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author | Niall <Niall.oReilly@ucd.ie> | 2019-11-14 19:21:09 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> | 2019-11-16 16:15:03 +0100 |
commit | b6a53fff6c1d07e8a9cb65ca1066d99490fb8132 (patch) | |
tree | 8f8b8ee97d9de60d29c0235953b37f798523769b /tests | |
parent | 7627a2dd9d4b7417672fdec3dc6e7f8d3de379de (diff) | |
download | curl-b6a53fff6c1d07e8a9cb65ca1066d99490fb8132.tar.gz |
doh: improced both encoding and decoding
Improved estimation of expected_len and updated related comments;
increased strictness of QNAME-encoding, adding error detection for empty
labels and names longer than the overall limit; avoided treating DNAME
as unexpected;
updated unit test 1655 with more thorough set of proofs and tests
Closes #4598
Diffstat (limited to 'tests')
-rw-r--r-- | tests/unit/unit1655.c | 118 |
1 files changed, 91 insertions, 27 deletions
diff --git a/tests/unit/unit1655.c b/tests/unit/unit1655.c index 7fea134d5..cccaab8da 100644 --- a/tests/unit/unit1655.c +++ b/tests/unit/unit1655.c @@ -36,43 +36,99 @@ static void unit_stop(void) UNITTEST_START -/* introduce a scope and prove the corner case with write overflow, - * so we can prove this test would detect it and that it is properly fixed +/* + * Prove detection of write overflow using a short buffer and a name + * of maximal valid length. + * + * Prove detection of other invalid input. */ do { - const char *bad = "this.is.a.hostname.where.each.individual.part.is.within." - "the.sixtythree.character.limit.but.still.long.enough.to." - "trigger.the.the.buffer.overflow......it.is.chosen.to.be." - "of.a.length.such.that.it.causes.a.two.byte.buffer......." - "overwrite.....making.it.longer.causes.doh.encode.to....." - ".return.early.so.dont.change.its.length.xxxx.xxxxxxxxxxx" - "..xxxxxx.....xx..........xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" - "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx..x......xxxx" - "xxxx..xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.x...xxxx.x.x.x...xxxxx"; + const char *max = + /* ..|....1.........2.........3.........4.........5.........6... */ + /* 3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123 */ + "this.is.a.maximum-length.hostname." /* 34: 34 */ + "with-no-label-of-greater-length-than-the-sixty-three-characters." + /* 64: 98 */ + "specified.in.the.RFCs." /* 22: 120 */ + "and.with.a.QNAME.encoding.whose.length.is.exactly." /* 50: 170 */ + "the.maximum.length.allowed." /* 27: 197 */ + "that.is.two-hundred.and.fifty-six." /* 34: 231 */ + "including.the.last.null." /* 24: 255 */ + ""; + const char *toolong = + /* ..|....1.........2.........3.........4.........5.........6... */ + /* 3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123 */ + "here.is.a.hostname.which.is.just.barely.too.long." /* 49: 49 */ + "to.be.encoded.as.a.QNAME.of.the.maximum.allowed.length." + /* 55: 104 */ + "which.is.256.including.a.final.zero-length.label." /* 49: 153 */ + "representing.the.root.node.so.that.a.name.with." /* 47: 200 */ + "a.trailing.dot.may.have.up.to." /* 30: 230 */ + "255.characters.never.more." /* 26: 256 */ + ""; + const char *emptylabel = + "this.is.an.otherwise-valid.hostname." + ".with.an.empty.label."; + const char *outsizelabel = + "this.is.an.otherwise-valid.hostname." + "with-a-label-of-greater-length-than-the-sixty-three-characters-" + "specified.in.the.RFCs."; + + struct test { + const char *name; + const DOHcode expected_result; + }; /* plays the role of struct dnsprobe in urldata.h */ struct demo { - unsigned char dohbuffer[512]; + unsigned char dohbuffer[255 + 16]; /* deliberately short buffer */ unsigned char canary1; unsigned char canary2; unsigned char canary3; }; - size_t olen = 100000; - struct demo victim; - DOHcode d; - victim.canary1 = 87; /* magic numbers, arbritrarily picked */ - victim.canary2 = 35; - victim.canary3 = 41; - d = doh_encode(bad, DNS_TYPE_A, victim.dohbuffer, - sizeof(victim.dohbuffer), &olen); - fail_unless(victim.canary1 == 87, "one byte buffer overwrite has happened"); - fail_unless(victim.canary2 == 35, "two byte buffer overwrite has happened"); - fail_unless(victim.canary3 == 41, - "three byte buffer overwrite has happened"); - if(d == DOH_OK) { - fail_unless(olen <= sizeof(victim.dohbuffer), "wrote outside bounds"); - fail_unless(olen > strlen(bad), "unrealistic low size"); + const struct test playlist[4] = { + { toolong, DOH_DNS_NAME_TOO_LONG }, /* expect early failure */ + { emptylabel, DOH_DNS_BAD_LABEL }, /* also */ + { outsizelabel, DOH_DNS_BAD_LABEL }, /* also */ + { max, DOH_OK } /* expect buffer overwrite */ + }; + + for(int i = 0; i < (int)(sizeof(playlist)/sizeof(*playlist)); i++) { + const char *name = playlist[i].name; + size_t olen = 100000; + struct demo victim; + DOHcode d; + + victim.canary1 = 87; /* magic numbers, arbritrarily picked */ + victim.canary2 = 35; + victim.canary3 = 41; + d = doh_encode(name, DNS_TYPE_A, victim.dohbuffer, + sizeof(struct demo), /* allow room for overflow */ + &olen); + + fail_unless(d == playlist[i].expected_result, + "result returned was not as expected"); + if(d == playlist[i].expected_result) { + if(name == max) { + fail_if(victim.canary1 == 87, + "demo one-byte buffer overwrite did not happen"); + } + else { + fail_unless(victim.canary1 == 87, + "one-byte buffer overwrite has happened"); + } + fail_unless(victim.canary2 == 35, + "two-byte buffer overwrite has happened"); + fail_unless(victim.canary3 == 41, + "three-byte buffer overwrite has happened"); + } + else { + if(d == DOH_OK) { + fail_unless(olen <= sizeof(victim.dohbuffer), "wrote outside bounds"); + fail_unless(olen > strlen(name), "unrealistic low size"); + } + } } } while(0); @@ -84,6 +140,7 @@ do { const size_t magic1 = 9765; size_t olen1 = magic1; const char *sunshine1 = "a.com"; + const char *dotshine1 = "a.com."; const char *sunshine2 = "aa.com"; size_t olen2; DOHcode ret2; @@ -94,6 +151,13 @@ do { fail_if(olen1 == magic1, "olen has not been assigned properly"); fail_unless(olen1 > strlen(sunshine1), "bad out length"); + /* with a trailing dot, the response should have the same length */ + olen2 = magic1; + ret2 = doh_encode(dotshine1, dnstype, buffer, buflen, &olen2); + fail_unless(ret2 == DOH_OK, "dotshine case should pass fine"); + fail_if(olen2 == magic1, "olen has not been assigned properly"); + fail_unless(olen1 == olen2, "olen should not grow for a trailing dot"); + /* add one letter, the response should be one longer */ olen2 = magic1; ret2 = doh_encode(sunshine2, dnstype, buffer, buflen, &olen2); |