// hmqv.h - written and placed in the public domain by Uri Blumenthal // Shamelessly based upon Jeffrey Walton's FHMQV and Wei Dai's MQV source files #ifndef CRYPTOPP_HMQV_H #define CRYPTOPP_HMQV_H //! \file hmqv.h //! \brief Classes for Hashed Menezes-Qu-Vanstone key agreement in GF(p) //! \since Crypto++ 5.6.4 #include "gfpcrypt.h" #include "algebra.h" #include "sha.h" NAMESPACE_BEGIN(CryptoPP) //! \brief Hashed Menezes-Qu-Vanstone in GF(p) //! \details This implementation follows Hugo Krawczyk's HMQV: A High-Performance //! Secure Diffie-Hellman Protocol. Note: this implements HMQV only. HMQV-C with Key Confirmation is not provided. //! \sa MQV, HMQV, FHMQV, and AuthenticatedKeyAgreementDomain //! \since Crypto++ 5.6.4 template class HMQV_Domain: public AuthenticatedKeyAgreementDomain { public: typedef GROUP_PARAMETERS GroupParameters; typedef typename GroupParameters::Element Element; typedef HMQV_Domain Domain; virtual ~HMQV_Domain() {} HMQV_Domain(bool clientRole = true): m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer) {} HMQV_Domain(const GroupParameters ¶ms, bool clientRole = true) : m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer), m_groupParameters(params) {} HMQV_Domain(BufferedTransformation &bt, bool clientRole = true) : m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer) {m_groupParameters.BERDecode(bt);} template HMQV_Domain(T1 v1, bool clientRole = true) : m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer) {m_groupParameters.Initialize(v1);} template HMQV_Domain(T1 v1, T2 v2, bool clientRole = true) : m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer) {m_groupParameters.Initialize(v1, v2);} template HMQV_Domain(T1 v1, T2 v2, T3 v3, bool clientRole = true) : m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer) {m_groupParameters.Initialize(v1, v2, v3);} template HMQV_Domain(T1 v1, T2 v2, T3 v3, T4 v4, bool clientRole = true) : m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer) {m_groupParameters.Initialize(v1, v2, v3, v4);} public: const GroupParameters & GetGroupParameters() const {return m_groupParameters;} GroupParameters & AccessGroupParameters(){return m_groupParameters;} CryptoParameters & AccessCryptoParameters(){return AccessAbstractGroupParameters();} //! return length of agreed value produced unsigned int AgreedValueLength() const {return GetAbstractGroupParameters().GetEncodedElementSize(false);} //! return length of static private keys in this domain unsigned int StaticPrivateKeyLength() const {return GetAbstractGroupParameters().GetSubgroupOrder().ByteCount();} //! return length of static public keys in this domain unsigned int StaticPublicKeyLength() const{return GetAbstractGroupParameters().GetEncodedElementSize(true);} //! generate static private key /*! \pre size of privateKey == PrivateStaticKeyLength() */ void GenerateStaticPrivateKey(RandomNumberGenerator &rng, byte *privateKey) const { Integer x(rng, Integer::One(), GetAbstractGroupParameters().GetMaxExponent()); x.Encode(privateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength()); } //! generate static public key /*! \pre size of publicKey == PublicStaticKeyLength() */ void GenerateStaticPublicKey(RandomNumberGenerator &rng, const byte *privateKey, byte *publicKey) const { CRYPTOPP_UNUSED(rng); const DL_GroupParameters ¶ms = GetAbstractGroupParameters(); Integer x(privateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength()); Element y = params.ExponentiateBase(x); params.EncodeElement(true, y, publicKey); } unsigned int EphemeralPrivateKeyLength() const {return StaticPrivateKeyLength() + StaticPublicKeyLength();} unsigned int EphemeralPublicKeyLength() const{return StaticPublicKeyLength();} //! return length of ephemeral private keys in this domain void GenerateEphemeralPrivateKey(RandomNumberGenerator &rng, byte *privateKey) const { const DL_GroupParameters ¶ms = GetAbstractGroupParameters(); Integer x(rng, Integer::One(), params.GetMaxExponent()); x.Encode(privateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength()); Element y = params.ExponentiateBase(x); params.EncodeElement(true, y, privateKey+StaticPrivateKeyLength()); } //! return length of ephemeral public keys in this domain void GenerateEphemeralPublicKey(RandomNumberGenerator &rng, const byte *privateKey, byte *publicKey) const { CRYPTOPP_UNUSED(rng); memcpy(publicKey, privateKey+StaticPrivateKeyLength(), EphemeralPublicKeyLength()); } //! derive agreed value from your private keys and couterparty's public keys, return false in case of failure /*! \note The ephemeral public key will always be validated. If you have previously validated the static public key, use validateStaticOtherPublicKey=false to save time. \pre size of agreedValue == AgreedValueLength() \pre length of staticPrivateKey == StaticPrivateKeyLength() \pre length of ephemeralPrivateKey == EphemeralPrivateKeyLength() \pre length of staticOtherPublicKey == StaticPublicKeyLength() \pre length of ephemeralOtherPublicKey == EphemeralPublicKeyLength() */ bool Agree(byte *agreedValue, const byte *staticPrivateKey, const byte *ephemeralPrivateKey, const byte *staticOtherPublicKey, const byte *ephemeralOtherPublicKey, bool validateStaticOtherPublicKey=true) const { byte *XX = NULLPTR, *YY = NULLPTR, *AA = NULLPTR, *BB = NULLPTR; size_t xxs = 0, yys = 0, aas = 0, bbs = 0; // Depending on the role, this will hold either A's or B's static // (long term) public key. AA or BB will then point into tt. SecByteBlock tt(StaticPublicKeyLength()); try { const DL_GroupParameters ¶ms = GetAbstractGroupParameters(); if(m_role == RoleServer) { Integer b(staticPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength()); Element B = params.ExponentiateBase(b); params.EncodeElement(true, B, tt); XX = const_cast(ephemeralOtherPublicKey); xxs = EphemeralPublicKeyLength(); YY = const_cast(ephemeralPrivateKey) + StaticPrivateKeyLength(); yys = EphemeralPublicKeyLength(); AA = const_cast(staticOtherPublicKey); aas = StaticPublicKeyLength(); BB = tt.BytePtr(); bbs = tt.SizeInBytes(); } else if(m_role == RoleClient) { Integer a(staticPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength()); Element A = params.ExponentiateBase(a); params.EncodeElement(true, A, tt); XX = const_cast(ephemeralPrivateKey) + StaticPrivateKeyLength(); xxs = EphemeralPublicKeyLength(); YY = const_cast(ephemeralOtherPublicKey); yys = EphemeralPublicKeyLength(); AA = tt.BytePtr(); aas = tt.SizeInBytes(); BB = const_cast(staticOtherPublicKey); bbs = StaticPublicKeyLength(); } else { CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(0); return false; } // DecodeElement calls ValidateElement at level 1. Level 1 only calls // VerifyPoint to ensure the element is in G*. If the other's PublicKey is // requested to be validated, we manually call ValidateElement at level 3. Element VV1 = params.DecodeElement(staticOtherPublicKey, false); if(!params.ValidateElement(validateStaticOtherPublicKey ? 3 : 1, VV1, NULLPTR)) return false; // DecodeElement calls ValidateElement at level 1. Level 1 only calls // VerifyPoint to ensure the element is in G*. Crank it up. Element VV2 = params.DecodeElement(ephemeralOtherPublicKey, false); if(!params.ValidateElement(3, VV2, NULLPTR)) return false; // const Integer& p = params.GetGroupOrder(); // not used, remove later const Integer& q = params.GetSubgroupOrder(); const unsigned int len /*bytes*/ = (((q.BitCount()+1)/2 +7)/8); Integer d, e; SecByteBlock dd(len), ee(len); // Compute $d = \hat{H}(X, \hat{B})$ Hash(NULLPTR, XX, xxs, BB, bbs, dd.BytePtr(), dd.SizeInBytes()); d.Decode(dd.BytePtr(), dd.SizeInBytes()); // Compute $e = \hat{H}(Y, \hat{A})$ Hash(NULLPTR, YY, yys, AA, aas, ee.BytePtr(), ee.SizeInBytes()); e.Decode(ee.BytePtr(), ee.SizeInBytes()); Element sigma; if(m_role == RoleServer) { Integer y(ephemeralPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength()); Integer b(staticPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength()); Integer s_B = (y + e * b) % q; Element A = params.DecodeElement(AA, false); Element X = params.DecodeElement(XX, false); Element t1 = params.ExponentiateElement(A, d); Element t2 = m_groupParameters.MultiplyElements(X, t1); // $\sigma_B}=(X \cdot A^{d})^{s_B} sigma = params.ExponentiateElement(t2, s_B); } else { Integer x(ephemeralPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength()); Integer a(staticPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength()); Integer s_A = (x + d * a) % q; Element B = params.DecodeElement(BB, false); Element Y = params.DecodeElement(YY, false); Element t1 = params.ExponentiateElement(B, e); Element t2 = m_groupParameters.MultiplyElements(Y, t1); // $\sigma_A}=(Y \cdot B^{e})^{s_A} sigma = params.ExponentiateElement(t2, s_A); } Hash(&sigma, NULLPTR, 0, NULLPTR, 0, agreedValue, AgreedValueLength()); } catch (DL_BadElement &) { return false; } return true; } protected: // Hash invocation by client and server differ only in what keys // each provides. inline void Hash(const Element* sigma, const byte* e1, size_t e1len, // Ephemeral key and key length const byte* s1, size_t s1len, // Static key and key length byte* digest, size_t dlen) const { HASH hash; size_t idx = 0, req = dlen; size_t blk = STDMIN(dlen, (size_t)HASH::DIGESTSIZE); if(sigma) { if (e1len != 0 || s1len != 0) { CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(0); } Integer x = GetAbstractGroupParameters().ConvertElementToInteger(*sigma); SecByteBlock sbb(x.MinEncodedSize()); x.Encode(sbb.BytePtr(), sbb.SizeInBytes()); hash.Update(sbb.BytePtr(), sbb.SizeInBytes()); } else { if (e1len == 0 || s1len == 0) { CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(0); } hash.Update(e1, e1len); hash.Update(s1, s1len); } hash.TruncatedFinal(digest, blk); req -= blk; // All this to catch tail bytes for large curves and small hashes while(req != 0) { hash.Update(&digest[idx], (size_t)HASH::DIGESTSIZE); idx += (size_t)HASH::DIGESTSIZE; blk = STDMIN(req, (size_t)HASH::DIGESTSIZE); hash.TruncatedFinal(&digest[idx], blk); req -= blk; } } private: // The paper uses Initiator and Recipient - make it classical. enum KeyAgreementRole{ RoleServer = 1, RoleClient }; DL_GroupParameters & AccessAbstractGroupParameters() {return m_groupParameters;} const DL_GroupParameters & GetAbstractGroupParameters() const{return m_groupParameters;} GroupParameters m_groupParameters; KeyAgreementRole m_role; }; //! \brief Hashed Menezes-Qu-Vanstone in GF(p) //! \details This implementation follows Hugo Krawczyk's HMQV: A High-Performance //! Secure Diffie-Hellman Protocol. Note: this implements HMQV only. HMQV-C with Key Confirmation is not provided. //! \sa HMQV, MQV_Domain, FHMQV_Domain, AuthenticatedKeyAgreementDomain //! \since Crypto++ 5.6.4 typedef HMQV_Domain HMQV; NAMESPACE_END #endif