/* Copyright 2015 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved. * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be * found in the LICENSE file. * * Externally-callable APIs * (Kernel portion) */ #include "2api.h" #include "2misc.h" #include "2nvstorage.h" #include "2rsa.h" #include "2secdata.h" #include "2sha.h" #include "2sysincludes.h" #include "vb2_common.h" vb2_error_t vb2api_kernel_phase1(struct vb2_context *ctx) { struct vb2_shared_data *sd = vb2_get_sd(ctx); struct vb2_workbuf wb; uint8_t *key_data; uint32_t key_size; vb2_error_t rv; vb2_workbuf_from_ctx(ctx, &wb); /* Initialize secure kernel data and read version */ rv = vb2_secdata_kernel_init(ctx); if (rv && !(ctx->flags & VB2_CONTEXT_RECOVERY_MODE)) { vb2api_fail(ctx, VB2_RECOVERY_SECDATA_KERNEL_INIT, rv); return rv; } sd->kernel_version_secdata = vb2_secdata_kernel_get(ctx, VB2_SECDATA_KERNEL_VERSIONS); /* Find the key to use to verify the kernel keyblock */ if (ctx->flags & VB2_CONTEXT_RECOVERY_MODE) { /* Recovery key from GBB */ struct vb2_gbb_header *gbb; uint32_t key_offset; /* Read GBB header into next chunk of work buffer */ gbb = vb2_workbuf_alloc(&wb, sizeof(*gbb)); if (!gbb) return VB2_ERROR_GBB_WORKBUF; rv = vb2_read_gbb_header(ctx, gbb); if (rv) return rv; /* Only need the recovery key position and size */ key_offset = gbb->recovery_key_offset; key_size = gbb->recovery_key_size; /* Free the GBB header */ vb2_workbuf_free(&wb, sizeof(*gbb)); /* Load the recovery key itself */ key_data = vb2_workbuf_alloc(&wb, key_size); if (!key_data) return VB2_ERROR_API_KPHASE1_WORKBUF_REC_KEY; rv = vb2ex_read_resource(ctx, VB2_RES_GBB, key_offset, key_data, key_size); if (rv) return rv; sd->kernel_key_offset = vb2_offset_of(sd, key_data); } else { /* Kernel subkey from firmware preamble */ struct vb2_fw_preamble *pre; struct vb2_packed_key *pre_key, *packed_key; /* Make sure we have a firmware preamble loaded */ if (!sd->preamble_size) return VB2_ERROR_API_KPHASE1_PREAMBLE; pre = (struct vb2_fw_preamble *) vb2_member_of(sd, sd->preamble_offset); pre_key = &pre->kernel_subkey; /* * At this point, we no longer need the packed firmware * data key, firmware preamble, or hash data. So move the * kernel key from the preamble down after the shared data. */ sd->kernel_key_offset = vb2_wb_round_up(sizeof(*sd)); key_data = vb2_member_of(sd, sd->kernel_key_offset); packed_key = (struct vb2_packed_key *)key_data; memmove(packed_key, pre_key, sizeof(*packed_key)); packed_key->key_offset = sizeof(*packed_key); memmove(key_data + packed_key->key_offset, (uint8_t *)pre_key + pre_key->key_offset, pre_key->key_size); key_size = packed_key->key_offset + packed_key->key_size; } /* Firmware stage structs are no longer present */ sd->data_key_size = 0; sd->preamble_size = 0; sd->hash_size = 0; /* * Kernel key will persist in the workbuf after we return. * * Work buffer now contains: * - vb2_shared_data * - kernel key */ sd->kernel_key_size = key_size; vb2_set_workbuf_used(ctx, sd->kernel_key_offset + sd->kernel_key_size); return VB2_SUCCESS; } vb2_error_t vb2api_load_kernel_vblock(struct vb2_context *ctx) { vb2_error_t rv; /* Verify kernel keyblock */ rv = vb2_load_kernel_keyblock(ctx); if (rv) return rv; /* Verify kernel preamble */ rv = vb2_load_kernel_preamble(ctx); if (rv) return rv; return VB2_SUCCESS; } vb2_error_t vb2api_get_kernel_size(struct vb2_context *ctx, uint32_t *offset_ptr, uint32_t *size_ptr) { struct vb2_shared_data *sd = vb2_get_sd(ctx); const struct vb2_kernel_preamble *pre; /* Get preamble pointer */ if (!sd->preamble_size) return VB2_ERROR_API_GET_KERNEL_SIZE_PREAMBLE; pre = (const struct vb2_kernel_preamble *) vb2_member_of(sd, sd->preamble_offset); if (offset_ptr) { /* The kernel implicitly follows the preamble */ *offset_ptr = sd->vblock_preamble_offset + sd->preamble_size; } if (size_ptr) { /* Expect the kernel to be the size of data we signed */ *size_ptr = pre->body_signature.data_size; } return VB2_SUCCESS; } vb2_error_t vb2api_verify_kernel_data(struct vb2_context *ctx, const void *buf, uint32_t size) { struct vb2_shared_data *sd = vb2_get_sd(ctx); struct vb2_kernel_preamble *pre; struct vb2_digest_context *dc; struct vb2_public_key key; struct vb2_workbuf wb; uint8_t *digest; uint32_t digest_size; vb2_error_t rv; vb2_workbuf_from_ctx(ctx, &wb); /* Get preamble pointer */ if (!sd->preamble_size) return VB2_ERROR_API_VERIFY_KDATA_PREAMBLE; pre = (struct vb2_kernel_preamble *) vb2_member_of(sd, sd->preamble_offset); /* Make sure we were passed the right amount of data */ if (size != pre->body_signature.data_size) return VB2_ERROR_API_VERIFY_KDATA_SIZE; /* Allocate workbuf space for the hash */ dc = vb2_workbuf_alloc(&wb, sizeof(*dc)); if (!dc) return VB2_ERROR_API_VERIFY_KDATA_WORKBUF; /* * Unpack the kernel data key to see which hashing algorithm we * should use. * * TODO: really, the kernel body should be hashed, and not signed, * because the signature we're checking is already signed as part of * the kernel preamble. But until we can change the signing scripts, * we're stuck with a signature here instead of a hash. */ if (!sd->data_key_size) return VB2_ERROR_API_VERIFY_KDATA_KEY; rv = vb2_unpack_key_buffer(&key, vb2_member_of(sd, sd->data_key_offset), sd->data_key_size); if (rv) return rv; rv = vb2_digest_init(dc, key.hash_alg); if (rv) return rv; rv = vb2_digest_extend(dc, buf, size); if (rv) return rv; digest_size = vb2_digest_size(key.hash_alg); digest = vb2_workbuf_alloc(&wb, digest_size); if (!digest) return VB2_ERROR_API_CHECK_HASH_WORKBUF_DIGEST; rv = vb2_digest_finalize(dc, digest, digest_size); if (rv) return rv; /* * The body signature is currently a *signature* of the body data, not * just its hash. So we need to verify the signature. */ /* * Check digest vs. signature. Note that this destroys the signature. * That's ok, because we only check each signature once per boot. */ return vb2_verify_digest(&key, &pre->body_signature, digest, &wb); } vb2_error_t vb2api_kernel_phase3(struct vb2_context *ctx) { struct vb2_shared_data *sd = vb2_get_sd(ctx); /* * If the kernel is a newer version than in secure storage, and the * kernel signature is valid, and we're not in recovery mode, and we're * allowed to, roll forward the version in secure storage. */ if (sd->kernel_version > sd->kernel_version_secdata && (sd->flags & VB2_SD_FLAG_KERNEL_SIGNED) && !(ctx->flags & VB2_CONTEXT_RECOVERY_MODE) && (ctx->flags & VB2_CONTEXT_ALLOW_KERNEL_ROLL_FORWARD)) { vb2_secdata_kernel_set(ctx, VB2_SECDATA_KERNEL_VERSIONS, sd->kernel_version); sd->kernel_version_secdata = sd->kernel_version; } return VB2_SUCCESS; }