Moving the check out of the general requests, makes sure we don't have
any slowdown in the regular requests.

To keep the process performing this checks small, the check is still
performed inside a unicorn. But that is called from a process running
on the same server.

Because the checks are now done outside normal request, we can have a
simpler failure strategy:

The check is now performed in the background every
`circuitbreaker_check_interval`. Failures are logged in redis. The
failures are reset when the check succeeds. Per check we will try
`circuitbreaker_access_retries` times within
`circuitbreaker_storage_timeout` seconds.

When the number of failures exceeds
`circuitbreaker_failure_count_threshold`, we will block access to the
storage.

After `failure_reset_time` of no checks, we will clear the stored
failures. This could happen when the process that performs the checks
is not running.

No-one is allowed to force push to a protected branch, or delete it. That's
correct in the documentation, but was wrong in the drop-down.

`allowed_key_types` is removed and the `minimum_<type>_bits` fields are
renamed to `<tech>_key_restriction`. A special sentinel value (`-1`) signifies
that the key type is disabled.

This also feeds through to the UI - checkboxes per key type are out, inline
selection of "forbidden" and "allowed" (i.e., no restrictions) are in.

As with the previous model, unknown key types are disallowed, even if the
underlying ssh daemon happens to support them. The defaults have also been
changed from the lowest known bit size to "no restriction". So if someone
does happen to have a 768-bit RSA key, it will continue to work on upgrade, at
least until the administrator restricts them.

This is an amalgamation of:

* Cory Hinshaw: Initial implementation !5552
* Rémy Coutable: Updates !9350
* Nick Thomas: Resolve conflicts and add ED25519 support !13712

In favor of the new `repository_storages`