diff options
author | Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> | 2004-06-22 08:51:22 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> | 2004-06-22 08:51:22 +0000 |
commit | 76920413d9f9e0c7cd05d297acd8dc640fdbd6f2 (patch) | |
tree | cee3c7da507090e19339527234f084ebcff2f7be /lib/ssluse.c | |
parent | 44d9a8ba4ed566939d3f21024ca1b5f271b03677 (diff) | |
download | curl-76920413d9f9e0c7cd05d297acd8dc640fdbd6f2.tar.gz |
Gisle fixed the wildcard checks for certificates.
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/ssluse.c')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/ssluse.c | 111 |
1 files changed, 61 insertions, 50 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssluse.c b/lib/ssluse.c index c35a52b5c..6404f7ac0 100644 --- a/lib/ssluse.c +++ b/lib/ssluse.c @@ -739,40 +739,59 @@ static int Curl_ASN1_UTCTIME_output(struct connectdata *conn, /* ====================================================== */ #ifdef USE_SSLEAY -static int -cert_hostcheck(const char *certname, const char *hostname) -{ - char *tmp; - const char *certdomain; - if(!certname || - strlen(certname)<3 || - !hostname || - !strlen(hostname)) /* sanity check */ - return 0; +/* + * Match a hostname against a wildcard pattern. + * E.g. + * "foo.host.com" matches "*.host.com". + * + * We are a bit more liberal than RFC2818 describes in that we + * accept multiple "*" in pattern (similar to what some other browsers do). + * E.g. + * "abc.def.domain.com" should strickly not match "*.domain.com", but we + * don't consider "." to be important in CERT checking. + */ +#define HOST_NOMATCH 0 +#define HOST_MATCH 1 - if(curl_strequal(certname, hostname)) /* trivial case */ - return 1; +static int hostmatch(const char *hostname, const char *pattern) +{ + while (1) { + int c = *pattern++; - certdomain = certname + 1; + if (c == '\0') + return (*hostname ? HOST_NOMATCH : HOST_MATCH); - if((certname[0] != '*') || (certdomain[0] != '.')) - return 0; /* not a wildcard certificate, check failed */ + if (c == '*') { + c = *pattern; + if (c == '\0') /* "*\0" matches anything remaining */ + return HOST_MATCH; - if(!strchr(certdomain+1, '.')) - return 0; /* the certificate must have at least another dot in its name */ + while (*hostname) { + /* The only recursive function in libcurl! */ + if (hostmatch(hostname++,pattern) == HOST_MATCH) + return HOST_MATCH; + } + return HOST_NOMATCH; + } - /* find 'certdomain' within 'hostname', case insensitive */ - tmp = Curl_strcasestr(hostname, certdomain); - if(tmp) { - /* ok the certname's domain matches the hostname, let's check that it's a - tail-match */ - if(curl_strequal(tmp, certdomain)) - /* looks like a match. Just check we havent swallowed a '.' */ - return tmp == strchr(hostname, '.'); - else - return 0; + if (toupper(c) != toupper(*hostname++)) + return HOST_NOMATCH; } +} + +static int +cert_hostcheck(const char *match_pattern, const char *hostname) +{ + if (!match_pattern || !*match_pattern || + !hostname || !*hostname) /* sanity check */ + return 0; + + if(curl_strequal(hostname,match_pattern)) /* trivial case */ + return 1; + + if (hostmatch(hostname,match_pattern) == HOST_MATCH) + return 1; return 0; } @@ -828,19 +847,9 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn, altnames = X509_get_ext_d2i(server_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); if(altnames) { - int hostlen = 0; - int domainlen = 0; - char *domain = NULL; int numalts; int i; - if(GEN_DNS == target) { - hostlen = (int)strlen(conn->host.name); - domain = strchr(conn->host.name, '.'); - if(domain) - domainlen = (int)strlen(domain); - } - /* get amount of alternatives, RFC2459 claims there MUST be at least one, but we don't depend on it... */ numalts = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames); @@ -854,26 +863,28 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn, if(check->type == target) { /* get data and length */ const char *altptr = (char *)ASN1_STRING_data(check->d.ia5); - const int altlen = ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5); + int altlen; switch(target) { - case GEN_DNS: /* name comparison */ - /* Is this an exact match? */ - if((hostlen == altlen) && - curl_strnequal(conn->host.name, altptr, hostlen)) - matched = TRUE; - - /* Is this a wildcard match? */ - else if((altptr[0] == '*') && - (domainlen == altlen-1) && - domain && - curl_strnequal(domain, altptr+1, domainlen)) + case GEN_DNS: /* name/pattern comparison */ + /* The OpenSSL man page explicitly says: "In general it cannot be + assumed that the data returned by ASN1_STRING_data() is null + terminated or does not contain embedded nulls." But also that + "The actual format of the data will depend on the actual string + type itself: for example for and IA5String the data will be ASCII" + + Gisle researched the OpenSSL sources: + "I checked the 0.9.6 and 0.9.8 sources before my patch and + it always 0-terminates an IA5String." + */ + if (cert_hostcheck(altptr, conn->host.name)) matched = TRUE; break; case GEN_IPADD: /* IP address comparison */ /* compare alternative IP address if the data chunk is the same size our server IP address is */ + altlen = ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5); if((altlen == addrlen) && !memcmp(altptr, &addr, altlen)) matched = TRUE; break; @@ -1034,7 +1045,7 @@ static void ssl_tls_trace(int direction, int ssl_ver, int content_type, ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR ? '3' : '?'); /* SSLv2 doesn't seem to have TLS record-type headers, so OpenSSL - * always pass-up content-type as 0. But the interesting message-tupe + * always pass-up content-type as 0. But the interesting message-type * is at 'buf[0]'. */ if (ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && content_type != 0) |