]) { + if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(connssl->ctx, + data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CIPHER_LIST])) { + failf(data, "failed setting cipher list"); + return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; + } + } + +#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP + if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) { + infof(data, "Using TLS-SRP username: %s\n", data->set.ssl.username); + + if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(connssl->ctx, data->set.ssl.username)) { + failf(data, "Unable to set SRP user name"); + return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + } + if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(connssl->ctx,data->set.ssl.password)) { + failf(data, "failed setting SRP password"); + return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + } + if(!data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CIPHER_LIST]) { + infof(data, "Setting cipher list SRP\n"); + + if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(connssl->ctx, "SRP")) { + failf(data, "failed setting SRP cipher list"); + return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; + } + } + } +#endif + if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE] || data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH]) { + /* tell SSL where to find CA certificates that are used to verify + the servers certificate. */ + if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(connssl->ctx, + data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE], + data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH])) { + if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) { + /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */ + failf(data,"error setting certificate verify locations:\n" + " CAfile: %s\n CApath: %s", + data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE]? + data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE]: "none", + data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH]? + data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH] : "none"); + return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; + } + else { + /* Just continue with a warning if no strict certificate verification + is required. */ + infof(data, "error setting certificate verify locations," + " continuing anyway:\n"); + } + } + else { + /* Everything is fine. */ + infof(data, "successfully set certificate verify locations:\n"); + } + infof(data, + " CAfile: %s\n" + " CApath: %s\n", + data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE] ? data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE]: + "none", + data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH] ? data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH]: + "none"); + } + + if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]) { + /* tell SSL where to find CRL file that is used to check certificate + * revocation */ + lookup=X509_STORE_add_lookup(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(connssl->ctx), + X509_LOOKUP_file()); + if(!lookup || + (!X509_load_crl_file(lookup,data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE], + X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) ) { + failf(data,"error loading CRL file: %s", + data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]); + return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE; + } + else { + /* Everything is fine. */ + infof(data, "successfully load CRL file:\n"); + X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(connssl->ctx), + X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL); + } + infof(data, + " CRLfile: %s\n", data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE] ? + data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]: "none"); + } + + /* SSL always tries to verify the peer, this only says whether it should + * fail to connect if the verification fails, or if it should continue + * anyway. In the latter case the result of the verification is checked with + * SSL_get_verify_result() below. */ + SSL_CTX_set_verify(connssl->ctx, + data->set.ssl.verifypeer?SSL_VERIFY_PEER:SSL_VERIFY_NONE, + cert_verify_callback); + + /* give application a chance to interfere with SSL set up. */ + if(data->set.ssl.fsslctx) { + retcode = (*data->set.ssl.fsslctx)(data, connssl->ctx, + data->set.ssl.fsslctxp); + if(retcode) { + failf(data,"error signaled by ssl ctx callback"); + return retcode; + } + } + + /* Lets make an SSL structure */ + if(connssl->handle) + SSL_free(connssl->handle); + connssl->handle = SSL_new(connssl->ctx); + if(!connssl->handle) { + failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context (handle)!"); + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + SSL_set_connect_state(connssl->handle); + + connssl->server_cert = 0x0; + +#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME + if((0 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, conn->host.name, &addr)) && +#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 + (0 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, conn->host.name, &addr)) && +#endif + sni && + !SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(connssl->handle, conn->host.name)) + infof(data, "WARNING: failed to configure server name indication (SNI) " + "TLS extension\n"); +#endif + + /* Check if there's a cached ID we can/should use here! */ + if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL)) { + /* we got a session id, use it! */ + if(!SSL_set_session(connssl->handle, ssl_sessionid)) { + failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_session failed: %s", + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(),NULL)); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + /* Informational message */ + infof (data, "SSL re-using session ID\n"); + } + + /* pass the raw socket into the SSL layers */ + if(!SSL_set_fd(connssl->handle, (int)sockfd)) { + failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_fd failed: %s", + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(),NULL)); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + + connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2; + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static CURLcode +ossl_connect_step2(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) +{ + struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data; + int err; + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex]; + + DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state + || ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state + || ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state); + + ERR_clear_error(); + + err = SSL_connect(connssl->handle); + + /* 1 is fine + 0 is "not successful but was shut down controlled" + <0 is "handshake was not successful, because a fatal error occurred" */ + if(1 != err) { + int detail = SSL_get_error(connssl->handle, err); + + if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ == detail) { + connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_reading; + return CURLE_OK; + } + else if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE == detail) { + connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_writing; + return CURLE_OK; + } + else { + /* untreated error */ + unsigned long errdetail; + char error_buffer[256]; /* OpenSSL documents that this must be at least + 256 bytes long. */ + CURLcode rc; + const char *cert_problem = NULL; + long lerr; + + connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2; /* the connection failed, + we're not waiting for + anything else. */ + + errdetail = ERR_get_error(); /* Gets the earliest error code from the + thread's error queue and removes the + entry. */ + + switch(errdetail) { + case 0x1407E086: + /* 1407E086: + SSL routines: + SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE: + certificate verify failed */ + /* fall-through */ + case 0x14090086: + /* 14090086: + SSL routines: + SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: + certificate verify failed */ + rc = CURLE_SSL_CACERT; + + lerr = SSL_get_verify_result(connssl->handle); + if(lerr != X509_V_OK) { + snprintf(error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer), + "SSL certificate problem: %s", + X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr)); + } + else + cert_problem = "SSL certificate problem, verify that the CA cert is" + " OK."; + + break; + default: + rc = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + SSL_strerror(errdetail, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)); + break; + } + + /* detail is already set to the SSL error above */ + + /* If we e.g. use SSLv2 request-method and the server doesn't like us + * (RST connection etc.), OpenSSL gives no explanation whatsoever and + * the SO_ERROR is also lost. + */ + if(CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR == rc && errdetail == 0) { + failf(data, "Unknown SSL protocol error in connection to %s:%ld ", + conn->host.name, conn->remote_port); + return rc; + } + /* Could be a CERT problem */ + + failf(data, "%s%s", cert_problem ? cert_problem : "", error_buffer); + return rc; + } + } + else { + /* we have been connected fine, we're not waiting for anything else. */ + connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_3; + + /* Informational message */ + infof (data, "SSL connection using %s\n", + SSL_get_cipher(connssl->handle)); + + return CURLE_OK; + } +} + +static int asn1_object_dump(ASN1_OBJECT *a, char *buf, size_t len) +{ + int i, ilen; + + if((ilen = (int)len) < 0) + return 1; /* buffer too big */ + + i = i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(buf, ilen, a); + + if(i >= ilen) + return 1; /* buffer too small */ + + return 0; +} + +static void pubkey_show(struct SessionHandle *data, + int num, + const char *type, + const char *name, + unsigned char *raw, + int len) +{ + size_t left; + int i; + char namebuf[32]; + char *buffer; + + left = len*3 + 1; + buffer = malloc(left); + if(buffer) { + char *ptr=buffer; + snprintf(namebuf, sizeof(namebuf), "%s(%s)", type, name); + for(i=0; i< len; i++) { + snprintf(ptr, left, "%02x:", raw[i]); + ptr += 3; + left -= 3; + } + infof(data, " %s: %s\n", namebuf, buffer); + Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, num, namebuf, buffer); + free(buffer); + } +} + +#define print_pubkey_BN(_type, _name, _num) \ +do { \ + if(pubkey->pkey._type->_name != NULL) { \ + int len = BN_num_bytes(pubkey->pkey._type->_name); \ + if(len < CERTBUFFERSIZE) { \ + BN_bn2bin(pubkey->pkey._type->_name, (unsigned char*)bufp); \ + bufp[len] = 0; \ + pubkey_show(data, _num, #_type, #_name, (unsigned char*)bufp, len); \ + } \ + } \ +} WHILE_FALSE + +static int X509V3_ext(struct SessionHandle *data, + int certnum, + STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts) +{ + int i; + size_t j; + + if(sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts) <= 0) + /* no extensions, bail out */ + return 1; + + for(i=0; i<sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) { + ASN1_OBJECT *obj; + X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i); + BUF_MEM *biomem; + char buf[512]; + char *ptr=buf; + char namebuf[128]; + BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + + if(!bio_out) + return 1; + + obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext); + + asn1_object_dump(obj, namebuf, sizeof(namebuf)); + + infof(data, "%s: %s\n", namebuf, + X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)?"(critical)":""); + + if(!X509V3_EXT_print(bio_out, ext, 0, 0)) + M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_print(bio_out, ext->value); + + BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem); + + /* biomem->length bytes at biomem->data, this little loop here is only + done for the infof() call, we send the "raw" data to the certinfo + function */ + for(j=0; j<(size_t)biomem->length; j++) { + const char *sep=""; + if(biomem->data[j] == '\n') { + sep=", "; + j++; /* skip the newline */ + }; + while((biomem->data[j] == ' ') && (j<(size_t)biomem->length)) + j++; + if(j<(size_t)biomem->length) + ptr+=snprintf(ptr, sizeof(buf)-(ptr-buf), "%s%c", sep, + biomem->data[j]); + } + infof(data, " %s\n", buf); + + Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, certnum, namebuf, buf); + + BIO_free(bio_out); + + } + return 0; /* all is fine */ +} + + +static void X509_signature(struct SessionHandle *data, + int numcert, + ASN1_STRING *sig) +{ + char buf[1024]; + char *ptr = buf; + int i; + for(i=0; i<sig->length; i++) + ptr+=snprintf(ptr, sizeof(buf)-(ptr-buf), "%02x:", sig->data[i]); + + infof(data, " Signature: %s\n", buf); + Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, numcert, "Signature", buf); +} + +static void dumpcert(struct SessionHandle *data, X509 *x, int numcert) +{ + BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + BUF_MEM *biomem; + + /* this outputs the cert in this 64 column wide style with newlines and + -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- texts and more */ + PEM_write_bio_X509(bio_out, x); + + BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem); + + infof(data, "%s\n", biomem->data); + + Curl_ssl_push_certinfo_len(data, numcert, + "Cert", biomem->data, biomem->length); + + BIO_free(bio_out); + +} + +/* + * This size was previously 512 which has been reported "too small" without + * any specifics, so it was enlarged to allow more data to get shown uncut. + * The "perfect" size is yet to figure out. + */ +#define CERTBUFFERSIZE 8192 + +static CURLcode get_cert_chain(struct connectdata *conn, + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl) + +{ + STACK_OF(X509) *sk; + int i; + char *bufp; + struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data; + int numcerts; + + bufp = malloc(CERTBUFFERSIZE); + if(!bufp) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + + sk = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(connssl->handle); + if(!sk) { + free(bufp); + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + + numcerts = sk_X509_num(sk); + if(Curl_ssl_init_certinfo(data, numcerts)) { + free(bufp); + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + + infof(data, "--- Certificate chain\n"); + for(i=0; i<numcerts; i++) { + long value; + ASN1_INTEGER *num; + ASN1_TIME *certdate; + + /* get the certs in "importance order" */ +#if 0 + X509 *x = sk_X509_value(sk, numcerts - i - 1); +#else + X509 *x = sk_X509_value(sk, i); +#endif + + X509_CINF *cinf; + EVP_PKEY *pubkey=NULL; + int j; + char *ptr; + + (void)x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE); + infof(data, "%2d Subject: %s\n", i, bufp); + Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, i, "Subject", bufp); + + (void)x509_name_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(x), bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE); + infof(data, " Issuer: %s\n", bufp); + Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, i, "Issuer", bufp); + + value = X509_get_version(x); + infof(data, " Version: %lu (0x%lx)\n", value+1, value); + snprintf(bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE, "%lx", value); + Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, i, "Version", bufp); /* hex */ + + num=X509_get_serialNumber(x); + if(num->length <= 4) { + value = ASN1_INTEGER_get(num); + infof(data," Serial Number: %ld (0x%lx)\n", value, value); + snprintf(bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE, "%lx", value); + } + else { + int left = CERTBUFFERSIZE; + + ptr = bufp; + *ptr++ = 0; + if(num->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) + *ptr++='-'; + + for(j=0; (j<num->length) && (left>=4); j++) { + /* TODO: length restrictions */ + snprintf(ptr, 3, "%02x%c",num->data[j], + ((j+1 == num->length)?'\n':':')); + ptr += 3; + left-=4; + } + if(num->length) + infof(data," Serial Number: %s\n", bufp); + else + bufp[0]=0; + } + if(bufp[0]) + Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, i, "Serial Number", bufp); /* hex */ + + cinf = x->cert_info; + + j = asn1_object_dump(cinf->signature->algorithm, bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE); + if(!j) { + infof(data, " Signature Algorithm: %s\n", bufp); + Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, i, "Signature Algorithm", bufp); + } + + certdate = X509_get_notBefore(x); + asn1_output(certdate, bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE); + infof(data, " Start date: %s\n", bufp); + Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, i, "Start date", bufp); + + certdate = X509_get_notAfter(x); + asn1_output(certdate, bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE); + infof(data, " Expire date: %s\n", bufp); + Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, i, "Expire date", bufp); + + j = asn1_object_dump(cinf->key->algor->algorithm, bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE); + if(!j) { + infof(data, " Public Key Algorithm: %s\n", bufp); + Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, i, "Public Key Algorithm", bufp); + } + + pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); + if(!pubkey) + infof(data, " Unable to load public key\n"); + else { + switch(pubkey->type) { + case EVP_PKEY_RSA: + infof(data, " RSA Public Key (%d bits)\n", + BN_num_bits(pubkey->pkey.rsa->n)); + snprintf(bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE, "%d", BN_num_bits(pubkey->pkey.rsa->n)); + Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, i, "RSA Public Key", bufp); + + print_pubkey_BN(rsa, n, i); + print_pubkey_BN(rsa, e, i); + print_pubkey_BN(rsa, d, i); + print_pubkey_BN(rsa, p, i); + print_pubkey_BN(rsa, q, i); + print_pubkey_BN(rsa, dmp1, i); + print_pubkey_BN(rsa, dmq1, i); + print_pubkey_BN(rsa, iqmp, i); + break; + case EVP_PKEY_DSA: + print_pubkey_BN(dsa, p, i); + print_pubkey_BN(dsa, q, i); + print_pubkey_BN(dsa, g, i); + print_pubkey_BN(dsa, priv_key, i); + print_pubkey_BN(dsa, pub_key, i); + break; + case EVP_PKEY_DH: + print_pubkey_BN(dh, p, i); + print_pubkey_BN(dh, g, i); + print_pubkey_BN(dh, priv_key, i); + print_pubkey_BN(dh, pub_key, i); + break; +#if 0 + case EVP_PKEY_EC: /* symbol not present in OpenSSL 0.9.6 */ + /* left TODO */ + break; +#endif + } + EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); + } + + X509V3_ext(data, i, cinf->extensions); + + X509_signature(data, i, x->signature); + + dumpcert(data, x, i); + } + + free(bufp); + + return CURLE_OK; +} + +/* + * Get the server cert, verify it and show it etc, only call failf() if the + * 'strict' argument is TRUE as otherwise all this is for informational + * purposes only! + * + * We check certificates to authenticate the server; otherwise we risk + * man-in-the-middle attack. + */ +static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn, + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl, + bool strict) +{ + CURLcode retcode = CURLE_OK; + int rc; + long lerr; + ASN1_TIME *certdate; + struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data; + X509 *issuer; + FILE *fp; + char *buffer = data->state.buffer; + + if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) + /* we've been asked to gather certificate info! */ + (void)get_cert_chain(conn, connssl); + + data->set.ssl.certverifyresult = !X509_V_OK; + + connssl->server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(connssl->handle); + if(!connssl->server_cert) { + if(strict) + failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get peer certificate!"); + return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; + } + infof (data, "Server certificate:\n"); + + rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(connssl->server_cert), + buffer, BUFSIZE); + infof(data, "\t subject: %s\n", rc?"[NONE]":buffer); + + certdate = X509_get_notBefore(connssl->server_cert); + asn1_output(certdate, buffer, BUFSIZE); + infof(data, "\t start date: %s\n", buffer); + + certdate = X509_get_notAfter(connssl->server_cert); + asn1_output(certdate, buffer, BUFSIZE); + infof(data, "\t expire date: %s\n", buffer); + + if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) { + retcode = verifyhost(conn, connssl->server_cert); + if(retcode) { + X509_free(connssl->server_cert); + connssl->server_cert = NULL; + return retcode; + } + } + + rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(connssl->server_cert), + buffer, BUFSIZE); + if(rc) { + if(strict) + failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get X509-issuer name!"); + retcode = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + else { + infof(data, "\t issuer: %s\n", buffer); + + /* We could do all sorts of certificate verification stuff here before + deallocating the certificate. */ + + /* e.g. match issuer name with provided issuer certificate */ + if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]) { + fp=fopen(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT],"r"); + if(!fp) { + if(strict) + failf(data, "SSL: Unable to open issuer cert (%s)", + data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]); + X509_free(connssl->server_cert); + connssl->server_cert = NULL; + return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR; + } + issuer = PEM_read_X509(fp,NULL,ZERO_NULL,NULL); + if(!issuer) { + if(strict) + failf(data, "SSL: Unable to read issuer cert (%s)", + data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]); + X509_free(connssl->server_cert); + X509_free(issuer); + fclose(fp); + return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR; + } + fclose(fp); + if(X509_check_issued(issuer,connssl->server_cert) != X509_V_OK) { + if(strict) + failf(data, "SSL: Certificate issuer check failed (%s)", + data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]); + X509_free(connssl->server_cert); + X509_free(issuer); + connssl->server_cert = NULL; + return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR; + } + infof(data, "\t SSL certificate issuer check ok (%s)\n", + data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]); + X509_free(issuer); + } + + lerr = data->set.ssl.certverifyresult= + SSL_get_verify_result(connssl->handle); + if(data->set.ssl.certverifyresult != X509_V_OK) { + if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) { + /* We probably never reach this, because SSL_connect() will fail + and we return earlier if verifypeer is set? */ + if(strict) + failf(data, "SSL certificate verify result: %s (%ld)", + X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr), lerr); + retcode = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; + } + else + infof(data, "\t SSL certificate verify result: %s (%ld)," + " continuing anyway.\n", + X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr), lerr); + } + else + infof(data, "\t SSL certificate verify ok.\n"); + } + + X509_free(connssl->server_cert); + connssl->server_cert = NULL; + connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done; + + return retcode; +} + + +static CURLcode +ossl_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn, + int sockindex) +{ + CURLcode retcode = CURLE_OK; + void *old_ssl_sessionid=NULL; + struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data; + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex]; + int incache; + SSL_SESSION *our_ssl_sessionid; + + DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_3 == connssl->connecting_state); + +#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET1_SESSION + our_ssl_sessionid = SSL_get1_session(connssl->handle); + + /* SSL_get1_session() will increment the reference + count and the session will stay in memory until explicitly freed with + SSL_SESSION_free(3), regardless of its state. + This function was introduced in openssl 0.9.5a. */ +#else + our_ssl_sessionid = SSL_get_session(connssl->handle); + + /* if SSL_get1_session() is unavailable, use SSL_get_session(). + This is an inferior option because the session can be flushed + at any time by openssl. It is included only so curl compiles + under versions of openssl < 0.9.5a. + + WARNING: How curl behaves if it's session is flushed is + untested. + */ +#endif + + incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL)); + if(incache) { + if(old_ssl_sessionid != our_ssl_sessionid) { + infof(data, "old SSL session ID is stale, removing\n"); + Curl_ssl_delsessionid(conn, old_ssl_sessionid); + incache = FALSE; + } + } + if(!incache) { + retcode = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, our_ssl_sessionid, + 0 /* unknown size */); + if(retcode) { + failf(data, "failed to store ssl session"); + return retcode; + } + } +#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET1_SESSION + else { + /* Session was incache, so refcount already incremented earlier. + * Avoid further increments with each SSL_get1_session() call. + * This does not free the session as refcount remains > 0 + */ + SSL_SESSION_free(our_ssl_sessionid); + } +#endif + + /* + * We check certificates to authenticate the server; otherwise we risk + * man-in-the-middle attack; NEVERTHELESS, if we're told explicitly not to + * verify the peer ignore faults and failures from the server cert + * operations. + */ + + if(!data->set.ssl.verifypeer && !data->set.ssl.verifyhost) + (void)servercert(conn, connssl, FALSE); + else + retcode = servercert(conn, connssl, TRUE); + + if(CURLE_OK == retcode) + connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done; + return retcode; +} + +static Curl_recv ossl_recv; +static Curl_send ossl_send; + +static CURLcode +ossl_connect_common(struct connectdata *conn, + int sockindex, + bool nonblocking, + bool *done) +{ + CURLcode retcode; + struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data; + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex]; + curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex]; + long timeout_ms; + int what; + + /* check if the connection has already been established */ + if(ssl_connection_complete == connssl->state) { + *done = TRUE; + return CURLE_OK; + } + + if(ssl_connect_1==connssl->connecting_state) { + /* Find out how much more time we're allowed */ + timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE); + + if(timeout_ms < 0) { + /* no need to continue if time already is up */ + failf(data, "SSL connection timeout"); + return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT; + } + retcode = ossl_connect_step1(conn, sockindex); + if(retcode) + return retcode; + } + + while(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state || + ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state || + ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state) { + + /* check allowed time left */ + timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE); + + if(timeout_ms < 0) { + /* no need to continue if time already is up */ + failf(data, "SSL connection timeout"); + return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT; + } + + /* if ssl is expecting something, check if it's available. */ + if(connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_reading + || connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_writing) { + + curl_socket_t writefd = ssl_connect_2_writing== + connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD; + curl_socket_t readfd = ssl_connect_2_reading== + connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD; + + what = Curl_socket_ready(readfd, writefd, nonblocking?0:timeout_ms); + if(what < 0) { + /* fatal error */ + failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + else if(0 == what) { + if(nonblocking) { + *done = FALSE; + return CURLE_OK; + } + else { + /* timeout */ + failf(data, "SSL connection timeout"); + return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT; + } + } + /* socket is readable or writable */ + } + + /* Run transaction, and return to the caller if it failed or if this + * connection is done nonblocking and this loop would execute again. This + * permits the owner of a multi handle to abort a connection attempt + * before step2 has completed while ensuring that a client using select() + * or epoll() will always have a valid fdset to wait on. + */ + retcode = ossl_connect_step2(conn, sockindex); + if(retcode || (nonblocking && + (ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state || + ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state || + ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state))) + return retcode; + + } /* repeat step2 until all transactions are done. */ + + + if(ssl_connect_3==connssl->connecting_state) { + retcode = ossl_connect_step3(conn, sockindex); + if(retcode) + return retcode; + } + + if(ssl_connect_done==connssl->connecting_state) { + connssl->state = ssl_connection_complete; + conn->recv[sockindex] = ossl_recv; + conn->send[sockindex] = ossl_send; + *done = TRUE; + } + else + *done = FALSE; + + /* Reset our connect state machine */ + connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_1; + + return CURLE_OK; +} + +CURLcode +Curl_ossl_connect_nonblocking(struct connectdata *conn, + int sockindex, + bool *done) +{ + return ossl_connect_common(conn, sockindex, TRUE, done); +} + +CURLcode +Curl_ossl_connect(struct connectdata *conn, + int sockindex) +{ + CURLcode retcode; + bool done = FALSE; + + retcode = ossl_connect_common(conn, sockindex, FALSE, &done); + if(retcode) + return retcode; + + DEBUGASSERT(done); + + return CURLE_OK; +} + +bool Curl_ossl_data_pending(const struct connectdata *conn, + int connindex) +{ + if(conn->ssl[connindex].handle) + /* SSL is in use */ + return (0 != SSL_pending(conn->ssl[connindex].handle)) ? TRUE : FALSE; + else + return FALSE; +} + +static ssize_t ossl_send(struct connectdata *conn, + int sockindex, + const void *mem, + size_t len, + CURLcode *curlcode) +{ + /* SSL_write() is said to return 'int' while write() and send() returns + 'size_t' */ + int err; + char error_buffer[120]; /* OpenSSL documents that this must be at least 120 + bytes long. */ + unsigned long sslerror; + int memlen; + int rc; + + ERR_clear_error(); + + memlen = (len > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)len; + rc = SSL_write(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, mem, memlen); + + if(rc <= 0) { + err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, rc); + + switch(err) { + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: + /* The operation did not complete; the same TLS/SSL I/O function + should be called again later. This is basically an EWOULDBLOCK + equivalent. */ + *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN; + return -1; + case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: + failf(conn->data, "SSL_write() returned SYSCALL, errno = %d", + SOCKERRNO); + *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + return -1; + case SSL_ERROR_SSL: + /* A failure in the SSL library occurred, usually a protocol error. + The OpenSSL error queue contains more information on the error. */ + sslerror = ERR_get_error(); + failf(conn->data, "SSL_write() error: %s", + ERR_error_string(sslerror, error_buffer)); + *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + return -1; + } + /* a true error */ + failf(conn->data, "SSL_write() return error %d", err); + *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + return -1; + } + return (ssize_t)rc; /* number of bytes */ +} + +static ssize_t ossl_recv(struct connectdata *conn, /* connection data */ + int num, /* socketindex */ + char *buf, /* store read data here */ + size_t buffersize, /* max amount to read */ + CURLcode *curlcode) +{ + char error_buffer[120]; /* OpenSSL documents that this must be at + least 120 bytes long. */ + unsigned long sslerror; + ssize_t nread; + int buffsize; + + ERR_clear_error(); + + buffsize = (buffersize > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)buffersize; + nread = (ssize_t)SSL_read(conn->ssl[num].handle, buf, buffsize); + if(nread <= 0) { + /* failed SSL_read */ + int err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl[num].handle, (int)nread); + + switch(err) { + case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* this is not an error */ + case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* no more data */ + break; + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: + /* there's data pending, re-invoke SSL_read() */ + *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN; + return -1; + default: + /* openssl/ssl.h for SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL says "look at error stack/return + value/errno" */ + /* http://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/ERR_get_error.html */ + sslerror = ERR_get_error(); + if((nread < 0) || sslerror) { + /* If the return code was negative or there actually is an error in the + queue */ + failf(conn->data, "SSL read: %s, errno %d", + ERR_error_string(sslerror, error_buffer), + SOCKERRNO); + *curlcode = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + return -1; + } + } + } + return nread; +} + +size_t Curl_ossl_version(char *buffer, size_t size) +{ +#ifdef YASSL_VERSION + /* yassl provides an OpenSSL API compatibility layer so it looks identical + to OpenSSL in all other aspects */ + return snprintf(buffer, size, "yassl/%s", YASSL_VERSION); +#else /* YASSL_VERSION */ + +#if(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x905000) + { + char sub[2]; + unsigned long ssleay_value; + sub[1]='\0'; + ssleay_value=SSLeay(); + if(ssleay_value < 0x906000) { + ssleay_value=SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER; + sub[0]='\0'; + } + else { + if(ssleay_value&0xff0) { + sub[0]=(char)(((ssleay_value>>4)&0xff) + 'a' -1); + } + else + sub[0]='\0'; + } + + return snprintf(buffer, size, "OpenSSL/%lx.%lx.%lx%s", + (ssleay_value>>28)&0xf, + (ssleay_value>>20)&0xff, + (ssleay_value>>12)&0xff, + sub); + } + +#else /* SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER is less than 0.9.5 */ + +#if(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x900000) + return snprintf(buffer, size, "OpenSSL/%lx.%lx.%lx", + (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>28)&0xff, + (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>20)&0xff, + (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>12)&0xf); + +#else /* (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x900000) */ + { + char sub[2]; + sub[1]='\0'; + if(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER&0x0f) { + sub[0]=(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER&0x0f) + 'a' -1; + } + else + sub[0]='\0'; + + return snprintf(buffer, size, "SSL/%x.%x.%x%s", + (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>12)&0xff, + (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>8)&0xf, + (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>4)&0xf, sub); + } +#endif /* (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x900000) */ +#endif /* SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER is less than 0.9.5 */ + +#endif /* YASSL_VERSION */ +} + +void Curl_ossl_random(struct SessionHandle *data, unsigned char *entropy, + size_t length) +{ + Curl_ossl_seed(data); /* Initiate the seed if not already done */ + RAND_bytes(entropy, curlx_uztosi(length)); +} + +void Curl_ossl_md5sum(unsigned char *tmp, /* input */ + size_t tmplen, + unsigned char *md5sum /* output */, + size_t unused) +{ + MD5_CTX MD5pw; + (void)unused; + MD5_Init(&MD5pw); + MD5_Update(&MD5pw, tmp, tmplen); + MD5_Final(md5sum, &MD5pw); +} +#endif /* USE_SSLEAY */ |