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-rw-r--r--lib/Makefile.am2
-rw-r--r--lib/inet_pton.c226
-rw-r--r--lib/inet_pton.h34
-rw-r--r--lib/ssluse.c272
4 files changed, 454 insertions, 80 deletions
diff --git a/lib/Makefile.am b/lib/Makefile.am
index 691d7b741..f1bd00823 100644
--- a/lib/Makefile.am
+++ b/lib/Makefile.am
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ memdebug.h inet_ntoa_r.h http_chunks.c http_chunks.h strtok.c strtok.h \
connect.c connect.h llist.c llist.h hash.c hash.h multi.c \
content_encoding.c content_encoding.h share.c share.h http_digest.c \
md5.c md5.h http_digest.h http_negotiate.c http_negotiate.h \
-http_ntlm.c http_ntlm.h ca-bundle.h
+http_ntlm.c http_ntlm.h ca-bundle.h inet_pton.c inet_pton.h
noinst_HEADERS = setup.h transfer.h
diff --git a/lib/inet_pton.c b/lib/inet_pton.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0945bdcb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/inet_pton.c
@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+/* This is from the BIND 4.9.4 release, modified to compile by itself */
+
+/* Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM DISCLAIMS
+ * ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTERNET SOFTWARE
+ * CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR
+ * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS
+ * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "setup.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INET_PTON
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#define IN6ADDRSZ 16
+#define INADDRSZ 4
+#define INT16SZ 2
+
+#ifndef AF_INET6
+#define AF_INET6 AF_MAX+1 /* just to let this compile */
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * WARNING: Don't even consider trying to compile this on a system where
+ * sizeof(int) < 4. sizeof(int) > 4 is fine; all the world's not a VAX.
+ */
+
+static int inet_pton4(const char *src, u_char *dst);
+static int inet_pton6(const char *src, u_char *dst);
+
+/* int
+ * inet_pton(af, src, dst)
+ * convert from presentation format (which usually means ASCII printable)
+ * to network format (which is usually some kind of binary format).
+ * return:
+ * 1 if the address was valid for the specified address family
+ * 0 if the address wasn't valid (`dst' is untouched in this case)
+ * -1 if some other error occurred (`dst' is untouched in this case, too)
+ * author:
+ * Paul Vixie, 1996.
+ */
+int
+Curl_inet_pton(af, src, dst)
+ int af;
+ const char *src;
+ void *dst;
+{
+ switch (af) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ return (inet_pton4(src, dst));
+ case AF_INET6:
+ return (inet_pton6(src, dst));
+ default:
+ errno = EAFNOSUPPORT;
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+/* int
+ * inet_pton4(src, dst)
+ * like inet_aton() but without all the hexadecimal and shorthand.
+ * return:
+ * 1 if `src' is a valid dotted quad, else 0.
+ * notice:
+ * does not touch `dst' unless it's returning 1.
+ * author:
+ * Paul Vixie, 1996.
+ */
+static int
+inet_pton4(src, dst)
+ const char *src;
+ u_char *dst;
+{
+ static const char digits[] = "0123456789";
+ int saw_digit, octets, ch;
+ u_char tmp[INADDRSZ], *tp;
+
+ saw_digit = 0;
+ octets = 0;
+ *(tp = tmp) = 0;
+ while ((ch = *src++) != '\0') {
+ const char *pch;
+
+ if ((pch = strchr(digits, ch)) != NULL) {
+ u_int new = *tp * 10 + (pch - digits);
+
+ if (new > 255)
+ return (0);
+ *tp = new;
+ if (! saw_digit) {
+ if (++octets > 4)
+ return (0);
+ saw_digit = 1;
+ }
+ } else if (ch == '.' && saw_digit) {
+ if (octets == 4)
+ return (0);
+ *++tp = 0;
+ saw_digit = 0;
+ } else
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (octets < 4)
+ return (0);
+ /* bcopy(tmp, dst, INADDRSZ); */
+ memcpy(dst, tmp, INADDRSZ);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/* int
+ * inet_pton6(src, dst)
+ * convert presentation level address to network order binary form.
+ * return:
+ * 1 if `src' is a valid [RFC1884 2.2] address, else 0.
+ * notice:
+ * (1) does not touch `dst' unless it's returning 1.
+ * (2) :: in a full address is silently ignored.
+ * credit:
+ * inspired by Mark Andrews.
+ * author:
+ * Paul Vixie, 1996.
+ */
+static int
+inet_pton6(src, dst)
+ const char *src;
+ u_char *dst;
+{
+ static const char xdigits_l[] = "0123456789abcdef",
+ xdigits_u[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+ u_char tmp[IN6ADDRSZ], *tp, *endp, *colonp;
+ const char *xdigits, *curtok;
+ int ch, saw_xdigit;
+ u_int val;
+
+ memset((tp = tmp), 0, IN6ADDRSZ);
+ endp = tp + IN6ADDRSZ;
+ colonp = NULL;
+ /* Leading :: requires some special handling. */
+ if (*src == ':')
+ if (*++src != ':')
+ return (0);
+ curtok = src;
+ saw_xdigit = 0;
+ val = 0;
+ while ((ch = *src++) != '\0') {
+ const char *pch;
+
+ if ((pch = strchr((xdigits = xdigits_l), ch)) == NULL)
+ pch = strchr((xdigits = xdigits_u), ch);
+ if (pch != NULL) {
+ val <<= 4;
+ val |= (pch - xdigits);
+ if (val > 0xffff)
+ return (0);
+ saw_xdigit = 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (ch == ':') {
+ curtok = src;
+ if (!saw_xdigit) {
+ if (colonp)
+ return (0);
+ colonp = tp;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (tp + INT16SZ > endp)
+ return (0);
+ *tp++ = (u_char) (val >> 8) & 0xff;
+ *tp++ = (u_char) val & 0xff;
+ saw_xdigit = 0;
+ val = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (ch == '.' && ((tp + INADDRSZ) <= endp) &&
+ inet_pton4(curtok, tp) > 0) {
+ tp += INADDRSZ;
+ saw_xdigit = 0;
+ break; /* '\0' was seen by inet_pton4(). */
+ }
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (saw_xdigit) {
+ if (tp + INT16SZ > endp)
+ return (0);
+ *tp++ = (u_char) (val >> 8) & 0xff;
+ *tp++ = (u_char) val & 0xff;
+ }
+ if (colonp != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Since some memmove()'s erroneously fail to handle
+ * overlapping regions, we'll do the shift by hand.
+ */
+ const int n = tp - colonp;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 1; i <= n; i++) {
+ endp[- i] = colonp[n - i];
+ colonp[n - i] = 0;
+ }
+ tp = endp;
+ }
+ if (tp != endp)
+ return (0);
+ /* bcopy(tmp, dst, IN6ADDRSZ); */
+ memcpy(dst, tmp, IN6ADDRSZ);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_INET_PTON */
diff --git a/lib/inet_pton.h b/lib/inet_pton.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d758e06d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/inet_pton.h
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#ifndef __INET_PTON_H
+#define __INET_PTON_H
+/***************************************************************************
+ * _ _ ____ _
+ * Project ___| | | | _ \| |
+ * / __| | | | |_) | |
+ * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
+ * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2003, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+ *
+ * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
+ * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
+ * are also available at http://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
+ *
+ * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
+ * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
+ *
+ * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
+ * KIND, either express or implied.
+ *
+ * $Id$
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+#include "setup.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_INET_PTON
+#define Curl_inet_pton(x,y,z) inet_pton(x,y,z)
+#else
+int Curl_inet_pton(int, const char *, void *);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __INET_PTON_H */
diff --git a/lib/ssluse.c b/lib/ssluse.c
index 14142822b..8b04ccf1f 100644
--- a/lib/ssluse.c
+++ b/lib/ssluse.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#endif
@@ -41,9 +42,11 @@
#include "sendf.h"
#include "formdata.h" /* for the boundary function */
#include "url.h" /* for the ssl config check function */
+#include "inet_pton.h"
#ifdef USE_SSLEAY
#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
/* The last #include file should be: */
#ifdef CURLDEBUG
@@ -191,7 +194,7 @@ int random_the_seed(struct SessionHandle *data)
/* generates a default path for the random seed file */
buf[0]=0; /* blank it first */
RAND_file_name(buf, BUFSIZE);
- if ( buf[0] ) {
+ if(buf[0]) {
/* we got a file name to try */
nread += RAND_load_file(buf, 16384);
if(seed_enough(nread))
@@ -207,13 +210,13 @@ int random_the_seed(struct SessionHandle *data)
#endif
static int do_file_type(const char *type)
{
- if (!type || !type[0])
+ if(!type || !type[0])
return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
- if (curl_strequal(type, "PEM"))
+ if(curl_strequal(type, "PEM"))
return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
- if (curl_strequal(type, "DER"))
+ if(curl_strequal(type, "DER"))
return SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1;
- if (curl_strequal(type, "ENG"))
+ if(curl_strequal(type, "ENG"))
return SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE;
return -1;
}
@@ -228,7 +231,7 @@ int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn,
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
int file_type;
- if (cert_file != NULL) {
+ if(cert_file != NULL) {
SSL *ssl;
X509 *x509;
@@ -255,7 +258,7 @@ int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn,
switch(file_type) {
case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM:
/* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() only works on PEM files */
- if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(conn->ssl.ctx,
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(conn->ssl.ctx,
cert_file) != 1) {
failf(data, "unable to set certificate file (wrong password?)");
return 0;
@@ -266,7 +269,7 @@ int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn,
/* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file() works with either PEM or ASN1, but
we use the case above for PEM so this can only be performed with
ASN1 files. */
- if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(conn->ssl.ctx,
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(conn->ssl.ctx,
cert_file,
file_type) != 1) {
failf(data, "unable to set certificate file (wrong password?)");
@@ -286,11 +289,11 @@ int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn,
switch(file_type) {
case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM:
- if (key_file == NULL)
+ if(key_file == NULL)
/* cert & key can only be in PEM case in the same file */
key_file=cert_file;
case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1:
- if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(conn->ssl.ctx,
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(conn->ssl.ctx,
key_file,
file_type) != 1) {
failf(data, "unable to set private key file: '%s' type %s\n",
@@ -302,11 +305,11 @@ int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn,
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H
{ /* XXXX still needs some work */
EVP_PKEY *priv_key = NULL;
- if (conn && conn->data && conn->data->engine) {
+ if(conn && conn->data && conn->data->engine) {
#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS
UI_METHOD *ui_method = UI_OpenSSL();
#endif
- if (!key_file || !key_file[0]) {
+ if(!key_file || !key_file[0]) {
failf(data, "no key set to load from crypto engine\n");
return 0;
}
@@ -315,11 +318,11 @@ int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn,
ui_method,
#endif
data->set.key_passwd);
- if (!priv_key) {
+ if(!priv_key) {
failf(data, "failed to load private key from crypto engine\n");
return 0;
}
- if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(conn->ssl.ctx, priv_key) != 1) {
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(conn->ssl.ctx, priv_key) != 1) {
failf(data, "unable to set private key\n");
EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key);
return 0;
@@ -346,7 +349,7 @@ int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn,
/* This version was provided by Evan Jordan and is supposed to not
leak memory as the previous version: */
- if (x509 != NULL) {
+ if(x509 != NULL) {
EVP_PKEY *pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(x509);
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp,SSL_get_privatekey(ssl));
EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
@@ -360,7 +363,7 @@ int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn,
/* Now we know that a key and cert have been set against
* the SSL context */
- if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(conn->ssl.ctx)) {
+ if(!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(conn->ssl.ctx)) {
failf(data, "Private key does not match the certificate public key");
return(0);
}
@@ -457,7 +460,7 @@ void Curl_SSL_cleanup(void)
*/
void Curl_SSL_Close(struct connectdata *conn)
{
- if (conn->ssl.use) {
+ if(conn->ssl.use) {
/*
ERR_remove_state() frees the error queue associated with
thread pid. If pid == 0, the current thread will have its
@@ -583,7 +586,7 @@ int Curl_SSL_Close_All(struct SessionHandle *data)
free(data->state.session);
}
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H
- if (data->engine)
+ if(data->engine)
{
ENGINE_free(data->engine);
data->engine = NULL;
@@ -669,28 +672,28 @@ static int Curl_ASN1_UTCTIME_output(struct connectdata *conn,
i=tm->length;
asn1_string=(char *)tm->data;
- if (i < 10)
+ if(i < 10)
return 1;
- if (asn1_string[i-1] == 'Z')
+ if(asn1_string[i-1] == 'Z')
gmt=TRUE;
for (i=0; i<10; i++)
- if ((asn1_string[i] > '9') || (asn1_string[i] < '0'))
+ if((asn1_string[i] > '9') || (asn1_string[i] < '0'))
return 2;
year= (asn1_string[0]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[1]-'0');
- if (year < 50)
+ if(year < 50)
year+=100;
month= (asn1_string[2]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[3]-'0');
- if ((month > 12) || (month < 1))
+ if((month > 12) || (month < 1))
return 3;
day= (asn1_string[4]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[5]-'0');
hour= (asn1_string[6]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[7]-'0');
minute= (asn1_string[8]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[9]-'0');
- if ( (asn1_string[10] >= '0') && (asn1_string[10] <= '9') &&
- (asn1_string[11] >= '0') && (asn1_string[11] <= '9'))
+ if((asn1_string[10] >= '0') && (asn1_string[10] <= '9') &&
+ (asn1_string[11] >= '0') && (asn1_string[11] <= '9'))
second= (asn1_string[10]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[11]-'0');
infof(data,
@@ -742,6 +745,148 @@ cert_hostcheck(const char *certname, const char *hostname)
}
#endif
+static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn)
+{
+ char peer_CN[257];
+ int ntype = 3; /* 1 = IPv6, 2 = IPv4, 3=DNS */
+ int i;
+ int altmatch = 0;
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+ struct in6_addr addr;
+#else
+ struct in_addr addr;
+#endif
+ char *ptr;
+ struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+ if(conn->hostname[0] == '[' && strchr(conn->hostname, ']')) {
+ char *n2 = strdup(conn->hostname+1);
+ *strchr(n2, ']') = '\0';
+ if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, n2, &addr))
+ ntype = 1;
+ free(n2);
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ {
+ if((ptr = strrchr(conn->hostname, '.')) &&
+ isdigit((unsigned char)ptr[1])) {
+ if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, conn->hostname, &addr))
+ ntype = 2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ i = X509_get_ext_by_NID(conn->ssl.server_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, -1);
+ if(i >= 0) {
+ X509_EXTENSION *ex;
+ STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *alt;
+
+ ex = X509_get_ext(conn->ssl.server_cert, i);
+ alt = X509V3_EXT_d2i(ex);
+ if(alt) {
+ int n, len1 = 0, len2 = 0;
+ char *domain = NULL;
+ GENERAL_NAME *gn;
+
+ if(ntype == 3) {
+ len1 = strlen(conn->hostname);
+ domain = strchr(conn->hostname, '.');
+ if(domain) {
+ len2 = len1 - (domain-conn->hostname);
+ }
+ }
+ n = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(alt);
+ for (i=0; i<n; i++) {
+ char *sn;
+ int sl;
+ gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(alt, i);
+ if(gn->type == GEN_DNS) {
+ if(ntype != 3)
+ continue;
+
+ sn = (char *) ASN1_STRING_data(gn->d.ia5);
+ sl = ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5);
+
+ /* Is this an exact match? */
+ if((len1 == sl) && curl_strnequal(conn->hostname, sn, len1))
+ break;
+
+ /* Is this a wildcard match? */
+ if((*sn == '*') && domain && (len2 == sl-1) &&
+ curl_strnequal(domain, sn+1, len2))
+ break;
+
+ }
+ else if(gn->type == GEN_IPADD) {
+ if(ntype == 3)
+ continue;
+
+ sn = (char *) ASN1_STRING_data(gn->d.ia5);
+ sl = ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5);
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPv6
+ if(ntype == 1 && sl != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
+ continue;
+ else
+#endif
+ if(ntype == 2 && sl != sizeof(struct in_addr))
+ continue;
+
+ if(!memcmp(sn, &addr, sl))
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ GENERAL_NAMES_free(alt);
+ if(i < n) { /* got a match in altnames */
+ altmatch = 1;
+ infof(data, "\t subjectAltName: %s matched\n", conn->hostname);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(!altmatch) {
+ bool obtain=FALSE;
+ if(X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(conn->ssl.server_cert),
+ NID_commonName,
+ peer_CN,
+ sizeof(peer_CN)) < 0) {
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost > 1) {
+ failf(data,
+ "SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
+ X509_free(conn->ssl.server_cert);
+ return CURLE_SSL_PEER_CERTIFICATE;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* Consider verifyhost == 1 as an "OK" for a missing CN field, but we
+ output a note about the situation */
+ infof(data, "\t common name: WARNING couldn't obtain\n");
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ obtain = TRUE;
+
+ if(obtain) {
+ if(!cert_hostcheck(peer_CN, conn->hostname)) {
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost > 1) {
+ failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name '%s' does not match "
+ "target host name '%s'", peer_CN, conn->hostname);
+ X509_free(conn->ssl.server_cert);
+ return CURLE_SSL_PEER_CERTIFICATE;
+ }
+ else
+ infof(data, "\t common name: %s (does not match '%s')\n",
+ peer_CN, conn->hostname);
+ }
+ else
+ infof(data, "\t common name: %s (matched)\n", peer_CN);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
/* ====================================================== */
CURLcode
Curl_SSLConnect(struct connectdata *conn)
@@ -803,19 +948,19 @@ Curl_SSLConnect(struct connectdata *conn)
SSL_CTX_set_options(conn->ssl.ctx, SSL_OP_ALL);
if(data->set.cert) {
- if (!cert_stuff(conn,
- data->set.cert,
- data->set.cert_type,
- data->set.key,
- data->set.key_type)) {
+ if(!cert_stuff(conn,
+ data->set.cert,
+ data->set.cert_type,
+ data->set.key,
+ data->set.key_type)) {
/* failf() is already done in cert_stuff() */
return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
}
}
if(data->set.ssl.cipher_list) {
- if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(conn->ssl.ctx,
- data->set.ssl.cipher_list)) {
+ if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(conn->ssl.ctx,
+ data->set.ssl.cipher_list)) {
failf(data, "failed setting cipher list");
return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
}
@@ -826,10 +971,10 @@ Curl_SSLConnect(struct connectdata *conn)
SSL_VERIFY_PEER|SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT|
SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE,
cert_verify_callback);
- if ((data->set.ssl.CAfile || data->set.ssl.CApath) &&
- !SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(conn->ssl.ctx,
- data->set.ssl.CAfile,
- data->set.ssl.CApath)) {
+ if((data->set.ssl.CAfile || data->set.ssl.CApath) &&
+ !SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(conn->ssl.ctx,
+ data->set.ssl.CAfile,
+ data->set.ssl.CApath)) {
failf(data,"error setting certificate verify locations");
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
}
@@ -838,10 +983,10 @@ Curl_SSLConnect(struct connectdata *conn)
SSL_CTX_set_verify(conn->ssl.ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, cert_verify_callback);
/* give application a chance to interfere with SSL set up. */
- if (data->set.ssl.fsslctx) {
+ if(data->set.ssl.fsslctx) {
retcode = (*data->set.ssl.fsslctx)(data, conn->ssl.ctx,
data->set.ssl.fsslctxp);
- if (retcode) {
+ if(retcode) {
failf(data,"error signaled by ssl ctx callback");
return retcode;
}
@@ -996,15 +1141,15 @@ Curl_SSLConnect(struct connectdata *conn)
* attack
*/
- conn->ssl.server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate (conn->ssl.handle);
+ conn->ssl.server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->ssl.handle);
if(!conn->ssl.server_cert) {
failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get peer certificate!");
return CURLE_SSL_PEER_CERTIFICATE;
}
infof (data, "Server certificate:\n");
- str = X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_subject_name (conn->ssl.server_cert),
- NULL, 0);
+ str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(conn->ssl.server_cert),
+ NULL, 0);
if(!str) {
failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get X509-subject!");
X509_free(conn->ssl.server_cert);
@@ -1019,45 +1164,14 @@ Curl_SSLConnect(struct connectdata *conn)
certdate = X509_get_notAfter(conn->ssl.server_cert);
Curl_ASN1_UTCTIME_output(conn, "\t expire date: ", certdate);
- if (data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
- char peer_CN[257];
- if (X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(conn->ssl.server_cert),
- NID_commonName,
- peer_CN,
- sizeof(peer_CN)) < 0) {
- /* Failed to get the CN field from the server's certificate */
- if (data->set.ssl.verifyhost > 1) {
- failf(data, "SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
- X509_free(conn->ssl.server_cert);
- return CURLE_SSL_PEER_CERTIFICATE;
- }
- else
- /* Consider verifyhost == 1 as an "OK" for a missing CN field, but we
- output a note about the situation */
- infof(data, "\t common name: WARNING couldn't obtain\n");
- }
- else {
- /* Compare the CN field with the remote host name */
- if (!cert_hostcheck(peer_CN, conn->hostname)) {
- if (data->set.ssl.verifyhost > 1) {
- failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name '%s' does not match "
- "target host name '%s'",
- peer_CN, conn->hostname);
- X509_free(conn->ssl.server_cert);
- return CURLE_SSL_PEER_CERTIFICATE;
- }
- else
- infof(data,
- "\t common name: %s (does not match '%s')\n",
- peer_CN, conn->hostname);
- }
- else
- infof(data, "\t common name: %s (matched)\n", peer_CN);
- }
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
+ retcode = verifyhost(conn);
+ if(retcode)
+ return retcode;
}
- str = X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_issuer_name (conn->ssl.server_cert),
- NULL, 0);
+ str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(conn->ssl.server_cert),
+ NULL, 0);
if(!str) {
failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get X509-issuer name!");
X509_free(conn->ssl.server_cert);
@@ -1071,7 +1185,7 @@ Curl_SSLConnect(struct connectdata *conn)
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
data->set.ssl.certverifyresult=SSL_get_verify_result(conn->ssl.handle);
- if (data->set.ssl.certverifyresult != X509_V_OK) {
+ if(data->set.ssl.certverifyresult != X509_V_OK) {
failf(data, "SSL certificate verify result: %d",
data->set.ssl.certverifyresult);
retcode = CURLE_SSL_PEER_CERTIFICATE;
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