Revert changes relative to lib/*.[ch] recent renaming

This reverts renaming and usage of lib/*.h header files done
28-12-2012, reverting 2 commits:

  f871de0... build: make use of 76 lib/*.h renamed files
  ffd8e12... build: rename 76 lib/*.h files

This also reverts removal of redundant include guard (redundant thanks
to changes in above commits) done 2-12-2013, reverting 1 commit:

  c087374... curl_setup.h: remove redundant include guard

This also reverts renaming and usage of lib/*.c source files done
3-12-2013, reverting 3 commits:

  13606bb... build: make use of 93 lib/*.c renamed files
  5b6e792... build: rename 93 lib/*.c files
  7d83dff... build: commit 13606bbfde follow-up 1

Start of related discussion thread:

  http://curl.haxx.se/mail/lib-2013-01/0012.html

Asking for confirmation on pushing this revertion commit:

  http://curl.haxx.se/mail/lib-2013-01/0048.html

Confirmation summary:

  http://curl.haxx.se/mail/lib-2013-01/0079.html

NOTICE: The list of 2 files that have been modified by other
intermixed commits, while renamed, and also by at least one
of the 6 commits this one reverts follows below. These 2 files
will exhibit a hole in history unless git's '--follow' option
is used when viewing logs.

  lib/curl_imap.h
  lib/curl_smtp.h

1 files changed, 1572 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/lib/nss.c b/lib/nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..86ce6a6d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1572 @@
+/***************************************************************************
+ *                                  _   _ ____  _
+ *  Project                     ___| | | |  _ \| |
+ *                             / __| | | | |_) | |
+ *                            | (__| |_| |  _ <| |___
+ *                             \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2012, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+ *
+ * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
+ * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
+ * are also available at http://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
+ *
+ * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
+ * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
+ *
+ * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
+ * KIND, either express or implied.
+ *
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Source file for all NSS-specific code for the TLS/SSL layer. No code
+ * but sslgen.c should ever call or use these functions.
+ */
+
+#include "setup.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+
+#include "urldata.h"
+#include "sendf.h"
+#include "formdata.h" /* for the boundary function */
+#include "url.h" /* for the ssl config check function */
+#include "connect.h"
+#include "strequal.h"
+#include "select.h"
+#include "sslgen.h"
+#include "llist.h"
+
+#define _MPRINTF_REPLACE /* use the internal *printf() functions */
+#include <curl/mprintf.h>
+
+#include "nssg.h"
+#include <nspr.h>
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslerr.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <secmod.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+#include <prtypes.h>
+#include <pk11pub.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <secitem.h>
+#include <secport.h>
+#include <certdb.h>
+#include <base64.h>
+#include <cert.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+
+#include "curl_memory.h"
+#include "rawstr.h"
+#include "warnless.h"
+
+/* The last #include file should be: */
+#include "memdebug.h"
+
+#define SSL_DIR "/etc/pki/nssdb"
+
+/* enough to fit the string "PEM Token #[0|1]" */
+#define SLOTSIZE 13
+
+PRFileDesc *PR_ImportTCPSocket(PRInt32 osfd);
+
+PRLock * nss_initlock = NULL;
+PRLock * nss_crllock = NULL;
+#ifdef HAVE_NSS_INITCONTEXT
+NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+#endif
+
+volatile int initialized = 0;
+
+typedef struct {
+  const char *name;
+  int num;
+} cipher_s;
+
+#define PK11_SETATTRS(_attr, _idx, _type, _val, _len) do {  \
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE *ptr = (_attr) + ((_idx)++);                 \
+  ptr->type = (_type);                                      \
+  ptr->pValue = (_val);                                     \
+  ptr->ulValueLen = (_len);                                 \
+} WHILE_FALSE
+
+#define CERT_NewTempCertificate __CERT_NewTempCertificate
+
+#define NUM_OF_CIPHERS sizeof(cipherlist)/sizeof(cipherlist[0])
+static const cipher_s cipherlist[] = {
+  /* SSL2 cipher suites */
+  {"rc4",                        SSL_EN_RC4_128_WITH_MD5},
+  {"rc4-md5",                    SSL_EN_RC4_128_WITH_MD5},
+  {"rc4export",                  SSL_EN_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5},
+  {"rc2",                        SSL_EN_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5},
+  {"rc2export",                  SSL_EN_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5},
+  {"des",                        SSL_EN_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5},
+  {"desede3",                    SSL_EN_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5},
+  /* SSL3/TLS cipher suites */
+  {"rsa_rc4_128_md5",            SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+  {"rsa_rc4_128_sha",            SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+  {"rsa_3des_sha",               SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+  {"rsa_des_sha",                SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+  {"rsa_rc4_40_md5",             SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5},
+  {"rsa_rc2_40_md5",             SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5},
+  {"rsa_null_md5",               SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+  {"rsa_null_sha",               SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+  {"fips_3des_sha",              SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+  {"fips_des_sha",               SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+  {"fortezza",                   SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA},
+  {"fortezza_rc4_128_sha",       SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+  {"fortezza_null",              SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+  /* TLS 1.0: Exportable 56-bit Cipher Suites. */
+  {"rsa_des_56_sha",             TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+  {"rsa_rc4_56_sha",             TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA},
+  /* AES ciphers. */
+  {"rsa_aes_128_sha",            TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+  {"rsa_aes_256_sha",            TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
+  /* ECC ciphers. */
+  {"ecdh_ecdsa_null_sha",        TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_ecdsa_rc4_128_sha",     TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_ecdsa_3des_sha",        TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_ecdsa_aes_128_sha",     TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_ecdsa_aes_256_sha",     TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdhe_ecdsa_null_sha",       TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+  {"ecdhe_ecdsa_rc4_128_sha",    TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+  {"ecdhe_ecdsa_3des_sha",       TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_128_sha",    TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_256_sha",    TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_rsa_null_sha",          TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_rsa_128_sha",           TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_rsa_3des_sha",          TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_rsa_aes_128_sha",       TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_rsa_aes_256_sha",       TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+  {"echde_rsa_null",             TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+  {"ecdhe_rsa_rc4_128_sha",      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+  {"ecdhe_rsa_3des_sha",         TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdhe_rsa_aes_128_sha",      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdhe_rsa_aes_256_sha",      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_anon_null_sha",         TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_anon_rc4_128sha",       TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_anon_3des_sha",         TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_anon_aes_128_sha",      TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_anon_aes_256_sha",      TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+#endif
+};
+
+/* following ciphers are new in NSS 3.4 and not enabled by default, therefore
+   they are enabled explicitly */
+static const int enable_ciphers_by_default[] = {
+  TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+  TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+  TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+  TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+  TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+  TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+  SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL
+};
+
+static const char* pem_library = "libnsspem.so";
+SECMODModule* mod = NULL;
+
+static const char* nss_error_to_name(PRErrorCode code)
+{
+  const char *name = PR_ErrorToName(code);
+  if(name)
+    return name;
+
+  return "unknown error";
+}
+
+static void nss_print_error_message(struct SessionHandle *data, PRUint32 err)
+{
+  failf(data, "%s", PR_ErrorToString(err, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT));
+}
+
+static SECStatus set_ciphers(struct SessionHandle *data, PRFileDesc * model,
+                             char *cipher_list)
+{
+  unsigned int i;
+  PRBool cipher_state[NUM_OF_CIPHERS];
+  PRBool found;
+  char *cipher;
+  SECStatus rv;
+
+  /* First disable all ciphers. This uses a different max value in case
+   * NSS adds more ciphers later we don't want them available by
+   * accident
+   */
+  for(i=0; i<SSL_NumImplementedCiphers; i++) {
+    SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, SSL_ImplementedCiphers[i], SSL_NOT_ALLOWED);
+  }
+
+  /* Set every entry in our list to false */
+  for(i=0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) {
+    cipher_state[i] = PR_FALSE;
+  }
+
+  cipher = cipher_list;
+
+  while(cipher_list && (cipher_list[0])) {
+    while((*cipher) && (ISSPACE(*cipher)))
+      ++cipher;
+
+    if((cipher_list = strchr(cipher, ','))) {
+      *cipher_list++ = '\0';
+    }
+
+    found = PR_FALSE;
+
+    for(i=0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) {
+      if(Curl_raw_equal(cipher, cipherlist[i].name)) {
+        cipher_state[i] = PR_TRUE;
+        found = PR_TRUE;
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if(found == PR_FALSE) {
+      failf(data, "Unknown cipher in list: %s", cipher);
+      return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if(cipher_list) {
+      cipher = cipher_list;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Finally actually enable the selected ciphers */
+  for(i=0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) {
+    rv = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, cipherlist[i].num, cipher_state[i]);
+    if(rv != SECSuccess) {
+      failf(data, "cipher-suite not supported by NSS: %s", cipherlist[i].name);
+      return SECFailure;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the number of ciphers that are enabled. We use this to determine
+ * if we need to call NSS_SetDomesticPolicy() to enable the default ciphers.
+ */
+static int num_enabled_ciphers(void)
+{
+  PRInt32 policy = 0;
+  int count = 0;
+  unsigned int i;
+
+  for(i=0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) {
+    SSL_CipherPolicyGet(cipherlist[i].num, &policy);
+    if(policy)
+      count++;
+  }
+  return count;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determine whether the nickname passed in is a filename that needs to
+ * be loaded as a PEM or a regular NSS nickname.
+ *
+ * returns 1 for a file
+ * returns 0 for not a file (NSS nickname)
+ */
+static int is_file(const char *filename)
+{
+  struct_stat st;
+
+  if(filename == NULL)
+    return 0;
+
+  if(stat(filename, &st) == 0)
+    if(S_ISREG(st.st_mode))
+      return 1;
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check if the given string is filename or nickname of a certificate.  If the
+ * given string is recognized as filename, return NULL.  If the given string is
+ * recognized as nickname, return a duplicated string.  The returned string
+ * should be later deallocated using free().  If the OOM failure occurs, we
+ * return NULL, too.
+ */
+static char* dup_nickname(struct SessionHandle *data, enum dupstring cert_kind)
+{
+  const char *str = data->set.str[cert_kind];
+  const char *n;
+
+  if(!is_file(str))
+    /* no such file exists, use the string as nickname */
+    return strdup(str);
+
+  /* search the last slash; we require at least one slash in a file name */
+  n = strrchr(str, '/');
+  if(!n) {
+    infof(data, "warning: certificate file name \"%s\" handled as nickname; "
+          "please use \"./%s\" to force file name\n", str, str);
+    return strdup(str);
+  }
+
+  /* we'll use the PEM reader to read the certificate from file */
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Call PK11_CreateGenericObject() with the given obj_class and filename.  If
+ * the call succeeds, append the object handle to the list of objects so that
+ * the object can be destroyed in Curl_nss_close(). */
+static CURLcode nss_create_object(struct ssl_connect_data *ssl,
+                                  CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_class,
+                                  const char *filename, bool cacert)
+{
+  PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+  PK11GenericObject *obj;
+  CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+  CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[/* max count of attributes */ 4];
+  int attr_cnt = 0;
+  CURLcode err = (cacert)
+    ? CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE
+    : CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+
+  const int slot_id = (cacert) ? 0 : 1;
+  char *slot_name = aprintf("PEM Token #%d", slot_id);
+  if(!slot_name)
+    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+  slot = PK11_FindSlotByName(slot_name);
+  free(slot_name);
+  if(!slot)
+    return err;
+
+  PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, attr_cnt, CKA_CLASS, &obj_class, sizeof(obj_class));
+  PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, attr_cnt, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+  PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, attr_cnt, CKA_LABEL, (unsigned char *)filename,
+                strlen(filename) + 1);
+
+  if(CKO_CERTIFICATE == obj_class) {
+    CK_BBOOL *pval = (cacert) ? (&cktrue) : (&ckfalse);
+    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, attr_cnt, CKA_TRUST, pval, sizeof(*pval));
+  }
+
+  obj = PK11_CreateGenericObject(slot, attrs, attr_cnt, PR_FALSE);
+  PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+  if(!obj)
+    return err;
+
+  if(!Curl_llist_insert_next(ssl->obj_list, ssl->obj_list->tail, obj)) {
+    PK11_DestroyGenericObject(obj);
+    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+  }
+
+  if(!cacert && CKO_CERTIFICATE == obj_class)
+    /* store reference to a client certificate */
+    ssl->obj_clicert = obj;
+
+  return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+/* Destroy the NSS object whose handle is given by ptr.  This function is
+ * a callback of Curl_llist_alloc() used by Curl_llist_destroy() to destroy
+ * NSS objects in Curl_nss_close() */
+static void nss_destroy_object(void *user, void *ptr)
+{
+  PK11GenericObject *obj = (PK11GenericObject *)ptr;
+  (void) user;
+  PK11_DestroyGenericObject(obj);
+}
+
+static CURLcode nss_load_cert(struct ssl_connect_data *ssl,
+                              const char *filename, PRBool cacert)
+{
+  CURLcode err = (cacert)
+    ? CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE
+    : CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+
+  /* libnsspem.so leaks memory if the requested file does not exist.  For more
+   * details, go to <https://bugzilla.redhat.com/734760>. */
+  if(is_file(filename))
+    err = nss_create_object(ssl, CKO_CERTIFICATE, filename, cacert);
+
+  if(CURLE_OK == err && !cacert) {
+    /* we have successfully loaded a client certificate */
+    CERTCertificate *cert;
+    char *nickname = NULL;
+    char *n = strrchr(filename, '/');
+    if(n)
+      n++;
+
+    /* The following undocumented magic helps to avoid a SIGSEGV on call
+     * of PK11_ReadRawAttribute() from SelectClientCert() when using an
+     * immature version of libnsspem.so.  For more details, go to
+     * <https://bugzilla.redhat.com/733685>. */
+    nickname = aprintf("PEM Token #1:%s", n);
+    if(nickname) {
+      cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(nickname, NULL);
+      if(cert)
+        CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+
+      free(nickname);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return err;
+}
+
+/* add given CRL to cache if it is not already there */
+static SECStatus nss_cache_crl(SECItem *crlDER)
+{
+  CERTCertDBHandle *db = CERT_GetDefaultCertDB();
+  CERTSignedCrl *crl = SEC_FindCrlByDERCert(db, crlDER, 0);
+  if(crl) {
+    /* CRL already cached */
+    SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+    SECITEM_FreeItem(crlDER, PR_FALSE);
+    return SECSuccess;
+  }
+
+  /* acquire lock before call of CERT_CacheCRL() */
+  PR_Lock(nss_crllock);
+  if(SECSuccess != CERT_CacheCRL(db, crlDER)) {
+    /* unable to cache CRL */
+    PR_Unlock(nss_crllock);
+    SECITEM_FreeItem(crlDER, PR_FALSE);
+    return SECFailure;
+  }
+
+  /* we need to clear session cache, so that the CRL could take effect */
+  SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+  PR_Unlock(nss_crllock);
+  return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus nss_load_crl(const char* crlfilename)
+{
+  PRFileDesc *infile;
+  PRFileInfo  info;
+  SECItem filedata = { 0, NULL, 0 };
+  SECItem crlDER = { 0, NULL, 0 };
+  char *body;
+
+  infile = PR_Open(crlfilename, PR_RDONLY, 0);
+  if(!infile)
+    return SECFailure;
+
+  if(PR_SUCCESS != PR_GetOpenFileInfo(infile, &info))
+    goto fail;
+
+  if(!SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &filedata, info.size + /* zero ended */ 1))
+    goto fail;
+
+  if(info.size != PR_Read(infile, filedata.data, info.size))
+    goto fail;
+
+  /* place a trailing zero right after the visible data */
+  body = (char*)filedata.data;
+  body[--filedata.len] = '\0';
+
+  body = strstr(body, "-----BEGIN");
+  if(body) {
+    /* assume ASCII */
+    char *trailer;
+    char *begin = PORT_Strchr(body, '\n');
+    if(!begin)
+      begin = PORT_Strchr(body, '\r');
+    if(!begin)
+      goto fail;
+
+    trailer = strstr(++begin, "-----END");
+    if(!trailer)
+      goto fail;
+
+    /* retrieve DER from ASCII */
+    *trailer = '\0';
+    if(ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem(&crlDER, begin))
+      goto fail;
+
+    SECITEM_FreeItem(&filedata, PR_FALSE);
+  }
+  else
+    /* assume DER */
+    crlDER = filedata;
+
+  PR_Close(infile);
+  return nss_cache_crl(&crlDER);
+
+fail:
+  PR_Close(infile);
+  SECITEM_FreeItem(&filedata, PR_FALSE);
+  return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static CURLcode nss_load_key(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex,
+                             char *key_file)
+{
+  PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+  SECStatus status;
+  CURLcode rv;
+  struct ssl_connect_data *ssl = conn->ssl;
+  (void)sockindex; /* unused */
+
+  rv = nss_create_object(ssl, CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, key_file, FALSE);
+  if(CURLE_OK != rv) {
+    PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY, 0);
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  slot = PK11_FindSlotByName("PEM Token #1");
+  if(!slot)
+    return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+
+  /* This will force the token to be seen as re-inserted */
+  SECMOD_WaitForAnyTokenEvent(mod, 0, 0);
+  PK11_IsPresent(slot);
+
+  status = PK11_Authenticate(slot, PR_TRUE,
+                             conn->data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
+  PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+  return (SECSuccess == status)
+    ? CURLE_OK
+    : CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+}
+
+static int display_error(struct connectdata *conn, PRInt32 err,
+                         const char *filename)
+{
+  switch(err) {
+  case SEC_ERROR_BAD_PASSWORD:
+    failf(conn->data, "Unable to load client key: Incorrect password");
+    return 1;
+  case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CERT:
+    failf(conn->data, "Unable to load certificate %s", filename);
+    return 1;
+  default:
+    break;
+  }
+  return 0; /* The caller will print a generic error */
+}
+
+static CURLcode cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex,
+                           char *cert_file, char *key_file)
+{
+  struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+  CURLcode rv;
+
+  if(cert_file) {
+    rv = nss_load_cert(&conn->ssl[sockindex], cert_file, PR_FALSE);
+    if(CURLE_OK != rv) {
+      const PRErrorCode err = PR_GetError();
+      if(!display_error(conn, err, cert_file)) {
+        const char *err_name = nss_error_to_name(err);
+        failf(data, "unable to load client cert: %d (%s)", err, err_name);
+      }
+
+      return rv;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if(key_file || (is_file(cert_file))) {
+    if(key_file)
+      rv = nss_load_key(conn, sockindex, key_file);
+    else
+      /* In case the cert file also has the key */
+      rv = nss_load_key(conn, sockindex, cert_file);
+    if(CURLE_OK != rv) {
+      const PRErrorCode err = PR_GetError();
+      if(!display_error(conn, err, key_file)) {
+        const char *err_name = nss_error_to_name(err);
+        failf(data, "unable to load client key: %d (%s)", err, err_name);
+      }
+
+      return rv;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+static char * nss_get_password(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+  (void)slot; /* unused */
+  if(retry || NULL == arg)
+    return NULL;
+  else
+    return (char *)PORT_Strdup((char *)arg);
+}
+
+/* bypass the default SSL_AuthCertificate() hook in case we do not want to
+ * verify peer */
+static SECStatus nss_auth_cert_hook(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig,
+                                    PRBool isServer)
+{
+  struct connectdata *conn = (struct connectdata *)arg;
+  if(!conn->data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
+    infof(conn->data, "skipping SSL peer certificate verification\n");
+    return SECSuccess;
+  }
+
+  return SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), fd, checksig, isServer);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Inform the application that the handshake is complete.
+ */
+static void HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc *sock, void *arg)
+{
+  (void)sock;
+  (void)arg;
+}
+
+static void display_cert_info(struct SessionHandle *data,
+                              CERTCertificate *cert)
+{
+  char *subject, *issuer, *common_name;
+  PRExplodedTime printableTime;
+  char timeString[256];
+  PRTime notBefore, notAfter;
+
+  subject = CERT_NameToAscii(&cert->subject);
+  issuer = CERT_NameToAscii(&cert->issuer);
+  common_name = CERT_GetCommonName(&cert->subject);
+  infof(data, "\tsubject: %s\n", subject);
+
+  CERT_GetCertTimes(cert, &notBefore, &notAfter);
+  PR_ExplodeTime(notBefore, PR_GMTParameters, &printableTime);
+  PR_FormatTime(timeString, 256, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y GMT", &printableTime);
+  infof(data, "\tstart date: %s\n", timeString);
+  PR_ExplodeTime(notAfter, PR_GMTParameters, &printableTime);
+  PR_FormatTime(timeString, 256, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y GMT", &printableTime);
+  infof(data, "\texpire date: %s\n", timeString);
+  infof(data, "\tcommon name: %s\n", common_name);
+  infof(data, "\tissuer: %s\n", issuer);
+
+  PR_Free(subject);
+  PR_Free(issuer);
+  PR_Free(common_name);
+}
+
+static void display_conn_info(struct connectdata *conn, PRFileDesc *sock)
+{
+  SSLChannelInfo channel;
+  SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+  CERTCertificate *cert;
+
+  if(SSL_GetChannelInfo(sock, &channel, sizeof channel) ==
+     SECSuccess && channel.length == sizeof channel &&
+     channel.cipherSuite) {
+    if(SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite,
+                              &suite, sizeof suite) == SECSuccess) {
+      infof(conn->data, "SSL connection using %s\n", suite.cipherSuiteName);
+    }
+  }
+
+  infof(conn->data, "Server certificate:\n");
+
+  cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(sock);
+  display_cert_info(conn->data, cert);
+  CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+
+  return;
+}
+
+static SECStatus BadCertHandler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *sock)
+{
+  struct connectdata *conn = (struct connectdata *)arg;
+  struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+  PRErrorCode err = PR_GetError();
+  CERTCertificate *cert;
+
+  /* remember the cert verification result */
+  data->set.ssl.certverifyresult = err;
+
+  if(err == SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN && !data->set.ssl.verifyhost)
+    /* we are asked not to verify the host name */
+    return SECSuccess;
+
+  /* print only info about the cert, the error is printed off the callback */
+  cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(sock);
+  if(cert) {
+    infof(data, "Server certificate:\n");
+    display_cert_info(data, cert);
+    CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+  }
+
+  return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/**
+ *
+ * Check that the Peer certificate's issuer certificate matches the one found
+ * by issuer_nickname.  This is not exactly the way OpenSSL and GNU TLS do the
+ * issuer check, so we provide comments that mimic the OpenSSL
+ * X509_check_issued function (in x509v3/v3_purp.c)
+ */
+static SECStatus check_issuer_cert(PRFileDesc *sock,
+                                   char *issuer_nickname)
+{
+  CERTCertificate *cert,*cert_issuer,*issuer;
+  SECStatus res=SECSuccess;
+  void *proto_win = NULL;
+
+  /*
+    PRArenaPool   *tmpArena = NULL;
+    CERTAuthKeyID *authorityKeyID = NULL;
+    SECITEM       *caname = NULL;
+  */
+
+  cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(sock);
+  cert_issuer = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert,PR_Now(),certUsageObjectSigner);
+
+  proto_win = SSL_RevealPinArg(sock);
+  issuer = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(issuer_nickname, proto_win);
+
+  if((!cert_issuer) || (!issuer))
+    res = SECFailure;
+  else if(SECITEM_CompareItem(&cert_issuer->derCert,
+                              &issuer->derCert)!=SECEqual)
+    res = SECFailure;
+
+  CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+  CERT_DestroyCertificate(issuer);
+  CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert_issuer);
+  return res;
+}
+
+/**
+ *
+ * Callback to pick the SSL client certificate.
+ */
+static SECStatus SelectClientCert(void *arg, PRFileDesc *sock,
+                                  struct CERTDistNamesStr *caNames,
+                                  struct CERTCertificateStr **pRetCert,
+                                  struct SECKEYPrivateKeyStr **pRetKey)
+{
+  struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = (struct ssl_connect_data *)arg;
+  struct SessionHandle *data = connssl->data;
+  const char *nickname = connssl->client_nickname;
+
+  if(connssl->obj_clicert) {
+    /* use the cert/key provided by PEM reader */
+    static const char pem_slotname[] = "PEM Token #1";
+    SECItem cert_der = { 0, NULL, 0 };
+    void *proto_win = SSL_RevealPinArg(sock);
+    struct CERTCertificateStr *cert;
+    struct SECKEYPrivateKeyStr *key;
+
+    PK11SlotInfo *slot = PK11_FindSlotByName(pem_slotname);
+    if(NULL == slot) {
+      failf(data, "NSS: PK11 slot not found: %s", pem_slotname);
+      return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if(PK11_ReadRawAttribute(PK11_TypeGeneric, connssl->obj_clicert, CKA_VALUE,
+                             &cert_der) != SECSuccess) {
+      failf(data, "NSS: CKA_VALUE not found in PK11 generic object");
+      PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+      return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    cert = PK11_FindCertFromDERCertItem(slot, &cert_der, proto_win);
+    SECITEM_FreeItem(&cert_der, PR_FALSE);
+    if(NULL == cert) {
+      failf(data, "NSS: client certificate from file not found");
+      PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+      return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    key = PK11_FindPrivateKeyFromCert(slot, cert, NULL);
+    PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+    if(NULL == key) {
+      failf(data, "NSS: private key from file not found");
+      CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+      return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    infof(data, "NSS: client certificate from file\n");
+    display_cert_info(data, cert);
+
+    *pRetCert = cert;
+    *pRetKey = key;
+    return SECSuccess;
+  }
+
+  /* use the default NSS hook */
+  if(SECSuccess != NSS_GetClientAuthData((void *)nickname, sock, caNames,
+                                          pRetCert, pRetKey)
+      || NULL == *pRetCert) {
+
+    if(NULL == nickname)
+      failf(data, "NSS: client certificate not found (nickname not "
+            "specified)");
+    else
+      failf(data, "NSS: client certificate not found: %s", nickname);
+
+    return SECFailure;
+  }
+
+  /* get certificate nickname if any */
+  nickname = (*pRetCert)->nickname;
+  if(NULL == nickname)
+    nickname = "[unknown]";
+
+  if(NULL == *pRetKey) {
+    failf(data, "NSS: private key not found for certificate: %s", nickname);
+    return SECFailure;
+  }
+
+  infof(data, "NSS: using client certificate: %s\n", nickname);
+  display_cert_info(data, *pRetCert);
+  return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* This function is supposed to decide, which error codes should be used
+ * to conclude server is TLS intolerant.
+ *
+ * taken from xulrunner - nsNSSIOLayer.cpp
+ */
+static PRBool
+isTLSIntoleranceError(PRInt32 err)
+{
+  switch (err) {
+  case SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_ALERT:
+  case SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ:
+  case SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ALERT:
+  case SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT:
+  case SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE:
+  case SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT:
+  case SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP:
+  case SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER:
+  case SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING:
+  case SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION:
+  case SSL_ERROR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_ALERT:
+  case SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED:
+  case SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE:
+  case SSL_ERROR_DECODE_ERROR_ALERT:
+  case SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_ALERT:
+    return PR_TRUE;
+  default:
+    return PR_FALSE;
+  }
+}
+
+static CURLcode nss_init_core(struct SessionHandle *data, const char *cert_dir)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_NSS_INITCONTEXT
+  NSSInitParameters initparams;
+
+  if(nss_context != NULL)
+    return CURLE_OK;
+
+  memset((void *) &initparams, '\0', sizeof(initparams));
+  initparams.length = sizeof(initparams);
+#else /* HAVE_NSS_INITCONTEXT */
+  SECStatus rv;
+
+  if(NSS_IsInitialized())
+    return CURLE_OK;
+#endif
+
+  if(cert_dir) {
+    const bool use_sql = NSS_VersionCheck("3.12.0");
+    char *certpath = aprintf("%s%s", use_sql ? "sql:" : "", cert_dir);
+    if(!certpath)
+      return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+    infof(data, "Initializing NSS with certpath: %s\n", certpath);
+#ifdef HAVE_NSS_INITCONTEXT
+    nss_context = NSS_InitContext(certpath, "", "", "", &initparams,
+            NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+    free(certpath);
+
+    if(nss_context != NULL)
+      return CURLE_OK;
+#else /* HAVE_NSS_INITCONTEXT */
+    rv = NSS_Initialize(certpath, "", "", "", NSS_INIT_READONLY);
+    free(certpath);
+
+    if(rv == SECSuccess)
+      return CURLE_OK;
+#endif
+
+    infof(data, "Unable to initialize NSS database\n");
+  }
+
+  infof(data, "Initializing NSS with certpath: none\n");
+#ifdef HAVE_NSS_INITCONTEXT
+  nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", &initparams, NSS_INIT_READONLY
+         | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB   | NSS_INIT_NOMODDB       | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN
+         | NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_OPTIMIZESPACE | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+  if(nss_context != NULL)
+    return CURLE_OK;
+#else /* HAVE_NSS_INITCONTEXT */
+  if(NSS_NoDB_Init(NULL) == SECSuccess)
+    return CURLE_OK;
+#endif
+
+  infof(data, "Unable to initialize NSS\n");
+  return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+}
+
+static CURLcode nss_init(struct SessionHandle *data)
+{
+  char *cert_dir;
+  struct_stat st;
+  CURLcode rv;
+
+  if(initialized)
+    return CURLE_OK;
+
+  /* First we check if $SSL_DIR points to a valid dir */
+  cert_dir = getenv("SSL_DIR");
+  if(cert_dir) {
+    if((stat(cert_dir, &st) != 0) ||
+        (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))) {
+      cert_dir = NULL;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Now we check if the default location is a valid dir */
+  if(!cert_dir) {
+    if((stat(SSL_DIR, &st) == 0) &&
+        (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))) {
+      cert_dir = (char *)SSL_DIR;
+    }
+  }
+
+  rv = nss_init_core(data, cert_dir);
+  if(rv)
+    return rv;
+
+  if(num_enabled_ciphers() == 0)
+    NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+
+  initialized = 1;
+  return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Global SSL init
+ *
+ * @retval 0 error initializing SSL
+ * @retval 1 SSL initialized successfully
+ */
+int Curl_nss_init(void)
+{
+  /* curl_global_init() is not thread-safe so this test is ok */
+  if(nss_initlock == NULL) {
+    PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 256);
+    nss_initlock = PR_NewLock();
+    nss_crllock = PR_NewLock();
+  }
+
+  /* We will actually initialize NSS later */
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+CURLcode Curl_nss_force_init(struct SessionHandle *data)
+{
+  CURLcode rv;
+  if(!nss_initlock) {
+    failf(data,
+          "unable to initialize NSS, curl_global_init() should have been "
+          "called with CURL_GLOBAL_SSL or CURL_GLOBAL_ALL");
+    return CURLE_FAILED_INIT;
+  }
+
+  PR_Lock(nss_initlock);
+  rv = nss_init(data);
+  PR_Unlock(nss_initlock);
+  return rv;
+}
+
+/* Global cleanup */
+void Curl_nss_cleanup(void)
+{
+  /* This function isn't required to be threadsafe and this is only done
+   * as a safety feature.
+   */
+  PR_Lock(nss_initlock);
+  if(initialized) {
+    /* Free references to client certificates held in the SSL session cache.
+     * Omitting this hampers destruction of the security module owning
+     * the certificates. */
+    SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+
+    if(mod && SECSuccess == SECMOD_UnloadUserModule(mod)) {
+      SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+      mod = NULL;
+    }
+#ifdef HAVE_NSS_INITCONTEXT
+    NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+    nss_context = NULL;
+#else /* HAVE_NSS_INITCONTEXT */
+    NSS_Shutdown();
+#endif
+  }
+  PR_Unlock(nss_initlock);
+
+  PR_DestroyLock(nss_initlock);
+  PR_DestroyLock(nss_crllock);
+  nss_initlock = NULL;
+
+  initialized = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function uses SSL_peek to determine connection status.
+ *
+ * Return codes:
+ *     1 means the connection is still in place
+ *     0 means the connection has been closed
+ *    -1 means the connection status is unknown
+ */
+int
+Curl_nss_check_cxn(struct connectdata *conn)
+{
+  int rc;
+  char buf;
+
+  rc =
+    PR_Recv(conn->ssl[FIRSTSOCKET].handle, (void *)&buf, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK,
+            PR_SecondsToInterval(1));
+  if(rc > 0)
+    return 1; /* connection still in place */
+
+  if(rc == 0)
+    return 0; /* connection has been closed */
+
+  return -1;  /* connection status unknown */
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is called when an SSL connection is closed.
+ */
+void Curl_nss_close(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+  struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+
+  if(connssl->handle) {
+    /* NSS closes the socket we previously handed to it, so we must mark it
+       as closed to avoid double close */
+    fake_sclose(conn->sock[sockindex]);
+    conn->sock[sockindex] = CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
+    if(connssl->client_nickname != NULL) {
+      free(connssl->client_nickname);
+      connssl->client_nickname = NULL;
+
+      /* force NSS to ask again for a client cert when connecting
+       * next time to the same server */
+      SSL_InvalidateSession(connssl->handle);
+    }
+    /* destroy all NSS objects in order to avoid failure of NSS shutdown */
+    Curl_llist_destroy(connssl->obj_list, NULL);
+    connssl->obj_list = NULL;
+    connssl->obj_clicert = NULL;
+
+    PR_Close(connssl->handle);
+    connssl->handle = NULL;
+  }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is called when the 'data' struct is going away. Close
+ * down everything and free all resources!
+ */
+int Curl_nss_close_all(struct SessionHandle *data)
+{
+  (void)data;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* return true if NSS can provide error code (and possibly msg) for the
+   error */
+static bool is_nss_error(CURLcode err)
+{
+  switch(err) {
+  case CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION:
+  case CURLE_SSL_CACERT:
+  case CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE:
+  case CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM:
+  case CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR:
+  case CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE:
+  case CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR:
+    return true;
+
+  default:
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+/* return true if the given error code is related to a client certificate */
+static bool is_cc_error(PRInt32 err)
+{
+  switch(err) {
+  case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_ALERT:
+  case SSL_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERT_ALERT:
+  case SSL_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_ALERT:
+    return true;
+
+  default:
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+static Curl_recv nss_recv;
+static Curl_send nss_send;
+
+static CURLcode nss_load_ca_certificates(struct connectdata *conn,
+                                         int sockindex)
+{
+  struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+  const char *cafile = data->set.ssl.CAfile;
+  const char *capath = data->set.ssl.CApath;
+
+  if(cafile) {
+    CURLcode rv = nss_load_cert(&conn->ssl[sockindex], cafile, PR_TRUE);
+    if(CURLE_OK != rv)
+      return rv;
+  }
+
+  if(capath) {
+    struct_stat st;
+    if(stat(capath, &st) == -1)
+      return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+
+    if(S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
+      PRDirEntry *entry;
+      PRDir *dir = PR_OpenDir(capath);
+      if(!dir)
+        return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+
+      while((entry = PR_ReadDir(dir, PR_SKIP_BOTH | PR_SKIP_HIDDEN))) {
+        char *fullpath = aprintf("%s/%s", capath, entry->name);
+        if(!fullpath) {
+          PR_CloseDir(dir);
+          return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+        }
+
+        if(CURLE_OK != nss_load_cert(&conn->ssl[sockindex], fullpath, PR_TRUE))
+          /* This is purposefully tolerant of errors so non-PEM files can
+           * be in the same directory */
+          infof(data, "failed to load '%s' from CURLOPT_CAPATH\n", fullpath);
+
+        free(fullpath);
+      }
+
+      PR_CloseDir(dir);
+    }
+    else
+      infof(data, "warning: CURLOPT_CAPATH not a directory (%s)\n", capath);
+  }
+
+  infof(data, "  CAfile: %s\n  CApath: %s\n",
+      cafile ? cafile : "none",
+      capath ? capath : "none");
+
+  return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+CURLcode Curl_nss_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+  PRErrorCode err = 0;
+  PRFileDesc *model = NULL;
+  PRBool ssl2 = PR_FALSE;
+  PRBool ssl3 = PR_FALSE;
+  PRBool tlsv1 = PR_FALSE;
+  PRBool ssl_no_cache;
+  PRBool ssl_cbc_random_iv;
+  struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+  curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
+  struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+  CURLcode curlerr;
+  const int *cipher_to_enable;
+  PRSocketOptionData sock_opt;
+  long time_left;
+  PRUint32 timeout;
+
+  if(connssl->state == ssl_connection_complete)
+    return CURLE_OK;
+
+  connssl->data = data;
+
+  /* list of all NSS objects we need to destroy in Curl_nss_close() */
+  connssl->obj_list = Curl_llist_alloc(nss_destroy_object);
+  if(!connssl->obj_list)
+    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+  /* FIXME. NSS doesn't support multiple databases open at the same time. */
+  PR_Lock(nss_initlock);
+  curlerr = nss_init(conn->data);
+  if(CURLE_OK != curlerr) {
+    PR_Unlock(nss_initlock);
+    goto error;
+  }
+
+  curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+
+  if(!mod) {
+    char *configstring = aprintf("library=%s name=PEM", pem_library);
+    if(!configstring) {
+      PR_Unlock(nss_initlock);
+      goto error;
+    }
+    mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(configstring, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+    free(configstring);
+
+    if(!mod || !mod->loaded) {
+      if(mod) {
+        SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+        mod = NULL;
+      }
+      infof(data, "WARNING: failed to load NSS PEM library %s. Using "
+            "OpenSSL PEM certificates will not work.\n", pem_library);
+    }
+  }
+
+  PK11_SetPasswordFunc(nss_get_password);
+  PR_Unlock(nss_initlock);
+
+  model = PR_NewTCPSocket();
+  if(!model)
+    goto error;
+  model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+
+  /* make the socket nonblocking */
+  sock_opt.option = PR_SockOpt_Nonblocking;
+  sock_opt.value.non_blocking = PR_TRUE;
+  if(PR_SetSocketOption(model, &sock_opt) != PR_SUCCESS)
+    goto error;
+
+  if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+  if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+  if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+
+  /* do not use SSL cache if we are not going to verify peer */
+  ssl_no_cache = (data->set.ssl.verifypeer) ? PR_FALSE : PR_TRUE;
+  if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_NO_CACHE, ssl_no_cache) != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+
+  switch (data->set.ssl.version) {
+  default:
+  case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
+    ssl3 = PR_TRUE;
+    if(data->state.ssl_connect_retry)
+      infof(data, "TLS disabled due to previous handshake failure\n");
+    else
+      tlsv1 = PR_TRUE;
+    break;
+  case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
+    tlsv1 = PR_TRUE;
+    break;
+  case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2:
+    ssl2 = PR_TRUE;
+    break;
+  case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3:
+    ssl3 = PR_TRUE;
+    break;
+  }
+
+  if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, ssl2) != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+  if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, ssl3) != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+  if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_TLS, tlsv1) != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+
+  if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, ssl2) != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+
+  ssl_cbc_random_iv = !data->set.ssl_enable_beast;
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+  /* unless the user explicitly asks to allow the protocol vulnerability, we
+     use the work-around */
+  if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, ssl_cbc_random_iv) != SECSuccess)
+    infof(data, "warning: failed to set SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV = %d\n",
+          ssl_cbc_random_iv);
+#else
+  if(ssl_cbc_random_iv)
+    infof(data, "warning: support for SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV not compiled in\n");
+#endif
+
+  /* reset the flag to avoid an infinite loop */
+  data->state.ssl_connect_retry = FALSE;
+
+  /* enable all ciphers from enable_ciphers_by_default */
+  cipher_to_enable = enable_ciphers_by_default;
+  while(SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL != *cipher_to_enable) {
+    if(SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, *cipher_to_enable, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess) {
+      curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
+      goto error;
+    }
+    cipher_to_enable++;
+  }
+
+  if(data->set.ssl.cipher_list) {
+    if(set_ciphers(data, model, data->set.ssl.cipher_list) != SECSuccess) {
+      curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
+      goto error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if(!data->set.ssl.verifypeer && data->set.ssl.verifyhost)
+    infof(data, "warning: ignoring value of ssl.verifyhost\n");
+
+  /* bypass the default SSL_AuthCertificate() hook in case we do not want to
+   * verify peer */
+  if(SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, nss_auth_cert_hook, conn) != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+
+  data->set.ssl.certverifyresult=0; /* not checked yet */
+  if(SSL_BadCertHook(model, BadCertHandler, conn) != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+
+  if(SSL_HandshakeCallback(model, HandshakeCallback, NULL) != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+
+  if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
+    const CURLcode rv = nss_load_ca_certificates(conn, sockindex);
+    if(CURLE_OK != rv) {
+      curlerr = rv;
+      goto error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if(data->set.ssl.CRLfile) {
+    if(SECSuccess != nss_load_crl(data->set.ssl.CRLfile)) {
+      curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
+      goto error;
+    }
+    infof(data,
+          "  CRLfile: %s\n",
+          data->set.ssl.CRLfile ? data->set.ssl.CRLfile : "none");
+  }
+
+  if(data->set.str[STRING_CERT]) {
+    char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, STRING_CERT);
+    if(nickname) {
+      /* we are not going to use libnsspem.so to read the client cert */
+      connssl->obj_clicert = NULL;
+    }
+    else {
+      CURLcode rv = cert_stuff(conn, sockindex, data->set.str[STRING_CERT],
+                               data->set.str[STRING_KEY]);
+      if(CURLE_OK != rv) {
+        /* failf() is already done in cert_stuff() */
+        curlerr = rv;
+        goto error;
+      }
+    }
+
+    /* store the nickname for SelectClientCert() called during handshake */
+    connssl->client_nickname = nickname;
+  }
+  else
+    connssl->client_nickname = NULL;
+
+  if(SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(model, SelectClientCert,
+                               (void *)connssl) != SECSuccess) {
+    curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+    goto error;
+  }
+
+  /* Import our model socket  onto the existing file descriptor */
+  connssl->handle = PR_ImportTCPSocket(sockfd);
+  connssl->handle = SSL_ImportFD(model, connssl->handle);
+  if(!connssl->handle)
+    goto error;
+
+  PR_Close(model); /* We don't need this any more */
+  model = NULL;
+
+  /* This is the password associated with the cert that we're using */
+  if(data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]) {
+    SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(connssl->handle, data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
+  }
+
+  /* Force handshake on next I/O */
+  SSL_ResetHandshake(connssl->handle, /* asServer */ PR_FALSE);
+
+  SSL_SetURL(connssl->handle, conn->host.name);
+
+  /* check timeout situation */
+  time_left = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
+  if(time_left < 0L) {
+    failf(data, "timed out before SSL handshake");
+    curlerr = CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
+    goto error;
+  }
+  timeout = PR_MillisecondsToInterval((PRUint32) time_left);
+
+  /* Force the handshake now */
+  if(SSL_ForceHandshakeWithTimeout(connssl->handle, timeout) != SECSuccess) {
+    if(conn->data->set.ssl.certverifyresult == SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN)
+      curlerr = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+    else if(conn->data->set.ssl.certverifyresult!=0)
+      curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
+    goto error;
+  }
+
+  connssl->state = ssl_connection_complete;
+  conn->recv[sockindex] = nss_recv;
+  conn->send[sockindex] = nss_send;
+
+  display_conn_info(conn, connssl->handle);
+
+  if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]) {
+    SECStatus ret = SECFailure;
+    char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT);
+    if(nickname) {
+      /* we support only nicknames in case of STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT for now */
+      ret = check_issuer_cert(connssl->handle, nickname);
+      free(nickname);
+    }
+
+    if(SECFailure == ret) {
+      infof(data,"SSL certificate issuer check failed\n");
+      curlerr = CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
+      goto error;
+    }
+    else {
+      infof(data, "SSL certificate issuer check ok\n");
+    }
+  }
+
+  return CURLE_OK;
+
+  error:
+  /* reset the flag to avoid an infinite loop */
+  data->state.ssl_connect_retry = FALSE;
+
+  if(is_nss_error(curlerr)) {
+    /* read NSPR error code */
+    err = PR_GetError();
+    if(is_cc_error(err))
+      curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+
+    /* print the error number and error string */
+    infof(data, "NSS error %d (%s)\n", err, nss_error_to_name(err));
+
+    /* print a human-readable message describing the error if available */
+    nss_print_error_message(data, err);
+  }
+
+  if(model)
+    PR_Close(model);
+
+    /* cleanup on connection failure */
+    Curl_llist_destroy(connssl->obj_list, NULL);
+    connssl->obj_list = NULL;
+
+  if(ssl3 && tlsv1 && isTLSIntoleranceError(err)) {
+    /* schedule reconnect through Curl_retry_request() */
+    data->state.ssl_connect_retry = TRUE;
+    infof(data, "Error in TLS handshake, trying SSLv3...\n");
+    return CURLE_OK;
+  }
+
+  return curlerr;
+}
+
+static ssize_t nss_send(struct connectdata *conn,  /* connection data */
+                        int sockindex,             /* socketindex */
+                        const void *mem,           /* send this data */
+                        size_t len,                /* amount to write */
+                        CURLcode *curlcode)
+{
+  int rc;
+
+  rc = PR_Send(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, mem, (int)len, 0, -1);
+
+  if(rc < 0) {
+    PRInt32 err = PR_GetError();
+    if(err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+      *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
+    else {
+      /* print the error number and error string */
+      const char *err_name = nss_error_to_name(err);
+      infof(conn->data, "SSL write: error %d (%s)\n", err, err_name);
+
+      /* print a human-readable message describing the error if available */
+      nss_print_error_message(conn->data, err);
+
+      *curlcode = (is_cc_error(err))
+        ? CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM
+        : CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
+    }
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return rc; /* number of bytes */
+}
+
+static ssize_t nss_recv(struct connectdata * conn, /* connection data */
+                        int num,                   /* socketindex */
+                        char *buf,                 /* store read data here */
+                        size_t buffersize,         /* max amount to read */
+                        CURLcode *curlcode)
+{
+  ssize_t nread;
+
+  nread = PR_Recv(conn->ssl[num].handle, buf, (int)buffersize, 0, -1);
+  if(nread < 0) {
+    /* failed SSL read */
+    PRInt32 err = PR_GetError();
+
+    if(err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+      *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
+    else {
+      /* print the error number and error string */
+      const char *err_name = nss_error_to_name(err);
+      infof(conn->data, "SSL read: errno %d (%s)\n", err, err_name);
+
+      /* print a human-readable message describing the error if available */
+      nss_print_error_message(conn->data, err);
+
+      *curlcode = (is_cc_error(err))
+        ? CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM
+        : CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
+    }
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return nread;
+}
+
+size_t Curl_nss_version(char *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+  return snprintf(buffer, size, "NSS/%s", NSS_VERSION);
+}
+
+int Curl_nss_seed(struct SessionHandle *data)
+{
+  /* TODO: implement? */
+  (void) data;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+void Curl_nss_random(struct SessionHandle *data,
+                     unsigned char *entropy,
+                     size_t length)
+{
+  Curl_nss_seed(data);  /* Initiate the seed if not already done */
+  PK11_GenerateRandom(entropy, curlx_uztosi(length));
+}
+
+void Curl_nss_md5sum(unsigned char *tmp, /* input */
+                     size_t tmplen,
+                     unsigned char *md5sum, /* output */
+                     size_t md5len)
+{
+  PK11Context *MD5pw = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_MD5);
+  unsigned int MD5out;
+  PK11_DigestOp(MD5pw, tmp, curlx_uztoui(tmplen));
+  PK11_DigestFinal(MD5pw, md5sum, &MD5out, curlx_uztoui(md5len));
+  PK11_DestroyContext(MD5pw, PR_TRUE);
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */