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-rw-r--r--lib/ssluse.c2736
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diff --git a/lib/ssluse.c b/lib/ssluse.c
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+++ b/lib/ssluse.c
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+/***************************************************************************
+ * _ _ ____ _
+ * Project ___| | | | _ \| |
+ * / __| | | | |_) | |
+ * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
+ * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2012, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+ *
+ * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
+ * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
+ * are also available at http://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
+ *
+ * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
+ * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
+ *
+ * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
+ * KIND, either express or implied.
+ *
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Source file for all OpenSSL-specific code for the TLS/SSL layer. No code
+ * but sslgen.c should ever call or use these functions.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The original SSLeay-using code for curl was written by Linas Vepstas and
+ * Sampo Kellomaki 1998.
+ */
+
+#include "setup.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
+#include <limits.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "urldata.h"
+#include "sendf.h"
+#include "formdata.h" /* for the boundary function */
+#include "url.h" /* for the ssl config check function */
+#include "inet_pton.h"
+#include "ssluse.h"
+#include "connect.h"
+#include "strequal.h"
+#include "select.h"
+#include "sslgen.h"
+#include "rawstr.h"
+#include "hostcheck.h"
+
+#define _MPRINTF_REPLACE /* use the internal *printf() functions */
+#include <curl/mprintf.h>
+
+#ifdef USE_SSLEAY
+
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#else
+#include <rand.h>
+#include <x509v3.h>
+#include <md5.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "warnless.h"
+#include "curl_memory.h"
+#include "non-ascii.h" /* for Curl_convert_from_utf8 prototype */
+
+/* The last #include file should be: */
+#include "memdebug.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
+#error "OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER not defined"
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090581fL
+#define HAVE_SSL_GET1_SESSION 1
+#else
+#undef HAVE_SSL_GET1_SESSION
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00904100L
+#define HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK 1
+#else
+#undef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907001L
+/* ENGINE_load_private_key() takes four arguments */
+#define HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS
+#include <openssl/ui.h>
+#else
+/* ENGINE_load_private_key() takes three arguments */
+#undef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS
+#endif
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00903001L) && defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_PKCS12_H)
+/* OpenSSL has PKCS 12 support */
+#define HAVE_PKCS12_SUPPORT
+#else
+/* OpenSSL/SSLEay does not have PKCS12 support */
+#undef HAVE_PKCS12_SUPPORT
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00906001L
+#define HAVE_ERR_ERROR_STRING_N 1
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00909000L
+#define SSL_METHOD_QUAL const
+#else
+#define SSL_METHOD_QUAL
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
+/* 0.9.6 didn't have X509_STORE_set_flags() */
+#define HAVE_X509_STORE_SET_FLAGS 1
+#else
+#define X509_STORE_set_flags(x,y) Curl_nop_stmt
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10000000L
+#define HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE 1
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SSLV2_CLIENT_METHOD
+#undef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 /* undef first to avoid compiler warnings */
+#define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Number of bytes to read from the random number seed file. This must be
+ * a finite value (because some entropy "files" like /dev/urandom have
+ * an infinite length), but must be large enough to provide enough
+ * entopy to properly seed OpenSSL's PRNG.
+ */
+#define RAND_LOAD_LENGTH 1024
+
+#ifndef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK
+static char global_passwd[64];
+#endif
+
+static int passwd_callback(char *buf, int num, int encrypting
+#ifdef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK
+ /* This was introduced in 0.9.4, we can set this
+ using SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata()
+ */
+ , void *global_passwd
+#endif
+ )
+{
+ DEBUGASSERT(0 == encrypting);
+
+ if(!encrypting) {
+ int klen = curlx_uztosi(strlen((char *)global_passwd));
+ if(num > klen) {
+ memcpy(buf, global_passwd, klen+1);
+ return klen;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * rand_enough() is a function that returns TRUE if we have seeded the random
+ * engine properly. We use some preprocessor magic to provide a seed_enough()
+ * macro to use, just to prevent a compiler warning on this function if we
+ * pass in an argument that is never used.
+ */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_RAND_STATUS
+#define seed_enough(x) rand_enough()
+static bool rand_enough(void)
+{
+ return (0 != RAND_status()) ? TRUE : FALSE;
+}
+#else
+#define seed_enough(x) rand_enough(x)
+static bool rand_enough(int nread)
+{
+ /* this is a very silly decision to make */
+ return (nread > 500) ? TRUE : FALSE;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int ossl_seed(struct SessionHandle *data)
+{
+ char *buf = data->state.buffer; /* point to the big buffer */
+ int nread=0;
+
+ /* Q: should we add support for a random file name as a libcurl option?
+ A: Yes, it is here */
+
+#ifndef RANDOM_FILE
+ /* if RANDOM_FILE isn't defined, we only perform this if an option tells
+ us to! */
+ if(data->set.ssl.random_file)
+#define RANDOM_FILE "" /* doesn't matter won't be used */
+#endif
+ {
+ /* let the option override the define */
+ nread += RAND_load_file((data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE]?
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE]:
+ RANDOM_FILE),
+ RAND_LOAD_LENGTH);
+ if(seed_enough(nread))
+ return nread;
+ }
+
+#if defined(HAVE_RAND_EGD)
+ /* only available in OpenSSL 0.9.5 and later */
+ /* EGD_SOCKET is set at configure time or not at all */
+#ifndef EGD_SOCKET
+ /* If we don't have the define set, we only do this if the egd-option
+ is set */
+ if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET])
+#define EGD_SOCKET "" /* doesn't matter won't be used */
+#endif
+ {
+ /* If there's an option and a define, the option overrides the
+ define */
+ int ret = RAND_egd(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET]?
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET]:EGD_SOCKET);
+ if(-1 != ret) {
+ nread += ret;
+ if(seed_enough(nread))
+ return nread;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* If we get here, it means we need to seed the PRNG using a "silly"
+ approach! */
+ {
+ int len;
+ char *area;
+
+ /* Changed call to RAND_seed to use the underlying RAND_add implementation
+ * directly. Do this in a loop, with the amount of additional entropy
+ * being dependent upon the algorithm used by Curl_FormBoundary(): N bytes
+ * of a 7-bit ascii set. -- Richard Gorton, March 11 2003.
+ */
+
+ do {
+ area = Curl_FormBoundary();
+ if(!area)
+ return 3; /* out of memory */
+
+ len = curlx_uztosi(strlen(area));
+ RAND_add(area, len, (len >> 1));
+
+ free(area); /* now remove the random junk */
+ } while(!RAND_status());
+ }
+
+ /* generates a default path for the random seed file */
+ buf[0]=0; /* blank it first */
+ RAND_file_name(buf, BUFSIZE);
+ if(buf[0]) {
+ /* we got a file name to try */
+ nread += RAND_load_file(buf, RAND_LOAD_LENGTH);
+ if(seed_enough(nread))
+ return nread;
+ }
+
+ infof(data, "libcurl is now using a weak random seed!\n");
+ return nread;
+}
+
+int Curl_ossl_seed(struct SessionHandle *data)
+{
+ /* we have the "SSL is seeded" boolean static to prevent multiple
+ time-consuming seedings in vain */
+ static bool ssl_seeded = FALSE;
+
+ if(!ssl_seeded || data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE] ||
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET]) {
+ ossl_seed(data);
+ ssl_seeded = TRUE;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+#ifndef SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE
+#define SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE 42
+#endif
+#ifndef SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12
+#define SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12 43
+#endif
+static int do_file_type(const char *type)
+{
+ if(!type || !type[0])
+ return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
+ if(Curl_raw_equal(type, "PEM"))
+ return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
+ if(Curl_raw_equal(type, "DER"))
+ return SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1;
+ if(Curl_raw_equal(type, "ENG"))
+ return SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE;
+ if(Curl_raw_equal(type, "P12"))
+ return SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static
+int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn,
+ SSL_CTX* ctx,
+ char *cert_file,
+ const char *cert_type,
+ char *key_file,
+ const char *key_type)
+{
+ struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+
+ int file_type = do_file_type(cert_type);
+
+ if(cert_file != NULL || file_type == SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE) {
+ SSL *ssl;
+ X509 *x509;
+ int cert_done = 0;
+
+ if(data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]) {
+#ifndef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK
+ /*
+ * If password has been given, we store that in the global
+ * area (*shudder*) for a while:
+ */
+ size_t len = strlen(data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
+ if(len < sizeof(global_passwd))
+ memcpy(global_passwd, data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD], len+1);
+ else
+ global_passwd[0] = '\0';
+#else
+ /*
+ * We set the password in the callback userdata
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx,
+ data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
+#endif
+ /* Set passwd callback: */
+ SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ctx, passwd_callback);
+ }
+
+
+#define SSL_CLIENT_CERT_ERR \
+ "unable to use client certificate (no key found or wrong pass phrase?)"
+
+ switch(file_type) {
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM:
+ /* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() only works on PEM files */
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx,
+ cert_file) != 1) {
+ failf(data, SSL_CLIENT_CERT_ERR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1:
+ /* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file() works with either PEM or ASN1, but
+ we use the case above for PEM so this can only be performed with
+ ASN1 files. */
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx,
+ cert_file,
+ file_type) != 1) {
+ failf(data, SSL_CLIENT_CERT_ERR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE:
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H) && defined(ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME)
+ {
+ if(data->state.engine) {
+ const char *cmd_name = "LOAD_CERT_CTRL";
+ struct {
+ const char *cert_id;
+ X509 *cert;
+ } params;
+
+ params.cert_id = cert_file;
+ params.cert = NULL;
+
+ /* Does the engine supports LOAD_CERT_CTRL ? */
+ if(!ENGINE_ctrl(data->state.engine, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME,
+ 0, (void *)cmd_name, NULL)) {
+ failf(data, "ssl engine does not support loading certificates");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Load the certificate from the engine */
+ if(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(data->state.engine, cmd_name,
+ 0, &params, NULL, 1)) {
+ failf(data, "ssl engine cannot load client cert with id"
+ " '%s' [%s]", cert_file,
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if(!params.cert) {
+ failf(data, "ssl engine didn't initialized the certificate "
+ "properly.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, params.cert) != 1) {
+ failf(data, "unable to set client certificate");
+ X509_free(params.cert);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ X509_free(params.cert); /* we don't need the handle any more... */
+ }
+ else {
+ failf(data, "crypto engine not set, can't load certificate");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+#else
+ failf(data, "file type ENG for certificate not implemented");
+ return 0;
+#endif
+
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12:
+ {
+#ifdef HAVE_PKCS12_SUPPORT
+ FILE *f;
+ PKCS12 *p12;
+ EVP_PKEY *pri;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *ca = NULL;
+ int i;
+
+ f = fopen(cert_file,"rb");
+ if(!f) {
+ failf(data, "could not open PKCS12 file '%s'", cert_file);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ p12 = d2i_PKCS12_fp(f, NULL);
+ fclose(f);
+
+ if(!p12) {
+ failf(data, "error reading PKCS12 file '%s'", cert_file );
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ PKCS12_PBE_add();
+
+ if(!PKCS12_parse(p12, data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD], &pri, &x509,
+ &ca)) {
+ failf(data,
+ "could not parse PKCS12 file, check password, OpenSSL error %s",
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL) );
+ PKCS12_free(p12);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ PKCS12_free(p12);
+
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x509) != 1) {
+ failf(data, SSL_CLIENT_CERT_ERR);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pri);
+ X509_free(x509);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pri) != 1) {
+ failf(data, "unable to use private key from PKCS12 file '%s'",
+ cert_file);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pri);
+ X509_free(x509);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if(!SSL_CTX_check_private_key (ctx)) {
+ failf(data, "private key from PKCS12 file '%s' "
+ "does not match certificate in same file", cert_file);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pri);
+ X509_free(x509);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Set Certificate Verification chain */
+ if(ca && sk_X509_num(ca)) {
+ for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ca); i++) {
+ if(!SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx,sk_X509_value(ca, i))) {
+ failf(data, "cannot add certificate to certificate chain");
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pri);
+ X509_free(x509);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if(!SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx, sk_X509_value(ca, i))) {
+ failf(data, "cannot add certificate to client CA list");
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pri);
+ X509_free(x509);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pri);
+ X509_free(x509);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
+ cert_done = 1;
+ break;
+#else
+ failf(data, "file type P12 for certificate not supported");
+ return 0;
+#endif
+ }
+ default:
+ failf(data, "not supported file type '%s' for certificate", cert_type);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ file_type = do_file_type(key_type);
+
+ switch(file_type) {
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM:
+ if(cert_done)
+ break;
+ if(key_file == NULL)
+ /* cert & key can only be in PEM case in the same file */
+ key_file=cert_file;
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1:
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, key_file, file_type) != 1) {
+ failf(data, "unable to set private key file: '%s' type %s",
+ key_file, key_type?key_type:"PEM");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE:
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H
+ { /* XXXX still needs some work */
+ EVP_PKEY *priv_key = NULL;
+ if(data->state.engine) {
+#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS
+ UI_METHOD *ui_method = UI_OpenSSL();
+#endif
+ /* the typecast below was added to please mingw32 */
+ priv_key = (EVP_PKEY *)
+ ENGINE_load_private_key(data->state.engine,key_file,
+#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS
+ ui_method,
+#endif
+ data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
+ if(!priv_key) {
+ failf(data, "failed to load private key from crypto engine");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, priv_key) != 1) {
+ failf(data, "unable to set private key");
+ EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key); /* we don't need the handle any more... */
+ }
+ else {
+ failf(data, "crypto engine not set, can't load private key");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+#else
+ failf(data, "file type ENG for private key not supported");
+ return 0;
+#endif
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12:
+ if(!cert_done) {
+ failf(data, "file type P12 for private key not supported");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ failf(data, "not supported file type for private key");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ssl=SSL_new(ctx);
+ if(NULL == ssl) {
+ failf(data,"unable to create an SSL structure");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ x509=SSL_get_certificate(ssl);
+
+ /* This version was provided by Evan Jordan and is supposed to not
+ leak memory as the previous version: */
+ if(x509 != NULL) {
+ EVP_PKEY *pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(x509);
+ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp,SSL_get_privatekey(ssl));
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+ }
+
+ SSL_free(ssl);
+
+ /* If we are using DSA, we can copy the parameters from
+ * the private key */
+
+
+ /* Now we know that a key and cert have been set against
+ * the SSL context */
+ if(!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
+ failf(data, "Private key does not match the certificate public key");
+ return 0;
+ }
+#ifndef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK
+ /* erase it now */
+ memset(global_passwd, 0, sizeof(global_passwd));
+#endif
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* returns non-zero on failure */
+static int x509_name_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+#if 0
+ return X509_NAME_oneline(a, buf, size);
+#else
+ BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ BUF_MEM *biomem;
+ int rc;
+
+ if(!bio_out)
+ return 1; /* alloc failed! */
+
+ rc = X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_out, a, 0, XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC);
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem);
+
+ if((size_t)biomem->length < size)
+ size = biomem->length;
+ else
+ size--; /* don't overwrite the buffer end */
+
+ memcpy(buf, biomem->data, size);
+ buf[size]=0;
+
+ BIO_free(bio_out);
+
+ return !rc;
+#endif
+}
+
+static
+int cert_verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ X509 *err_cert;
+ char buf[256];
+
+ err_cert=X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
+ (void)x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
+ return ok;
+}
+
+/* Return error string for last OpenSSL error
+ */
+static char *SSL_strerror(unsigned long error, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_ERR_ERROR_STRING_N
+ /* OpenSSL 0.9.6 and later has a function named
+ ERRO_error_string_n() that takes the size of the buffer as a
+ third argument */
+ ERR_error_string_n(error, buf, size);
+#else
+ (void) size;
+ ERR_error_string(error, buf);
+#endif
+ return buf;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_SSLEAY */
+
+#ifdef USE_SSLEAY
+/**
+ * Global SSL init
+ *
+ * @retval 0 error initializing SSL
+ * @retval 1 SSL initialized successfully
+ */
+int Curl_ossl_init(void)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_BUILTIN_ENGINES
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+#endif
+
+ /* Lets get nice error messages */
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+
+ /* Init the global ciphers and digests */
+ if(!SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms())
+ return 0;
+
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_SSLEAY */
+
+#ifdef USE_SSLEAY
+
+/* Global cleanup */
+void Curl_ossl_cleanup(void)
+{
+ /* Free ciphers and digests lists */
+ EVP_cleanup();
+
+#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_CLEANUP
+ /* Free engine list */
+ ENGINE_cleanup();
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPTO_CLEANUP_ALL_EX_DATA
+ /* Free OpenSSL ex_data table */
+ CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+#endif
+
+ /* Free OpenSSL error strings */
+ ERR_free_strings();
+
+ /* Free thread local error state, destroying hash upon zero refcount */
+#ifdef HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE
+ ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
+#else
+ ERR_remove_state(0);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function uses SSL_peek to determine connection status.
+ *
+ * Return codes:
+ * 1 means the connection is still in place
+ * 0 means the connection has been closed
+ * -1 means the connection status is unknown
+ */
+int Curl_ossl_check_cxn(struct connectdata *conn)
+{
+ int rc;
+ char buf;
+
+ rc = SSL_peek(conn->ssl[FIRSTSOCKET].handle, (void*)&buf, 1);
+ if(rc > 0)
+ return 1; /* connection still in place */
+
+ if(rc == 0)
+ return 0; /* connection has been closed */
+
+ return -1; /* connection status unknown */
+}
+
+/* Selects an OpenSSL crypto engine
+ */
+CURLcode Curl_ossl_set_engine(struct SessionHandle *data, const char *engine)
+{
+#if defined(USE_SSLEAY) && defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H)
+ ENGINE *e;
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00909000L
+ e = ENGINE_by_id(engine);
+#else
+ /* avoid memory leak */
+ for(e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) {
+ const char *e_id = ENGINE_get_id(e);
+ if(!strcmp(engine, e_id))
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if(!e) {
+ failf(data, "SSL Engine '%s' not found", engine);
+ return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_NOTFOUND;
+ }
+
+ if(data->state.engine) {
+ ENGINE_finish(data->state.engine);
+ ENGINE_free(data->state.engine);
+ data->state.engine = NULL;
+ }
+ if(!ENGINE_init(e)) {
+ char buf[256];
+
+ ENGINE_free(e);
+ failf(data, "Failed to initialise SSL Engine '%s':\n%s",
+ engine, SSL_strerror(ERR_get_error(), buf, sizeof(buf)));
+ return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_INITFAILED;
+ }
+ data->state.engine = e;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+#else
+ (void)engine;
+ failf(data, "SSL Engine not supported");
+ return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_NOTFOUND;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Sets engine as default for all SSL operations
+ */
+CURLcode Curl_ossl_set_engine_default(struct SessionHandle *data)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H
+ if(data->state.engine) {
+ if(ENGINE_set_default(data->state.engine, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL) > 0) {
+ infof(data,"set default crypto engine '%s'\n",
+ ENGINE_get_id(data->state.engine));
+ }
+ else {
+ failf(data, "set default crypto engine '%s' failed",
+ ENGINE_get_id(data->state.engine));
+ return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_SETFAILED;
+ }
+ }
+#else
+ (void) data;
+#endif
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+/* Return list of OpenSSL crypto engine names.
+ */
+struct curl_slist *Curl_ossl_engines_list(struct SessionHandle *data)
+{
+ struct curl_slist *list = NULL;
+#if defined(USE_SSLEAY) && defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H)
+ struct curl_slist *beg;
+ ENGINE *e;
+
+ for(e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) {
+ beg = curl_slist_append(list, ENGINE_get_id(e));
+ if(!beg) {
+ curl_slist_free_all(list);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ list = beg;
+ }
+#endif
+ (void) data;
+ return list;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * This function is called when an SSL connection is closed.
+ */
+void Curl_ossl_close(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+
+ if(connssl->handle) {
+ (void)SSL_shutdown(connssl->handle);
+ SSL_set_connect_state(connssl->handle);
+
+ SSL_free (connssl->handle);
+ connssl->handle = NULL;
+ }
+ if(connssl->ctx) {
+ SSL_CTX_free (connssl->ctx);
+ connssl->ctx = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is called to shut down the SSL layer but keep the
+ * socket open (CCC - Clear Command Channel)
+ */
+int Curl_ossl_shutdown(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+ int retval = 0;
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+ struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ char buf[120]; /* We will use this for the OpenSSL error buffer, so it has
+ to be at least 120 bytes long. */
+ unsigned long sslerror;
+ ssize_t nread;
+ int buffsize;
+ int err;
+ int done = 0;
+
+ /* This has only been tested on the proftpd server, and the mod_tls code
+ sends a close notify alert without waiting for a close notify alert in
+ response. Thus we wait for a close notify alert from the server, but
+ we do not send one. Let's hope other servers do the same... */
+
+ if(data->set.ftp_ccc == CURLFTPSSL_CCC_ACTIVE)
+ (void)SSL_shutdown(connssl->handle);
+
+ if(connssl->handle) {
+ buffsize = (int)sizeof(buf);
+ while(!done) {
+ int what = Curl_socket_ready(conn->sock[sockindex],
+ CURL_SOCKET_BAD, SSL_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT);
+ if(what > 0) {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ /* Something to read, let's do it and hope that it is the close
+ notify alert from the server */
+ nread = (ssize_t)SSL_read(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, buf,
+ buffsize);
+ err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, (int)nread);
+
+ switch(err) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* this is not an error */
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* no more data */
+ /* This is the expected response. There was no data but only
+ the close notify alert */
+ done = 1;
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ /* there's data pending, re-invoke SSL_read() */
+ infof(data, "SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ\n");
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ /* SSL wants a write. Really odd. Let's bail out. */
+ infof(data, "SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE\n");
+ done = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* openssl/ssl.h says "look at error stack/return value/errno" */
+ sslerror = ERR_get_error();
+ failf(conn->data, "SSL read: %s, errno %d",
+ ERR_error_string(sslerror, buf),
+ SOCKERRNO);
+ done = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ else if(0 == what) {
+ /* timeout */
+ failf(data, "SSL shutdown timeout");
+ done = 1;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* anything that gets here is fatally bad */
+ failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO);
+ retval = -1;
+ done = 1;
+ }
+ } /* while()-loop for the select() */
+
+ if(data->set.verbose) {
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_SHUTDOWN
+ switch(SSL_get_shutdown(connssl->handle)) {
+ case SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN:
+ infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN\n");
+ break;
+ case SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN:
+ infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN\n");
+ break;
+ case SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN:
+ infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|"
+ "SSL_RECEIVED__SHUTDOWN\n");
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+ SSL_free (connssl->handle);
+ connssl->handle = NULL;
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+
+void Curl_ossl_session_free(void *ptr)
+{
+ /* free the ID */
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ptr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is called when the 'data' struct is going away. Close
+ * down everything and free all resources!
+ */
+int Curl_ossl_close_all(struct SessionHandle *data)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H
+ if(data->state.engine) {
+ ENGINE_finish(data->state.engine);
+ ENGINE_free(data->state.engine);
+ data->state.engine = NULL;
+ }
+#else
+ (void)data;
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int asn1_output(const ASN1_UTCTIME *tm,
+ char *buf,
+ size_t sizeofbuf)
+{
+ const char *asn1_string;
+ int gmt=FALSE;
+ int i;
+ int year=0,month=0,day=0,hour=0,minute=0,second=0;
+
+ i=tm->length;
+ asn1_string=(const char *)tm->data;
+
+ if(i < 10)
+ return 1;
+ if(asn1_string[i-1] == 'Z')
+ gmt=TRUE;
+ for(i=0; i<10; i++)
+ if((asn1_string[i] > '9') || (asn1_string[i] < '0'))
+ return 2;
+
+ year= (asn1_string[0]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[1]-'0');
+ if(year < 50)
+ year+=100;
+
+ month= (asn1_string[2]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[3]-'0');
+ if((month > 12) || (month < 1))
+ return 3;
+
+ day= (asn1_string[4]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[5]-'0');
+ hour= (asn1_string[6]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[7]-'0');
+ minute= (asn1_string[8]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[9]-'0');
+
+ if((asn1_string[10] >= '0') && (asn1_string[10] <= '9') &&
+ (asn1_string[11] >= '0') && (asn1_string[11] <= '9'))
+ second= (asn1_string[10]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[11]-'0');
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeofbuf,
+ "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d %s",
+ year+1900, month, day, hour, minute, second, (gmt?"GMT":""));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ====================================================== */
+
+
+/* Quote from RFC2818 section 3.1 "Server Identity"
+
+ If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present, that MUST
+ be used as the identity. Otherwise, the (most specific) Common Name
+ field in the Subject field of the certificate MUST be used. Although
+ the use of the Common Name is existing practice, it is deprecated and
+ Certification Authorities are encouraged to use the dNSName instead.
+
+ Matching is performed using the matching rules specified by
+ [RFC2459]. If more than one identity of a given type is present in
+ the certificate (e.g., more than one dNSName name, a match in any one
+ of the set is considered acceptable.) Names may contain the wildcard
+ character * which is considered to match any single domain name
+ component or component fragment. E.g., *.a.com matches foo.a.com but
+ not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com but not bar.com.
+
+ In some cases, the URI is specified as an IP address rather than a
+ hostname. In this case, the iPAddress subjectAltName must be present
+ in the certificate and must exactly match the IP in the URI.
+
+*/
+static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn,
+ X509 *server_cert)
+{
+ int matched = -1; /* -1 is no alternative match yet, 1 means match and 0
+ means mismatch */
+ int target = GEN_DNS; /* target type, GEN_DNS or GEN_IPADD */
+ size_t addrlen = 0;
+ struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altnames;
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+ struct in6_addr addr;
+#else
+ struct in_addr addr;
+#endif
+ CURLcode res = CURLE_OK;
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+ if(conn->bits.ipv6_ip &&
+ Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, conn->host.name, &addr)) {
+ target = GEN_IPADD;
+ addrlen = sizeof(struct in6_addr);
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, conn->host.name, &addr)) {
+ target = GEN_IPADD;
+ addrlen = sizeof(struct in_addr);
+ }
+
+ /* get a "list" of alternative names */
+ altnames = X509_get_ext_d2i(server_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+
+ if(altnames) {
+ int numalts;
+ int i;
+
+ /* get amount of alternatives, RFC2459 claims there MUST be at least
+ one, but we don't depend on it... */
+ numalts = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames);
+
+ /* loop through all alternatives while none has matched */
+ for(i=0; (i<numalts) && (matched != 1); i++) {
+ /* get a handle to alternative name number i */
+ const GENERAL_NAME *check = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, i);
+
+ /* only check alternatives of the same type the target is */
+ if(check->type == target) {
+ /* get data and length */
+ const char *altptr = (char *)ASN1_STRING_data(check->d.ia5);
+ size_t altlen = (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
+
+ switch(target) {
+ case GEN_DNS: /* name/pattern comparison */
+ /* The OpenSSL man page explicitly says: "In general it cannot be
+ assumed that the data returned by ASN1_STRING_data() is null
+ terminated or does not contain embedded nulls." But also that
+ "The actual format of the data will depend on the actual string
+ type itself: for example for and IA5String the data will be ASCII"
+
+ Gisle researched the OpenSSL sources:
+ "I checked the 0.9.6 and 0.9.8 sources before my patch and
+ it always 0-terminates an IA5String."
+ */
+ if((altlen == strlen(altptr)) &&
+ /* if this isn't true, there was an embedded zero in the name
+ string and we cannot match it. */
+ Curl_cert_hostcheck(altptr, conn->host.name))
+ matched = 1;
+ else
+ matched = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case GEN_IPADD: /* IP address comparison */
+ /* compare alternative IP address if the data chunk is the same size
+ our server IP address is */
+ if((altlen == addrlen) && !memcmp(altptr, &addr, altlen))
+ matched = 1;
+ else
+ matched = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
+ }
+
+ if(matched == 1)
+ /* an alternative name matched the server hostname */
+ infof(data, "\t subjectAltName: %s matched\n", conn->host.dispname);
+ else if(matched == 0) {
+ /* an alternative name field existed, but didn't match and then
+ we MUST fail */
+ infof(data, "\t subjectAltName does not match %s\n", conn->host.dispname);
+ res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* we have to look to the last occurrence of a commonName in the
+ distinguished one to get the most significant one. */
+ int j,i=-1 ;
+
+/* The following is done because of a bug in 0.9.6b */
+
+ unsigned char *nulstr = (unsigned char *)"";
+ unsigned char *peer_CN = nulstr;
+
+ X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(server_cert) ;
+ if(name)
+ while((j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i))>=0)
+ i=j;
+
+ /* we have the name entry and we will now convert this to a string
+ that we can use for comparison. Doing this we support BMPstring,
+ UTF8 etc. */
+
+ if(i>=0) {
+ ASN1_STRING *tmp = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(name,i));
+
+ /* In OpenSSL 0.9.7d and earlier, ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 fails if the input
+ is already UTF-8 encoded. We check for this case and copy the raw
+ string manually to avoid the problem. This code can be made
+ conditional in the future when OpenSSL has been fixed. Work-around
+ brought by Alexis S. L. Carvalho. */
+ if(tmp) {
+ if(ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
+ j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
+ if(j >= 0) {
+ peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(j+1);
+ if(peer_CN) {
+ memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_data(tmp), j);
+ peer_CN[j] = '\0';
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else /* not a UTF8 name */
+ j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_CN, tmp);
+
+ if(peer_CN && (curlx_uztosi(strlen((char *)peer_CN)) != j)) {
+ /* there was a terminating zero before the end of string, this
+ cannot match and we return failure! */
+ failf(data, "SSL: illegal cert name field");
+ res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(peer_CN == nulstr)
+ peer_CN = NULL;
+ else {
+ /* convert peer_CN from UTF8 */
+ CURLcode rc = Curl_convert_from_utf8(data, peer_CN, strlen(peer_CN));
+ /* Curl_convert_from_utf8 calls failf if unsuccessful */
+ if(rc) {
+ OPENSSL_free(peer_CN);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(res)
+ /* error already detected, pass through */
+ ;
+ else if(!peer_CN) {
+ failf(data,
+ "SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
+ res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+ else if(!Curl_cert_hostcheck((const char *)peer_CN, conn->host.name)) {
+ failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name '%s' does not match "
+ "target host name '%s'", peer_CN, conn->host.dispname);
+ res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+ else {
+ infof(data, "\t common name: %s (matched)\n", peer_CN);
+ }
+ if(peer_CN)
+ OPENSSL_free(peer_CN);
+ }
+ return res;
+}
+#endif /* USE_SSLEAY */
+
+/* The SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK doesn't exist in ancient OpenSSL versions
+ and thus this cannot be done there. */
+#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK
+
+static const char *ssl_msg_type(int ssl_ver, int msg)
+{
+ if(ssl_ver == SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+ switch (msg) {
+ case SSL2_MT_ERROR:
+ return "Error";
+ case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ return "Client hello";
+ case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
+ return "Client key";
+ case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED:
+ return "Client finished";
+ case SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO:
+ return "Server hello";
+ case SSL2_MT_SERVER_VERIFY:
+ return "Server verify";
+ case SSL2_MT_SERVER_FINISHED:
+ return "Server finished";
+ case SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE:
+ return "Request CERT";
+ case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
+ return "Client CERT";
+ }
+ }
+ else if(ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+ switch (msg) {
+ case SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST:
+ return "Hello request";
+ case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ return "Client hello";
+ case SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO:
+ return "Server hello";
+ case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE:
+ return "CERT";
+ case SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
+ return "Server key exchange";
+ case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
+ return "Client key exchange";
+ case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
+ return "Request CERT";
+ case SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE:
+ return "Server finished";
+ case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
+ return "CERT verify";
+ case SSL3_MT_FINISHED:
+ return "Finished";
+ }
+ }
+ return "Unknown";
+}
+
+static const char *tls_rt_type(int type)
+{
+ return (
+ type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ? "TLS change cipher, " :
+ type == SSL3_RT_ALERT ? "TLS alert, " :
+ type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ? "TLS handshake, " :
+ type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ? "TLS app data, " :
+ "TLS Unknown, ");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Our callback from the SSL/TLS layers.
+ */
+static void ssl_tls_trace(int direction, int ssl_ver, int content_type,
+ const void *buf, size_t len, const SSL *ssl,
+ struct connectdata *conn)
+{
+ struct SessionHandle *data;
+ const char *msg_name, *tls_rt_name;
+ char ssl_buf[1024];
+ int ver, msg_type, txt_len;
+
+ if(!conn || !conn->data || !conn->data->set.fdebug ||
+ (direction != 0 && direction != 1))
+ return;
+
+ data = conn->data;
+ ssl_ver >>= 8;
+ ver = (ssl_ver == SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR ? '2' :
+ ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR ? '3' : '?');
+
+ /* SSLv2 doesn't seem to have TLS record-type headers, so OpenSSL
+ * always pass-up content-type as 0. But the interesting message-type
+ * is at 'buf[0]'.
+ */
+ if(ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && content_type != 0)
+ tls_rt_name = tls_rt_type(content_type);
+ else
+ tls_rt_name = "";
+
+ msg_type = *(char*)buf;
+ msg_name = ssl_msg_type(ssl_ver, msg_type);
+
+ txt_len = snprintf(ssl_buf, sizeof(ssl_buf), "SSLv%c, %s%s (%d):\n",
+ ver, tls_rt_name, msg_name, msg_type);
+ Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_TEXT, ssl_buf, (size_t)txt_len, NULL);
+
+ Curl_debug(data, (direction == 1) ? CURLINFO_SSL_DATA_OUT :
+ CURLINFO_SSL_DATA_IN, (char *)buf, len, NULL);
+ (void) ssl;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_SSLEAY
+/* ====================================================== */
+
+#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
+# define use_sni(x) sni = (x)
+#else
+# define use_sni(x) Curl_nop_stmt
+#endif
+
+static CURLcode
+ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn,
+ int sockindex)
+{
+ CURLcode retcode = CURLE_OK;
+
+ struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ SSL_METHOD_QUAL SSL_METHOD *req_method=NULL;
+ void *ssl_sessionid=NULL;
+ X509_LOOKUP *lookup=NULL;
+ curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+ long ctx_options;
+#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
+ bool sni;
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+ struct in6_addr addr;
+#else
+ struct in_addr addr;
+#endif
+#endif
+
+ DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state);
+
+ /* Make funny stuff to get random input */
+ Curl_ossl_seed(data);
+
+ /* check to see if we've been told to use an explicit SSL/TLS version */
+
+ switch(data->set.ssl.version) {
+ default:
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
+#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+ if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) {
+ infof(data, "Set version TLSv1 for SRP authorisation\n");
+ req_method = TLSv1_client_method() ;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ /* we try to figure out version */
+ req_method = SSLv23_client_method();
+ use_sni(TRUE);
+ break;
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
+ req_method = TLSv1_client_method();
+ use_sni(TRUE);
+ break;
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2:
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ failf(data, "OpenSSL was built without SSLv2 support");
+ return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
+#else
+#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+ if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP)
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+#endif
+ req_method = SSLv2_client_method();
+ use_sni(FALSE);
+ break;
+#endif
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3:
+#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+ if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP)
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+#endif
+ req_method = SSLv3_client_method();
+ use_sni(FALSE);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if(connssl->ctx)
+ SSL_CTX_free(connssl->ctx);
+ connssl->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(req_method);
+
+ if(!connssl->ctx) {
+ failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context: %s",
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_peek_error(), NULL));
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(connssl->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK
+ if(data->set.fdebug && data->set.verbose) {
+ /* the SSL trace callback is only used for verbose logging so we only
+ inform about failures of setting it */
+ if(!SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(connssl->ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK,
+ (void (*)(void))ssl_tls_trace)) {
+ infof(data, "SSL: couldn't set callback!\n");
+ }
+ else if(!SSL_CTX_ctrl(connssl->ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0,
+ conn)) {
+ infof(data, "SSL: couldn't set callback argument!\n");
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* OpenSSL contains code to work-around lots of bugs and flaws in various
+ SSL-implementations. SSL_CTX_set_options() is used to enabled those
+ work-arounds. The man page for this option states that SSL_OP_ALL enables
+ all the work-arounds and that "It is usually safe to use SSL_OP_ALL to
+ enable the bug workaround options if compatibility with somewhat broken
+ implementations is desired."
+
+ The "-no_ticket" option was introduced in Openssl0.9.8j. It's a flag to
+ disable "rfc4507bis session ticket support". rfc4507bis was later turned
+ into the proper RFC5077 it seems: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077
+
+ The enabled extension concerns the session management. I wonder how often
+ libcurl stops a connection and then resumes a TLS session. also, sending
+ the session data is some overhead. .I suggest that you just use your
+ proposed patch (which explicitly disables TICKET).
+
+ If someone writes an application with libcurl and openssl who wants to
+ enable the feature, one can do this in the SSL callback.
+
+ SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG option enabling allowed proper
+ interoperability with web server Netscape Enterprise Server 2.0.1 which
+ was released back in 1996.
+
+ Due to CVE-2010-4180, option SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG has
+ become ineffective as of OpenSSL 0.9.8q and 1.0.0c. In order to mitigate
+ CVE-2010-4180 when using previous OpenSSL versions we no longer enable
+ this option regardless of OpenSSL version and SSL_OP_ALL definition.
+
+ OpenSSL added a work-around for a SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability
+ (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt). In 0.9.6e they added a bit to
+ SSL_OP_ALL that _disables_ that work-around despite the fact that
+ SSL_OP_ALL is documented to do "rather harmless" workarounds. In order to
+ keep the secure work-around, the SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS bit
+ must not be set.
+ */
+
+ ctx_options = SSL_OP_ALL;
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
+ /* mitigate CVE-2010-4180 */
+ ctx_options &= ~SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
+ /* unless the user explicitly ask to allow the protocol vulnerability we
+ use the work-around */
+ if(!conn->data->set.ssl_enable_beast)
+ ctx_options &= ~SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS;
+#endif
+
+ /* disable SSLv2 in the default case (i.e. allow SSLv3 and TLSv1) */
+ if(data->set.ssl.version == CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT)
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(connssl->ctx, ctx_options);
+
+#if 0
+ /*
+ * Not sure it's needed to tell SSL_connect() that socket is
+ * non-blocking. It doesn't seem to care, but just return with
+ * SSL_ERROR_WANT_x.
+ */
+ if(data->state.used_interface == Curl_if_multi)
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(connssl->ctx, BIO_C_SET_NBIO, 1, NULL);
+#endif
+
+ if(data->set.str[STRING_CERT] || data->set.str[STRING_CERT_TYPE]) {
+ if(!cert_stuff(conn,
+ connssl->ctx,
+ data->set.str[STRING_CERT],
+ data->set.str[STRING_CERT_TYPE],
+ data->set.str[STRING_KEY],
+ data->set.str[STRING_KEY_TYPE])) {
+ /* failf() is already done in cert_stuff() */
+ return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CIPHER_LIST]) {
+ if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(connssl->ctx,
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CIPHER_LIST])) {
+ failf(data, "failed setting cipher list");
+ return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
+ }
+ }
+
+#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+ if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) {
+ infof(data, "Using TLS-SRP username: %s\n", data->set.ssl.username);
+
+ if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(connssl->ctx, data->set.ssl.username)) {
+ failf(data, "Unable to set SRP user name");
+ return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(connssl->ctx,data->set.ssl.password)) {
+ failf(data, "failed setting SRP password");
+ return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ if(!data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CIPHER_LIST]) {
+ infof(data, "Setting cipher list SRP\n");
+
+ if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(connssl->ctx, "SRP")) {
+ failf(data, "failed setting SRP cipher list");
+ return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE] || data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH]) {
+ /* tell SSL where to find CA certificates that are used to verify
+ the servers certificate. */
+ if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(connssl->ctx,
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE],
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH])) {
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
+ /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
+ failf(data,"error setting certificate verify locations:\n"
+ " CAfile: %s\n CApath: %s",
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE]?
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE]: "none",
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH]?
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH] : "none");
+ return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* Just continue with a warning if no strict certificate verification
+ is required. */
+ infof(data, "error setting certificate verify locations,"
+ " continuing anyway:\n");
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ /* Everything is fine. */
+ infof(data, "successfully set certificate verify locations:\n");
+ }
+ infof(data,
+ " CAfile: %s\n"
+ " CApath: %s\n",
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE] ? data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE]:
+ "none",
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH] ? data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH]:
+ "none");
+ }
+
+ if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]) {
+ /* tell SSL where to find CRL file that is used to check certificate
+ * revocation */
+ lookup=X509_STORE_add_lookup(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(connssl->ctx),
+ X509_LOOKUP_file());
+ if(!lookup ||
+ (!X509_load_crl_file(lookup,data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE],
+ X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) ) {
+ failf(data,"error loading CRL file: %s",
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]);
+ return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* Everything is fine. */
+ infof(data, "successfully load CRL file:\n");
+ X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(connssl->ctx),
+ X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
+ }
+ infof(data,
+ " CRLfile: %s\n", data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE] ?
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]: "none");
+ }
+
+ /* SSL always tries to verify the peer, this only says whether it should
+ * fail to connect if the verification fails, or if it should continue
+ * anyway. In the latter case the result of the verification is checked with
+ * SSL_get_verify_result() below. */
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(connssl->ctx,
+ data->set.ssl.verifypeer?SSL_VERIFY_PEER:SSL_VERIFY_NONE,
+ cert_verify_callback);
+
+ /* give application a chance to interfere with SSL set up. */
+ if(data->set.ssl.fsslctx) {
+ retcode = (*data->set.ssl.fsslctx)(data, connssl->ctx,
+ data->set.ssl.fsslctxp);
+ if(retcode) {
+ failf(data,"error signaled by ssl ctx callback");
+ return retcode;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Lets make an SSL structure */
+ if(connssl->handle)
+ SSL_free(connssl->handle);
+ connssl->handle = SSL_new(connssl->ctx);
+ if(!connssl->handle) {
+ failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context (handle)!");
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+ SSL_set_connect_state(connssl->handle);
+
+ connssl->server_cert = 0x0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
+ if((0 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, conn->host.name, &addr)) &&
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+ (0 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, conn->host.name, &addr)) &&
+#endif
+ sni &&
+ !SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(connssl->handle, conn->host.name))
+ infof(data, "WARNING: failed to configure server name indication (SNI) "
+ "TLS extension\n");
+#endif
+
+ /* Check if there's a cached ID we can/should use here! */
+ if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL)) {
+ /* we got a session id, use it! */
+ if(!SSL_set_session(connssl->handle, ssl_sessionid)) {
+ failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_session failed: %s",
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(),NULL));
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ }
+ /* Informational message */
+ infof (data, "SSL re-using session ID\n");
+ }
+
+ /* pass the raw socket into the SSL layers */
+ if(!SSL_set_fd(connssl->handle, (int)sockfd)) {
+ failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_fd failed: %s",
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(),NULL));
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+static CURLcode
+ossl_connect_step2(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+ struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ int err;
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+
+ DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state
+ || ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state
+ || ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state);
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ err = SSL_connect(connssl->handle);
+
+ /* 1 is fine
+ 0 is "not successful but was shut down controlled"
+ <0 is "handshake was not successful, because a fatal error occurred" */
+ if(1 != err) {
+ int detail = SSL_get_error(connssl->handle, err);
+
+ if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ == detail) {
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_reading;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+ else if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE == detail) {
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_writing;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* untreated error */
+ unsigned long errdetail;
+ char error_buffer[256]; /* OpenSSL documents that this must be at least
+ 256 bytes long. */
+ CURLcode rc;
+ const char *cert_problem = NULL;
+ long lerr;
+
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2; /* the connection failed,
+ we're not waiting for
+ anything else. */
+
+ errdetail = ERR_get_error(); /* Gets the earliest error code from the
+ thread's error queue and removes the
+ entry. */
+
+ switch(errdetail) {
+ case 0x1407E086:
+ /* 1407E086:
+ SSL routines:
+ SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE:
+ certificate verify failed */
+ /* fall-through */
+ case 0x14090086:
+ /* 14090086:
+ SSL routines:
+ SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:
+ certificate verify failed */
+ rc = CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
+
+ lerr = SSL_get_verify_result(connssl->handle);
+ if(lerr != X509_V_OK) {
+ snprintf(error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer),
+ "SSL certificate problem: %s",
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr));
+ }
+ else
+ cert_problem = "SSL certificate problem, verify that the CA cert is"
+ " OK.";
+
+ break;
+ default:
+ rc = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ SSL_strerror(errdetail, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* detail is already set to the SSL error above */
+
+ /* If we e.g. use SSLv2 request-method and the server doesn't like us
+ * (RST connection etc.), OpenSSL gives no explanation whatsoever and
+ * the SO_ERROR is also lost.
+ */
+ if(CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR == rc && errdetail == 0) {
+ failf(data, "Unknown SSL protocol error in connection to %s:%ld ",
+ conn->host.name, conn->port);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ /* Could be a CERT problem */
+
+ failf(data, "%s%s", cert_problem ? cert_problem : "", error_buffer);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ /* we have been connected fine, we're not waiting for anything else. */
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_3;
+
+ /* Informational message */
+ infof (data, "SSL connection using %s\n",
+ SSL_get_cipher(connssl->handle));
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+}
+
+static int asn1_object_dump(ASN1_OBJECT *a, char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ int i, ilen;
+
+ if((ilen = (int)len) < 0)
+ return 1; /* buffer too big */
+
+ i = i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(buf, ilen, a);
+
+ if(i >= ilen)
+ return 1; /* buffer too small */
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static CURLcode push_certinfo_len(struct SessionHandle *data,
+ int certnum,
+ const char *label,
+ const char *value,
+ size_t valuelen)
+{
+ struct curl_certinfo *ci = &data->info.certs;
+ char *output;
+ struct curl_slist *nl;
+ CURLcode res = CURLE_OK;
+ size_t labellen = strlen(label);
+ size_t outlen = labellen + 1 + valuelen + 1; /* label:value\0 */
+
+ output = malloc(outlen);
+ if(!output)
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+ /* sprintf the label and colon */
+ snprintf(output, outlen, "%s:", label);
+
+ /* memcpy the value (it might not be zero terminated) */
+ memcpy(&output[labellen+1], value, valuelen);
+
+ /* zero terminate the output */
+ output[labellen + 1 + valuelen] = 0;
+
+ /* TODO: we should rather introduce an internal API that can do the
+ equivalent of curl_slist_append but doesn't strdup() the given data as
+ like in this place the extra malloc/free is totally pointless */
+ nl = curl_slist_append(ci->certinfo[certnum], output);
+ free(output);
+ if(!nl) {
+ curl_slist_free_all(ci->certinfo[certnum]);
+ ci->certinfo[certnum] = NULL;
+ res = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+ else
+ ci->certinfo[certnum] = nl;
+
+ return res;
+}
+
+/* this is a convenience function for push_certinfo_len that takes a zero
+ terminated value */
+static CURLcode push_certinfo(struct SessionHandle *data,
+ int certnum,
+ const char *label,
+ const char *value)
+{
+ size_t valuelen = strlen(value);
+
+ return push_certinfo_len(data, certnum, label, value, valuelen);
+}
+
+static void pubkey_show(struct SessionHandle *data,
+ int num,
+ const char *type,
+ const char *name,
+ unsigned char *raw,
+ int len)
+{
+ size_t left;
+ int i;
+ char namebuf[32];
+ char *buffer;
+
+ left = len*3 + 1;
+ buffer = malloc(left);
+ if(buffer) {
+ char *ptr=buffer;
+ snprintf(namebuf, sizeof(namebuf), "%s(%s)", type, name);
+ for(i=0; i< len; i++) {
+ snprintf(ptr, left, "%02x:", raw[i]);
+ ptr += 3;
+ left -= 3;
+ }
+ infof(data, " %s: %s\n", namebuf, buffer);
+ push_certinfo(data, num, namebuf, buffer);
+ free(buffer);
+ }
+}
+
+#define print_pubkey_BN(_type, _name, _num) \
+do { \
+ if(pubkey->pkey._type->_name != NULL) { \
+ int len = BN_num_bytes(pubkey->pkey._type->_name); \
+ if(len < CERTBUFFERSIZE) { \
+ BN_bn2bin(pubkey->pkey._type->_name, (unsigned char*)bufp); \
+ bufp[len] = 0; \
+ pubkey_show(data, _num, #_type, #_name, (unsigned char*)bufp, len); \
+ } \
+ } \
+} WHILE_FALSE
+
+static int X509V3_ext(struct SessionHandle *data,
+ int certnum,
+ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts)
+{
+ int i;
+ size_t j;
+
+ if(sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts) <= 0)
+ /* no extensions, bail out */
+ return 1;
+
+ for(i=0; i<sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+ X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i);
+ BUF_MEM *biomem;
+ char buf[512];
+ char *ptr=buf;
+ char namebuf[128];
+ BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+
+ if(!bio_out)
+ return 1;
+
+ obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext);
+
+ asn1_object_dump(obj, namebuf, sizeof(namebuf));
+
+ infof(data, "%s: %s\n", namebuf,
+ X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)?"(critical)":"");
+
+ if(!X509V3_EXT_print(bio_out, ext, 0, 0))
+ M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_print(bio_out, ext->value);
+
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem);
+
+ /* biomem->length bytes at biomem->data, this little loop here is only
+ done for the infof() call, we send the "raw" data to the certinfo
+ function */
+ for(j=0; j<(size_t)biomem->length; j++) {
+ const char *sep="";
+ if(biomem->data[j] == '\n') {
+ sep=", ";
+ j++; /* skip the newline */
+ };
+ while((biomem->data[j] == ' ') && (j<(size_t)biomem->length))
+ j++;
+ if(j<(size_t)biomem->length)
+ ptr+=snprintf(ptr, sizeof(buf)-(ptr-buf), "%s%c", sep,
+ biomem->data[j]);
+ }
+ infof(data, " %s\n", buf);
+
+ push_certinfo(data, certnum, namebuf, buf);
+
+ BIO_free(bio_out);
+
+ }
+ return 0; /* all is fine */
+}
+
+
+static void X509_signature(struct SessionHandle *data,
+ int numcert,
+ ASN1_STRING *sig)
+{
+ char buf[1024];
+ char *ptr = buf;
+ int i;
+ for(i=0; i<sig->length; i++)
+ ptr+=snprintf(ptr, sizeof(buf)-(ptr-buf), "%02x:", sig->data[i]);
+
+ infof(data, " Signature: %s\n", buf);
+ push_certinfo(data, numcert, "Signature", buf);
+}
+
+static void dumpcert(struct SessionHandle *data, X509 *x, int numcert)
+{
+ BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ BUF_MEM *biomem;
+
+ /* this outputs the cert in this 64 column wide style with newlines and
+ -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- texts and more */
+ PEM_write_bio_X509(bio_out, x);
+
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem);
+
+ infof(data, "%s\n", biomem->data);
+
+ push_certinfo_len(data, numcert, "Cert", biomem->data, biomem->length);
+
+ BIO_free(bio_out);
+
+}
+
+
+static int init_certinfo(struct SessionHandle *data,
+ int num)
+{
+ struct curl_certinfo *ci = &data->info.certs;
+ struct curl_slist **table;
+
+ Curl_ssl_free_certinfo(data);
+
+ ci->num_of_certs = num;
+ table = calloc((size_t)num, sizeof(struct curl_slist *));
+ if(!table)
+ return 1;
+
+ ci->certinfo = table;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This size was previously 512 which has been reported "too small" without
+ * any specifics, so it was enlarged to allow more data to get shown uncut.
+ * The "perfect" size is yet to figure out.
+ */
+#define CERTBUFFERSIZE 8192
+
+static CURLcode get_cert_chain(struct connectdata *conn,
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl)
+
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk;
+ int i;
+ char *bufp;
+ struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ int numcerts;
+
+ bufp = malloc(CERTBUFFERSIZE);
+ if(!bufp)
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+ sk = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(connssl->handle);
+ if(!sk) {
+ free(bufp);
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ numcerts = sk_X509_num(sk);
+ if(init_certinfo(data, numcerts)) {
+ free(bufp);
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ infof(data, "--- Certificate chain\n");
+ for(i=0; i<numcerts; i++) {
+ long value;
+ ASN1_INTEGER *num;
+ ASN1_TIME *certdate;
+
+ /* get the certs in "importance order" */
+#if 0
+ X509 *x = sk_X509_value(sk, numcerts - i - 1);
+#else
+ X509 *x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+#endif
+
+ X509_CINF *cinf;
+ EVP_PKEY *pubkey=NULL;
+ int j;
+ char *ptr;
+
+ (void)x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
+ infof(data, "%2d Subject: %s\n", i, bufp);
+ push_certinfo(data, i, "Subject", bufp);
+
+ (void)x509_name_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(x), bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
+ infof(data, " Issuer: %s\n", bufp);
+ push_certinfo(data, i, "Issuer", bufp);
+
+ value = X509_get_version(x);
+ infof(data, " Version: %lu (0x%lx)\n", value+1, value);
+ snprintf(bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE, "%lx", value);
+ push_certinfo(data, i, "Version", bufp); /* hex */
+
+ num=X509_get_serialNumber(x);
+ if(num->length <= 4) {
+ value = ASN1_INTEGER_get(num);
+ infof(data," Serial Number: %ld (0x%lx)\n", value, value);
+ snprintf(bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE, "%lx", value);
+ }
+ else {
+ int left = CERTBUFFERSIZE;
+
+ ptr = bufp;
+ *ptr++ = 0;
+ if(num->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
+ *ptr++='-';
+
+ for(j=0; (j<num->length) && (left>=4); j++) {
+ /* TODO: length restrictions */
+ snprintf(ptr, 3, "%02x%c",num->data[j],
+ ((j+1 == num->length)?'\n':':'));
+ ptr += 3;
+ left-=4;
+ }
+ if(num->length)
+ infof(data," Serial Number: %s\n", bufp);
+ else
+ bufp[0]=0;
+ }
+ if(bufp[0])
+ push_certinfo(data, i, "Serial Number", bufp); /* hex */
+
+ cinf = x->cert_info;
+
+ j = asn1_object_dump(cinf->signature->algorithm, bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
+ if(!j) {
+ infof(data, " Signature Algorithm: %s\n", bufp);
+ push_certinfo(data, i, "Signature Algorithm", bufp);
+ }
+
+ certdate = X509_get_notBefore(x);
+ asn1_output(certdate, bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
+ infof(data, " Start date: %s\n", bufp);
+ push_certinfo(data, i, "Start date", bufp);
+
+ certdate = X509_get_notAfter(x);
+ asn1_output(certdate, bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
+ infof(data, " Expire date: %s\n", bufp);
+ push_certinfo(data, i, "Expire date", bufp);
+
+ j = asn1_object_dump(cinf->key->algor->algorithm, bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
+ if(!j) {
+ infof(data, " Public Key Algorithm: %s\n", bufp);
+ push_certinfo(data, i, "Public Key Algorithm", bufp);
+ }
+
+ pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ if(!pubkey)
+ infof(data, " Unable to load public key\n");
+ else {
+ switch(pubkey->type) {
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+ infof(data, " RSA Public Key (%d bits)\n",
+ BN_num_bits(pubkey->pkey.rsa->n));
+ snprintf(bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE, "%d", BN_num_bits(pubkey->pkey.rsa->n));
+ push_certinfo(data, i, "RSA Public Key", bufp);
+
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, n, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, e, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, d, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, p, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, q, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, dmp1, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, dmq1, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, iqmp, i);
+ break;
+ case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, p, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, q, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, g, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, priv_key, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, pub_key, i);
+ break;
+ case EVP_PKEY_DH:
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, p, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, g, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, priv_key, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, pub_key, i);
+ break;
+#if 0
+ case EVP_PKEY_EC: /* symbol not present in OpenSSL 0.9.6 */
+ /* left TODO */
+ break;
+#endif
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
+ }
+
+ X509V3_ext(data, i, cinf->extensions);
+
+ X509_signature(data, i, x->signature);
+
+ dumpcert(data, x, i);
+ }
+
+ free(bufp);
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the server cert, verify it and show it etc, only call failf() if the
+ * 'strict' argument is TRUE as otherwise all this is for informational
+ * purposes only!
+ *
+ * We check certificates to authenticate the server; otherwise we risk
+ * man-in-the-middle attack.
+ */
+static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn,
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
+ bool strict)
+{
+ CURLcode retcode = CURLE_OK;
+ int rc;
+ long lerr;
+ ASN1_TIME *certdate;
+ struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ X509 *issuer;
+ FILE *fp;
+ char *buffer = data->state.buffer;
+
+ if(data->set.ssl.certinfo)
+ /* we've been asked to gather certificate info! */
+ (void)get_cert_chain(conn, connssl);
+
+ data->set.ssl.certverifyresult = !X509_V_OK;
+
+ connssl->server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(connssl->handle);
+ if(!connssl->server_cert) {
+ if(strict)
+ failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get peer certificate!");
+ return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+ infof (data, "Server certificate:\n");
+
+ rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(connssl->server_cert),
+ buffer, BUFSIZE);
+ if(rc) {
+ if(strict)
+ failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get X509-subject!");
+ X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
+ connssl->server_cert = NULL;
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ }
+ infof(data, "\t subject: %s\n", buffer);
+
+ certdate = X509_get_notBefore(connssl->server_cert);
+ asn1_output(certdate, buffer, BUFSIZE);
+ infof(data, "\t start date: %s\n", buffer);
+
+ certdate = X509_get_notAfter(connssl->server_cert);
+ asn1_output(certdate, buffer, BUFSIZE);
+ infof(data, "\t expire date: %s\n", buffer);
+
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
+ retcode = verifyhost(conn, connssl->server_cert);
+ if(retcode) {
+ X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
+ connssl->server_cert = NULL;
+ return retcode;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(connssl->server_cert),
+ buffer, BUFSIZE);
+ if(rc) {
+ if(strict)
+ failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get X509-issuer name!");
+ retcode = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ }
+ else {
+ infof(data, "\t issuer: %s\n", buffer);
+
+ /* We could do all sorts of certificate verification stuff here before
+ deallocating the certificate. */
+
+ /* e.g. match issuer name with provided issuer certificate */
+ if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]) {
+ fp=fopen(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT],"r");
+ if(!fp) {
+ if(strict)
+ failf(data, "SSL: Unable to open issuer cert (%s)",
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]);
+ X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
+ connssl->server_cert = NULL;
+ return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
+ }
+ issuer = PEM_read_X509(fp,NULL,ZERO_NULL,NULL);
+ if(!issuer) {
+ if(strict)
+ failf(data, "SSL: Unable to read issuer cert (%s)",
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]);
+ X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
+ X509_free(issuer);
+ fclose(fp);
+ return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
+ }
+ fclose(fp);
+ if(X509_check_issued(issuer,connssl->server_cert) != X509_V_OK) {
+ if(strict)
+ failf(data, "SSL: Certificate issuer check failed (%s)",
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]);
+ X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
+ X509_free(issuer);
+ connssl->server_cert = NULL;
+ return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
+ }
+ infof(data, "\t SSL certificate issuer check ok (%s)\n",
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]);
+ X509_free(issuer);
+ }
+
+ lerr = data->set.ssl.certverifyresult=
+ SSL_get_verify_result(connssl->handle);
+ if(data->set.ssl.certverifyresult != X509_V_OK) {
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
+ /* We probably never reach this, because SSL_connect() will fail
+ and we return earlier if verifypeer is set? */
+ if(strict)
+ failf(data, "SSL certificate verify result: %s (%ld)",
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr), lerr);
+ retcode = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+ else
+ infof(data, "\t SSL certificate verify result: %s (%ld),"
+ " continuing anyway.\n",
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr), lerr);
+ }
+ else
+ infof(data, "\t SSL certificate verify ok.\n");
+ }
+
+ X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
+ connssl->server_cert = NULL;
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done;
+
+ return retcode;
+}
+
+
+static CURLcode
+ossl_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
+ int sockindex)
+{
+ CURLcode retcode = CURLE_OK;
+ void *old_ssl_sessionid=NULL;
+ struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+ int incache;
+ SSL_SESSION *our_ssl_sessionid;
+
+ DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_3 == connssl->connecting_state);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET1_SESSION
+ our_ssl_sessionid = SSL_get1_session(connssl->handle);
+
+ /* SSL_get1_session() will increment the reference
+ count and the session will stay in memory until explicitly freed with
+ SSL_SESSION_free(3), regardless of its state.
+ This function was introduced in openssl 0.9.5a. */
+#else
+ our_ssl_sessionid = SSL_get_session(connssl->handle);
+
+ /* if SSL_get1_session() is unavailable, use SSL_get_session().
+ This is an inferior option because the session can be flushed
+ at any time by openssl. It is included only so curl compiles
+ under versions of openssl < 0.9.5a.
+
+ WARNING: How curl behaves if it's session is flushed is
+ untested.
+ */
+#endif
+
+ incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL));
+ if(incache) {
+ if(old_ssl_sessionid != our_ssl_sessionid) {
+ infof(data, "old SSL session ID is stale, removing\n");
+ Curl_ssl_delsessionid(conn, old_ssl_sessionid);
+ incache = FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+ if(!incache) {
+ retcode = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, our_ssl_sessionid,
+ 0 /* unknown size */);
+ if(retcode) {
+ failf(data, "failed to store ssl session");
+ return retcode;
+ }
+ }
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET1_SESSION
+ else {
+ /* Session was incache, so refcount already incremented earlier.
+ * Avoid further increments with each SSL_get1_session() call.
+ * This does not free the session as refcount remains > 0
+ */
+ SSL_SESSION_free(our_ssl_sessionid);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * We check certificates to authenticate the server; otherwise we risk
+ * man-in-the-middle attack; NEVERTHELESS, if we're told explicitly not to
+ * verify the peer ignore faults and failures from the server cert
+ * operations.
+ */
+
+ if(!data->set.ssl.verifypeer)
+ (void)servercert(conn, connssl, FALSE);
+ else
+ retcode = servercert(conn, connssl, TRUE);
+
+ if(CURLE_OK == retcode)
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done;
+ return retcode;
+}
+
+static Curl_recv ossl_recv;
+static Curl_send ossl_send;
+
+static CURLcode
+ossl_connect_common(struct connectdata *conn,
+ int sockindex,
+ bool nonblocking,
+ bool *done)
+{
+ CURLcode retcode;
+ struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+ curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
+ long timeout_ms;
+ int what;
+
+ /* check if the connection has already been established */
+ if(ssl_connection_complete == connssl->state) {
+ *done = TRUE;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+
+ if(ssl_connect_1==connssl->connecting_state) {
+ /* Find out how much more time we're allowed */
+ timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
+
+ if(timeout_ms < 0) {
+ /* no need to continue if time already is up */
+ failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
+ return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
+ }
+ retcode = ossl_connect_step1(conn, sockindex);
+ if(retcode)
+ return retcode;
+ }
+
+ while(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state ||
+ ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state ||
+ ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state) {
+
+ /* check allowed time left */
+ timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
+
+ if(timeout_ms < 0) {
+ /* no need to continue if time already is up */
+ failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
+ return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
+ }
+
+ /* if ssl is expecting something, check if it's available. */
+ if(connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_reading
+ || connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_writing) {
+
+ curl_socket_t writefd = ssl_connect_2_writing==
+ connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
+ curl_socket_t readfd = ssl_connect_2_reading==
+ connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
+
+ what = Curl_socket_ready(readfd, writefd, nonblocking?0:timeout_ms);
+ if(what < 0) {
+ /* fatal error */
+ failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO);
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ }
+ else if(0 == what) {
+ if(nonblocking) {
+ *done = FALSE;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* timeout */
+ failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
+ return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
+ }
+ }
+ /* socket is readable or writable */
+ }
+
+ /* Run transaction, and return to the caller if it failed or if this
+ * connection is done nonblocking and this loop would execute again. This
+ * permits the owner of a multi handle to abort a connection attempt
+ * before step2 has completed while ensuring that a client using select()
+ * or epoll() will always have a valid fdset to wait on.
+ */
+ retcode = ossl_connect_step2(conn, sockindex);
+ if(retcode || (nonblocking &&
+ (ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state ||
+ ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state ||
+ ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state)))
+ return retcode;
+
+ } /* repeat step2 until all transactions are done. */
+
+
+ if(ssl_connect_3==connssl->connecting_state) {
+ retcode = ossl_connect_step3(conn, sockindex);
+ if(retcode)
+ return retcode;
+ }
+
+ if(ssl_connect_done==connssl->connecting_state) {
+ connssl->state = ssl_connection_complete;
+ conn->recv[sockindex] = ossl_recv;
+ conn->send[sockindex] = ossl_send;
+ *done = TRUE;
+ }
+ else
+ *done = FALSE;
+
+ /* Reset our connect state machine */
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_1;
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+CURLcode
+Curl_ossl_connect_nonblocking(struct connectdata *conn,
+ int sockindex,
+ bool *done)
+{
+ return ossl_connect_common(conn, sockindex, TRUE, done);
+}
+
+CURLcode
+Curl_ossl_connect(struct connectdata *conn,
+ int sockindex)
+{
+ CURLcode retcode;
+ bool done = FALSE;
+
+ retcode = ossl_connect_common(conn, sockindex, FALSE, &done);
+ if(retcode)
+ return retcode;
+
+ DEBUGASSERT(done);
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+bool Curl_ossl_data_pending(const struct connectdata *conn,
+ int connindex)
+{
+ if(conn->ssl[connindex].handle)
+ /* SSL is in use */
+ return (0 != SSL_pending(conn->ssl[connindex].handle)) ? TRUE : FALSE;
+ else
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+static ssize_t ossl_send(struct connectdata *conn,
+ int sockindex,
+ const void *mem,
+ size_t len,
+ CURLcode *curlcode)
+{
+ /* SSL_write() is said to return 'int' while write() and send() returns
+ 'size_t' */
+ int err;
+ char error_buffer[120]; /* OpenSSL documents that this must be at least 120
+ bytes long. */
+ unsigned long sslerror;
+ int memlen;
+ int rc;
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ memlen = (len > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)len;
+ rc = SSL_write(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, mem, memlen);
+
+ if(rc < 0) {
+ err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, rc);
+
+ switch(err) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ /* The operation did not complete; the same TLS/SSL I/O function
+ should be called again later. This is basically an EWOULDBLOCK
+ equivalent. */
+ *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
+ return -1;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+ failf(conn->data, "SSL_write() returned SYSCALL, errno = %d",
+ SOCKERRNO);
+ *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
+ return -1;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+ /* A failure in the SSL library occurred, usually a protocol error.
+ The OpenSSL error queue contains more information on the error. */
+ sslerror = ERR_get_error();
+ failf(conn->data, "SSL_write() error: %s",
+ ERR_error_string(sslerror, error_buffer));
+ *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* a true error */
+ failf(conn->data, "SSL_write() return error %d", err);
+ *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return (ssize_t)rc; /* number of bytes */
+}
+
+static ssize_t ossl_recv(struct connectdata *conn, /* connection data */
+ int num, /* socketindex */
+ char *buf, /* store read data here */
+ size_t buffersize, /* max amount to read */
+ CURLcode *curlcode)
+{
+ char error_buffer[120]; /* OpenSSL documents that this must be at
+ least 120 bytes long. */
+ unsigned long sslerror;
+ ssize_t nread;
+ int buffsize;
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ buffsize = (buffersize > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)buffersize;
+ nread = (ssize_t)SSL_read(conn->ssl[num].handle, buf, buffsize);
+ if(nread < 0) {
+ /* failed SSL_read */
+ int err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl[num].handle, (int)nread);
+
+ switch(err) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* this is not an error */
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* no more data */
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ /* there's data pending, re-invoke SSL_read() */
+ *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
+ return -1;
+ default:
+ /* openssl/ssl.h says "look at error stack/return value/errno" */
+ sslerror = ERR_get_error();
+ failf(conn->data, "SSL read: %s, errno %d",
+ ERR_error_string(sslerror, error_buffer),
+ SOCKERRNO);
+ *curlcode = CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ return nread;
+}
+
+size_t Curl_ossl_version(char *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+#ifdef YASSL_VERSION
+ /* yassl provides an OpenSSL API compatibility layer so it looks identical
+ to OpenSSL in all other aspects */
+ return snprintf(buffer, size, "yassl/%s", YASSL_VERSION);
+#else /* YASSL_VERSION */
+
+#if(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x905000)
+ {
+ char sub[2];
+ unsigned long ssleay_value;
+ sub[1]='\0';
+ ssleay_value=SSLeay();
+ if(ssleay_value < 0x906000) {
+ ssleay_value=SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER;
+ sub[0]='\0';
+ }
+ else {
+ if(ssleay_value&0xff0) {
+ sub[0]=(char)(((ssleay_value>>4)&0xff) + 'a' -1);
+ }
+ else
+ sub[0]='\0';
+ }
+
+ return snprintf(buffer, size, "OpenSSL/%lx.%lx.%lx%s",
+ (ssleay_value>>28)&0xf,
+ (ssleay_value>>20)&0xff,
+ (ssleay_value>>12)&0xff,
+ sub);
+ }
+
+#else /* SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER is less than 0.9.5 */
+
+#if(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x900000)
+ return snprintf(buffer, size, "OpenSSL/%lx.%lx.%lx",
+ (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>28)&0xff,
+ (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>20)&0xff,
+ (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>12)&0xf);
+
+#else /* (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x900000) */
+ {
+ char sub[2];
+ sub[1]='\0';
+ if(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER&0x0f) {
+ sub[0]=(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER&0x0f) + 'a' -1;
+ }
+ else
+ sub[0]='\0';
+
+ return snprintf(buffer, size, "SSL/%x.%x.%x%s",
+ (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>12)&0xff,
+ (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>8)&0xf,
+ (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>4)&0xf, sub);
+ }
+#endif /* (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x900000) */
+#endif /* SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER is less than 0.9.5 */
+
+#endif /* YASSL_VERSION */
+}
+
+void Curl_ossl_random(struct SessionHandle *data, unsigned char *entropy,
+ size_t length)
+{
+ Curl_ossl_seed(data); /* Initiate the seed if not already done */
+ RAND_bytes(entropy, curlx_uztosi(length));
+}
+
+void Curl_ossl_md5sum(unsigned char *tmp, /* input */
+ size_t tmplen,
+ unsigned char *md5sum /* output */,
+ size_t unused)
+{
+ MD5_CTX MD5pw;
+ (void)unused;
+ MD5_Init(&MD5pw);
+ MD5_Update(&MD5pw, tmp, tmplen);
+ MD5_Final(md5sum, &MD5pw);
+}
+#endif /* USE_SSLEAY */