Currently, the only way to pass proxy credentials to curl is by including them
in the proxy URL. Usually, this means they will end up on disk unencrypted, one
way or another (by inclusion in ~/.gitconfig, shell profile or history). Since
proxy authentication often uses a domain user, credentials can be security
sensitive; therefore, a safer way of passing credentials is desirable.

If the configured proxy contains a username but not a password, query the
credential API for one. Also, make sure we approve/reject proxy credentials
properly.

For consistency reasons, add parsing of http_proxy/https_proxy/all_proxy
environment variables, which would otherwise be evaluated as a fallback by curl.
Without this, we would have different semantics for git configuration and
environment variables.

Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Helped-by: Eric Sunshine <sunshine@sunshineco.com>
Helped-by: Elia Pinto <gitter.spiros@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Knut Franke <k.franke@science-computing.de>
Signed-off-by: Elia Pinto <gitter.spiros@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

CURLAUTH_ANY does not work with proxies which answer unauthenticated requests
with a 307 redirect to an error page instead of a 407 listing supported
authentication methods. Therefore, allow the authentication method to be set
using the environment variable GIT_HTTP_PROXY_AUTHMETHOD or configuration
variables http.proxyAuthmethod and remote.<name>.proxyAuthmethod (in analogy
to http.proxy and remote.<name>.proxy).

The following values are supported:

* anyauth (default)
* basic
* digest
* negotiate
* ntlm

Signed-off-by: Knut Franke <k.franke@science-computing.de>
Signed-off-by: Elia Pinto <gitter.spiros@gmail.com>
Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Helped-by: Eric Sunshine <sunshine@sunshineco.com>
Helped-by: Elia Pinto <gitter.spiros@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

History traversal with "git log --source" that starts with an
annotated tag failed to report the tag as "source", due to an
old regression in the command line parser back in v2.2 days.

* jk/pending-keep-tag-name:
  revision.c: propagate tag names from pending array

"git symbolic-ref" forgot to report a failure with its exit status.

* jk/symbolic-ref-maint:
  t1401: test reflog creation for git-symbolic-ref
  symbolic-ref: propagate error code from create_symref()

When getpwuid() on the system returned NULL (e.g. the user is not
in the /etc/passwd file or other uid-to-name mappings), the
codepath to find who the user is to record it in the reflog barfed
and died.  Loosen the check in this codepath, which already accepts
questionable ident string (e.g. host part of the e-mail address is
obviously bogus), and in general when we operate fmt_ident() function
in non-strict mode.

* jk/ident-loosen-getpwuid:
  ident: loosen getpwuid error in non-strict mode
  ident: keep a flag for bogus default_email
  ident: make xgetpwuid_self() a static local helper

Improve error reporting when SMTP TLS fails.

* jk/send-email-ssl-errors:
  send-email: enable SSL level 1 debug output

The completion script (in contrib/) used to list "git column"
(which is not an end-user facing command) as one of the choices

* sg/completion-no-column:
  completion: remove 'git column' from porcelain commands