// hmqv.h - written and placed in the public domain by Uri Blumenthal
// Shamelessly based upon Jeffrey Walton's FHMQV and Wei Dai's MQV source files
#ifndef CRYPTOPP_HMQV_H
#define CRYPTOPP_HMQV_H
//! \file hmqv.h
//! \brief Classes for Hashed Menezes-Qu-Vanstone key agreement in GF(p)
//! \since Crypto++ 5.6.4
#include "gfpcrypt.h"
#include "algebra.h"
#include "sha.h"
NAMESPACE_BEGIN(CryptoPP)
//! \brief Hashed Menezes-Qu-Vanstone in GF(p)
//! \details This implementation follows Hugo Krawczyk's HMQV: A High-Performance
//! Secure Diffie-Hellman Protocol. Note: this implements HMQV only. HMQV-C with Key Confirmation is not provided.
//! \sa MQV, HMQV, FHMQV, and AuthenticatedKeyAgreementDomain
//! \since Crypto++ 5.6.4
template
class HMQV_Domain: public AuthenticatedKeyAgreementDomain
{
public:
typedef GROUP_PARAMETERS GroupParameters;
typedef typename GroupParameters::Element Element;
typedef HMQV_Domain Domain;
virtual ~HMQV_Domain() {}
HMQV_Domain(bool clientRole = true): m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer) {}
HMQV_Domain(const GroupParameters ¶ms, bool clientRole = true)
: m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer), m_groupParameters(params) {}
HMQV_Domain(BufferedTransformation &bt, bool clientRole = true)
: m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer)
{m_groupParameters.BERDecode(bt);}
template
HMQV_Domain(T1 v1, bool clientRole = true)
: m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer)
{m_groupParameters.Initialize(v1);}
template
HMQV_Domain(T1 v1, T2 v2, bool clientRole = true)
: m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer)
{m_groupParameters.Initialize(v1, v2);}
template
HMQV_Domain(T1 v1, T2 v2, T3 v3, bool clientRole = true)
: m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer)
{m_groupParameters.Initialize(v1, v2, v3);}
template
HMQV_Domain(T1 v1, T2 v2, T3 v3, T4 v4, bool clientRole = true)
: m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer)
{m_groupParameters.Initialize(v1, v2, v3, v4);}
public:
const GroupParameters & GetGroupParameters() const {return m_groupParameters;}
GroupParameters & AccessGroupParameters(){return m_groupParameters;}
CryptoParameters & AccessCryptoParameters(){return AccessAbstractGroupParameters();}
//! return length of agreed value produced
unsigned int AgreedValueLength() const {return GetAbstractGroupParameters().GetEncodedElementSize(false);}
//! return length of static private keys in this domain
unsigned int StaticPrivateKeyLength() const {return GetAbstractGroupParameters().GetSubgroupOrder().ByteCount();}
//! return length of static public keys in this domain
unsigned int StaticPublicKeyLength() const{return GetAbstractGroupParameters().GetEncodedElementSize(true);}
//! generate static private key
/*! \pre size of privateKey == PrivateStaticKeyLength() */
void GenerateStaticPrivateKey(RandomNumberGenerator &rng, byte *privateKey) const
{
Integer x(rng, Integer::One(), GetAbstractGroupParameters().GetMaxExponent());
x.Encode(privateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
}
//! generate static public key
/*! \pre size of publicKey == PublicStaticKeyLength() */
void GenerateStaticPublicKey(RandomNumberGenerator &rng, const byte *privateKey, byte *publicKey) const
{
CRYPTOPP_UNUSED(rng);
const DL_GroupParameters ¶ms = GetAbstractGroupParameters();
Integer x(privateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Element y = params.ExponentiateBase(x);
params.EncodeElement(true, y, publicKey);
}
unsigned int EphemeralPrivateKeyLength() const {return StaticPrivateKeyLength() + StaticPublicKeyLength();}
unsigned int EphemeralPublicKeyLength() const{return StaticPublicKeyLength();}
//! return length of ephemeral private keys in this domain
void GenerateEphemeralPrivateKey(RandomNumberGenerator &rng, byte *privateKey) const
{
const DL_GroupParameters ¶ms = GetAbstractGroupParameters();
Integer x(rng, Integer::One(), params.GetMaxExponent());
x.Encode(privateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Element y = params.ExponentiateBase(x);
params.EncodeElement(true, y, privateKey+StaticPrivateKeyLength());
}
//! return length of ephemeral public keys in this domain
void GenerateEphemeralPublicKey(RandomNumberGenerator &rng, const byte *privateKey, byte *publicKey) const
{
CRYPTOPP_UNUSED(rng);
memcpy(publicKey, privateKey+StaticPrivateKeyLength(), EphemeralPublicKeyLength());
}
//! derive agreed value from your private keys and couterparty's public keys, return false in case of failure
/*! \note The ephemeral public key will always be validated.
If you have previously validated the static public key, use validateStaticOtherPublicKey=false to save time.
\pre size of agreedValue == AgreedValueLength()
\pre length of staticPrivateKey == StaticPrivateKeyLength()
\pre length of ephemeralPrivateKey == EphemeralPrivateKeyLength()
\pre length of staticOtherPublicKey == StaticPublicKeyLength()
\pre length of ephemeralOtherPublicKey == EphemeralPublicKeyLength()
*/
bool Agree(byte *agreedValue,
const byte *staticPrivateKey, const byte *ephemeralPrivateKey,
const byte *staticOtherPublicKey, const byte *ephemeralOtherPublicKey,
bool validateStaticOtherPublicKey=true) const
{
byte *XX = NULL, *YY = NULL, *AA = NULL, *BB = NULL;
size_t xxs = 0, yys = 0, aas = 0, bbs = 0;
// Depending on the role, this will hold either A's or B's static
// (long term) public key. AA or BB will then point into tt.
SecByteBlock tt(StaticPublicKeyLength());
try
{
const DL_GroupParameters ¶ms = GetAbstractGroupParameters();
if(m_role == RoleServer)
{
Integer b(staticPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Element B = params.ExponentiateBase(b);
params.EncodeElement(true, B, tt);
XX = const_cast(ephemeralOtherPublicKey);
xxs = EphemeralPublicKeyLength();
YY = const_cast(ephemeralPrivateKey) + StaticPrivateKeyLength();
yys = EphemeralPublicKeyLength();
AA = const_cast(staticOtherPublicKey);
aas = StaticPublicKeyLength();
BB = tt.BytePtr();
bbs = tt.SizeInBytes();
}
else if(m_role == RoleClient)
{
Integer a(staticPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Element A = params.ExponentiateBase(a);
params.EncodeElement(true, A, tt);
XX = const_cast(ephemeralPrivateKey) + StaticPrivateKeyLength();
xxs = EphemeralPublicKeyLength();
YY = const_cast(ephemeralOtherPublicKey);
yys = EphemeralPublicKeyLength();
AA = tt.BytePtr();
aas = tt.SizeInBytes();
BB = const_cast(staticOtherPublicKey);
bbs = StaticPublicKeyLength();
}
else
{
CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(0);
return false;
}
// DecodeElement calls ValidateElement at level 1. Level 1 only calls
// VerifyPoint to ensure the element is in G*. If the other's PublicKey is
// requested to be validated, we manually call ValidateElement at level 3.
Element VV1 = params.DecodeElement(staticOtherPublicKey, false);
if(!params.ValidateElement(validateStaticOtherPublicKey ? 3 : 1, VV1, NULL))
return false;
// DecodeElement calls ValidateElement at level 1. Level 1 only calls
// VerifyPoint to ensure the element is in G*. Crank it up.
Element VV2 = params.DecodeElement(ephemeralOtherPublicKey, false);
if(!params.ValidateElement(3, VV2, NULL))
return false;
// const Integer& p = params.GetGroupOrder(); // not used, remove later
const Integer& q = params.GetSubgroupOrder();
const unsigned int len /*bytes*/ = (((q.BitCount()+1)/2 +7)/8);
Integer d, e;
SecByteBlock dd(len), ee(len);
// Compute $d = \hat{H}(X, \hat{B})$
Hash(NULL, XX, xxs, BB, bbs, dd.BytePtr(), dd.SizeInBytes());
d.Decode(dd.BytePtr(), dd.SizeInBytes());
// Compute $e = \hat{H}(Y, \hat{A})$
Hash(NULL, YY, yys, AA, aas, ee.BytePtr(), ee.SizeInBytes());
e.Decode(ee.BytePtr(), ee.SizeInBytes());
Element sigma;
if(m_role == RoleServer)
{
Integer y(ephemeralPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Integer b(staticPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Integer s_B = (y + e * b) % q;
Element A = params.DecodeElement(AA, false);
Element X = params.DecodeElement(XX, false);
Element t1 = params.ExponentiateElement(A, d);
Element t2 = m_groupParameters.MultiplyElements(X, t1);
// $\sigma_B}=(X \cdot A^{d})^{s_B}
sigma = params.ExponentiateElement(t2, s_B);
}
else
{
Integer x(ephemeralPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Integer a(staticPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
Integer s_A = (x + d * a) % q;
Element B = params.DecodeElement(BB, false);
Element Y = params.DecodeElement(YY, false);
Element t1 = params.ExponentiateElement(B, e);
Element t2 = m_groupParameters.MultiplyElements(Y, t1);
// $\sigma_A}=(Y \cdot B^{e})^{s_A}
sigma = params.ExponentiateElement(t2, s_A);
}
Hash(&sigma, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, agreedValue, AgreedValueLength());
}
catch (DL_BadElement &)
{
return false;
}
return true;
}
protected:
// Hash invocation by client and server differ only in what keys
// each provides.
inline void Hash(const Element* sigma,
const byte* e1, size_t e1len, // Ephemeral key and key length
const byte* s1, size_t s1len, // Static key and key length
byte* digest, size_t dlen) const
{
HASH hash;
size_t idx = 0, req = dlen;
size_t blk = STDMIN(dlen, (size_t)HASH::DIGESTSIZE);
if(sigma)
{
if (e1len != 0 || s1len != 0) {
CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(0);
}
Integer x = GetAbstractGroupParameters().ConvertElementToInteger(*sigma);
SecByteBlock sbb(x.MinEncodedSize());
x.Encode(sbb.BytePtr(), sbb.SizeInBytes());
hash.Update(sbb.BytePtr(), sbb.SizeInBytes());
} else {
if (e1len == 0 || s1len == 0) {
CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(0);
}
hash.Update(e1, e1len);
hash.Update(s1, s1len);
}
hash.TruncatedFinal(digest, blk);
req -= blk;
// All this to catch tail bytes for large curves and small hashes
while(req != 0)
{
hash.Update(&digest[idx], (size_t)HASH::DIGESTSIZE);
idx += (size_t)HASH::DIGESTSIZE;
blk = STDMIN(req, (size_t)HASH::DIGESTSIZE);
hash.TruncatedFinal(&digest[idx], blk);
req -= blk;
}
}
private:
// The paper uses Initiator and Recipient - make it classical.
enum KeyAgreementRole{ RoleServer = 1, RoleClient };
DL_GroupParameters & AccessAbstractGroupParameters() {return m_groupParameters;}
const DL_GroupParameters & GetAbstractGroupParameters() const{return m_groupParameters;}
GroupParameters m_groupParameters;
KeyAgreementRole m_role;
};
//! \brief Hashed Menezes-Qu-Vanstone in GF(p)
//! \details This implementation follows Hugo Krawczyk's HMQV: A High-Performance
//! Secure Diffie-Hellman Protocol. Note: this implements HMQV only. HMQV-C with Key Confirmation is not provided.
//! \sa HMQV, MQV_Domain, FHMQV_Domain, AuthenticatedKeyAgreementDomain
//! \since Crypto++ 5.6.4
typedef HMQV_Domain HMQV;
NAMESPACE_END
#endif