# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- # OpenID relying party library # Copyright Martin v. Löwis, 2009 # Licensed under the Academic Free License, version 3 # This library implements OpenID Authentication 2.0, # in the role of a relying party import urlparse, urllib, httplib, time, cgi, HTMLParser import cStringIO, base64, hmac, hashlib, datetime, re, random import itertools, cPickle, sys try: from xml.etree import ElementTree except ImportError: from elementtree import ElementTree # Don't use urllib2, since it breaks in 2.5 # for https://login.launchpad.net//+xrds # Don't use urllib, since it sometimes selects HTTP/1.1 (e.g. in PyPI) # and then fails to parse chunked responses. # 3.x portability if sys.version_info < (3,): def b(s): return s # Convert byte to integer b2i = ord def bytes_from_ints(L): return ''.join([chr(i) for i in L]) else: def b(s): return s.encode('latin-1') def b2i(char): # 3.x: bytes are already sequences of integers return char bytes_from_ints = bytes class NotAuthenticated(Exception): CONNECTION_REFUSED = 1 DIRECT_VERIFICATION_FAILED = 2 CANCELLED = 3 UNSUPPORTED_VERSION = 4 UNEXPECTED_MODE = 5 CLAIMED_ID_MISSING = 6 DISCOVERY_FAILED = 7 INCONSISTENT_IDS = 8 REPLAY_ATTACK = 9 MISSING_NONCE = 10 msgs = { CONNECTION_REFUSED : 'OP refuses connection with status %d', DIRECT_VERIFICATION_FAILED : 'OP doesn\'t assert that the signature of the verification request is valid', CANCELLED : 'OP did not authenticate user (cancelled)', UNSUPPORTED_VERSION : 'Unsupported OpenID version', UNEXPECTED_MODE : 'Unexpected mode %s', CLAIMED_ID_MISSING : 'Cannot determine claimed ID', DISCOVERY_FAILED : 'Claimed ID %s cannot be rediscovered', INCONSISTENT_IDS : 'Discovered and asserted endpoints differ', REPLAY_ATTACK : 'Replay attack detected', MISSING_NONCE : 'Nonce missing in OpenID 2 response', } def __init__(self, errno, *args): msg = self.msgs[errno] if args: msg %= args self.errno = errno Exception.__init__(self, msg, errno, *args) def __str__(self): return self.args[0] def normalize_uri(uri): """Normalize an uri according to OpenID section 7.2. Return a pair type,value, where type can be either 'xri' or 'uri'.""" # 7.2 Normalization if uri.startswith('xri://'): uri = uri[6:] if uri[0] in ("=", "@", "+", "$", "!", ")"): return 'xri', uri if not uri.startswith('http'): uri = 'http://' + uri # RFC 3986, section 6 # 6.2.2.1 case normalization parts = urlparse.urlparse(uri) # already lower-cases scheme if '@' in parts[1]: #netloc userinfo,hostname = parts[1].rsplit('@', 1) else: userinfo,hostname = None,parts[1] if ':' in hostname: host,port = hostname.rsplit(':', 1) if ']' in port: # IPv6 host,port = hostname,None else: host,port = hostname,None netloc = hostname = host.lower() if port: netloc = hostname = host+':'+port if userinfo: netloc = userinfo + '@' + hostname parts = list(parts) parts[1] = netloc uri = urlparse.urlunparse(parts) # 6.2.2.2. normalize case in % escapes # XXX should restrict search to parts that can be pct-encoded for match in re.findall('%[0-9a-fA-F][0-9a-fA-F]', uri): m2 = match.upper() if m2 != match: uri = uri.replace(match, m2) # 6.2.2.3 remove dot segments parts = urlparse.urlparse(uri) path = parts[2] #path newpath = '' while path: if path.startswith('../'): path = path[3:] elif path.startswith('./'): path = path[2:] elif path.startswith('/./'): newpath += '/'; path = path[3:] elif path == '/.': newpath += '/'; path = '' elif path.startswith('/../'): newpath = newpath.rsplit('/', 1)[0] path = path[3:] # leave / elif path == '/..': newpath = newpath.rsplit('/', 1)[0] path = '/' elif path == '.' or path=='..': path = '' else: pos = path.find('/', 1) if pos == -1: pos = len(path) newpath += path[:pos] path = path[pos:] parts = list(parts) parts[2] = newpath uri = urlparse.urlunparse(parts) # 6.2.3 scheme based normalization parts = urlparse.urlparse(uri) netloc = parts[1] if netloc.endswith(':'): netloc = netloc[:-1] elif parts[0] == 'http' and netloc.endswith(':80'): netloc = netloc[:-3] elif parts[0] == 'https' and netloc.endswith(':443'): netloc = netloc[:-4] # other default ports not considered here path = parts[2] if parts[0] in ('http', 'https') and parts[2]=='': path = '/' # 6.2.5 protocol-based normalization not done, as it # is not appropriate to resolve the URL just for normalization # it seems like a bug in the OpenID spec that it doesn't specify # which normalizations exactly should be performed parts = list(parts) parts[1] = netloc parts[2] = path return 'uri', urlparse.urlunparse(parts) def parse_response(s): '''Parse a key-value form (OpenID section 4.1.1) into a dictionary''' res = {} for line in s.decode('utf-8').splitlines(): k,v = line.split(':', 1) res[k] = v return res class OpenIDParser(HTMLParser.HTMLParser): def __init__(self): HTMLParser.HTMLParser.__init__(self) self.links = {} self.xrds_location=None def handle_starttag(self, tag, attrs): if tag == 'link': attrs = dict(attrs) try: self.links[attrs['rel']] = attrs['href'] except KeyError: pass elif tag == 'meta': attrs = dict(attrs) # Yadis 6.2.5 option 1: meta tag if attrs.get('http-equiv','').lower() == 'x-xrds-location': self.xrds_location = attrs['content'] def _extract_services(doc): for svc in doc.findall(".//{xri://$xrd*($v*2.0)}Service"): services = [x.text for x in svc.findall("{xri://$xrd*($v*2.0)}Type")] if 'http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0/server' in services: # 7.3.2.1.1 OP Identifier Element uri = svc.find("{xri://$xrd*($v*2.0)}URI") if uri is not None: op_local = None op_endpoint = uri.text break elif 'http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0/signon' in services: # 7.3.2.1.2. Claimed Identifier Element op_local = svc.find("{xri://$xrd*($v*2.0)}LocalID") if op_local is not None: op_local = op_local.text uri = svc.find("{xri://$xrd*($v*2.0)}URI") if uri is not None: op_endpoint = uri.text break elif 'http://openid.net/server/1.0' in services or \ 'http://openid.net/server/1.1' in services or \ 'http://openid.net/signon/1.0' in services or \ 'http://openid.net/signon/1.1' in services: # 14.2.1 says we also need to check for the 1.x types; # XXX should check 1.x only if no 2.0 service is found op_local = svc.find("{http://openid.net/xmlns/1.0}Delegate") if op_local is not None: op_local = op_local.text uri = svc.find("{xri://$xrd*($v*2.0)}URI") if uri is not None: op_endpoint = uri.text break else: return None # No OpenID 2.0 service found return services, op_endpoint, op_local def discover(url): '''Perform service discovery on the OP URL. Return list of service types, and the auth/2.0 URL, or None if discovery fails.''' scheme, netloc, path, query, fragment = urlparse.urlsplit(url) assert not fragment if scheme == 'https': conn = httplib.HTTPSConnection(netloc) elif scheme == 'http': conn = httplib.HTTPConnection(netloc) else: raise ValueError, "Unsupported scheme "+scheme # conn.set_debuglevel(1) if query: path += '?'+query try: conn.connect() except: # DNS or TCP error return None # httplib in 2.5 incorrectly sends https port in Host # header even if it is 443 conn.putrequest("GET", path, skip_host=1) conn.putheader('Host', netloc) conn.putheader('Accept', "text/html; q=0.3, "+ "application/xhtml+xml; q=0.5, "+ "application/xrds+xml") conn.endheaders() res = conn.getresponse() data = res.read() conn.close() if res.status in (301, 302, 303, 307): return discover(res.msg.get('location')) if sys.version_info < (3,0): content_type = res.msg.gettype() else: content_type = res.msg.get_content_type() # Yadis 6.2.5 option 2 and 3: header includes x-xrds-location xrds_loc = res.msg.get('x-xrds-location') if xrds_loc and content_type != 'application/xrds+xml': return discover(xrds_loc) if content_type in ('text/html', 'application/xhtml+xml'): parser = OpenIDParser() parser.feed(data.decode('latin-1')) parser.close() # Yadis 6.2.5 option 1: meta tag if parser.xrds_location: return discover(parser.xrds_location) # OpenID 7.3.3: attempt html based discovery op_endpoint = parser.links.get('openid2.provider') if op_endpoint: op_local = parser.links.get('openid2.local_id') return ['http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0/signon'], op_endpoint, op_local # 14.2.1: 1.1 compatibility op_endpoint = parser.links.get('openid.server') if op_endpoint: op_local = parser.links.get('openid.delegate') return ['http://openid.net/signon/1.1'], op_endpoint, op_local # Discovery failed return None elif content_type == 'application/xrds+xml': # Yadis 6.2.5 option 4 doc = ElementTree.fromstring(data) return _extract_services(doc) else: # unknown content type return None return services, op_endpoint, op_local def resolve_xri(xri, proxy='xri.net'): '''Perform XRI resolution of xri using a proxy resolver. Return canonical ID, services, op endpoint, op local; return None if an error occurred''' xri = urllib.quote(xri, safe='=@*!+()') # Ask explicitly for the specific service types, to # avoid having to identify the correct XRD element in # case the identifier is hierarchical for stype in ('http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0/signon', 'http://openid.net/signon/1.0'): conn = httplib.HTTPConnection(proxy) try: conn.connect() except: # DNS or TCP error return None conn.putrequest("GET", '/'+xri+'?_xrd_r=application/xrd+xml' +'&_xrd_t='+stype) conn.putheader('Connection', 'Keep-Alive') conn.endheaders() res = conn.getresponse() data = res.read() doc = ElementTree.fromstring(data) res = _extract_services(doc) conn.close() if res is not None: break else: # No OpenID service found return None services, op_endpoint, op_local = res canonical_id = doc.find(".//{xri://$xrd*($v*2.0)}CanonicalID") if canonical_id is None: return None return canonical_id.text, services, op_endpoint, op_local def is_compat_1x(services): for uri in ('http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0/signon', 'http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0/server'): if uri in services: return False for uri in ('http://openid.net/signon/1.0', 'http://openid.net/signon/1.1', 'http://openid.net/server/1.0', 'http://openid.net/server/1.1'): if uri in services: return True raise ValueError, "Neither 1.x nor 2.0 service found" def is_op_endpoint(services): for uri in ('http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0/server', 'http://openid.net/server/1.0', 'http://openid.net/server/1.1'): if uri in services: return True return False is_op_identifier = is_op_endpoint # 4.1.3: Binary two's complement def btwoc(l): res = cPickle.dumps(l, 2) # Pickle result: proto 2, long1 (integer < 256 bytes) # number of bytes, little-endian integer, stop assert res[:3] == b('\x80\x02\x8a') # btwoc ought to produce the shortest representation in two's # complement. Fortunately, pickle already does that. return res[3+b2i(res[3]):3:-1] def unbtwoc(B): return cPickle.loads(b('\x80\x02\x8a')+bytes_from_ints([len(B)])+B[::-1]+(b'.')) # Appendix B; DH default prime dh_prime = """ DCF93A0B883972EC0E19989AC5A2CE310E1D37717E8D9571BB7623731866E61E F75A2E27898B057F9891C2E27A639C3F29B60814581CD3B2CA3986D268370557 7D45C2E7E52DC81C7A171876E5CEA74B1448BFDFAF18828EFD2519F14E45E382 6634AF1949E5B535CC829A483B8A76223E5D490A257F05BDFF16F2FB22C583AB """ dh_prime = long("".join(dh_prime.split()), 16) def string_xor(s1, s2): res = [] for c1, c2 in itertools.izip(s1, s2): res.append(b2i(c1) ^ b2i(c2)) return bytes_from_ints(res) def associate(services, url): '''Create an association (OpenID section 8) between RP and OP. Return response as a dictionary.''' data = { 'openid.ns':"http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0", 'openid.mode':"associate", 'openid.assoc_type':"HMAC-SHA1", 'openid.session_type':"no-encryption", } if url.startswith('http:'): # Use DH exchange data['openid.session_type'] = "DH-SHA1" # Private key: random number between 1 and dh_prime-1 priv = random.randrange(1, dh_prime-1) # Public key: 2^priv mod prime pubkey = pow(2L, priv, dh_prime) dh_public_base64 = base64.b64encode(btwoc(pubkey)) # No need to send key and generator data['openid.dh_consumer_public'] = dh_public_base64 if is_compat_1x(services): # 14.2.1: clear session_type in 1.1 compatibility mode if data['openid.session_type'] == "no-encryption": data['openid.session_type'] = '' del data['openid.ns'] res = urllib.urlopen(url, b(urllib.urlencode(data))) if res.getcode() != 200: raise ValueError, "OpenID provider refuses connection with status %d" % res.getcode() data = parse_response(res.read()) if 'error' in data: raise ValueError, "associate failed: "+data['error'] if url.startswith('http:'): enc_mac_key = b(data.get('enc_mac_key')) if not enc_mac_key: raise ValueError, "Provider protocol error: not using DH-SHA1" enc_mac_key = base64.b64decode(enc_mac_key) dh_server_public = unbtwoc(base64.b64decode(b(data['dh_server_public']))) # shared secret: sha1(2^(server_priv*priv) mod prime) xor enc_mac_key shared_secret = btwoc(pow(dh_server_public, priv, dh_prime)) shared_secret = hashlib.sha1(shared_secret).digest() if len(shared_secret) != len(enc_mac_key): raise ValueError, "incorrect DH key size" # Fake mac_key result data['mac_key'] = b(base64.b64encode(string_xor(enc_mac_key, shared_secret))) return data class _AX: def __init__(self): self.__dict__['_reverse'] = {} def __setattr__(self, name, value): self.__dict__[name] = value self._reverse[value] = name def lookup(self, value): try: return self._reverse[value] except KeyError: return 'a%d' % (hash(value) % 1000000000) AX = _AX() AX.nickname = "http://axschema.org/namePerson/friendly" AX.email = "http://axschema.org/contact/email" AX.fullname = "http://axschema.org/namePerson" AX.dob = "http://axschema.org/birthDate" AX.gender = "http://axschema.org/person/gender" AX.postcode = "http://axschema.org/contact/postalCode/home" AX.country = "http://axschema.org/contact/country/home" AX.language = "http://axschema.org/pref/language" AX.timezone = "http://axschema.org/pref/timezone" AX.first = "http://axschema.org/namePerson/first" AX.last = "http://axschema.org/namePerson/last" def request_authentication(services, url, assoc_handle, return_to, claimed=None, op_local=None, realm=None, sreg = (('nickname', 'email'), ()), ax = ((AX.email, AX.first, AX.last), ())): '''Request authentication (OpenID section 9). services is the list of discovered service types, url the OP service URL, assoc_handle the established session dictionary, and return_to the return URL. The return_to URL will also be passed as realm, and the OP may perform RP discovery on it; always request these data through SREG 1.0 as well. If AX or SREG 1.1 are supported, request email address, first/last name, or nickname. Return the URL that the browser should be redirected to.''' if is_op_endpoint(services): # claimed is an OP identifier claimed = op_local = None if claimed is None: claimed = "http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0/identifier_select" if op_local is None: op_local = claimed if realm is None: realm = return_to data = { 'openid.ns':"http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0", 'openid.mode':"checkid_setup", 'openid.assoc_handle':assoc_handle, 'openid.return_to':return_to, 'openid.claimed_id':claimed, 'openid.identity':op_local, 'openid.realm':realm, 'openid.sreg.required':'nickname,email', } sreg_req, sreg_opt = sreg sreg11 = {} if sreg_req or sreg_opt: data['openid.ns.sreg'] = "http://openid.net/sreg/1.0" if sreg_req: data['openid.sreg.required'] = sreg11['openid.sreg11.required'] = ','.join(sreg_req) if sreg_opt: data['openid.sreg.optional'] = sreg11['openid.sreg11.optional'] =','.join(sreg_opt) if is_compat_1x(services): # OpenID 1.1 does not communicate claimed_ids. Put them into the return URL return_to += '&' if '?' in return_to else '?' return_to += '&openid1=' + urllib.quote(claimed) data['openid.return_to'] = return_to del data['openid.ns'] del data['openid.claimed_id'] del data['openid.realm'] trust_root = urlparse.urlparse(return_to)[:3] + (None,None,None) data['openid.trust_root'] = urlparse.urlunparse(trust_root) ax_req, ax_opt = ax if "http://openid.net/srv/ax/1.0" in services and (ax_req or ax_opt): data.update({ 'openid.ns.ax':"http://openid.net/srv/ax/1.0", 'openid.ax.mode':'fetch_request', }) for uri in ax_req + ax_opt: data['openid.ax.type.'+AX.lookup(uri)] = uri if ax_req: data['openid.ax.required'] = ','.join(AX.lookup(uri) for uri in ax_req) if ax_opt: data['openid.ax.if_available'] = ','.join(AX.lookup(uri) for uri in ax_req) if "http://openid.net/extensions/sreg/1.1" in services and sreg11: data.update({ 'openid.ns.sreg11':"http://openid.net/extensions/sreg/1.1", }) data.update(sreg11) if '?' in url: return url+'&'+urllib.urlencode(data) else: return url+"?"+urllib.urlencode(data) # 11.4.2 Verifying Directly with the OpenID Provider def verify_signature_directly(op_endpoint, response): '''Request that the OP verify the signature via Direct Verification''' request = [('openid.mode', 'check_authentication')] # Exact copies of all fields from the authentication response, except for # "openid.mode" request.extend((k, v) for k, (v,) in response.items() if 'openid.mode' != k) res = urllib.urlopen(op_endpoint, urllib.urlencode(request)) if 200 != res.getcode(): raise NotAuthenticated(NotAuthenticated.CONNECTION_REFUSED, res.getcode()) response = parse_response(res.read()) if 'true' != response['is_valid']: raise NotAuthenticated(NotAuthenticated.DIRECT_VERIFICATION_FAILED) def _prepare_response(response): if isinstance(response, str): return cgi.parse_qs(response, keep_blank_values=True) # backwards compatibility: allow caller to pass parse_qs result # already pass return response def authenticate(session, response): '''Process an authentication response. session must be the established session (minimally including assoc_handle and mac_key), response the query string as given in the original URL (i.e. as the CGI variable QUERY_STRING). If authentication succeeds, return the list of signed fields. If the user was not authenticated, NotAuthenticated is raised. If the HTTP request is invalid (missing parameters, failure to validate signature), different exceptions will be raised, typically ValueError. Callers must check openid.response_nonce for replay attacks. ''' response = _prepare_response(response) # 1.1 compat: openid.ns may not be sent # if response['openid.ns'][0] != 'http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0': # raise ValueError('missing openid.ns') if session['assoc_handle'] != response['openid.assoc_handle'][0]: raise ValueError('incorrect session') if response['openid.mode'][0] == 'cancel': raise NotAuthenticated(NotAuthenticated.CANCELLED) if response['openid.mode'][0] != 'id_res': raise ValueError('invalid openid.mode') if 'openid.identity' not in response: raise ValueError('missing openid.identity') # Will not check nonce value - caller must verify this is not a replay signed = response['openid.signed'][0].split(',') query = [] for name in signed: value = response['openid.'+name][0] value = '%s:%s\n' % (name, value) if sys.version_info >= (3,): value = value.encode('utf-8') query.append(value) query = b('').join(query) mac_key = base64.decodestring(session['mac_key']) transmitted_sig = base64.decodestring(b(response['openid.sig'][0])) computed_sig = hmac.new(mac_key, query, hashlib.sha1).digest() if transmitted_sig != computed_sig: raise ValueError('Invalid signature') # Check that all critical fields are signed. OpenID 2.0 says # that in a positive assertion, op_endpoint, return_to, # response_nonce and assoc_handle must be signed, and claimed_id # and identity if present in the response. 1.1 compatibility # says that response_nonce and op_endpoint may be missing. # In addition, OpenID 1.1 providers apparently fail to sign # assoc_handle often. if response['openid.mode'][0] == 'id_res': if 'return_to' not in signed or \ ('openid.identity' in response and 'identity' not in signed) or \ ('openid.claimed_id' in response and 'claimed_id' not in signed): raise ValueError, "Critical field missing in signature" return signed # td.total_seconds only works in 2.7 def _total_seconds(td): return td.days*24*3600 + td.seconds def verify(response, discovery_cache, find_association, nonce_seen): response = _prepare_response(response) if 'openid.ns' in response: ns = response['openid.ns'][0] if ns != 'http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0': raise NotAuthenticated(NotAuthenticate.UNSUPPORTED_VERSION) else: ns = None mode = response['openid.mode'][0] if mode == 'cancel': raise NotAuthenticated(NotAuthenticated.CANCELLED) if mode != 'id_res': raise NotAuthenticated(NotAuthenticated.UNEXPECTED_MODE, mode) # Establish claimed ID if 'openid.claimed_id' in response: claimed_id = response['openid.claimed_id'][0] # 11.2. Drop Fragment from claimed_id fragment = claimed_id.find('#') if fragment != -1: claimed_id = claimed_id[:fragment] elif 'openid1' in response: claimed_id = response['openid1'][0] else: raise NotAuthenticated(NotAuthenticated.CLAIMED_ID_MISSING) discovered = discovery_cache(claimed_id) if not discovered: discovered = discover(claimed_id) if not discovered: raise NotAuthenticated(NotAuthenticated.DISCOVERY_FAILED, claimed_id) services, op_endpoint, op_local = discovered # For a provider-allocated claimed_id, there will be no op_local ID, # and there is no point checking it. if op_local and op_local != response['openid.identity'][0]: raise NotAuthenticated('Discovered and asserted local identifiers differ') # For OpenID 1.1, op_endpoint may not be included in the response if ('openid.op_endpoint' in response and op_endpoint != response['openid.op_endpoint'][0]): raise NotAuthenticated(NotAuthenticated.INCONSISTENT_IDS) # XXX verify protocol version, verify claimed_id wrt. original request, # verify return_to URL # verify the signature assoc_handle = response['openid.assoc_handle'][0] session = find_association(assoc_handle) if session: signed = authenticate(session, response) else: verify_signature_directly(op_endpoint, response) signed = response['openid.signed'][0].split(',') # Check the nonce. OpenID 1.1 doesn't have them if 'openid.response_nonce' in response: nonce = response['openid.response_nonce'][0] timestamp = parse_nonce(nonce) if _total_seconds(datetime.datetime.utcnow() - timestamp) > 10: # allow for at most 10s transmission time and time shift raise NotAuthenticated(NotAuthenticated.REPLAY_ATTACK) if nonce_seen(nonce): raise NotAuthenticated(NotAuthenticated.REPLAY_ATTACK) elif ns: raise NotAuthenticated(NotAuthenticated.MISSING_NONCE) return signed, claimed_id def parse_nonce(nonce): '''Extract a datetime.datetime stamp from the nonce''' stamp = nonce.split('Z', 1)[0] stamp = time.strptime(stamp, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S")[:6] stamp = datetime.datetime(*stamp) return stamp def get_namespaces(resp): resp = _prepare_response(resp) res = {} for k, v in resp.items(): if k.startswith('openid.ns.'): k = k.rsplit('.', 1)[1] res[v[0]] = k return res def get_ax(resp, ns, validated): if "http://openid.net/srv/ax/1.0" not in ns: return {} ax = ns["http://openid.net/srv/ax/1.0"]+"." oax = "openid."+ax res = {} resp = _prepare_response(resp) for k, v in resp.items(): if k.startswith(oax+"type."): k = k.rsplit('.',1)[1] value_name = oax+"value."+k if ax+"value."+k not in validated: continue res[v[0]] = resp[value_name][0] return res def get_sreg(resp, validated): """Return the dictionary of simple registration parameters in resp, with the openid.sreg. prefix stripped.""" res = {} resp = _prepare_response(resp) for k, v in resp.items(): if k.startswith('openid.sreg.'): k = k[len('openid.sreg.'):] if 'sreg.'+k in validated: res[k] = v[0] return res def get_email(resp): "Return the email address embedded response, or None." resp = _prepare_response(resp) validated = resp['openid.signed'][0] # SREG 1.0; doesn't require namespace, as the protocol doesn't # specify one if 'openid.sreg.email' in resp and \ 'sreg.email' in validated: return resp['openid.sreg.email'][0] ns = get_namespaces(resp) ax = get_ax(resp, ns, validated) if "http://axschema.org/contact/email" in ax: return ax["http://axschema.org/contact/email"] # TODO: SREG 1.1 return None def get_username(resp): """Return either nickname or (first, last) or None. This function is deprecated; use get_ax and get_sreg instead. """ resp = _prepare_response(resp) validated = resp['openid.signed'][0] if 'openid.sreg.nickname' in resp and \ 'sreg.nickname' in validated: return resp['openid.sreg.nickname'][0] ns = get_namespaces(resp) ax = get_ax(resp, ns, validated) if "http://axschema.org/namePerson/first" in ax and \ "http://axschema.org/namePerson/last" in ax: return (ax["http://axschema.org/namePerson/first"], ax["http://axschema.org/namePerson/last"]) # TODO: SREG 1.1 return