/* Copyright (c) 2014 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved. * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be * found in the LICENSE file. * * Misc functions which need access to vb2_context but are not public APIs */ #include "2api.h" #include "2common.h" #include "2misc.h" #include "2nvstorage.h" #include "2rsa.h" #include "2secdata.h" #include "2sha.h" #include "2sysincludes.h" vb2_error_t vb2_load_fw_keyblock(struct vb2_context *ctx) { struct vb2_shared_data *sd = vb2_get_sd(ctx); struct vb2_gbb_header *gbb = vb2_get_gbb(ctx); struct vb2_workbuf wb; uint8_t *key_data; uint32_t key_size; struct vb2_public_key root_key; struct vb2_keyblock *kb; uint32_t block_size; vb2_error_t rv = VB2_SUCCESS; vb2_workbuf_from_ctx(ctx, &wb); /* Read the root key */ key_size = gbb->rootkey_size; key_data = vb2_workbuf_alloc(&wb, key_size); if (!key_data) return VB2_ERROR_FW_KEYBLOCK_WORKBUF_ROOT_KEY; VB2_TRY(vb2ex_read_resource(ctx, VB2_RES_GBB, gbb->rootkey_offset, key_data, key_size)); /* Unpack the root key */ VB2_TRY(vb2_unpack_key_buffer(&root_key, key_data, key_size)); root_key.allow_hwcrypto = vb2api_hwcrypto_allowed(ctx); /* Load the firmware keyblock header after the root key */ kb = vb2_workbuf_alloc(&wb, sizeof(*kb)); if (!kb) return VB2_ERROR_FW_KEYBLOCK_WORKBUF_HEADER; VB2_TRY(vb2ex_read_resource(ctx, VB2_RES_FW_VBLOCK, 0, kb, sizeof(*kb))); block_size = kb->keyblock_size; /* * Load the entire keyblock, now that we know how big it is. Note that * we're loading the entire keyblock instead of just the piece after * the header. That means we re-read the header. But that's a tiny * amount of data, and it makes the code much more straightforward. */ kb = vb2_workbuf_realloc(&wb, sizeof(*kb), block_size); if (!kb) return VB2_ERROR_FW_KEYBLOCK_WORKBUF; VB2_TRY(vb2ex_read_resource(ctx, VB2_RES_FW_VBLOCK, 0, kb, block_size)); /* Verify the keyblock */ VB2_TRY(vb2_verify_keyblock(kb, block_size, &root_key, &wb), ctx, VB2_RECOVERY_FW_KEYBLOCK); /* Key version is the upper 16 bits of the composite firmware version */ if (kb->data_key.key_version > VB2_MAX_KEY_VERSION) rv = VB2_ERROR_FW_KEYBLOCK_VERSION_RANGE; if (!rv && kb->data_key.key_version < (sd->fw_version_secdata >> 16)) { if (gbb->flags & VB2_GBB_FLAG_DISABLE_FW_ROLLBACK_CHECK) VB2_DEBUG("Ignoring FW key rollback due to GBB flag\n"); else rv = VB2_ERROR_FW_KEYBLOCK_VERSION_ROLLBACK; } if (rv) { vb2api_fail(ctx, VB2_RECOVERY_FW_KEY_ROLLBACK, rv); return rv; } sd->fw_version = kb->data_key.key_version << 16; /* Preamble follows the keyblock in the vblock. */ sd->vblock_preamble_offset = kb->keyblock_size; /* * Save the data key in the work buffer. We'll overwrite the root key * we read above. That's ok, because now that we have the data key we * no longer need the root key. First, let's double-check that it is * well-formed though (although the keyblock was signed anyway). */ VB2_TRY(vb2_verify_packed_key_inside(kb, block_size, &kb->data_key)); /* Save the future offset and size while kb->data_key is still valid. The check above made sure that key_offset and key_size are valid. */ sd->data_key_offset = vb2_offset_of(sd, key_data); sd->data_key_size = kb->data_key.key_offset + kb->data_key.key_size; /* * Use memmove() instead of memcpy(). In theory, the destination will * never overlap because with the source because the root key is likely * to be at least as large as the data key, but there's no harm here in * being paranoid. Make sure we immediately invalidate 'kb' after the * move to guarantee we won't try to access it anymore. */ memmove(key_data, &kb->data_key, sd->data_key_size); kb = NULL; /* * Data key will persist in the workbuf after we return. * * Work buffer now contains: * - vb2_shared_data * - packed firmware data key */ vb2_set_workbuf_used(ctx, sd->data_key_offset + sd->data_key_size); return VB2_SUCCESS; } vb2_error_t vb2_load_fw_preamble(struct vb2_context *ctx) { struct vb2_shared_data *sd = vb2_get_sd(ctx); struct vb2_gbb_header *gbb = vb2_get_gbb(ctx); struct vb2_workbuf wb; uint8_t *key_data = vb2_member_of(sd, sd->data_key_offset); uint32_t key_size = sd->data_key_size; struct vb2_public_key data_key; /* Preamble goes in the next unused chunk of work buffer */ struct vb2_fw_preamble *pre; uint32_t pre_size; vb2_error_t rv = VB2_SUCCESS; vb2_workbuf_from_ctx(ctx, &wb); /* Unpack the firmware data key */ if (!sd->data_key_size) return VB2_ERROR_FW_PREAMBLE2_DATA_KEY; VB2_TRY(vb2_unpack_key_buffer(&data_key, key_data, key_size)); data_key.allow_hwcrypto = vb2api_hwcrypto_allowed(ctx); /* Load the firmware preamble header */ pre = vb2_workbuf_alloc(&wb, sizeof(*pre)); if (!pre) return VB2_ERROR_FW_PREAMBLE2_WORKBUF_HEADER; VB2_TRY(vb2ex_read_resource(ctx, VB2_RES_FW_VBLOCK, sd->vblock_preamble_offset, pre, sizeof(*pre))); pre_size = pre->preamble_size; /* Load the entire firmware preamble, now that we know how big it is */ pre = vb2_workbuf_realloc(&wb, sizeof(*pre), pre_size); if (!pre) return VB2_ERROR_FW_PREAMBLE2_WORKBUF; VB2_TRY(vb2ex_read_resource(ctx, VB2_RES_FW_VBLOCK, sd->vblock_preamble_offset, pre, pre_size)); /* Work buffer now contains the data subkey data and the preamble */ /* Verify the preamble */ VB2_TRY(vb2_verify_fw_preamble(pre, pre_size, &data_key, &wb), ctx, VB2_RECOVERY_FW_PREAMBLE); /* * Firmware version is the lower 16 bits of the composite firmware * version. */ if (pre->firmware_version > VB2_MAX_PREAMBLE_VERSION) rv = VB2_ERROR_FW_PREAMBLE_VERSION_RANGE; /* Combine with the key version from vb2_load_fw_keyblock() */ sd->fw_version |= pre->firmware_version; if (!rv && sd->fw_version < sd->fw_version_secdata) { if (gbb->flags & VB2_GBB_FLAG_DISABLE_FW_ROLLBACK_CHECK) VB2_DEBUG("Ignoring FW rollback due to GBB flag\n"); else rv = VB2_ERROR_FW_PREAMBLE_VERSION_ROLLBACK; } if (rv) { vb2api_fail(ctx, VB2_RECOVERY_FW_ROLLBACK, rv); return rv; } /* * If this is a newer version than in secure storage, and we * successfully booted the same slot last boot, roll forward the * version in secure storage. * * Note that this happens before we've verified the firmware data this * boot; we're relying on the indicator that the last boot was * successful. That's ok, because even if the firmware data has a * valid hash, the only way we can know if it's functional is to trust * the status from the last boot. */ if (sd->fw_version > sd->fw_version_secdata && sd->last_fw_slot == sd->fw_slot && sd->last_fw_result == VB2_FW_RESULT_SUCCESS) { sd->fw_version_secdata = sd->fw_version; vb2_secdata_firmware_set(ctx, VB2_SECDATA_FIRMWARE_VERSIONS, sd->fw_version); } /* Keep track of where we put the preamble */ sd->preamble_offset = vb2_offset_of(sd, pre); sd->preamble_size = pre_size; /* * Preamble will persist in work buffer after we return. * * Work buffer now contains: * - vb2_shared_data * - vb2_gbb_header * - packed firmware data key * - firmware preamble * * TODO: we could move the preamble down over the firmware data key * since we don't need it anymore. */ vb2_set_workbuf_used(ctx, sd->preamble_offset + pre_size); return VB2_SUCCESS; }