diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/vtls/openssl.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/vtls/openssl.c | 196 |
1 files changed, 177 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/lib/vtls/openssl.c b/lib/vtls/openssl.c index 176fa522a..6f6b604c2 100644 --- a/lib/vtls/openssl.c +++ b/lib/vtls/openssl.c @@ -46,6 +46,11 @@ #include "multiif.h" #include "strerror.h" #include "curl_printf.h" + +#if defined(USE_WIN32_CRYPTO) +#include <wincrypt.h> +#endif + #include <openssl/ssl.h> #include <openssl/rand.h> #include <openssl/x509v3.h> @@ -2720,31 +2725,184 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) } #endif + +#if defined(USE_WIN32_CRYPTO) + /* Import certificates from the Windows root certificate store if requested. + https://stackoverflow.com/questions/9507184/ + https://github.com/d3x0r/SACK/blob/master/src/netlib/ssl_layer.c#L1037 + https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280 */ + if((SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer) || SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost)) && + (SSL_SET_OPTION(native_ca_store))) { + X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx); + HCERTSTORE hStore = CertOpenSystemStoreA((HCRYPTPROV_LEGACY)NULL, "ROOT"); + + if(hStore) { + PCCERT_CONTEXT pContext = NULL; + /* The array of enhanced key usage OIDs will vary per certificate and is + declared outside of the loop so that rather than malloc/free each + iteration we can grow it with realloc, when necessary. */ + CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *enhkey_usage = NULL; + DWORD enhkey_usage_size = 0; + + /* This loop makes a best effort to import all valid certificates from + the MS root store. If a certificate cannot be imported it is skipped. + 'result' is used to store only hard-fail conditions (such as out of + memory) that cause an early break. */ + result = CURLE_OK; + for(;;) { + X509 *x509; + FILETIME now; + BYTE key_usage[2]; + DWORD req_size; + const unsigned char *encoded_cert; +#if defined(DEBUGBUILD) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS) + char cert_name[256]; +#endif + + pContext = CertEnumCertificatesInStore(hStore, pContext); + if(!pContext) + break; + +#if defined(DEBUGBUILD) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS) + if(!CertGetNameStringA(pContext, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE, 0, + NULL, cert_name, sizeof(cert_name))) { + strcpy(cert_name, "Unknown"); + } + infof(data, "SSL: Checking cert \"%s\"\n", cert_name); +#endif + + encoded_cert = (const unsigned char *)pContext->pbCertEncoded; + if(!encoded_cert) + continue; + + GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&now); + if(CompareFileTime(&pContext->pCertInfo->NotBefore, &now) > 0 || + CompareFileTime(&now, &pContext->pCertInfo->NotAfter) > 0) + continue; + + /* If key usage exists check for signing attribute */ + if(CertGetIntendedKeyUsage(pContext->dwCertEncodingType, + pContext->pCertInfo, + key_usage, sizeof(key_usage))) { + if(!(key_usage[0] & CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE)) + continue; + } + else if(GetLastError()) + continue; + + /* If enhanced key usage exists check for server auth attribute. + * + * Note "In a Microsoft environment, a certificate might also have EKU + * extended properties that specify valid uses for the certificate." + * The call below checks both, and behavior varies depending on what is + * found. For more details see CertGetEnhancedKeyUsage doc. + */ + if(CertGetEnhancedKeyUsage(pContext, 0, NULL, &req_size)) { + if(req_size && req_size > enhkey_usage_size) { + void *tmp = realloc(enhkey_usage, req_size); + + if(!tmp) { + failf(data, "SSL: Out of memory allocating for OID list"); + result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + break; + } + + enhkey_usage = (CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *)tmp; + enhkey_usage_size = req_size; + } + + if(CertGetEnhancedKeyUsage(pContext, 0, enhkey_usage, &req_size)) { + if(!enhkey_usage->cUsageIdentifier) { + /* "If GetLastError returns CRYPT_E_NOT_FOUND, the certificate is + good for all uses. If it returns zero, the certificate has no + valid uses." */ + if(GetLastError() != CRYPT_E_NOT_FOUND) + continue; + } + else { + DWORD i; + bool found = false; + + for(i = 0; i < enhkey_usage->cUsageIdentifier; ++i) { + if(!strcmp("1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1" /* OID server auth */, + enhkey_usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i])) { + found = true; + break; + } + } + + if(!found) + continue; + } + } + else + continue; + } + else + continue; + + x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &encoded_cert, pContext->cbCertEncoded); + if(!x509) + continue; + + /* Try to import the certificate. This may fail for legitimate reasons + such as duplicate certificate, which is allowed by MS but not + OpenSSL. */ + if(X509_STORE_add_cert(store, x509) == 1) { +#if defined(DEBUGBUILD) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS) + infof(data, "SSL: Imported cert \"%s\"\n", cert_name); +#else + do {} while(0); +#endif + } + X509_free(x509); + } + + free(enhkey_usage); + CertFreeCertificateContext(pContext); + CertCloseStore(hStore, 0); + + if(result) + return result; + + infof(data, "successfully set certificate verify locations " + "to windows ca store\n"); + } + else { + infof(data, "error setting certificate verify locations " + "to windows ca store, continuing anyway\n"); + } + } + else +#endif + #if defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3) /* OpenSSL 3.0.0 has deprecated SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations */ - if(ssl_cafile) { - if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_file(backend->ctx, ssl_cafile)) { - if(verifypeer) { - /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */ - failf(data, "error setting certificate file: %s", ssl_cafile); - return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; + { + if(ssl_cafile) { + if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_file(backend->ctx, ssl_cafile)) { + if(verifypeer) { + /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */ + failf(data, "error setting certificate file: %s", ssl_cafile); + return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; + } + /* Continue with a warning if no certificate verif is required. */ + infof(data, "error setting certificate file, continuing anyway\n"); } - /* Continue with a warning if no certificate verification is required. */ - infof(data, "error setting certificate file, continuing anyway\n"); + infof(data, " CAfile: %s\n", ssl_cafile); } - infof(data, " CAfile: %s\n", ssl_cafile); - } - if(ssl_capath) { - if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_dir(backend->ctx, ssl_capath)) { - if(verifypeer) { - /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */ - failf(data, "error setting certificate path: %s", ssl_capath); - return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; + if(ssl_capath) { + if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_dir(backend->ctx, ssl_capath)) { + if(verifypeer) { + /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */ + failf(data, "error setting certificate path: %s", ssl_capath); + return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; + } + /* Continue with a warning if no certificate verif is required. */ + infof(data, "error setting certificate path, continuing anyway\n"); } - /* Continue with a warning if no certificate verification is required. */ - infof(data, "error setting certificate path, continuing anyway\n"); + infof(data, " CApath: %s\n", ssl_capath); } - infof(data, " CApath: %s\n", ssl_capath); } #else if(ssl_cafile || ssl_capath) { |