diff options
-rw-r--r-- | ssl_engine_kernel.c | 28 |
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/ssl_engine_kernel.c b/ssl_engine_kernel.c index 349d9b1f8b..009ad76a7e 100644 --- a/ssl_engine_kernel.c +++ b/ssl_engine_kernel.c @@ -751,6 +751,20 @@ int ssl_hook_Access(request_rec *r) } } + /* If we're trying to have the user name set from a client + * certificate then we need to set it here. This should be safe as + * the user name probably isn't important from an auth checking point + * of view as the certificate supplied acts in that capacity. + * However, if FakeAuth is being used then this isn't the case so + * we need to postpone setting the username until later. + */ + if ((dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_FAKEBASICAUTH) == 0 && dc->szUserName) { + char *val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection, + r, (char *)dc->szUserName); + if (val && val[0]) + r->user = val; + } + /* * Check SSLRequire boolean expressions */ @@ -799,20 +813,6 @@ int ssl_hook_Access(request_rec *r) } } - /* If we're trying to have the user name set from a client - * certificate then we need to set it here. This should be safe as - * the user name probably isn't important from an auth checking point - * of view as the certificate supplied acts in that capacity. - * However, if FakeAuth is being used then this isn't the case so - * we need to postpone setting the username until later. - */ - if ((dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_FAKEBASICAUTH) == 0 && dc->szUserName) { - char *val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection, - r, (char *)dc->szUserName); - if (val && val[0]) - r->user = val; - } - /* * Else access is granted from our point of view (except vendor * handlers override). But we have to return DECLINED here instead |