delta/linux.git/fs/exec.c, branch proc-cmdline

exec: pin stack limit during exec

2018-04-11T17:28:37+00:00

Since the stack rlimit is used in multiple places during exec and it can
be changed via other threads (via setrlimit()) or processes (via
prlimit()), the assumption that the value doesn't change cannot be made.
This leads to races with mm layout selection and argument size
calculations.  This changes the exec path to use the rlimit stored in
bprm instead of in current.  Before starting the thread, the bprm stack
rlimit is stored back to current.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Fixes: 64701dee4178e ("exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings 
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski 
Reported-by: Brad Spengler 
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Ben Hutchings 
Cc: Greg KH 
Cc: Hugh Dickins 
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" 
Cc: Laura Abbott 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Willy Tarreau 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

exec: introduce finalize_exec() before start_thread()

2018-04-11T17:28:37+00:00

Provide a final callback into fs/exec.c before start_thread() takes
over, to handle any last-minute changes, like the coming restoration of
the stack limit.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Ben Hutchings 
Cc: Ben Hutchings 
Cc: Brad Spengler 
Cc: Greg KH 
Cc: Hugh Dickins 
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" 
Cc: Laura Abbott 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Willy Tarreau 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions

2018-04-11T17:28:37+00:00

Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec".

Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec
continue to be frustrated[1][2].  In addition to the specific issues
around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3]
other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to
be unchanging.  Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it
can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only
way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack
limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the
functions that need to know the stack limits.  This series implements
the approach.

[1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()")
[2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"")
[3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?"

This patch (of 3):

Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during
exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process
calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the
per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the
bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is
finalized.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Ben Hutchings 
Cc: Willy Tarreau 
Cc: Hugh Dickins 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Laura Abbott 
Cc: Greg KH 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Ben Hutchings 
Cc: Brad Spengler 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

exec: Set file unwritable before LSM check

2018-03-19T04:49:32+00:00

The LSM check should happen after the file has been confirmed to be
unchanging. Without this, we could have a race between the Time of Check
(the call to security_kernel_read_file() which could read the file and
make access policy decisions) and the Time of Use (starting with
kernel_read_file()'s reading of the file contents). In theory, file
contents could change between the two.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

exec: Weaken dumpability for secureexec

2018-01-03T18:13:36+00:00

This is a logical revert of commit e37fdb785a5f ("exec: Use secureexec
for setting dumpability")

This weakens dumpability back to checking only for uid/gid changes in
current (which is useless), but userspace depends on dumpability not
being tied to secureexec.

  https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1528633

Reported-by: Tom Horsley 
Fixes: e37fdb785a5f ("exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"

2017-12-17T22:26:25+00:00

This reverts commit 04e35f4495dd560db30c25efca4eecae8ec8c375.

SELinux runs with secureexec for all non-"noatsecure" domain transitions,
which means lots of processes end up hitting the stack hard-limit change
that was introduced in order to fix a race with prlimit(). That race fix
will need to be redesigned.

Reported-by: Laura Abbott 
Reported-by: Tomáš Trnka 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

exec: avoid gcc-8 warning for get_task_comm

2017-12-15T00:00:48+00:00

gcc-8 warns about using strncpy() with the source size as the limit:

  fs/exec.c:1223:32: error: argument to 'sizeof' in 'strncpy' call is the same expression as the source; did you mean to use the size of the destination? [-Werror=sizeof-pointer-memaccess]

This is indeed slightly suspicious, as it protects us from source
arguments without NUL-termination, but does not guarantee that the
destination is terminated.

This keeps the strncpy() to ensure we have properly padded target
buffer, but ensures that we use the correct length, by passing the
actual length of the destination buffer as well as adding a build-time
check to ensure it is exactly TASK_COMM_LEN.

There are only 23 callsites which I all reviewed to ensure this is
currently the case.  We could get away with doing only the check or
passing the right length, but it doesn't hurt to do both.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171205151724.1764896-1-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann 
Suggested-by: Kees Cook 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Alexander Viro 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Serge Hallyn 
Cc: James Morris 
Cc: Aleksa Sarai 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()

2017-11-30T02:40:42+00:00

While the defense-in-depth RLIMIT_STACK limit on setuid processes was
protected against races from other threads calling setrlimit(), I missed
protecting it against races from external processes calling prlimit().
This adds locking around the change and makes sure that rlim_max is set
too.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171127193457.GA11348@beast
Fixes: 64701dee4178e ("exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings 
Reported-by: Brad Spengler 
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn 
Cc: James Morris 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Jiri Slaby 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

locking/atomics: COCCINELLE/treewide: Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() patterns to READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE()

2017-10-25T09:01:08+00:00

Please do not apply this to mainline directly, instead please re-run the
coccinelle script shown below and apply its output.

For several reasons, it is desirable to use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() in
preference to ACCESS_ONCE(), and new code is expected to use one of the
former. So far, there's been no reason to change most existing uses of
ACCESS_ONCE(), as these aren't harmful, and changing them results in
churn.

However, for some features, the read/write distinction is critical to
correct operation. To distinguish these cases, separate read/write
accessors must be used. This patch migrates (most) remaining
ACCESS_ONCE() instances to {READ,WRITE}_ONCE(), using the following
coccinelle script:

----
// Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() uses to equivalent READ_ONCE() and
// WRITE_ONCE()

// $ make coccicheck COCCI=/home/mark/once.cocci SPFLAGS="--include-headers" MODE=patch

virtual patch

@ depends on patch @
expression E1, E2;
@@

- ACCESS_ONCE(E1) = E2
+ WRITE_ONCE(E1, E2)

@ depends on patch @
expression E;
@@

- ACCESS_ONCE(E)
+ READ_ONCE(E)
----

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland 
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: davem@davemloft.net
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au
Cc: shuah@kernel.org
Cc: snitzer@redhat.com
Cc: thor.thayer@linux.intel.com
Cc: tj@kernel.org
Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: will.deacon@arm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1508792849-3115-19-git-send-email-paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

membarrier: Provide register expedited private command

2017-10-20T02:13:40+00:00

This introduces a "register private expedited" membarrier command which
allows eventual removal of important memory barrier constraints on the
scheduler fast-paths. It changes how the "private expedited" membarrier
command (new to 4.14) is used from user-space.

This new command allows processes to register their intent to use the
private expedited command.  This affects how the expedited private
command introduced in 4.14-rc is meant to be used, and should be merged
before 4.14 final.

Processes are now required to register before using
MEMBARRIER_CMD_PRIVATE_EXPEDITED, otherwise that command returns EPERM.

This fixes a problem that arose when designing requested extensions to
sys_membarrier() to allow JITs to efficiently flush old code from
instruction caches.  Several potential algorithms are much less painful
if the user register intent to use this functionality early on, for
example, before the process spawns the second thread.  Registering at
this time removes the need to interrupt each and every thread in that
process at the first expedited sys_membarrier() system call.

Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers 
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Alexander Viro 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds