The checkout code didn't iterate into a subdir if it didn't match the
pathspec, but since the pathspec might match files in the subdir we
should recurse into it (In contrast to gitignore handling).

Fixes #5089

The checkout::index::can_disable_pathspec_match test attempts to set a
path filter of `test11.txt` and `test12.txt`, but then validates that
`test10.txt` and `test11.txt` were left unmodified.  Update the test's
path filter to match the expectation.

A little-known feature of NTFS is that it offers to store metadata in
so-called "Alternate Data Streams" (inspired by Apple's "resource
forks") that are copied together with the file they are associated with.
These Alternate Data Streams can be accessed via `<file name>:<stream
name>:<stream type>`.

Directories, too, have Alternate Data Streams, and they even have a
default stream type `$INDEX_ALLOCATION`. Which means that `abc/` and
`abc::$INDEX_ALLOCATION/` are actually equivalent.

This is of course another attack vector on the Git directory that we
definitely want to prevent.

On Windows, we already do this incidentally, by disallowing colons in
file/directory names.

While it looks as if files'/directories' Alternate Data Streams are not
accessible in the Windows Subsystem for Linux, and neither via
CIFS/SMB-mounted network shares in Linux, it _is_ possible to access
them on SMB-mounted network shares on macOS.

Therefore, let's go the extra mile and prevent this particular attack
_everywhere_. To keep things simple, let's just disallow *any* Alternate
Data Stream of `.git`.

This is libgit2's variant of CVE-2019-1352.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>

The Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) is getting increasingly popular,
in particular because it makes it _so_ easy to run Linux software on
Windows' files, via the auto-mounted Windows drives (`C:\` is mapped to
`/mnt/c/`, no need to set that up manually).

Unfortunately, files/directories on the Windows drives can be accessed
via their _short names_, if that feature is enabled (which it is on the
`C:` drive by default).

Which means that we have to safeguard even our Linux users against the
short name attacks.

Further, while the default options of CIFS/SMB-mounts seem to disallow
accessing files on network shares via their short names on Linux/macOS,
it _is_ possible to do so with the right options.

So let's just safe-guard against short name attacks _everywhere_.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>

When initializing a repository, we need to check whether its working
directory supports symlinks to correctly set the initial value of the
"core.symlinks" config variable. The code to check the filesystem is
reusable in other parts of our codebase, like for example in our tests
to determine whether certain tests can be expected to succeed or not.

Extract the code into a new function `git_path_supports_symlinks` to
avoid duplicate implementations. Remove a duplicate implementation in
the repo test helper code.

Our file utils functions all have a "futils" prefix, e.g.
`git_futils_touch`. One would thus naturally guess that their
definitions and implementation would live in files "futils.h" and
"futils.c", respectively, but in fact they live in "fileops.h".

Rename the files to match expectations.

`cvar` is an unhelpful name.  Refactor its usage to `configmap` for more
clarity.

In libgit2 nomenclature, when we need to verb a direct object, we name
a function `git_directobject_verb`.  Thus, if we need to init an options
structure named `git_foo_options`, then the name of the function that
does that should be `git_foo_options_init`.

The previous names of `git_foo_init_options` is close - it _sounds_ as
if it's initializing the options of a `foo`, but in fact
`git_foo_options` is its own noun that should be respected.

Deprecate the old names; they'll now call directly to the new ones.

The function `populate_symlink_workdir` creates a new
"symlink.git" repository with a relative path "../symlink.git".
As the current working directory is the sandbox, the new
repository will be created just outside of the sandbox.

Fix this by using `clar_sandbox_path`.