From 5c643db4cc95c6ac6457731cb5bb75d6896e415b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jun Nie Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 16:55:58 +0800 Subject: SPL: Add signature verification when loading image U-boot proper signature is not verified by SPL on most platforms even config SPL_FIT_SIGNATURE is enabled. Only fsl-layerscape platform support secure boot in platform specific code. So verified boot cannot be achieved if u-boot proper is loaded by SPL. This patch add signature verification to u-boot proper images when loading FIT image in SPL. It is tested on Allwinner bananapi zero board with H2+ SoC. Signed-off-by: Jun Nie --- common/spl/spl_fit.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) (limited to 'common/spl/spl_fit.c') diff --git a/common/spl/spl_fit.c b/common/spl/spl_fit.c index b705d030e7..be92ca4b4f 100644 --- a/common/spl/spl_fit.c +++ b/common/spl/spl_fit.c @@ -174,6 +174,9 @@ static int spl_load_fit_image(struct spl_load_info *info, ulong sector, uint8_t image_comp = -1, type = -1; const void *data; bool external_data = false; +#ifdef CONFIG_SPL_FIT_SIGNATURE + int ret; +#endif if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPL_OS_BOOT) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPL_GZIP)) { if (fit_image_get_comp(fit, node, &image_comp)) @@ -252,7 +255,16 @@ static int spl_load_fit_image(struct spl_load_info *info, ulong sector, image_info->entry_point = fdt_getprop_u32(fit, node, "entry"); } +#ifdef CONFIG_SPL_FIT_SIGNATURE + printf("## Checking hash(es) for Image %s ...\n", + fit_get_name(fit, node, NULL)); + ret = fit_image_verify_with_data(fit, node, + (const void *)load_addr, length); + printf("\n"); + return !ret; +#else return 0; +#endif } static int spl_fit_append_fdt(struct spl_image_info *spl_image, -- cgit v1.2.1