/* Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved. * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be * found in the LICENSE file. * * Functions for querying, manipulating and locking rollback indices * stored in the TPM NVRAM. */ #include "crc8.h" #include "rollback_index.h" #include "tlcl.h" #include "tss_constants.h" #include "utility.h" #include "vboot_api.h" #ifndef offsetof #define offsetof(A,B) __builtin_offsetof(A,B) #endif #ifdef FOR_TEST /* Compiling for unit test, so we need the real implementations of * rollback functions. The unit test mocks the underlying tlcl * functions, so this is ok to run on the host. */ #undef CHROMEOS_ENVIRONMENT #undef DISABLE_ROLLBACK_TPM #endif static int g_rollback_recovery_mode = 0; /* disable MSVC warning on const logical expression (as in } while(0);) */ __pragma(warning (disable: 4127)) #define RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tpm_command) do { \ uint32_t result; \ if ((result = (tpm_command)) != TPM_SUCCESS) { \ VBDEBUG(("Rollback: %08x returned by " #tpm_command "\n", (int)result)); \ return result; \ } \ } while (0) uint32_t TPMClearAndReenable(void) { VBDEBUG(("TPM: Clear and re-enable\n")); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclForceClear()); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclSetEnable()); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclSetDeactivated(0)); return TPM_SUCCESS; } uint32_t SafeWrite(uint32_t index, const void* data, uint32_t length) { uint32_t result = TlclWrite(index, data, length); if (result == TPM_E_MAXNVWRITES) { RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TPMClearAndReenable()); return TlclWrite(index, data, length); } else { return result; } } uint32_t SafeDefineSpace(uint32_t index, uint32_t perm, uint32_t size) { uint32_t result = TlclDefineSpace(index, perm, size); if (result == TPM_E_MAXNVWRITES) { RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TPMClearAndReenable()); return TlclDefineSpace(index, perm, size); } else { return result; } } /* Functions to read and write firmware and kernel spaces. */ uint32_t ReadSpaceFirmware(RollbackSpaceFirmware* rsf) { uint32_t r; int attempts = 3; while (attempts--) { r = TlclRead(FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX, rsf, sizeof(RollbackSpaceFirmware)); if (r != TPM_SUCCESS) return r; /* No CRC in this version, so we'll create one when we write it. Note that * we're marking this as version 2, not ROLLBACK_SPACE_FIRMWARE_VERSION, * because version 2 just added the CRC. Later versions will need to * set default values for any extra fields explicitly (probably here). */ if (rsf->struct_version < 2) { rsf->struct_version = 2; /* Danger Will Robinson! Danger! */ return TPM_SUCCESS; } /* If the CRC is good, we're done. If it's bad, try a couple more times to * see if it gets better before we give up. It could just be noise. */ if (rsf->crc8 == Crc8(rsf, offsetof(RollbackSpaceFirmware, crc8))) return TPM_SUCCESS; VBDEBUG(("TPM: %s() - bad CRC\n", __func__)); } VBDEBUG(("TPM: %s() - too many bad CRCs, giving up\n", __func__)); return TPM_E_CORRUPTED_STATE; } uint32_t WriteSpaceFirmware(RollbackSpaceFirmware* rsf) { RollbackSpaceFirmware rsf2; uint32_t r; int attempts = 3; /* All writes should use struct_version 2 or greater. */ if (rsf->struct_version < 2) rsf->struct_version = 2; rsf->crc8 = Crc8(rsf, offsetof(RollbackSpaceFirmware, crc8)); while (attempts--) { r = SafeWrite(FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX, rsf, sizeof(RollbackSpaceFirmware)); /* Can't write, not gonna try again */ if (r != TPM_SUCCESS) return r; /* Read it back to be sure it got the right values. */ r = ReadSpaceFirmware(&rsf2); /* This checks the CRC */ if (r == TPM_SUCCESS) return r; VBDEBUG(("TPM: %s() - bad CRC\n", __func__)); /* Try writing it again. Maybe it was garbled on the way out. */ } VBDEBUG(("TPM: %s() - too many bad CRCs, giving up\n", __func__)); return TPM_E_CORRUPTED_STATE; } uint32_t SetVirtualDevMode(int val) { RollbackSpaceFirmware rsf; VBDEBUG(("TPM: Entering %s()\n", __func__)); if (TPM_SUCCESS != ReadSpaceFirmware(&rsf)) return VBERROR_TPM_FIRMWARE_SETUP; VBDEBUG(("TPM: flags were 0x%02x\n", rsf.flags)); if (val) rsf.flags |= FLAG_VIRTUAL_DEV_MODE_ON; else rsf.flags &= ~FLAG_VIRTUAL_DEV_MODE_ON; /* NOTE: This doesn't update the FLAG_LAST_BOOT_DEVELOPER bit */ VBDEBUG(("TPM: flags are now 0x%02x\n", rsf.flags)); if (TPM_SUCCESS != WriteSpaceFirmware(&rsf)) return VBERROR_TPM_SET_BOOT_MODE_STATE; VBDEBUG(("TPM: Leaving %s()\n", __func__)); return VBERROR_SUCCESS; } uint32_t ReadSpaceKernel(RollbackSpaceKernel* rsk) { uint32_t r; int attempts = 3; while (attempts--) { r = TlclRead(KERNEL_NV_INDEX, rsk, sizeof(RollbackSpaceKernel)); if (r != TPM_SUCCESS) return r; /* No CRC in this version, so we'll create one when we write it. Note that * we're marking this as version 2, not ROLLBACK_SPACE_KERNEL_VERSION, * because version 2 just added the CRC. Later versions will need to * set default values for any extra fields explicitly (probably here). */ if (rsk->struct_version < 2) { rsk->struct_version = 2; /* Danger Will Robinson! Danger! */ return TPM_SUCCESS; } /* If the CRC is good, we're done. If it's bad, try a couple more times to * see if it gets better before we give up. It could just be noise. */ if (rsk->crc8 == Crc8(rsk, offsetof(RollbackSpaceKernel, crc8))) return TPM_SUCCESS; VBDEBUG(("TPM: %s() - bad CRC\n", __func__)); } VBDEBUG(("TPM: %s() - too many bad CRCs, giving up\n", __func__)); return TPM_E_CORRUPTED_STATE; } uint32_t WriteSpaceKernel(RollbackSpaceKernel* rsk) { RollbackSpaceKernel rsk2; uint32_t r; int attempts = 3; /* All writes should use struct_version 2 or greater. */ if (rsk->struct_version < 2) rsk->struct_version = 2; rsk->crc8 = Crc8(rsk, offsetof(RollbackSpaceKernel, crc8)); while (attempts--) { r = SafeWrite(KERNEL_NV_INDEX, rsk, sizeof(RollbackSpaceKernel)); /* Can't write, not gonna try again */ if (r != TPM_SUCCESS) return r; /* Read it back to be sure it got the right values. */ r = ReadSpaceKernel(&rsk2); /* This checks the CRC */ if (r == TPM_SUCCESS) return r; VBDEBUG(("TPM: %s() - bad CRC\n", __func__)); /* Try writing it again. Maybe it was garbled on the way out. */ } VBDEBUG(("TPM: %s() - too many bad CRCs, giving up\n", __func__)); return TPM_E_CORRUPTED_STATE; } uint32_t OneTimeInitializeTPM(RollbackSpaceFirmware* rsf, RollbackSpaceKernel* rsk) { static const RollbackSpaceFirmware rsf_init = { .struct_version = ROLLBACK_SPACE_FIRMWARE_VERSION, }; static const RollbackSpaceKernel rsk_init = { .struct_version = ROLLBACK_SPACE_KERNEL_VERSION, .uid = ROLLBACK_SPACE_KERNEL_UID, }; TPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS pflags; uint32_t result; VBDEBUG(("TPM: One-time initialization\n")); /* Do a full test. This only happens the first time the device is turned on * in the factory, so performance is not an issue. This is almost certainly * not necessary, but it gives us more confidence about some code paths below * that are difficult to test---specifically the ones that set lifetime * flags, and are only executed once per physical TPM. */ result = TlclSelfTestFull(); if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) return result; result = TlclGetPermanentFlags(&pflags); if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) return result; /* TPM may come from the factory without physical presence finalized. Fix * if necessary. */ VBDEBUG(("TPM: physicalPresenceLifetimeLock=%d\n", pflags.physicalPresenceLifetimeLock)); if (!pflags.physicalPresenceLifetimeLock) { VBDEBUG(("TPM: Finalizing physical presence\n")); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclFinalizePhysicalPresence()); } /* The TPM will not enforce the NV authorization restrictions until the * execution of a TPM_NV_DefineSpace with the handle of TPM_NV_INDEX_LOCK. * Here we create that space if it doesn't already exist. */ VBDEBUG(("TPM: nvLocked=%d\n", pflags.nvLocked)); if (!pflags.nvLocked) { VBDEBUG(("TPM: Enabling NV locking\n")); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclSetNvLocked()); } /* Clear TPM owner, in case the TPM is already owned for some reason. */ VBDEBUG(("TPM: Clearing owner\n")); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TPMClearAndReenable()); /* Initializes the firmware and kernel spaces */ Memcpy(rsf, &rsf_init, sizeof(RollbackSpaceFirmware)); Memcpy(rsk, &rsk_init, sizeof(RollbackSpaceKernel)); /* Defines and sets firmware and kernel spaces */ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(SafeDefineSpace(KERNEL_NV_INDEX, TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE, sizeof(RollbackSpaceKernel))); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(WriteSpaceKernel(rsk)); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(SafeDefineSpace(FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX, TPM_NV_PER_GLOBALLOCK | TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE, sizeof(RollbackSpaceFirmware))); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(WriteSpaceFirmware(rsf)); return TPM_SUCCESS; } /* SetupTPM starts the TPM and establishes the root of trust for the * anti-rollback mechanism. SetupTPM can fail for three reasons. 1 A bug. 2 a * TPM hardware failure. 3 An unexpected TPM state due to some attack. In * general we cannot easily distinguish the kind of failure, so our strategy is * to reboot in recovery mode in all cases. The recovery mode calls SetupTPM * again, which executes (almost) the same sequence of operations. There is a * good chance that, if recovery mode was entered because of a TPM failure, the * failure will repeat itself. (In general this is impossible to guarantee * because we have no way of creating the exact TPM initial state at the * previous boot.) In recovery mode, we ignore the failure and continue, thus * giving the recovery kernel a chance to fix things (that's why we don't set * bGlobalLock). The choice is between a knowingly insecure device and a * bricked device. * * As a side note, observe that we go through considerable hoops to avoid using * the STCLEAR permissions for the index spaces. We do this to avoid writing * to the TPM flashram at every reboot or wake-up, because of concerns about * the durability of the NVRAM. */ uint32_t SetupTPM(int recovery_mode, int developer_mode, int disable_dev_request, int clear_tpm_owner_request, RollbackSpaceFirmware* rsf) { uint8_t in_flags; uint8_t disable; uint8_t deactivated; uint32_t result; VBDEBUG(("TPM: SetupTPM(r%d, d%d)\n", recovery_mode, developer_mode)); if (recovery_mode) g_rollback_recovery_mode = 1; /* Global variables are usable in * recovery mode */ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclLibInit()); #ifdef TEGRA_SOFT_REBOOT_WORKAROUND result = TlclStartup(); if (result == TPM_E_INVALID_POSTINIT) { /* Some prototype hardware doesn't reset the TPM on a CPU reset. We do a * hard reset to get around this. */ VBDEBUG(("TPM: soft reset detected\n", result)); return TPM_E_MUST_REBOOT; } else if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) { VBDEBUG(("TPM: TlclStartup returned %08x\n", result)); return result; } #else RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclStartup()); #endif /* Some TPMs start the self test automatically at power on. In that case we * don't need to call ContinueSelfTest. On some (other) TPMs, * ContinueSelfTest may block. In that case, we definitely don't want to * call it here. For TPMs in the intersection of these two sets, we're * screwed. (In other words: TPMs that require manually starting the * self-test AND block will have poor performance until we split * TlclSendReceive() into Send() and Receive(), and have a state machine to * control setup.) * * This comment is likely to become obsolete in the near future, so don't * trust it. It may have not been updated. */ #ifdef TPM_MANUAL_SELFTEST #ifdef TPM_BLOCKING_CONTINUESELFTEST #warning "lousy TPM!" #endif RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclContinueSelfTest()); #endif result = TlclAssertPhysicalPresence(); if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) { /* It is possible that the TPM was delivered with the physical presence * command disabled. This tries enabling it, then tries asserting PP * again. */ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclPhysicalPresenceCMDEnable()); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclAssertPhysicalPresence()); } /* Checks that the TPM is enabled and activated. */ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclGetFlags(&disable, &deactivated, NULL)); if (disable || deactivated) { VBDEBUG(("TPM: disabled (%d) or deactivated (%d). Fixing...\n", disable, deactivated)); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclSetEnable()); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclSetDeactivated(0)); VBDEBUG(("TPM: Must reboot to re-enable\n")); return TPM_E_MUST_REBOOT; } /* Reads the firmware space. */ result = ReadSpaceFirmware(rsf); if (TPM_E_BADINDEX == result) { RollbackSpaceKernel rsk; /* This is the first time we've run, and the TPM has not been * initialized. This initializes it. */ VBDEBUG(("TPM: Not initialized yet.\n")); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(OneTimeInitializeTPM(rsf, &rsk)); } else if (TPM_SUCCESS != result) { VBDEBUG(("TPM: Firmware space in a bad state; giving up.\n")); return TPM_E_CORRUPTED_STATE; } VBDEBUG(("TPM: Firmware space sv%d f%x v%x\n", rsf->struct_version, rsf->flags, rsf->fw_versions)); in_flags = rsf->flags; /* If we've been asked to clear the virtual dev-mode flag, do so now */ if (disable_dev_request) { rsf->flags &= ~FLAG_VIRTUAL_DEV_MODE_ON; VBDEBUG(("TPM: Clearing virt dev-switch: f%x\n", rsf->flags)); } /* The developer_mode value that's passed in is only set by a hardware * dev-switch. We should OR it with the virtual switch, whether or not the * virtual switch is used. If it's not used, it shouldn't change, so it * doesn't matter. */ if (rsf->flags & FLAG_VIRTUAL_DEV_MODE_ON) developer_mode = 1; /* Clears ownership if developer flag has toggled, or if an owner-clear has * been requested. */ if ((developer_mode ? FLAG_LAST_BOOT_DEVELOPER : 0) != (in_flags & FLAG_LAST_BOOT_DEVELOPER)) { VBDEBUG(("TPM: Developer flag changed; clearing owner.\n")); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TPMClearAndReenable()); } else if (clear_tpm_owner_request) { VBDEBUG(("TPM: Clearing owner as specifically requested.\n")); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TPMClearAndReenable()); } if (developer_mode) rsf->flags |= FLAG_LAST_BOOT_DEVELOPER; else rsf->flags &= ~FLAG_LAST_BOOT_DEVELOPER; /* If firmware space is dirty, this flushes it back to the TPM */ if (rsf->flags != in_flags) { VBDEBUG(("TPM: Updating firmware space.\n")); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(WriteSpaceFirmware(rsf)); } VBDEBUG(("TPM: SetupTPM() succeeded\n")); return TPM_SUCCESS; } /* disable MSVC warnings on unused arguments */ __pragma(warning (disable: 4100)) #ifdef DISABLE_ROLLBACK_TPM /* Dummy implementations which don't support TPM rollback protection */ uint32_t RollbackS3Resume(void) { #ifndef CHROMEOS_ENVIRONMENT /* Initialize the TPM, but ignore return codes. In ChromeOS * environment, don't even talk to the TPM. */ TlclLibInit(); TlclResume(); #endif return TPM_SUCCESS; } uint32_t RollbackFirmwareSetup(int recovery_mode, int is_hw_dev, int disable_dev_request, int clear_tpm_owner_request, int *is_virt_dev, uint32_t *version) { #ifndef CHROMEOS_ENVIRONMENT /* Initialize the TPM, but ignores return codes. In ChromeOS * environment, don't even talk to the TPM. */ TlclLibInit(); TlclStartup(); TlclContinueSelfTest(); #endif *version = 0; return TPM_SUCCESS; } uint32_t RollbackFirmwareRead(uint32_t* version) { *version = 0; return TPM_SUCCESS; } uint32_t RollbackFirmwareWrite(uint32_t version) { return TPM_SUCCESS; } uint32_t RollbackFirmwareLock(void) { return TPM_SUCCESS; } uint32_t RollbackKernelRead(uint32_t* version) { *version = 0; return TPM_SUCCESS; } uint32_t RollbackKernelWrite(uint32_t version) { return TPM_SUCCESS; } uint32_t RollbackKernelLock(void) { return TPM_SUCCESS; } #else uint32_t RollbackS3Resume(void) { uint32_t result; RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclLibInit()); result = TlclResume(); if (result == TPM_E_INVALID_POSTINIT) { /* We're on a platform where the TPM maintains power in S3, so it's already initialized. */ return TPM_SUCCESS; } return result; } uint32_t RollbackFirmwareSetup(int recovery_mode, int is_hw_dev, int disable_dev_request, int clear_tpm_owner_request, int *is_virt_dev, uint32_t *version) { RollbackSpaceFirmware rsf; /* Set version to 0 in case we fail */ *version = 0; RETURN_ON_FAILURE(SetupTPM(recovery_mode, is_hw_dev, disable_dev_request, clear_tpm_owner_request, &rsf)); *version = rsf.fw_versions; *is_virt_dev = (rsf.flags & FLAG_VIRTUAL_DEV_MODE_ON) ? 1 : 0; VBDEBUG(("TPM: RollbackFirmwareSetup %x\n", (int)rsf.fw_versions)); return TPM_SUCCESS; } uint32_t RollbackFirmwareWrite(uint32_t version) { RollbackSpaceFirmware rsf; RETURN_ON_FAILURE(ReadSpaceFirmware(&rsf)); VBDEBUG(("TPM: RollbackFirmwareWrite %x --> %x\n", (int)rsf.fw_versions, (int)version)); rsf.fw_versions = version; return WriteSpaceFirmware(&rsf); } uint32_t RollbackFirmwareLock(void) { return TlclSetGlobalLock(); } uint32_t RollbackKernelRead(uint32_t* version) { RollbackSpaceKernel rsk; uint32_t perms; /* Read the kernel space and verify its permissions. If the kernel * space has the wrong permission, or it doesn't contain the right * identifier, we give up. This will need to be fixed by the * recovery kernel. We have to worry about this because at any time * (even with PP turned off) the TPM owner can remove and redefine a * PP-protected space (but not write to it). */ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(ReadSpaceKernel(&rsk)); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclGetPermissions(KERNEL_NV_INDEX, &perms)); if (TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE != perms || ROLLBACK_SPACE_KERNEL_UID != rsk.uid) return TPM_E_CORRUPTED_STATE; *version = rsk.kernel_versions; VBDEBUG(("TPM: RollbackKernelRead %x\n", (int)rsk.kernel_versions)); return TPM_SUCCESS; } uint32_t RollbackKernelWrite(uint32_t version) { RollbackSpaceKernel rsk; RETURN_ON_FAILURE(ReadSpaceKernel(&rsk)); VBDEBUG(("TPM: RollbackKernelWrite %x --> %x\n", (int)rsk.kernel_versions, (int)version)); rsk.kernel_versions = version; return WriteSpaceKernel(&rsk); } uint32_t RollbackKernelLock(void) { if (g_rollback_recovery_mode) { return TPM_SUCCESS; } else { return TlclLockPhysicalPresence(); } } #endif // DISABLE_ROLLBACK_TPM