Stop including config.h by default in cache.h. Instead only include config.h in those files which require use of the config system. Signed-off-by: Brandon Williams <bmwill@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Allow the http.postbuffer configuration variable to be set to a size that can be expressed in size_t, which can be larger than ulong on some platforms. * dt/http-postbuffer-can-be-large: http.postbuffer: allow full range of ssize_t values
Conversion from unsigned char [40] to struct object_id continues. * bc/object-id: Documentation: update and rename api-sha1-array.txt Rename sha1_array to oid_array Convert sha1_array_for_each_unique and for_each_abbrev to object_id Convert sha1_array_lookup to take struct object_id Convert remaining callers of sha1_array_lookup to object_id Make sha1_array_append take a struct object_id * sha1-array: convert internal storage for struct sha1_array to object_id builtin/pull: convert to struct object_id submodule: convert check_for_new_submodule_commits to object_id sha1_name: convert disambiguate_hint_fn to take object_id sha1_name: convert struct disambiguate_state to object_id test-sha1-array: convert most code to struct object_id parse-options-cb: convert sha1_array_append caller to struct object_id fsck: convert init_skiplist to struct object_id builtin/receive-pack: convert portions to struct object_id builtin/pull: convert portions to struct object_id builtin/diff: convert to struct object_id Convert GIT_SHA1_RAWSZ used for allocation to GIT_MAX_RAWSZ Convert GIT_SHA1_HEXSZ used for allocation to GIT_MAX_HEXSZ Define new hash-size constants for allocating memory
Unfortunately, in order to push some large repos where a server does not support chunked encoding, the http postbuffer must sometimes exceed two gigabytes. On a 64-bit system, this is OK: we just malloc a larger buffer. This means that we need to use CURLOPT_POSTFIELDSIZE_LARGE to set the buffer size. Signed-off-by: David Turner <dturner@twosigma.com> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Since this structure handles an array of object IDs, rename it to struct
oid_array. Also rename the accessor functions and the initialization
constant.
This commit was produced mechanically by providing non-Documentation
files to the following Perl one-liners:
perl -pi -E 's/struct sha1_array/struct oid_array/g'
perl -pi -E 's/\bsha1_array_/oid_array_/g'
perl -pi -E 's/SHA1_ARRAY_INIT/OID_ARRAY_INIT/g'
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Make the internal storage for struct sha1_array use an array of struct object_id internally. Update the users of this struct which inspect its internals. Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Teach remote-curl to understand push options and to be able to convey them across HTTP. Signed-off-by: Brandon Williams <bmwill@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
When the http server gives an incomplete response to a smart-http rpc call, it could lead to client waiting for a full response that will never come. Teach the client side to notice this condition and abort the transfer. An improvement counterproposal has failed. cf. <20161114194049.mktpsvgdhex2f4zv@sigill.intra.peff.net> * dt/smart-http-detect-server-going-away: upload-pack: optionally allow fetching any sha1 remote-curl: don't hang when a server dies before any output
Transport with dumb http can be fooled into following foreign URLs that the end user does not intend to, especially with the server side redirects and http-alternates mechanism, which can lead to security issues. Tighten the redirection and make it more obvious to the end user when it happens. * jk/http-walker-limit-redirect-2.9: http: treat http-alternates like redirects http: make redirects more obvious remote-curl: rename shadowed options variable http: always update the base URL for redirects http: simplify update_url_from_redirect
We instruct curl to always follow HTTP redirects. This is
convenient, but it creates opportunities for malicious
servers to create confusing situations. For instance,
imagine Alice is a git user with access to a private
repository on Bob's server. Mallory runs her own server and
wants to access objects from Bob's repository.
Mallory may try a few tricks that involve asking Alice to
clone from her, build on top, and then push the result:
1. Mallory may simply redirect all fetch requests to Bob's
server. Git will transparently follow those redirects
and fetch Bob's history, which Alice may believe she
got from Mallory. The subsequent push seems like it is
just feeding Mallory back her own objects, but is
actually leaking Bob's objects. There is nothing in
git's output to indicate that Bob's repository was
involved at all.
The downside (for Mallory) of this attack is that Alice
will have received Bob's entire repository, and is
likely to notice that when building on top of it.
2. If Mallory happens to know the sha1 of some object X in
Bob's repository, she can instead build her own history
that references that object. She then runs a dumb http
server, and Alice's client will fetch each object
individually. When it asks for X, Mallory redirects her
to Bob's server. The end result is that Alice obtains
objects from Bob, but they may be buried deep in
history. Alice is less likely to notice.
Both of these attacks are fairly hard to pull off. There's a
social component in getting Mallory to convince Alice to
work with her. Alice may be prompted for credentials in
accessing Bob's repository (but not always, if she is using
a credential helper that caches). Attack (1) requires a
certain amount of obliviousness on Alice's part while making
a new commit. Attack (2) requires that Mallory knows a sha1
in Bob's repository, that Bob's server supports dumb http,
and that the object in question is loose on Bob's server.
But we can probably make things a bit more obvious without
any loss of functionality. This patch does two things to
that end.
First, when we encounter a whole-repo redirect during the
initial ref discovery, we now inform the user on stderr,
making attack (1) much more obvious.
Second, the decision to follow redirects is now
configurable. The truly paranoid can set the new
http.followRedirects to false to avoid any redirection
entirely. But for a more practical default, we will disallow
redirects only after the initial ref discovery. This is
enough to thwart attacks similar to (2), while still
allowing the common use of redirects at the repository
level. Since c93c92f30 (http: update base URLs when we see
redirects, 2013-09-28) we re-root all further requests from
the redirect destination, which should generally mean that
no further redirection is necessary.
As an escape hatch, in case there really is a server that
needs to redirect individual requests, the user can set
http.followRedirects to "true" (and this can be done on a
per-server basis via http.*.followRedirects config).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>